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Abstract of the thesis : 
THE GOVERNANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW 
An investigation into the relationship between the 
political theories, the legal system, and the so­
cial background in the coranetitive society. 
The thesis endeavours to show the interdependence of political 
theories, the social sub-structure, and the formal structure of 
the legal system in competitive society. 
The first Dart developes the fundamental notions of legal 
sociologv, namelv, the conception of law, the task of a sociologv 
of law, the distinction between Dublic and private law, and the 
relation between sovereignty and the rule of law. The rule of 
law.is determined as the rule of the State through general norms 
which have the character of formal rational!tv, calculabilitv, 
and predictability. As the rule of law is confronted with the 
liberties of the individuals and with institutions formed by men, 
the concention of liberty and that of the institution, and their 
mutual relationship, are defined. 
The second part is devoted to the elucidation of the process 
which I have called the disenchantment of the law, that is to say, 
the divo-e* of natural from positive law. The relationship bet­
ween sovereignty and natural law is examined in the theories of 
Thomas Aquinas and of the Nominalists, in the conciliar theory, 
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in English legal history, in the struggle of the Monarchomarchs, -
and in the systems of Bodin, Althusius, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The assump­
tions on which this part of the thesis rest are that we can speak 
of a rule of natural law only if that natural law is concretised 
and institutionalised; and that its function is that of legiti­
mising and justifying attack? on political positions; and that 
natural law is consequentlyAiandoned when the group which makes 
use of it has achieved its aim. The conclusion reached in the 
second part is that natural law finally disappears at the begin­
ning of the 19th century, and is superseded by positive lavr which has 
the formal character of general rules. 
The third and last part endeavours to verify the conclusions 
reached in the first two parts by applying them +o the conmeti-
tive society of the 19th century. With this ob.iect, the social 
sub-structure which is described by classical economy, and the 
political sub-structure of the distribution of powers between 
various groups in society, are presented. The integrating 
factor of the rational society of the 19th century is to be 
found in the concept of the nation, whose social and political 
functions are therefore examined. The notion of the generality 
of the law, and its realisation in French, German, and English 
constitutional theorv, is examined. As the application of these 
general rules is of decisive significance, the attitude of judges 
towards the law, and their position in the State, is analysed. 
The analysis given with the help of the pure science of lav;, the 
orthodox theory of Montesquieu and its application in England, 
Prance, and Germany, and by the theory of the American realists 
and that of the continental School of Free DisctfcHon, are pre­
sented. I endeavour to discover the sociological and political 
significance of the answers given by the various theories. I 
therefore examine whether English Common Law and Equity conform 
to the conceDt of the rationality of the law, and come to an af­
firmative conclusion. The function of the law and of the judge 
in the liberal legal system is seen to be threefold: the lav/ 
has the function of veiling the rule of one stratum of society; 
it has the function of rendering the exchange processes calculable 
and it has the ethical function of realising equality. 
By wav of contrast, I also examine very briefly the legal 
system in the periods of monopoly capitalism and of National 
Socialism, which I find characterised by the disappearance of 
rational law, and especially of its ethical function. 
All study Is rationed or nothing worth. 
Thomas Hobbes 
(A Dialogue between a 
Philosopher and a Student 
of the Common Laws of 
England). 
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P R E F A C E  
This book la neither a study In legal or political theory, 
nor Is its Intention historical. It is rather a sociological 
treatise, intended to be a contribution to a theory of modern 
society, with a view to its control. The conclusion of the 
book — that law as such, and as realised historically in the 
English doctrine of the rule of law and the German Reohtsstaat, 
guarantees only a minimum of freedom; and that the attainment 
of liberty is rather the outcome of political struggle for it 
— does not appear to amount to muoh. But law does contain a 
"negative" guarantee, which, as Hegel put it in his Philosophy 
of Right, must not be made absolute, but must not be thrown 
away. 
Having oompleted this book, I see at once its deficien­
cies, which are due to the fact that it has been written under 
adverse conditions. There is too loose a connection between 
Parts Two and Three, and this is due to the Impracticability 
of applying to the second Part the method used in Part Three, 
as this would have necessitated the enlargement of the second 
Part to such an extent that the book would never have been 
finished. The inadequacy of the two last parts has, however, 
also a significant aooiologioal reason. With the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, political philosophy practically 
oams to an end. Hegel really said the final word. From 
then on, political theory either lived on the old heritage, 
or turned completely from philosophy towards sociology. 
I have reoeived invaluable suggestions from Professor 
Morris Ginsberg, Professor Karl Mannheim and the Right Hon. 
Dr. H.B. Lees-Smith {of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science); and from my friend Dr. N. Leites (Cornell 
University) who read and corrected the first two Parts of the 
book. I am above all indebted to Professor Harold J. Laski, 
whose influence must not only be sought in the notes in which 
his work is mentioned, but rather in the whole structure of 
the book. 
The book could not have been written without the finan­
cial help of the Central British Fund for German Jewry, and 
the Israel Zangwill Memorial Fund; and I wish to express my 
gratitude to these two Committees, and to their respective 
secretaries, Mr* A.J. Maokower, M.A., and Mr. J. Isaacs. 
Miss Jean McDonald and Miss Christian Maxwell have 
kindly assisted me with the composition of the English. 
London, W.C.I. 
January 1st, 1936. 
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2 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern state shows two basic characteristics: 
the existence of a sphere of sovereignty of the state, and 
the existence of a sphere of freedom from it. 
I. Only if sovereignty exists can we speak of the 
State as such# The sovereign state exists independently of 
the different struggling groups within society• Only the 
modern state protects the state, guarding its frontiers; it 
conquers new markets, and produces the inner unity of admin-
instration and lawj it destroys local and particular powers, 
squeezes out the Church from the secular sphere, holds the 
struggling social grpups within definite boundaries, or ex­
terminates one of the struggling groups when its extermina­
tion seems necessary for the good of the "state". 
At the same time modern society recognises in the 
decisive periods of its existence certain human rights — i.e, 
guarantees a certain realm of freedom from the state. Thus 
it has used the idea of freedom in its struggle against feudal 
powers and against Absolutism. It needed economic freedom 
for the development of the productive forces0 Historically 
and philosophically this freedom was conceived to exist before 
the state, and the state developed as the means to its 
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realisation. With this conception bourgeois society changed 
the medieval Natural Law into secular human rights, serving 
as a limitation of the power of the State. The conception 
of such a realm of freedom however, can only he reached by 
general norms — vjuobher these norms have the character of 
a divine or secular, natural or general positive law. 
The general norm in modern society played and plays 
however another role. In so far as no freedom is grantod, 
ov in so far as freedom can be interfered with under extra­
ordinary circumstances, the action of the state must be able 
to be deduced from general norms, a phenomenon which was 
postulated by theorists in an absolute form. 
Human rights and the imputation of all acts of state 
intervention to general norms constitutes what is known as 
the Rule of Law, or, according to German terminology the 
Rechtsstaatscharakter of the state. 
Both sovereignty and the Rule of Law are constitutive 
elements of the modern state. Both however are irreconcilable 
with each other, for highest might and highest right cannot 
be at one and the same time realised in a common sphere. So 
far as the sovereignty of the state extends there is no place 
for the Rule of Law* Wherever an attempt at reconciliation 
is made we come up against insoluble contradictions. 
In so far, on the other hand, as the domination of the 
state is declared synonymous with the Rule of Law it is 
4 
impossible to conceive of the state as a sovereign and 
autonomous body, independent of existing social forces. 
Wherever theorists of the rights of man make this attempt 
to construct an absolute, sovereign, and independent power 
of the state, they must either abandon the Rule of Law, or 
they find themselves entangled in insoluble contradictions. 
All systems contain both elements, even when they 
are asserted to be monistic, as for instance, on the one hand 
Hobbes, and on the other hand Locke. 
To the logical antagonism between absolute sovereignty 
and the Rule of Law, there does not always correspond a 
factual antagonism between the exercise of state sovereignty 
and the virtual practice of the Rule of Law: that is to say, 
there are historical situations in which the exercise of 
state sovereignty confines itself within such limits as to 
permit of the virtual exercise of the Rule of Law. 
This was true, for example, according to Chapter XIII 
of Dicey1b  "Law of the Constitution", for the period in which 
he lived* In such a period, that is to say, the highest 
efficiency of the power of the state is reached Just on the 
1. basis of political freedom. 
1. Or — in other words — in such a period there is a 
prospect that sovereignty may emerge from free competition 
of the society. 
5 
There are periods, however, when a real antagonism 
corresponds to the logical one. This real antagonism leads 
to a revision of the distribution of spheres between state 
sovereignty and the Rule of Law in favour of one element or 
the other, whereby the marginal case on the one hand is state 
absolutism and on the other hand the cessation of the state 
as such* 
II. We further attempt to show that a secular and 
1 
rational justification of state and law: i.e0 a human justi­
fication, basing itself on the wills or the needs of men, can 
have under certain historical circumstances revolutionary 
consequences. This is true as well for the theory of people's 
2 
sovereignty as for that of enlightened absolutism. So the 
claims of the bourgeoisie to be the nation is met by a parallel 
claim on the part of the proletariat constituting itself as 
the nation. In the same way as the bourgeoisie under the 
slogan of "Representation of the Will of the People1 has 
brought down the feudal rule^ and monarchical absolutism, 
so will the proletariat on its side represent the will of 
the people by merging the state into the proletariat after 
1. See for the concept of 'rational', fe.E p. «7. 
2. Other forms of Justification are Traditionalism, by 
which the state is justified by its very existence; Charisma, 
and of course all divine theories» 
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it has "become the nation. "The weapons with which the bour­
geoisie overthrew feudalism are now turned agqinst the bour­
geoisie itself." This sentence, intended as valid for the 
practical sphere, is also valid for the ideological sphere, 
for the democratic concept only exhausts itself when the pro­
letariat becomes the nation and constitutes itself as the 
national class. Every modern society is confronted, however, 
with the well-known dilemma: either to satisfy the claims of 
the proletariat, or to abolish democracy, i.e. either to 
abandon its past ideals or to give preference to immediate 
interests. The choice usually made is well-known. The con­
cept of democracy is abandoned, when the masses, newly-awakened 
and aroused to a political self-consciousness during the period 
of industrialism and world-war, demand this democracy for 
themselves, and when a society feudalised by monopoly-economy 
2 
is unable to satisfy that demand. 
III. The third and central thesis is finally to demon­
strate the disintegrating effect of the general Rule of Law 
guaranteeing freedom in a society based upon inequality. We 
assert that any general norm, whether it be one of natural 
1. Which is best presented in Harold J. Laski's, 
"Democracy in Crisid1, 1933. 
2. Similarly see Bertrand Russell, "The Revolt against 
Reason", Political Quarterly, 1935, p. 5. 
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law, or of positive law, which is intended to set a limit to 
state activity, necessarily contributes to the disintegration 
of the status quo. Any such norm is double-edged, is a double-
edged sword. 
1. Natural law especially, as Kurt Wolzendorff has 
1 2 
shown, is only "a theoretical form for any political Idea". 
The text will show, as the above theses have suggested, that 
the then valid norms of natural law, as also the general 
positive laws, correspond to the interests of certain groups, 
and have the function of legitimising the positions of power 
to which they have attained. After having attained these 
positions the representatives of particular classes abandoned 
the fiule of Law, or only rendered it lip-service, so that it 
only disguised the domination of a class; for, according to 
Theses 2 and 3, it must happen sooner or later, that the 
further recognition of the Rule of Law becomes dangerous for 
the power positions or for the stability of the social order. 
It is therefore attempted to prove that legal theory and legal 
practice of bourgeois society are, as Carl Schmitt put it, 
Situations-Jurlsprudenz — that law is a mere technique for 
the conquest and maintenance of power. 
1. Kurt Wolzendorff: "Archiv fur offentliches Recht". Vol. XXXIV, p. 477. 
2. "Eine staatstheoretische Form fur jede politische Idee." 
J 
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The abandonment of democracy is accompanied by a re­
versal in the system of values in the philosophical sphere. 
The Ratio is devaluated, because the Justification of the 
state by the wills of men is shown to be immanently revolu­
tionary, The Justification on the basis of the needs of men 
is not realisable because the increasingly obvious contradic­
tion between promise and fulfilment must necessarily disillu­
sion* So, because of the impossibility of reversing the 
process of secularisation, there remains only the Charismatic 
Justification, which is a typical case of an extreme attitude 
of irrationality. That with which modern vitalist philosophy 
reproaches rationalism — via. that thought becomes a fatal 
influence — is right in so far as thought sets free those 
forces heading for the destruction of bourgeois society, Just 
as it has contributed to the downfall of the secular domina­
tion of the Church, and the feudal system, and Just as it 
has contributed to the victory of political rights to freedom. 
In so far as this book continues my unpublished dootoral 
thesis of 1923, it develops what is conoeived to be the purely 
ideological character of natural law on the basis of a criti­
cism of Kantian and Neo-Kantian legal philosophy. The 
1* cf. Max Horkheimer, "Zum Rationalismusstrelt In der 
gegenwartlgen Philosophie", Zeitschrlft fur Sozialforschuna. 
1934, p, 1 ff. 
cf. "On the flanger of asking the 'Why', John Stuart 
Mill ln"Dissertations and Discus si one/', Vol. I, (3rd ed.), p.332. 
following ten years which I mainly devoted to industrial law, 
did not leave me the time for a further examination of my 
thesis. However, my practice during these ten years as a 
lawyer and a lawteacher has in no way contributed to weaken 
my conviction of the purely ideological character of Natural 
Law, whatsoever be its structure. My practice has, on the 
contrary, only strengthened that conviction, which finds ex­
pression in the present work. 
IV. It is sometimes asserted that the theory of the 
Social Contract Justifies sovereignty, and that the theory 
of Natural Law justifies the freedom of men from the inter­
ference of the state. This is contradicted by the facts, 
however, for the separation of the Liberal and democratic 
ideology has taken place only in the nineteenth century. Up 
to this time^both elements were merged in every theory and 
in practice. The Natural Law theorists also wanted to justify 
the state, and the democratic theorists of the Social Contract 
2 also wanted to Justify liberty. Thus was Figgis able to put 
forward the following thesis in dealing with monarchomachical 
1. General Survey by Otto Gierke, "Natural Law and the 
Theory of Society 1500-1800", ed. Ernest Darker, Cambridge 
1934, Vol. I, p. 111. 
2. J.N. Figgis, "Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius", Cambridge 1916, pp. 157-0. 
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theories, The prlmum mobile waa the religious elementt 
"civil rights are secondary and moans ho an and". The con­
tract is the basis of the state, therefore Natural haw must 
precede the state — which implies that according to bin vtow 
Natural Law not only legitimises freedom, but also coercion 
on the part of the state. Therefore, law l» not only a .vm-
mand, but also "the voice of reason". In this formulation 
of Figgis, both elements are united. 
Further, as it appears to me, (and in thin 1 agree 
with C.J, Friodrich) that the significance of the Juridical 
category of the oontraot is easily over-emphasI sed. What In 
decisive is not the Juridical category of the contract, but. 
its meaning, its sooular and rational Justification; I.e. * 
Justification deriving from men, their wills and ends. :ioin«-
times in a system the guaranteos of .liberty are predominant 
(Orotius and Locko) and someblmas the Justification of state 
coercion (Hobbes and Tufendorf). 
Equally unimportant for our Investigations aro question* 
whioh have given muoh trouble to political theory — vU, 
whether the natural state wan thought bo be an historical 
1 
phenomenon or only a fiction. liven If noma theorists ,,r 
Natural Law have conceived bho natural state bo be an his­
torical phenomenon and even if this conception Is false, 
1 • introduction of the notion of the natural state, 
cf. William A. Robson, "Civilisation an«1 the Orowth or haw (1931), p. 858. 
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/wlonh not alwaya-ts-Hjfee-6ft«y; even then, their thesis can be 
freed from this incorrect basis by paintaining the natural 
state as a methodological principle only. We have therefore 
to put the question: How is the natural state to be described 
in order to justify either the domination of the state, or the 
freedom from its interference? The answer is, that all abso­
lutists theorists of Natural Law (Hobbes) conceived man to 
be inherently evil in his natural state and the liberal 
theorists of Natural Law (e.g. Locke) conceived him as good. 
Similarly, for us it is of only minor importance 
whether the social contract is considered as an historical 
phenomenon, as an ideal to be realised (Rousseau), or as a 
transcendental idea (Kant). 
Even if, which seems^to be certain, no state ever was 
established by contract, the category of the Social Contract 
might be a methodological principle necessary for the justifi­
cation of the state or from freedom from it. 
In Part I (Theoretical Basis) we develop those general 
principles later to be applied in the analysis of particular 
instances in the next two parts. 
1. cf. S.P. Gooch and H.J. Laski, "English Democratic 
Ideas in the Seventeenth Century". Cambridge 1927, p# 139. 
2. Max Salomon, "Kants Originalitat in der Auffassung 
^ Le%e vom Staatsvertrage". Archiv fur offentliches Eecht, Vol. XXVIII (1920), p. 97. 
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1. The present work deals with the theory of the re­
lations of law, political science, and economics. In para­
graph 1, "Concept of Law", we make some general remarks on 
the concept of the validity of law. 
2« Within the theory of law the emphasis of this work 
is laid on the sociology of law. In paragraph 2, therefore 
we oppose the sociology of law to the exegetic or dogmatic 
treatment of law, and the central problem of the sociology 
of law — viz. the problem of the interrelations between law 
and the legal substructure (Substrat), is sketched in its 
basic features. 
3* Within the sociology of law attention is here 
directed mainly towards the sociology of the legal structure 
and the state. In paragraph 3, therefore, we make some re­
marks about the concept and the basic structure of the state, 
and deal with the distinguishing features and essential 
categories of public and private law. 
4. Within the field of investigation defined above, 
this work, as its title would indicate, deals mainly with 
the sociology of the relations of sovereignty and the Rule 
of Law„ 
(a) In paragraph 1, therefore, we give a sketch 
of a theory of sovereignty. 
(b) Wo undenttand by tho Ku.lo of Law u domliiMt. U»t» 
through general norma, ft ml consequently through dotorm1n«t* 
material norms. 
As the* domination of general norms exercises an Im­
portant influenoe upon the character and extent of the 
rationality of law, we doal with the various fcypos of ration­
ality of law and their interrelationships. 
The various norma constituting the Kule of Law nro 
usually either such as guarantee certain liberties or ruoIi 
as guarantee oertaln legal institutions. Therefore wo k.1v« 
a sketch of a theory of liberty and of a system of llbertlos, 
and following consistently the theory and the system of 1*hhI 
institutions. 
In a further chapter we deal with the relations between 
liberties and institutions with special reference bo the 
supplementary relations. 
Anticipating the sociological Investigation of the 
relation between sovereignty and the Hule of Law, wo flnnlly 
deal in paragraph 3, with the relations corresponding in 
law — viz® the dualism of the two concepts of' law. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Place of the Problem within the Legal System 
1. The Concept of Law. We wish to define law by two 
1 
'moments' — that of order and that of coercion. As Hegel 
says, "the abstract forms reveal themselves not as self-sub-
2 
sistent but as untrue". 
By its coercive character law can be distinguished 
from custom and morality. All attempts at alternative defini-
3 
tions have failed. Since the Renaissance the state, and only 
the state, has constituted the coercive machinery« But never­
theless the state is not the sole 'creator' of law, because 
the coercive power of the state is only one moment of the law 
and not the law itself« We therefore support the formulation 
of Wilhelm Dilthey: "The legal system is the ordering of the 
aims of society which is maintained by means of coercion 
exercised by its own external organisation, and the possibility 
of using force forms the decisive reserve power of the legal 
system; but external control of wills is seen to be spread 
1. Wilhelm Dilthey, "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaft-
en, Vol. 1, p. 80. Leipzig and Berlin, 1922« 
2. Hegel, "Philosophy of Right", 4 32. Add. "Abstrakten 
Formen erweisen sich nicht als fur sich bestehend, sondern als 
Unwahrheit 
3. cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Collected Legal Papers 
(1928), p. 170. 
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throughout the whole of organised society, and that is why 
not only the state but also other wills have the function 
of creating and maintaining law. Every concept of law con­
tains the moment of the external society, on the other hand 
1 an organisation can be constructed only in legal terms". So 
in this way other social groups are able to create one moment 
of the law: i.e* social norms which however become legal 
norms only through the coercive power of the state. 
All legal norms having sociological validity also pos­
sess juridical validity. In order to give these norms juridical 
validity the coercive power of the state must stand potentially 
at their disposal* The imputation of the coercive power of 
the state is sufficient for a juridical consideration of the 
concept of law* For the sociological validity of the norm, 
however, the potentiality of its being carried out by the 
coercive power of the state is insufficient* The fact of its 
being carried out is essential* The sociological validity of 
a legal norm is therefore characterised by the fact that 
1• Dilthey, op* clt., p. 80. "Die Rechtsordnung ist die 
Ordnung der Zwecke der Gesellschaft, walche von der ausseren 
Organisation derselben durch Zwang aufrecht erhalten wird. 
Und zwar bildet der Zwang des Staatf ..... den entscheidenden 
Ruckhalt der Rechtsordnung; aber aussere Bindung der Willen 
sehen wir durch die ganze organisierte Gesellschaft verbreitet, 
und so erklart sich, dass in dieser auch andere Gesamtwillen 
neben dem Staat Recht bilden und aufrecht erhalten. Jeder 
Rechtsbegriff enthalt also das Moment der ausseren Gesellschaft 
in sich. Anderseits kann jeder Verband nur in Rechtsbegriffen 
konstruiert werden." 
17 
"by it is created an expectancy (Chance) that one or another 
economic subject will enjoy a specially emphatic and rarely 
1 failing protection of certain of their interests". Socio­
logically then the legal norm grants an expectancy which is 
2 in fact realised by the coercive machinery of the state. 
Since the Renaissance the state has been the decisive coercive 
machinery. We have, therefore, in order to be able to decide 
whether a certain legal norm is sociologically valid, to in­
vestigate whether the coercive machinery 'state' provides for 
coercion on behalf of those legal norms, and whether it has 
such a power that on the average it can be expected that the 
legal norms rill be fulfilled* It is a question, therefore, | 
of typical human behaviour. If we discover that a legal norm 
is part of the hierarchy of norms, but that it is not fulfilled, 
i either because the coercive apparatus is too weak, or because 
the legal subjects and the legal administrators do not take it 
seriously, we aro no longer able to speak of the sociological 
validity of that norm. The consent of the legal subject is 
therefore unessential. The reason for disobedience or acqui­
escence is not the subject-matter of a sociology of law, 
1. Max Weber, Verhandlungen des 1. Deutschen Soziolozentages, 
Col. I. Tubingen, 1911, p. 75. 
J. Bentham, (Theory of Legislation): "It is hence that ' 
we have the power of forming a general plan of conduct... Ex­
pectation is a chain which unites our present existence to our 
future existence, and which passes beyond us to the generation 
which is to follow". 
Oliver W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920),p. 169: j 
Legal duty as a prediction, as a prophecy. 
2. Max Weber,"Wirtschaft und GesellschaftJ', p# 369. if 
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although perhaps for a psychology of law. 
Law in the philosophical sense is to be defined as a 
"reality which has as its function the service of the idea 
1 
of right". "The concept of law is directed towards the idea 
of right". The idea of right contains on the one hand the 
demand for justice, and on the other hand the demand for the 
satisfaction of vital human and state needs in the various 
spheres of social life* The definition of the idea of justice 
is here as irrelevant as the extent of its historical realisa-
2 
tion. What is here important is the fact that law in the 
philosophical sense is not identical with the needs of the 
state or of society. In the dialectical tension between 
Justice and necessity lie the main problems of the philosophy 
of law. 
2• The Sociology of Law, 
(i) Exegesis and Sociology of Law:-
The science of law is just as much a science of norms as of 
reality# As a science of norms it has as its subject-matter 
1. Gustav Radbruch, "Grundzuge der Rechtsphilosophle", 
2 Aufl,, p, 29, "Wirklichkeit, die den Sinn hat, der 
Rechtsidee zu dienen, Der Rechtsbegriff ist ausgerichtet 
an der Rechtsidee." 
2, Dietrich Schlndler, "Verfassungsrecht und Soziale 
Struktur", Zurich, 1932, p, 35. Karl Mannheim, "Ideologic 
und Utopie", pp<, 110-111. Hermann Heller, "Die Souveranitat", 
Leipzig und Berlin, 1927, p, 128. 
JO 
the objective meaning of the legal norms. As a science of 
reality it investigates the relatione between legal norms, 
the social substructure (Substrat),the social behaviour of 
the legal subjects, and of the legal administrators. 
The interpretation of the legal norms can therefore 
be — like that of all mental structures — a dual one; on 
immanent and a transcendental one, if we adopt lvarl Mannheim's 
1 
classification of types of interpretation; or, In Marxian 
terminology, an ideological and a sociological one. 
The science of norms has as its subject-matter the 
legal order as an autonomous mental structure opposed to 
reality. The pure theory of law of Kelsen is thoroforo n 
2 
theory of positive law. Thus far we do not doubt the validity 
of the pure science of law — as Laski says: "in terms of Its 
alCioms, formal jurisprudence is completely Justified in the 
whole of its procedure; in terms of its axioms, neither Its 
method nor its results can bo denied. E^y It.** own inherent 
logic, all that makes law, is necessarily legal, all in con­
flict with it is necessarily illegal. For it cannot continue 
3 
its sovereignty on any other terms". Normative Jurisprudence 
1. Karl Mannheim, "Ideologische und Sosslologische Ho-
tracxung der geintlgon Gebilde"in Jahrbucli fur Sozlologie, 
Vol.A II, Karlsruhe, 1920, p. 424 ff. 
2. Hans Kelsen, "Heine Hechtalehre", Leipzig und Wlen, 
1934, p, 1. 
3. H.J. Laskl, Law and the State in "Studies in Law and 
Politics", London, 1932, p. 2J$. 
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puts, therefore, the single and exclusive question: which 
1 
objective meaning is to be attributed to the legal norm? The 
fundamental difference between 'is' and 'ought' can be formu­
lated in this way: "Prom the fact that this is, it follows 
that that was — or that it will be — but never that some­
thing ought to be. Something can be, and yet never has been, 
2 
nor is it now, nor will it ever be". Normative jurisprudence 
takes law as a mental structure without reference to social 
reality or to its ethical Justification. Questions such a3 
how law arose, to which social forces it owes its existence, 
which effects it exercises in social reality, whether it cor­
responds to an idea or contradicts it — all such questions 
are for the pure science of law meta-juridical problems, 
3 
Juridical mysteries. In this separation of the categories 
of essence and existence, of ethical norm and legal norm, 
lies the merit of Kelsen's pure theory of law. By this ex­
purgation of all ethical, natural law, and political evalua­
tions which had found their way into legal science by virtue 
of the methodological syncretism of the Natural Law period 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", p» 368. 
2• Kitz, "Sein und Sollen". Frankfurt/Main, 1869, p„ 74. 
3. Hans Kelsen,"Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre". 
Tubingen, 1911, p. 334. 
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and the nineteenth century, the way is indeed made open for 
a new ethical evaluation of law and a new genuine relation 
between law and political science. 
1 
In normative jurisprudence state and law are identical. 
In the last resort law is to be attributed to the State. The 
finally distinctive characteristic of law is its derivation 
from the state. If this is the case, and if law and state 
are both orders, both orders must be identical. The state 
can legally only be recognised as a phenomenon of law as a 
hierarchy of norms in which all norms have to be attributed 
to one basic norm. Every legal norm is therefore a hypo­
thetical Judgment on the future behaviour of the state. The 
essence of a legal norm does not consist in a command but in 
the statement that if this or that should happen the state 
shall react in such and such a way. The connection between 
the legal cause and the legal effect is therefore a normative 
one. The relation is determined not by the category of causa­
tion but by that of norms. 
Normative Jurisprudence does not reach any concrete 
positive results. The results reached by it are purely nega­
tive ones. 
1. In place of a reference to the whole of Kelsen'a 
works. I refer the reader to his symposium, "Heine Hechts-
lehre , Leipzig und Wien, 1934, with its accompanying 
bibliography. For the English reader in particular, cf. 
his two articles in the Law Quarterly Review, 1934-1935, 
translated by C.H. Wilson. 
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For normative jurisprudence subjective right does not 
stand before objective law, but is derived from it. Even 
if, according to the conception of philosophical liberalism, 
the sphere of freedom of the individual is to be considered 
principally as an unlimited one, in the legal system of 
liberalism this sphere of freedom is only understandable as 
delegated by the law. 
Subjective right is a title, and therefore only a 
special formation of the process of creation of law. So far 
the fundamental difference between objective law and sub­
jective rights is abolished. 
The legal order can only be conceived as part of a 
process of a gradual concretisation of law, from a single 
hypothesis — viz. the basic norm. Law is all that, and 
only that which can be imputed directly or indirectly to 
this basic norm. The legal order is a hierarchy (Stufenbau). 
This idea was introduced by Kelson1s disciple Adolf Merkl, 
who, however, as he himself admitted, derived his idea from 
1 
Kelson's work itself. The stages of the hierarchy consist 
in the constitution, legislation and the administration of 
justice. The administration of Justice does not only consist 
1. cf• Merkl in "Veroffe'fytlichungen der Verelnigung der 
deutschen Staatsrechtslehrei1'. Heft 4. Berlin u. Leipzig, 
1921, p. 200. 
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in the declaration of the law, but also In its creation. The 
decision of the court creates law because it creates a new 
1 
norm. 
For normative jurisprudence there is no difference 
between an ethical and a legal person. The natural person 
is bearer of rights and duties only because the legal system 
has made him a point of attribution for such legal rights 
and duties. In the pure science of law there is no difference 
between administration and the Judiciary function, because the 
unbiased examination of the case which is supposed to dis­
tinguish the one from the other is also only a function of 
the legal system* There is further, no categorical difference 
between contract of the legal subjects and the coercive acts 
of the state. Both kinds of act are individuallsations and 
2 
concretisations of general norms. As for the contract, the 
state delegates to the legal subjects the power of executing 
it — i.e» the so-called "private autonomy". 
The legal system is closed; genuine gaps do not exist, 
spheres free from law are inconceivable. 
A categorical difference between legal and customary 
law, state law and autonomous law, case law and statutory 
1. Here there seems to be a contradiction within Kelsen's 
theory. If a norm is a hypothetical judgment of the future 
behaviour of the state, the decision of the court cannot be 
itself a norm. 
2. Here, characteristically of his Liberal starting-point, 
without any proof, the legal norm is identified with the 
general norm and is therefore already given content. 
law cannot be conceived. For customary law can legally only 
tie conceived as law if one starts from the fact that the state 
has ascribed to permanent cuutoms the right to create law. 
This has been very clearly formulated by Hobbes s "When lont-', 
use obtaineth the authority of law, it is not the length of 
time that rnaketh the authority, but the will of the sovereign, 
1 
signified by silence". Pilmer has enunciated this principle 
even more clearly: "It is not the being of a Cubtorn, that 
maketh it lawful, for then all Customs, evon evil Customs, 
would be lawful: but it is the approbation of the supreme 
Power, that gives a legality to the Custom: where there Is 
no supreme power over many nations their Customs can not be 
2 
made legal". 
Autonomous bodies are, according to the pure theory 
of law, in reality not autonomous because their right to 
create law is legally conceivable only if it is presupposed 
that this capacity has been delegated to them by the state. 
In so far as the pure science of law is also identical with 
the theories of Ilobbes, who could understand canonic law only 
3 
as a part "of the law of England". Finally there exists for 
the pure science of law no difference between case and statuto 
1* Leviathan, Molesworth's od., Vol. VIII, C. XXV'J, p, 
2. Observations upon H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads. 
3. A Dialogue, Molosworth ed., Vol, VI, p. 15. 
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law. Just in the same way as Hobbes has expressed It: "As 
for the Common law contained in reports, they have force but 
1 
what the kings give them". 
In the system of the pure science of law there is no 
categorical difference between public and private law, however 
these are defined; for the legal surplus value which the public 
body has as against the private law subject has been granted 
to the public body only by the legal system itself. 
(ii) Law and the Legal Substructure:-
Legal science is not only concerned with legal norms, but 
also with the social substructure (Substrat) of the legal 
system. By the term 'social substructure1 we understand 
social reality after the subtraction of the law itself. 
Social reality is the work of men in society. 
The legal norm orders social reality — i.e. in the 
2 
more exact formulation of Paschukanis the ordering of social 
relations takes on under certain conditions a Juridical 
character. Law is the specific order of the social substruc­
ture. It seems unnecessary to say that this social substruc­
ture is not only an economic substructure. The so-called 
1. It follows, therefore, that Kelsen's pure theory of 
law is nothing but a purified theory of the British Absolut­
ists: with Hobbes and Filmer, however, this theory had 
political significance, whereas it is reduced in the pure 
theory of law to a methodological principle. 
2. cf. Karl Renner, "Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts 
u. ihre soziale Funktion", Tubingen, 1929, p. 32. Also 
Max Huber, "Beitrage fur Kenntnis der soziologischen Grund-
lagen des Volkerrechts", in Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts 
(1910), Vol. IV, p. 61. 
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economic interpretation of legal norms and legal institutions 
is not a total interpretation. Political, religious and 
mental ideas as well as family relations are realities to 
which the legal norm is equally subjected. The exclusively 
economic interpretation is in no way the Marxist one. Such 
an assertion would "be as essentially un-Marxistic as that his­
tory is the development of ideas, or the work of great person­
alities. Marxism aims at a total interpretation of all social 
phenomena. Marx was a Hegelian, and Hegel has conceived a 
law to bo "a dependent element in a totality, one of the many 
others constituting the character of a nation and an epoch, 
and receiving their meaning and justification from their 
1 
interdependence". Marxian sociology asserts that law may 
develop relatively independently of social reality, that 
autonomous legal forces may drive its development in another 
2 
direction to that of the social substructure. The independ­
ence of the legal system from social forces is, however, as 
has been indicated by Engels with great firmness, only a 
10 Hegel, "Rechtsphilosophie", «£. 3. Note, "abhanginges 
Moment einer Totalitat im Zusammenhang mit alien ubrigen 
Bestimmungen, welche den Charakter einer Nation und einer 
Zeit ausmachen.... Denn erst in diesem Zusammenhang erhalten 
sie ihre wahrhafte Bedeutung, sowie damit ihre wahrhafte 
Rechtfertigung". 
2» By this, however, law is not an ideology, it is a 
real social relationship as Paschukanis rightly says, p. 57. 
1 
relative one. It is, however, a meaningless statement tlint 
law and the state are relatively autonomous. The central 
task of a sociological investigation into tho legal system 
consists in indicating on the one hand tho conditions under 
which law and the state can develop relatively independently, 
and on the othor hand the forces which go to destroy thin 
relative autonomy and subject tho law and the state with full 
force to the stream of social realities. This will be ono of 
the main tasks of the present investigation. 
The inter-relationships of legal and social phenomena 
cannot be contested. It may be perhaps possible to asnort 
that ethical evaluations and styles of art can develop inde­
pendently of social forces — i.e. that more or less absolute 
independence from social reality exists for art and morals. 
It is, however, Impossible to maintain this with regard to 
law which is but one aspect of the order of human livos. 
Nor is law the form taken by human living together. In 
particular can it not be said that law and the economic system 
stand in the relationship of form and content erroneously 
1. F. Engelo, "Ludwlg Feuerbach", p. 49, 52-53. "IJere 
the inter-connection between the ideas and their material 
conditions of existence becomes moro and more complicated, 
more and more obscured by intermediate links. But the Inter­
connection exists." 
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1 
attributed to them by Staramler; law is the structure of 
human living together in so .far as this living together luia 
become the subject of state regulation. A legal order for 
its own sake is unthinkable* Thore is no special style of 
law, as there is no special ethic of law. "Henco, the origin 
2 
of the conception of right falls outside the science of right." 
The legal norm and its social substructure do not al­
ways coincide. If we consider their relationship we can stabe 
3 
with Karl Renner the following possibilities: (a) the sub­
structure can change while the legal norm Itself remains con­
stant; (b) the legal norm can change while the social sub­
structure remains constant. 
The legal norm oan remain unchanging for years, decades 
and, under certain circumstances, for centurlos while the 
sooial substructure suffers in the course of historical events 
fundamental alterations which reverse the social function of 
the legal norm. This phenomenon is defined in German litera­
ture as a change of the function, a change of the aim, or as 
a substitution of the basis of the legal norm. The Instances 
are numerous and one hesitates to quote themt one decisive 
1. cf. criticism of this assertion by Max Weber, "Rudolf 
Stammler's Ueberwlndung", In Oesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissen-
schaftslehre", Tubingen, 1922, p. 309. 
2. Hegel, "Rechtsphllosophle", 2. "Der Begriff dea 
Rechts (im j)hllosophischen Sinne) fallt seinem Werden nuch 
ausserhalb der Wissenschaft des Rechts." 
3. Op. clt«. p. 5 ff. 
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example is offered by the institution of property. The legal 
norm indicating the characteristics of property domination 
has remained unchanged ever since Roman times. The same 
formula covered Roman individualistic private property and 
Germanic 1Ober- und Unter-Elgentum'; the self-same formula was 
again used for feudal property as well as for industrial 
property; property in both production and consumption goods 
has also come under it. 
This phenomenon, that legal norms remain unchanged 
whereas the social structure is subjected to alterations, has 
induced Max Weber and Kantorowicz to assert that in order to 
erect a socialist society, not a single word of the civil 
code need be altered. This assertion assumes a highly im­
probable possibility. Obviously it is possible, and has been 
attempted several times * Constituting communal property 
i.e. socialist property — by entering into private contracts 
of sale has not been an uncommon phenomenon. It is quite 
possible for the state to obtain private property by means 
of private contracts within the framework of the old con­
tractual law, and then to utilise it for the common good# In 
this case only the bearer of property woiild have changed. The 
legal institution as such would not have been altered. Such 
a case is of course theoretically possible. 
1. Verhandlungen des ersten deutschen Soziologentages. 
1910, Vol. I. Tubingen, 1911, pp. 209, 273. 
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It is, however, not probable, because it is overlooked 
that a socialist society not only aims at a change of the 
bearer of the property, but at the attainment of communal 
property— i.e. at the democratisation of the economic system. 
This aim could be attained by means of private law contracts 
only if the society were based on the consent of all citizens 
— which is an absurd postulate* Therefore, the socialist 
society, too, will have to take recourse to the institution 
of the administrative act — i.e. to compulsory regulation 
belonging to public law. For such a case, however, the thesis 
of Max Weber makes no provision, for obviously the civil code 
cannot be dealt with in a socialist society as an isolated 
phenomenon. The whole legal system must, on the contrary, 
be considered as a unit, including all auxiliary institutions 
and auxiliary guarantees, including all those auxiliary norms 
belonging to the sphere of public law. This being the case, 
it follows that without a decisive alteration of the legal 
system the attainment of a socialist society is impossible. 
The opposite case, change of the norm while the social 
substructure remains constant occurs also quite often. 
Not every change of the legal norms is socially im­
portant* Whether, for instance, social processes such as 
sale, lease, loan, contract between master and servant, etc. 
are to be Included in juridical exegetic need have no social 
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importance at all. The structural formation of the legal 
norms keeps itself exclusively within the realm of juridical 
technique. 
On the other hand, it can be the change of the legal 
norm itself which leads to an alteration of the social sub­
structure. In such a case the change of the legal norm pre­
cedes the change of the substructure. This phenomenon has 
induced many theorists to make the generalisation that a 
change of the legal system is not only a necessary accompani­
ment of a change in the social system, but also the only cause 
of such a change — in particular of such a change in the 
economic system. This view is mainly adopted by the American 
1 
Institutionalists, especially John R. Commons and his German 
2 
follower Karl Diehl. He formulates the possibility of an 
alteration in a single section of the German Civil Code bring­
ing about socialism. This view, however, is just as incom­
plete as the opposite one of Max Weber, It is a platitude 
to assert that a change of the legal system can bring about 
social changes, but we must not forget that a change in the 
legal system will only be effected if such a change is demand­
ed by social forces. It is indeed right to assert that a 
change of the German Civil Code in the sense that private 
property be abolished and communal property established would 
1. "Legal Foundations of Capitalism". New York, 1924. 
2. "Die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Kapitalismus. Jena,1929. 
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fundamentally change the economic and property systems. But 
such an alteration of the Code can only be expected if politi­
cal and social forces drive in this direction. A socially 
important change of the legal system does not fall from the 
blue: it is the product of a social process. It follows, 
therefore, that both extreme points of view overlook the in­
terdependence of law and social reality, that the first point 
of view neglects the significance of the legal developments, 
whereas the second emancipates law from its social basis. 
The Theory of Public Law. 
(i) Public and Private Law:-
We agree with the pure science of law that the difference be­
tween public and private law is no categorical one, but that 
the sphere of distribution between them is subject to historic­
al changes. 
Here we deal with two questions: (a) the concept and 
the function of public and private law; (b) the legal forms 
of public and private law. 
The dualism of public law and private law is already 
current in Roman law. The quotation from the Digests: 
"Publicum lus est quod ad statum rei romanae spectat, privatum 
quod ad singulorem utilitatem", (Dig. 1.1.1.2 Ulpian) is well-
known . Some modern authors have followed this quotation and 
have asserted that private law serves private interests, while 
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public law serves public interests. This delimitation how­
ever, is inadmissible as it confuses the 'ought1 with the 
'is'. Not everything serving private interests belongs to 
private law. Some matters are regulated by public law; and 
not everything which is allocated to public law by the posi­
tive law serves public interests. 
Unsatisfactory is also the so-called subjective theory 
according to which public law is given when the state or some 
other public body comes into action. In the first place this 
definition pushes the problem on to the question of defining 
the public body, whose identity in this connection is often 
extremely doubtful. On the other hand the state sometimes 
(as the German Flskus) appears as a subject of private law, 
and sometimes submits itself to private law. 
The theory of power __ the third theory mentioned above 
also confuses the 'ought' with the 'Is'. Its contention 
that public law is to be found wherever power relations exist 
is contradicted by the fundamental example offered by the 
existence of property in the means of production and of private 
monopolies. If this theory is not supposed to be a pure 
tautology, saying that only where the power relations belong 
to the public law sphere can public law exist, it must face 
up to the contradiction offered by the example offered by 
private property in the means of production. Private property 
lo The clearest statement of the problem is to be found 
in Erwin Jacobi's "Grundlagen des Arbeitsrechts", Leipzig, 
1927, p. 397. My own views are expressed in "Koalitionsfrei-heit und Reichsverfassung", Berlin, 1932, p. 33 ff. 
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gives the employers power as against their workers; all 
monopolies give power in the market; but in spite of this 
both private property and monopolies are not automatically 
the objects of public law regulation. One might postulate 
that this should be so, but it is by no means always so. 
The essential difference between public and private 
law consists in the different legal consequences of regula­
tions in the two spheres. The state delegates to the bear­
ers of public law, as distinct from those of private law, a 
certain legal surplus value. Public law is the law of dom­
ination. 
The subject of private law can, apart from original 
acquisition, or by inheritance, only acquire something by 
contract — i.e. by mutual agreement between two private law 
subjects. The state, on the other hand, and the other public 
bodies, can acquire property by one-sided acts (taxation, or 
simple expropriation): the private law subject having a 
claim against another may satisfy his claim only with the 
assistance of the court and bailiff. Self-help is generally 
denied him. The state and other public bodies perform, how­
ever, the functions of judge and bailiff as well as being 
at the same time parties to the dispute. Instances can be 
quoted in profusion. They show that the public law subject, 
in all those spheres in which the st&to plays an immediate 
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role, enjoys a juridical surplus value as against the private 
law subject. In the Liberal state, the sole task of which 
consisted in the protection of private property and the main­
tenance of bourgeois security, taxation, tariff policy, police, 
army, and the organisation of administration and justice 
formed the main spheres of public law; all other spheres come 
under the jurisdiction of private law, because apart from the 
limits defined above, human life developed freely and unhamper­
ed by state interference„ 
According as the state penetrates into the realm of its 
citizens' freedom, and according as the limits between state 
and society shift in favour of the state, so is the sphere 
of public law extended. Only an interpretation of the whole 
legal system can enable us to recognise which spheres the 
state reserves for its immediate control and which it leaves 
at the disposal of its citizens; i.e« the boundaries between 
public and private law follow only aposteriori. The notion 
of order which lies at the bottom of the difference between 
private and public law can only be the decision of the state 
itself; the exclusive criterion as to what belongs to public 
and what to private law is the concrete decision of the state. 
1 Any other criterion is impossible. 
1. Ernst Forsthoff, "Die offentliche Korperschaft im 
Bundesstaat". Tubingen, 1931, p. 17. 
It is therefore necessary to distinguish the direct 
from the indirect regulation of the state* The Civil Code 
is a typically indirect regulation of social relationships 
by the state. In a civil code the state on the whole only 
places various legal forms of behaviour at the disposal of 
the citizen. The State itself does not regulate the social 
spheres, and this means that the contents of the decision 
of the state with reference to the respective spheres of pub­
lic and private law is in this case often difficult to dis­
cover. The contents of the decision can only be discovered 
f£om a consideration of the legal order in its entirety, and 
of the relations between state and society. 
The typical legal form belonging to private law is the 
contract, whose perfection depends upon an agreement between 
two private subjects — although such a mutual agreement may 
not necessarily be sufficient for its perfection. 
We shall have to distinguish three different types of 
contract: 
The Exchange Contract — called by Max Weber Zweck-
kontrakt. This is a contract which has as its aim only the 
realisation of concrete general economic purposeso In such a 
1. "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", p. 416. 
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contract single individuals stand in reciprocal relationship 
to one anothero The contract creates a relationship measviring 
the degree of permissible interference of either party with 
the freedom of the other. For instance, the contract of sale 
or exchange, and the loan, come under this category. 
The Power Contract is given when not only performances 
for mutual fulfilment are stipulated, "but when one of the 
parties to the contract submits to an external power — as 
for example, when the subject is received into an institution 
such as a hospital or an asylum. The most important present 
example of this type of contract is that between master and 
servant. The power contract constitutes therefore a permanent 
relationship consisting of the whole sphere of life of the 
subject, and therefore changing his total legal quality. The 
1 
power contract becomes a status contract^ if the workers 
conceive this phenomenon of subjection to an external power 
not as something to be struggled against, but as something 
within which to secure their position, either by intervention 
of the state, the trade union or the workers' council. The 
distinction between exchange and power contracts appears in 
the Natural Law system of Samuel Pufendorf as that between 2 
"obligations of equality and obligations of Inequality". 
1. Karl Schmitt, "Verfassungsrecht", p. 67, without 
acknowledgment to Max Weber whom he simply copies. Weber's 
formulation corresponds exactly to Sir H. Maine's famous 
generalisation, the validity of which cannot be contested. 
Cf. "Ancient Law", ch. V, at the end. 
2. Elem. I Def. XII, i, p. 77.^^"* 
vCfrur) 
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"We call the obligation of inequality that which makes him to 
whom something is owed by us in virtue of it our superior and 
brings some authority or command upon us." The contract of 
inequality is therefore characterised by a power relationship. 
This contract is, according to Pufendorf, either a "universal 
obligation" such as our obligation to God, or a "particular 
obligation" given when "definite men are beholden to definite 
men • This particular power contract can belong either to 
public or to private law. The power exercised is either limit­
ed, such as that of the husband, the father, op the employer 
as against the employee, or unlimited as that of the state 
as against the citizen (unrestricted power contract belonging 
to public law) or of the master as against the slave (unre­
stricted power contract belonging to private law). 
Finally, a collective act (Gesamtakt) is a contract if 
it has as its object the constitution of a democratic power. 
The foundation of a corporation, of a Joint Stock Company, 
of a cartel, of a trade union or of a party, by mutual agree­
ments between the members concerned constitutes such a col­
lective agreement. 
In the sphere of public law those legal forms which 
bring about a legal change are, apart from legislation, the 
administrative acts (Acte admlnlstratif). Public law bearers 
entering into mutual legal relationships may also utilise the 
public law contract. 
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There ie, further, the one-sided administrative act 
containing a command from the public law bearers to those 
subject to them, by which a collective agreement is extended 
outside the members of the bargaining parties, etc. 
We have to separate the administrative act from the 
governmental act (Acte flouvernemental) which is to be attri­
buted to the prerogative; i.e. to a power which has not been 
bound by law and remains uncontrolled by it. Such an act 
for example is the declaration of war by the King of England 
because the king possesses a genuine residuum of prerogative 
On the other hand, an emergency decree of the President of 
the Reich, according to article 48 of the late Weimar Consti 
tution, is only an administrative act and not a governmental 
act because it is Issued only on the fulfilment of certain 
conditions, which could be controlled by the Judiciary. It 
is, however, not only the head of the state who is entitled 
to Issue a governmental act: in so far as the prerogative 
lies with Parliament, it can apart from legislating, also 
issue governmental acts — for example, impeachment. 
(ii) The Concept of the State:-
I call every sociologically sovereign institution a state. 
Therefore, the state cannot, according to this definl> 
tion, be a legal order (Hans Kelsen): neither can it be a 
fiction, or an abstraction. For In all those throe cases we 
could not speak of state sovereignty but only of the soverel/ 
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1 
of organs of the state. 
In this definition it is further evident that state 
2 and society are "both quite distinct phenomena. The specific 
relationship existing between state and society is, formally 
speaking, that the acts of the sovereign state relate to the 
society and that these are at the same time caused by social 
factors operating in that society. 
This definition of the state must now be explained. 
We have defined it as an institution. There belong to this 
institution "state" the totality of those men who exercise 
the highest legal power, and that totality of men to whom 
such legal power is delegated. Therefore, the following 
categories of persons belong to the institution of the state; 
the legislative, the executive (police, army, Judiciary, 
bureaucracy), those persons in the service of autonomous 
public institutions to whom the state has delegated partial 
legal power (such as municipalities, universities, churches, 
and corporations), and finally, those private persons and 
private corporations to whom the state equally has delegated 
partial legal powers (such as Jurors, and lay Judges, trade 
unions and employers' associations). This definition, there­
fore, contains Laski's identification of state and government, 
but also transcends it. 
1. Hermann Heller, "Die Souveranitat", p. 62. 
2. In the same way H.J. Laski calls sovereignty an ex­
ternal power in his "Foundations of Sovereignty". London, 
1931. Dietrich Schindler, however, does not recognise this 
clearly enough in his "Verfassungsrecht u. soziale Struktur", i 
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We have defined the state as a sovereign institution. 
Sovereignty contains as a legal moment the original right 
of the sovereign to issue general norms and individual norms 
(commands, decisions). In consequence of this dualism of 
the right of issuing general and individual norms there exists 
the possibility of an antagonism between the then existing 
series of general norms and the then issued individual norms. 
Such conflict between norms is not only possible, bub has 
actually been realised innumerable times in history. Where 
the state in case of such a conflict has the right in the 
interests of its 'self-maintenance1 to break through partially 
the series of norms by means of individual norms, or even to 
suspend the whole series, a situation arises which we do not 
intend to discuss here. Alone important for us here is that 
state has done this thing, and is continually doing it* In 
cases the exercise of sovereignty is a power decision in the 
sense of Carl Schmitt. 
Because sovereignty is the highest legal power, in any 
given territory there can only exist one sovereign and there­
fore only one state0 Lassalle has formulated this idea very 
wellt "two sovereigns can no more exist in any one state 
than can two suns shine in the same sky". There is, I think, 
Z^r«Ch' P» 62. This chapter owes much to "Foundations of Sovereignty", as to all Prof. Laski's work. 
1• See also Hermann Heller, "Souveranitat", p# 165 ff. 
general agreement here. The sovereign disappears, therefore, 
in a civil ^ar where the two conflicting parties are equally 
strong. 
But even if one undisputed legal sovereign exists in 
any given territory, and this sovereign be not strong enough 
to carry out his legal norms and his individual norms, we can 
no longer speak of either a sovereign in the real sense or of 
the state. An example is offered by the impotence of the 
Italian state power to carry out its norms in certain parts 
of Southern Italy under the domination of Maffia and Camorra. 
We have already declared that the content of a state 
action referring to society is determined either exclusively 
or partially by social factors. According to the materialist­
ic interpretation of history, these determining relations are 
conceived as such that the contents of the state will tend 
on the whole to coincide with the interests of the economic­
ally exploiting class, and thaj the state is a class state, 
an apparatus for the maintenance of this relationship of ex­
ploitation. 
According to Engels1 concretisatior. of this generalisa­
tion, under certain historical conditions of class equilibrium 
the state can place itself above the classes as independent 
power. Whether such assertions are right can only be verified 
by empirical investigation. Our own view will be seen from 
the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Relation of Sovereignty to the Rule of Law 
1# The Theory of Sovereignty 
In a legal sense, any institution is called sovereign when it 
has undelegated and unlimited power to issue general norms 
and individual commands (decisions). 
In a sociological sense, an institution is called 
sovereign if it not only has legal rights of this kind, but 
has also the ability to carry out the norms and commands is­
sued by it. In the sociological sense of sovereignty,therefore, 
1 
an element of both right and power is included. All analyses 
of state sovereignty must beware of a syncretism of the subject 
matter. It is an extraordinarily common phenomenon that all 
three distinct objects which we have here taken into considera­
tion — viz• the legal, the politico-sociological and the 
ethical — are permanently confused. The sociologist answers 
the jurist analysing the concept of sovereignty, and both are whether 
answered by the philosopher who raises the questioryone is 
1. Austin's definition: "If a determinate human superior 
not in a habit of obedience to a like superior receives 
habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that 
determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and society 
(including the superior) is a society political and Independ­
ent". "The part truly independent ... is not the society but 
the sovereign portion of the society." "The State is usually 
synonymous with the sovereign." Sentence 1 i? incomplete, 
it is concerned with obedience. It is too narrow as for us 
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obliged to obey the sovereign power. The first prerequisite 
in dee 11 Tig with the problem of a sovereignty is the unhesitat­
ing Bv.fi callous separation of the three possible statements 
of the problem. 
Sovereign in a sociological sens© Is therefore not 
the lecal order as asserted "by the pare law theorists like 
1 
Eelsen. Sovereignty according to our definition Is not 
identical with the notion of the essentially undelegated 
nature of the legal system. (351 cht-welter-Ableitbarkelt. ) 
According to the pure science of lair, all relations of super-
an3 sub-ordination are "based upon the fact that either ex­
plicitly or implicitly powers are delegated out from the 
centre. The state Is the last point of attribution ancL at 
the same time an order itself which cannot "be further dele­
gated. IShat In this connection is the meaning of "print" 
and how it is possible that a ''point* be at the same time 
an order I have been completely unable to discover even after 
2 
an exhaustive perusal of all available works of Eel sen. 
•only the actual fulfilment is of importance. Sent. 2 anfi 5 
are unfortunately formulated, although in agreement with our 
definition. Just as sentence 1, they lack the element of 
right. The connection with Bentham Is stressed by 
/"Rousseau, Sew "York. 1900, pp. 151, 155. 
f= fj- c• 
1. TtBTia Eels en, "Das Problem der Souveranitat n. die 
Tbeorle des TUolkerrechts", Tubingen, 192C u. viele andere 
Schriften. 
2 m  Cf. the essay by C.B. "Wilson, "The Basis of Helsen's 
?nre Theory of Law" in Politics, 1954, p» 54 ff. for a 
criticism of the central postulates of the pure science of 
law. 
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The pure science of law may indeed be self-contt.incd 
and self-consistent, but it solves no political problem what­
soever® According to our definition, sovereignty also in­
cludes command. Commands and norms can, after all only be 
1 
issued by men and not by an 'order'. Equally unsatisfactory 
is the antinomic theory of Carl Schmitt, expounded before him 
2 
by Wenger. According to Schmitt, he is sovereign who decides 
3 
what constitutes an emergency situation. This definition 
has been developed by Schmitt in his book, "Die Diktatur". 
There he undertakes to prove that also the natural law theor­
ists of the seventeenth century — above all Pufendorf — 
understood by sovereignty the decision as to what constitutes 
an emergency situation. Sovereignty is therefore an essential­
ly marginal conception. The notion covers only the most ex­
treme cases of urgency, when the state itself is in danger. 
Such cases cannot be subsumed under the legal order. The 
conditions of the exercise and the contents of the sovereign 
competence are unlimited because it is impossible to deduce 
1. Hermann Heller, "Die Souveranitat, ein Beitrag zur 
Theorie des Staats- und Volkerrechts", Berlin u. Leipzig, 
1927, p. 38. 
r d i 2. Anton Menger, "Neue Staatslehre", 3. Ed. Jena, p. 166 ff. 
3. Carl Schmitt, "Politische Theologie, vier Kapitel zur 
Lehre von der Souveranitat", 2nd Ed» Munich u. Leipzig, 1934, 
p. 11 and "Die Diktatur", 2nd Ed. Munich u. Leipzig, 
p, 272, 201, x. 
them from an abstract norm. The sovereign, therefore, decide 
with reference to two things: (a) whether there is such an 
emergency situation, and (b) "by what means it can be overcome 
The sovereign is outside the legal order; he is able, there­
fore, to suspend the constitution in toto as well as to viola 
it. He alone decides finally when normality is to be resumed 
So much is correct — that for no definition can the 
exception to the normal be excluded. The exceptional case 
logically must occupy as important a place as the normal one; 
and often it is only through the abnormal that the normal 
comes to be recognised at all. But the abnormal cannot be 
the unique and essential element in a definition. It must 
be added that if a constitution grants emergency powers to 
an organ of the state such as were granted by Article 46 of 
the Weimar constitution to the President of the Reich, the 
question arises as to whether the President is compelled to 
repeal his dictatorial measures at the demand of another 
state organ, as for instance the Reichstag? Who in such a 
case is sovereign? The President of the Reich, Parliament, 
both together, or the people which is represented by both? 
The theory of Schmitt does not answer such a question at all 
clearly. In a state where the principle of "separation of 
powers' rulefiP, and where the division of function is the 
rule, Schmitt's definition does not solve the problem; and 
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In a Caesaristic democracy, the question of the bearer of 
the sovereign power does not arise at all, irrespective of the 
definition of 'sovereignty' adopted. 
"The normless will of Schmitt fails equally to solve 
the problem as the will-less norm of Kelsen." (Hermann 
Heller•) 
If we understand by 'state' something non-legal (as 
for example the fellowship theory of Gierke — a naturalistic 
definition) the state can have power, but not the legal power 
1 which is required by our sociological definition. 
2» The Theory of the Rule of Law:-
(1) Theory of the Rule of General Norms:-
(Rationality) 
The sociological examination of law is not only concerned 
with legal norms and their social substructure, but al30 
with the behaviour and activity of men. That law is under­
stood to be the product of social forces means that it is 
the product of human activity both determined by and determin­
ing social forces. 
Human behaviour can be rational or irrational. We 
speak of a rational behaviour, but we do not mean by this a 
rationalistic one. 
1. Hermann Heller, ''Die Souveranitat", p. 62. 
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The noun corresponding to the adjective 'rational' 
is 'rationality' . The noun corresponding to the adjective 
'rationalistic' is 'rationalism'„ Perhaps the double con­
cept 'rational-rationalistic' corresponds to that of German 
philosophy 'reason-intellect' (Vernunft-Verstand). Modern 
German political theory and the philosophy of law suffers 
from the fact that these two distinct concepts are made syn­
onymous . 
Hence: a rational foundation of the coercive powers 
of state and law is a justification on the basis of the needs 
or the wills of men. Such a rational theory does not deny 
that men, human groups, or classes are driven by motives 
other than intellectual ones — for instance by superstition, 
religion, or repressed drives — in short, that these irra­
tional forces play a more or less decisive role. The ration­
al approach takes the existence of any irrational elements 
into account, it attempts to explain them, to show how and 
why such an .irrational sphere exists, and, on an individual 
basis with the aid of psychology, and with the aid of sociolo­
gy on the basis of social forces, to explain why the relation 
between rational and irrational is changing. 
A rationalistic approach on the other hand (for ex­
ample, that of natural law and of Kantian philosophy) con­
siders man as a purely intellectual being, as a mere point 
of attribution. 
Whenever we speak of 'rational' or 'rationality' 
we mean this kinc. of rationality and nothing else. When 
we say that state and law are founded secularly and raticn-
ally we mean only that the state and the la» are neither 
creations of God nor institutions of the devil; that thex 
are neither super- nor sub-human institutions, cut that they 
are simply human institutions springing from the wills or 
the needs of men# 
We distinguish with Karl Kannhein "between substantial 
and functional rationality, and correspondingly between sub­
stantial and functional irrationality, "We understand by 
substantial rationality simply the process of thinking pr,r 
understanding: in short, everything that 1b cogitative i-
substance." Substantial irrationality is on the other hand, 
"all those psychic phenomena which are not cogitative in 
substance". Substantially rational behaviour can {iiaz Weber 
2 
be either purp-osive-rational or value-rational. (Zweckration-
al oder WertratlonaU It is value-raticnal if the behaviour 
of the active subject is motivated by its belief in the unique 
value (ethical, religious, or aesthetic) of a certain type cf 
behaviour as such, independent of its results. If a wsntc 
to realise a certain value through his behaviour, for instance 
1» Karl Ilannheim, "Rational and Irrational Elements in 
Contemporary Society". London, 1934, p. 14. 
2. "Wirtschaft und G-esellschaf t", p. 12. 
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that of brotherly love, and subordinates all his other motives 
to this central value, we may speak of his behaviour as value-
rational. 
Purposive-rational, or in Mannheim's terminology 
functional-rational, is human behaviour for which two criteria 
are given: the organisation of activities must be directed 
towards a given end, and there must be given a certain calcu-
lability of these activities from the standpoint of the ex­
ternal observer. Or in Max Weber's terminology we can speak 
of the purposive-rational behaviour, if the behaviour of things 
and of other men is taken into account a3 a means to the 
2 achievement of one's own desired and calculated ends# The 
purposive-rationality (functional-rationality) of certain 
behaviour is therefore a function of a given and. The same 
behaviour In the same situation can in relation to another 
end, be irrational. The aim itself can be an irrational one, 
and behaviour in an irrational situation can become purposive-
rational behaviour. There is, for Instance, a purposive-
rationalisation of mental contemplation. A theory of the 
state and law based upon revelation can be rationalised in 3 
itself. W.A. Robinson has directed our attention to the 
1. Mannheim, op. clt., p„ 15. 
2. Max Weber, op. clt.. p. 12. 
3. Cf. Max Weber, "Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religion-
sozlologie", Tubingen, 1920. Vol. I, p. 11, und Mannheim, Qp. clt.. p, 29. 
51 
fact that even In the most unexpected fields, as for example 
in that of the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy, 
which in the last resort is a modification of rational law, 
the tendency towards 'consistency' (only another expression 
for rationality) is extremely strong. 
Rationality in the political and economic spheres is 
not always produced by the law itself• It can also be achieved 
by means alien to the law. In the political sphere,for in­
stance, in a transitional situation rationality of political 
decisions can be reached by extra-legal means. In the totali­
tarian state which is dominated by a monopoly party, state 
and party machinery in a transitional situation are opposed 
to each other. As the instances of Italy and Germany have 
shown the party machinery at first shows itself stronger than 
the state. Trotsky In his "History of the Russian Revolution" 
has accurately described the phenomenon of dual-rule. In 
such a situation the monopoly party can transform political 
decisions into active political reality without the aid of 
the law, and in a rational manner. This, however, is only 
possible in a transitional situation which cannot last. 
During the transition to normality the power position is 
either relinquished or it is legalised. 
1. "Justice and Administrative Law", London, 1928, pp0 
189-90. 
In the economic sphere rationality of the exchange 
process can be achieved by extra-legal means. In a legal 
system otherwise irrational, for example, or in a system 
normally rational but temporarily disorganised, the calcula-
bility of the behaviour of the state machinery is ensured by 
corruption of state agents. If the citizen can rely on the 
possibility of getting every help from the state machinery 
by bribery,even if this help is legally forbidden him, the 
expectation that bribery will secure the appropriate action 
on the part of the state agent — either in doing or refrain­
ing from doing — can form under certain circumstances as 
firm a basis of calculation for the economic subject as the 
normally functioning rational legal system. 
The legal rationality which we are considering is not 
alien to the law, but on the contrary, is legally relevant. 
Thus far we base our investigation on Max Weber in that we 
distinguish two kinds of irrational law. Law can be formal-
irrational if means other than intellectually controllable 
ones are applied in the creation and application of law; if, 
for example, application is made to an oracle. In such a 
case law is irrational because the decision is unpredictable, 
and it is formally irrational because the legal system or 
custom demands that an oracle be called for the creation or 
1. "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Rechtssoziologie)". 
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the application of the law. Irrational law can be on the other 
hand, material-irrational if concrete evaluations of the in­
dividual cases belong either to the ethical or political 
spheres, or rely simply on intuition and are then made the 
basis of individual decisions in place of general norms„ So, 
for example, Kadi-justice may be typified as material-irra­
tional; the Kadi bases his decision exclusively on the evalua-
tion of the individual case presented to him, and is neither 
compelled to base his decision on general norms, nor does he 
in fact do so. 
In the realm of rational law we first make a sub­
division which does not appear in Max Weber's classification; 
viz. between adjective and substantive law. The distinction 
is a simple one. If substantive law is complicated by, for 
instance, unclear formulation as Is often the case where an 
accurate codification is lacking, calculability of judicial 
decisions can be ensured by the fact that the organisation 
of the judicial machinery has a particular structure. A 
relatively good example is offered by Great Britain. There 
can be no doubt that the British substantive law Is infinitely 
more complicated and less lucid than the continental ones and 
that British private law/Trrational elements exist. But there 
can equally be no doubt that the present English law is to a 
far greater extent more calculable for the economic subject 
than was the case with the German law in the period 1924-1952; 
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yet this is in spite of the fact that British law is uncodi­
fied, The reasons are that the English judiciary administra­
tion is concentrated in the High Court of Justice in which 
the number of judges is extremely small compared with the 
highest German courts (Relchsgerlcht. Oberlandesgerichte). 
The small number of judges makes it very easy for the counsel 
to survey the decisions of the court, thus rendering accurate 
calculation of the reaction of the judge in any given law­
suit much easier. It must be added that in England the career 
of judge and counsel are not divorced. The selection of the 
judges from the members of the Bar, the professional and 
social connections of the judges and counsels even after the 
elevation of the judges to the bench (the judges are affiliat­
ed to the Counsels' Trade Union) all make possible a far more 
accurate calculation of the reaction of the judge in individual 
cases, even allowing for the presence of many irrational ele­
ments in substantive law._^ This idea is very clearly expressed 
by Sir William Holdsworth who investigates under which condi­
tions a case law system can function. He puts forward three 
essential conditions: a centralised judicial system, groups 
of judges and lawyers bound together by common professional 
aims and traditions, and an independent well-paid judge who 
2 on the whole is more able than the Bar. If we add that there 
1. "Some Lessons from our Legal History", pp. 20-23. 
2. Cf. an excellent exposition by A.L. Goodhdart, "Essays 
in Jurisprudence and the Common Law", Cambridge. 1931, p. 65. 
And my own exposition in Part IJT of this book. 
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is hardly an Important business transaction done in England 
without taking the advice of a solicitor and counsel, we have 
in its essential features demonstrated that by purely organi­
sational means it is possible to reach a degree of rationality 
which is far more efficient than that of the rational sub­
stantive law on the Continent. However, we have to add that 
this blessing of rational law is restricted in its operation 
to the possessing classes. 
Within the rationality of substantive law we didtin-
guish as does Max Weber formal and material rationality. 
Rationally substantive law is formally rational if the legal 
consequences are either dependent upon characteristics (for 
instance upon the fulfilment of certain forms like signature, 
seal or consideration) or on general abstract norms unambigu­
ously defined. Rationally substantive law is materially 
rational when non-logical generalisations, norms belonging 
to other orders such as the ethical, religious, or political, 
form the basis of the decisions. The most frequent case of 
such a material rationality of substantive law is provided 
by the legal standards of conduct (Generalklauseln) such as 
provisions to the effect that decisions of judges must be 
made on the basis of 'good faith' (Treu u. Glauben) (Sect. 
242 of the German Civil Code): or that violation of 'good 
morals' renders liable to damage (Sect. 826): or that a 
contract is void if it violates good morals (Sect. 138): or 
that restrictions on free competition which are 'unreasonable' 
or 'against public policy1 are void and render liable to 
damages: in all these cases the legal norms represent "blank 
norms" (Blankettnormen) — they refer to general norms which 
are not legal norms; i.e» to evaluations which can only be 
elevated to the position of legally relevant clauses by the 
roundabout method through the legal standards of conduct 
(Generalklauseln). 
(ii) Theory of the Rule of Law:-
(a) Freedom and the Rule of Law:-
(a) Freedom:~ in the legal sense is to be defined as the 
absence of restraint. This definition is most clearly put 
forward by Hobbes• "Liberty is .... the absence of external 
1 
impediment." For the existence of such legal freedom the 
factual differences between men are as irrelevant as is the 
character of the social substructure corresponding to the 
legal norms. In the economic sphere freedom exists to the 
same degree,in a contract between two equally strong com­
petitors as in a contract between a monopolist and a non-
monopolist; in the same degree between an employer and a 
worker as between a trade union and an employers1 associa­
tion. In certain legal systems this freedom means the 
1. Leviathan, Molesworth ed. Vol. Ill, p. 116. 
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freedom to create as well as to dissolve monopolies. If for 
instance, as some well-known German industrial lawyers main­
tain: "freedom of contract means in fact nothing else than 
that contracts of any content can be concluded so long as 
they do not violate good faith or the existing law. And we 
still have such a freedom of contract to-day, (i.e. considered 
from the point of view of content)"1 jfaien that fundamental 
misunderstanding of the material function of freedom which 
here takes on a purely formal aspect, becomes fully evident. 
In the political sphere legal freedom exists for every 
type of behaviour not prohibited by the law — law being every 
norm imputable to the state. Thus is freedom of person, of 
association, of assembly, or press, of a trade union, etc. 
"guaranteed within the framework and provisions of the exist­
ing legal code". To a well-known English constitutional 
lawyer the postulate of such a freedom appears as purely 
tautological, and as the expression of the principle "of the 
Illegality of illegality" in which "the right to personal 
freedom not a right to personal freedom, it is a right to 
2 
so much personal freedom as Is given by law". 
If we finally add that the concept of "law" Is not at 
can 
all definite, so that by this notion general norms/as well 
1. Rudolf Isay u. Karl Geiler in "Die Reform des Kartell-
rechts", Berlin, 1929, including their reports to the Salzburg 
Legal Congress. Cf. also my "Koalitionsfreiheit u. Reichs-
verfassung", p. 51. My italics. 
20 Ivor Jennings, "The Law and the Constitution", London, 1933, p. 235. 
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be meant as individual commands, the definition of legal 
freedom becomes nearly meaningless. By accepting such a 
definition, text-books on constitutional law can assort the 
existence of 'freedom' oven if political freedom in the uaual 
sense of the word does not in fact exist. In spite of this 
the formalistic conception of legal freedom is extraordinarily 
politically significant in a positive way. 
As wo shall show in Part Three in greater detail, u 
predictable action of tho state, i.e. lbs measurable in Inter­
ference, even if oppressive. is bo be proforrod to Immeasurable 
intervention (unpredictable, arbitrary action), oven If at one 
time benevolent, as such immeasurable state of affairs creates 
insecurity. A "fair trial", the compulsion of state organs 
to keep within tho limits of the state's own law — oven if 
it can alter tho law according to the then existing needs, 
Is preferable to a state of affairs where there is 110 such 
compulsion. That is, in truth, tho eternal value of tho ideas 
of the "Rule of Law" and of the "liCi^staatscharakter" of tho 
State • 
Freedom in a sociological sense moans something com­
pletely different. Tho approach to tho problem is made easier 
if we mention three quotations: 
H.J. Laskl defines negative liberty thus: "There is 
no liberty if speolal privilege restricts the franchise of a 
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of human life. This definition of sociological freedom 
implies that freedom between mutually competing individuals 
necessitates in the first place a certain degree of equality, 
already seen by Rousseau when he maintained liberty and 
equality as the two fundamental postulates of social life: 
"La liberte, parce que toute dependence particuliere est 
autant de force otee au corps de l'etat; l'egalite, parce 
que la liberte ne peut subsister sans elle". 
The existence of legal freedom is essential to the 
existence of freedom in the sociological sense. Legal freedom 
is essential, but it is insufficient. "Negative freedom .... 
is one-sided, yet as this one-sidedness contains an essential 
feature, it is not to be disregarded. But the defect of the 
conception is that it exalts its one-sidedness to the unique 
2 
and highest place." 
It seems to us insufficient to define as does Karl 
Mannheim, freedom in a sociological sense as given if a person 
has the possibility of evading the one action by taking another 
3 
or none. We will attempt to clarify the problem with two 
1. "Contrat Social", II, p. 11. 
2. Hegel, "Rechtsphilosophie", Sect. 5, Appendix.^ tjT 3. "Mensch u. Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus", ( Leiden, 1935. p. 109i J"Diese negative Freiheit ... ist ein-
tig, aber dieses Einseitige enthalt immer eine wesentliche 
timmung in sich: es ist daher nicht wegzuwerfen, aber der 
.gel des Verstandes ist, dass er eine einseitige Bestimmung 
einzigen und hochsten erhebt". 
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examples from the economic and political spheres„ If an 
employer offers his worker inadequate terms of employment, 
the worker in the liberal system has legally the right to 
refuse those terms. His decision to accept or to reject Is 
legally a free one. Whether this decision can be called 
sociologically free, however, depends upon two alternative 
conditions: the worker is free if he is economically inde­
pendent enough to allow his labour power to remain idle rather 
than accept inadequate terms; if this is not the case his 
decision is only free if he can get a better offer from another 
employer. Only under such circumstances would the worker have 
the choice between two equally good opportunities. If both 
conditions are non-existent and he accepts the work in order 
to save himself from starving, his labour may be exploited, 
and although he has the legal possibility of evasion he can­
not bo said to be free. 
Similarly in the political sphere; if a citizen under 
a dictatorship is asked in a plebiscite whether he consents 
to the rule of the dictator or to a specific law, and he re­
jects both, his decision is legally free because he is not 
compelled to consent or to reject. In a sociological sense, 
however, he is unfree because he has not the choice between 
two equal opportunities. He cannot nominate another political 
leader Instead of the one presented to him; he cannot give his 
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1 
consent to another law rather than that put before him. 
The modern development of lew, apart from the more 
recent fascist reactionary tendencies, is characterised by 
ever stronger attempts to realise in practice this sociological 
conception of law by paying increasing attention to the social 
differences between men. Here we will give only a few examples 
in an effort to elucidate a problem which will reappear at 
several further points in the book* A classic example is 
presented by Article 165 of the late Weimar Constitution in 
which the freedom of association is guaranteed for everyone 
in all professions. This guarantee is primarily directed 
2 
against the police power. Neither the legislature nor the 
executive have the power to prevent a worker from Joining a 
Trade Union or from forming a new one with his fellows. Thus 
far Article 165 constitutes a legal freedom within a certain 
sphere of human activity. But the Constitution took into 
consideration also the fact that in spite of this constitu­
tional guarantee of freedom an employer might under certain 
circumstances use the extra social power at his disposal. 
It therefore added an extra sentence to Article 165 declaring 
1. In addition to J.R. Commons, "Legal Foundations of 
Capitalism", London-New York, 1934, p. 20, see aleo Max Wobrr, 
"Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p. 454. 
2. Franz Neumann, "Koalitionefreiheit und tteiohave>vfttatHmh". 
pp. 20-63. 
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all contracts made with the intention o f impairing the rights 
of the worker were void. The constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of association is therefore directed both against 
police and private social powers. Thus the legal category of 
freedom was rendered sociologically valid. In the sar.e way 
the recognition of collective agreements by Article 165 was 
to have led to the realisation of the sociological freedom 
of the worker in entering into contracts of labour. The legal 
category by itself in no way guarantees the sociological 
1 freedom of the worker entering into contract. 
Freedom in a philosophical sense is the real possibility 
of human self-assertion, the ending of the alienation of .atn 
from himself. The realisation of this "concrete conception 
2 
of freedom" includes the two other notions of freedom. 
It is of decisive importance to recognise this hier­
archy of concepts of freedom and not to confuse its stages, 
(b) Classification of Liberties. In the course of historical 
development a certain number of special liberties have emerged 
which are described as fundamental rights — as human rights, 
or as "rights of men". We shall attempt to systematise these 
1. Lord Jdacnag4en in the Nordenfeldt Case (1894) A.C. 
ad 566: "It is obviously more freedom of contract between 
buyer and seller than between master and servant or between 
employer and a person seeking employment". Similarly, Lord 
Parker in Morris v. Saxelby (1916) 1. A.C.688 ad 708/9. 
2. Kegel, "Rechtsphilosophie." Sect. 7, Appendix. 
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theories. We repeat that the so-called pre-atate rights of 
men of philosophical liberalism are also legally intelligible 
only as rights granted "by the state. 
It is possible to classify these liberties from two 
points of view: either from the legal protection which they 
1 
enjoy, or from the subject-matter which they regulate. 
Under the first heading the question arises whether 
there are fundamental rights which are inalienable even by 
constitutional methods. It has been asserted both in German 
and in American literature that there are certain fundamental 
rights which cannot be alienated even if the constitution 
permits of amendment. Such theorists distinguish between 
constitutional amendments which leave the "constitution as 
a fundamental decision", (Verfasaung als Grundentscheldung) 
1. Partial contributions in: Carl Schmitt, "Verfassungs-
lehre", p. 161 ff. and in Ansch^tz-Thoma, "Handbuch des 
deutschen Staatsrechts; Die Grundrechte u. Orundpflichten 
der Deutschen", published by Nipperdey, Berlin, 1930. Vol. I, 
p« 33 ff. Franz Neumann, "Koalitionsfreiheit u. Reichsver-
fassung", p. 13 ff. 
2• German literature as follows: Carl Schmitt, "Verfas-
sungslehre", p. 99 ff. u. p. 176. On the other hand: Richard 
Thoma in "Grundrechte u. Grundpflichten der Deutschen", Vol.1, | 
p« 40 ff, and Franz Neumann, "Die Soziale Bedeutung der 
Grundrechte", in "Die Arbeit", 1930, p. 570 ff. 
American literature: C. Groves Haines, "The revival 
of Natural Law concepts". Harvard, 1930, p. 336_ff. taking 
into consideration the awakening of Natural /wid roslLlvtf law. 
Further examples: W.A. Marbury, "The Nineteenth 
Amendment and After", Virginia Law Review, VII, 1, (1920). 
On the other hand: W.W. Willoughby, "The Constitutional Law 
of the U.S.A.", 2nd Ed. Vol. I, p. 598 ff. against the 
"inherent limitations upon the amending power". 
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untouched, only altering special provisions considered per­
missible i end constitutional amendments which aim at the 
abolition of this constitution ami asserted to be impermissi­
ble. Wo do not want to discuss here the possible political 
funotlons of the crestion of such s category of inalienable 
rights of men. We would only remark that in the United States 
as in Germany, noticeable stress has been laid on such liber­
ties as go to preserve the bourgeois system of property. 
Within the inalienable liberties there are on the one 
hand liberties which oan only be removed by the legislature 
in the process of constitutional amendment, and on the other 
hand, suoh as oan be removed by the simple legislative prooessj 
there ar« fundamental rights which oannot be interfered with 
by the legislature, and suoh an oan he so interfered with — 
I.e. those which are equipped with the so-called "reservation 
of the law" (Vorbehalt dan Qcset»es)i thnt means I granted 
only within the framework of the legal system. Examples of 
suoh "reservations of the law" are to be found in Chapters 
V-VIII of Dicey's Law of the Constitution. There are, finally, 
fundamental rights whioh oan be withdrawn in exceptional cir­
cumstances, and suoh as oannot even then be touched* In the 
oase of a federal state wa have in addition to distinguish 
between authority of state legislation and of federal legis­
lation, and between state executive and federal executive. 
(H\ 
Apart from tehees distinctions according to categories 
of posit.lv© constitutional law, we distinguish the fundament# 1 
liberties according to their subJeofc-matter. Prow thin point 
of view we have to note the ex1 stence of no-culled "individual" 
or "personal" rights to freedom* These are the fundamental 
rights of the isolated individual, such an the protection 
from illegal imprisonment, security of dwelling-plane end of 
correspondence, of religion end conscience. 
As a second category there appear the so-called politi­
cal rights to freedom. These are fundamental rights which 
refer to types of behaviour arising out of the living together 
of men in the state. To this category belong freedom of 
asfloolatlon, of the press, of meeting, and secrecy of ballot. 
They have a dual funotloni a liberal one In creating directly 
a sphere free from the state, and a democratic one In serving 
the integration of the will of the state in a democratic way. 
It goes without saying that also the first group of the 
rights to personal freedom serve indirectly the formation of 
a democratic will of the state because by arbitrary imprison­
ment or by arbitrary censorship of correspondence the citizens 
under certain circumstances can be prevented from exercising 
their political rights# The rights of political freedom are 
therefore supplementary guarantees of the democratic rights 
of the citizen.' Without freedom of discussion, of press, of 
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association and of meeting, a genuinely freely chosen deci­
sion is impossible. The rationalisation of political life 
by political parties which are based on a formal freedom of 
propaganda would be impossible without political and personal 
rights to freedom. 
A third category is presented by the rights to economic O 
freedom. The central economic right is property. Property 
is in the first instance a right. It is a subjective right 
because it is granted by the legal order. It is an absolute 
right and not a relative one because it grants rights of 
defence against everyone and not only — as in the case of 
the law of contract — agair.nt the contracting partner. It 
is finally a universal right because the power of the owner 
over the thing is on principle unlimited. We have therefore 
always to distinguish between the thing over which the right 
of the owner extends and the subjective right itself of the 
owner. On the other hand the characteristics of the things 
are without significance. It is equally irrelevant whether 
the property consist in consumption or production goods. The 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaftn, p. 
2. R.T. Ely, "Property and Contract in their Relation to 
the Distribution of Wealth", 1914, I, p. 94 ff. 
John Austin, "Jurisprudence", 4th ed. 1875, Vol. I, 
Lect. XIV, p. 382; and Lect. XLVII, p. 81V ff. 
W.H. Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions", iNewhaven. p. 28. 
Karl Renner, "Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts u. 
ihre soziale Punktion", Tubingen, 1930, p. 28. 
Anton Monger, "Neue Staatslehre", Jena, 1903, p. 99. 
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supplementary liberties of the right to property are freedom 
of contract, of trade and of testation. 
Finally, the last category is the rights to social 
freedom which have developed historically from the rights 
to economic freedom. They aim at the liberation of the work-
ing-class. The primary instance is that of the right of 
association granted to trade unions — i.e. the freedom of 
the worker to join with his fellows in a trade union* 
Prom the political rights the rights of status activus 
must be divorced. Democratic rights belong to the citizen, 
and serve directly to integrate the will of the state in a 
democratic way. Here belong equal franchise, and the right 
of equal access to public positions. 
One of the central problems of a sociological investi­
gation of law is the question of the relation of these four 
groups to each other. Modern German constitutional theory 
takes the view that the first-mentioned three groups — i«e» 
the rights to individual, political and economic freedom, 
for the rights to social freedom do not exist for this group 
of theorists — are children of the modern bourgeois society 
of free-competition. They therefore disappear and as a 
logical consequence have to be abolished when free competition 
no longer exists. In the same way the annihilation of the 
rights to personal, political and social freedom is justified 
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"by Fascism, which asserts that all these fundamental rights 
are the mere offspring of capitalism. 
As against this theory we take decisively the view 
that such a connection between the rights to personal, politi­
cal and social freedom on the one hand, and the rights to 
economic freedom which have developed only within a competitive 
economic system on the other, does not in fact exist. Even 
a very superficial historical analysis teaches us that at 
least personal and political rights have existed and even 
"been struggled for long "before the competitive economic system 
arose. It can be proved that the function of these rights 
is not lost, but tends rather to increase in importance after 
the disappearance of free competition. 
(b) [Ens tl tut ions and the Rule of Law:-
(Theory of Institutions) 
A legal conception fundamental to the analysis of every legal 
system is that of the legal institution* We use this term 
purely descriptively — i,e« the word "institution" does not 
contain any metaphysical implications. The conception of the 
institution does not belong either to the pluralistic theory 
of the state of SS Gierke, Figgis or Laski, or to the Neo-
Thomistic legal philosophy of Hauriou or Lambert. We do not 
deny that the notion of the legal institution can be absolu-
tised and can therefore be made the basis of a legal philosophy; 
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the conditions under which such a transformation may happen 
will be shown in Part III# In order to avoid any misunder­
standing we therefore repeat that the concept of "institution" 
is here purely descriptive* We deal first with the notion 
of the legal institution and then with its relations with 
freedom. 
We understand by a legal institution the establishment 
of a relationship, intended to endure, between either men, 
or between properties, or between men and property, for the 
purpose of regulating social processes, either organised on 
a hierarchical basis or as a fellowship (herrschaftllch or 
genossenschaftlich). and belonging either to public or to 
private law. 
An institution is therefore a complex of rights and 
duties belonging either to public or to private law — a 
"jus symbioticum", which "ex personarum plurium comprehensione 
corpus constans". The institution can have either a hierar­
chical basis or be a fellowship as has been defined by Gierke. 
A hierarchical institution is given when there exists super-
and sub-ordinational relationships: power is exercised. A 
1. Otto von Gierke, "Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht"-Berlin, 1368, Vol. 1, p. 8 ff. 
Johannes Althusius, "Politica Methodica Digesta", ed. 
C.J. Friedrich (Cambridge, Harvard) 1932, pp. 21-2. Also 
Otto v. Gierke, "Johannes Althusius", 2nd ed. Breslau, 1902, 
pp. 48, 161, 197. „ 
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fellowship exists when this is not the case and no power is 
exercised. The emergence of the character of these relation­
ships is therefore not decisive. A fellowship can he created 
by power, and domination can be exercised by contract. If 
for instance the public power compulsorily creates a fellow­
ship of fishermen, or for the construction and preservation 
of dykes, or if workers are compulsorily Joined to a sick-fund, 
such a bringing together by coercion does not necessarily 
create a coercive relationship, but in the majority of cases 
there emerges a genuine fellowship. The legal institution 
may consist of the bringing together of men aloneo That is 
the case in all human associations whether state, family, 
church, trade union, political party or cartel. 
But specially allocated property can also by itself 
form an institution. It is created by separating off property 
and making it independent either virtually or legally# In 
German law we have the examples of Anstalt (belonging to 
public law) and Stiftung (foundation) (belonging to private 
law) . 
Finally, men and property can be brought together to 
form an institution either on an hierarchical or a fellowship 
basis. The most striking examples of a bringing together of 
men and things hierarchically is the shop (Betrieb). the 
1. Hugo Sinzheimer, "Grundziige des Arbeitsrechts", 2nd ed. Jena, 1927. 
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undertaking and the combination of undertakings. We under­
stand by a "shop" (Betrleb) a hierarchical bringing together 
of things and men (material and personal means of production). 
The shop is a technical unit in which economic e/±ma as such 
atfe not pursued. 
Economic aims find their place in the undertaking. 
By this we understand a bringing together hierarchically of 
things and men (material and personal means of production) 
for the pursuit of economic ends. In small units shop and 
undertaking often coincide. The technical unit is often at 
the same time the economic one. The spheres for the decision 
of business policy and the unit for the technical realisation 
of this business policy are one and the same, although in 
modern large-scale units they are usually divorced. 
The hierarchical combination of undertaking is the 
concern. The concern is a hierarchical bringing together 
of several legally independent undertakings for the pursuit 
of economic aims. 
We speak of a trust when either a hierarchical combina­
tion or an individual undertaking exercises monopoly powers. 
As property in the means of production is a bundle of three 
functions — possession, administration and profit-making 
the concern can either be a hierarchical bringing together 
of the function of possession (for example, interlocking of 
following: Franz Neumann, Oesellschaftllche 
"Dlf Arbeit"! 19lI™|.mM3!0liStlS0her 0nternehmunSen ^ 
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share capital), or of that of administration (exchange of 
members of the managing boards, or the creation of special 
administrative undertakings for the purpose of controlling 
dependent undertakings), or of the function of profit-making 
(the German Interessen Gemeinschaft or the English pool). 
Finally, all these property functions of combined undertakings 
can be performed at the same time without in any way destroy­
ing the juridical independence of the undertakings concerned. 
The legal institution can be defined as a bringing 
together, intended to endure, for the purpose of regulating 
the processes of life and for their production and reproduction. 
All institutions serving the production and reproduction of 
human relationships and intended to endure are therefore 
equally legal institutions in so far as they have been the 
subject-matter of legal regulations* For instance, marriage 
serving the reproduction of human life, and on the whole, 
private property in the means of production. 
If property, as we saw above, is a right, property 
in the means of production is also an institution with a three-1 
fold function: possession, or detention, administration and 
profit-making* It is unnecessary to mention that from the 
1. Fundamental: Karl Renner, "Die Rechtsinstitute des 
Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion". 2nd Ed. Tubingen. 
First edition appeared under the pseudonym Josef Karner in 
Vol. 1. of the Wiener Marx Studien. Anton Menger, "Neue 
Staatslehre", Jena, 1903, p. 99 ff. R.T. Ely, "Property and 
Contract in their relation to the distribution of Wealth", 
1914, I, p. 94 ff. Franz Neumann, "Ko&litionsfreiheit u. 
Reichsverfassung". Berlin, 1932. Hugo Sinzheimer, "Grundziige des Arbeitsrechts". 
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point of view of the owner the central function of property 
is profit-making, and that for him all other functions are 
subordinated to it. 
We understand by the function of possession, the physi­
cal detention of things or rights by the owner. It will be 
seen that this function is lost in the case of large-scale 
property, and is transferred to the workers. In a shop based 
upon division of labour, the owner loses the factual detention 
of the means of production. 
The function of administration consists in the adminis­
tration of men, the personal means of production, and of 
things, the material means of production. The administration 
of men implies the power to command them. 
Property in the means of production necessarily attracts 
men into its sphere when the society is divided into owners 
1 
of means of production and "free" workers« Property clearly 
only possesses this magnetic quality when this collective 
social relationship exists. The worker cannot escape it if 
he wants to reproduce his labour power. 
The power of command is on the other hand, potentially 
exercised by every individual owner of the means of production. 
Property is a relationship between men through the medium of 
1. "Free" in the sense of the dual freedom of the emanci­
pated slave — legally free and free from property! 
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things. As we have already mentioned, the function of pos­
session and of administration stand, for the owner of the means 
of production, In the service of the profit-making function 
even if, from another point of view, they stand in the service 
of production itself. From his point of view they are only 
means for the making of profit. At the present stage of de­
velopment of division of labour the owner of the means of 
production very often is not the controller of the adminis­
trative function. He delegates his exercise to his employees. 
The invisible principal, the legal employer, has to be dis­
tinguished from the ^visible one, the factual employer. 
(c) The Relations between Liberties and Institutions 
Liberty, (Main Liberty — Hauptfreiheit), may be surrounded 
for its protection and realisation by other liberties or 
institutions. We call such liberties and institutions con­
nected, or auxiliary, or supplementary liberties and insti­
tutions. Similarly, an Institution (Main Institution) can 
be surrounded by auxiliary Institutions and liberties for its 
1 
protection and realisation. 
1* Fundamental: Karl Renner, "Die Rechtsinstltute des 
Privatrechts und Ihre soziale Funktion". 2nd Ed. Tubingen, 
1902. Carl Schmltt, "Frelheitsrechte, u. institutlonelle 
Garantien in der Relchsverfassung", Berlin, 1932, Franz 
Neumann, "Koalltionsfreiheit u. Reichsverfassung. Die Stellung 
der Gewerkschaften im Verfassungssystem", Berlin, 1932, p.86 ff. 
Karl Rentier's fundamental work presents property and all its 
auxiliary institutions, but unfortunately neglects to make at 
any rate a sufficiently sharp distinction between Liberty and 
Institution. 
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We understand therefore by auxiliary Institution, or 
liberty, the guarantee of the main liberty or institution by 
other liberties or institutions intended to serve its protec­
tion. The distinction between a main and auxiliary institu­
tion or liberty is of decisive importance not only for any 
sociological investigation but also for any kind of exegetic 
interpretation of law. The following instances will demon­
strate this: 
By the right of association the workers and their em­
ployers are given the right to join together for the pursuit 
of certain ends# This right prevents, as we have already 
shown, public and private powers from hindering such associa­
tion, If the legislator grants such a freedom the question 
will be at once raised, whether those liberties which for 
instance, a trade union needs for its successful functioning, 
and which are only supplementary to the main liberty, are not 
also guaranteed by the guaranteeing of the main right of 
association: concretely, whether the rights of the press, 
of meeting, etc., which at the same time are independent 
main liberties, do not enjoy the same protection from the law 
as is granted to the main liberty, the right of association. 
The question is of decisive significance if, as was the case 
in the Weimar constitution, the freedom of association has a 
far stronger legal basis than the rights of tho press and of 
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assembly. Whereas the right to associate possessed an abso­
lute fundamental right untouchable by either legislature or 
executive, the two other liberties were only relative ones 
coming under the "reservation of the law" (Vorbehalt des 
Gesetzes). Is the legally stronger protection enjoyed by 
the right of association to be extended to the rights of press 
and assembly, or must these two be measured by their own con-
1 
stitutional standards? 
The right of association does not only possess supple­
mentary liberties, but also supplementary institutions, as 
for instance the collective agreement which alone can give 
the trade unions the possibility of carrying out their economic 
functions• 
Marriage as a main institution is also surrounded by 
auxiliary institutions and liberties such as the social in­
surance institutions (sick-fund, workmen's compensation laws, 
unemployment insurance) which have become supplementary to 
marriage In so far as they are benefits differentiated in 
distribution according to the family cir.cumstances of the 
person concerned* Another auxiliary institution of marriage 
is that of testation, which guarantees the bourgeois order of 
property succession. 
lo Part IV of my book on Koalitionsfreiheit Is devoted to 
this problem. The institutions auxiliary to the right of 
workers to associate are Investigated with a view to finding 
out how far they share the fate of the main liberty, and how 
far they suffer an independent fate of their own. 
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Every liberty, therefore, appears both as a main and 
as an auxiliary one, just as a legal institution appears at 
the same time supplementary as main* Here, indeed, is an 
extraordinarily fruitful field for further investigations into 
the sociology of law. 
Property is the means of production, which stands in 
the centre of our investigation, is surrounded by auxiliary 
liberties and institutions, all serving the protection and 
realisation of its profit~making function. In order to be 
able to carry out the profit-making function the owner must 
buy and sell, exchange and take loans, enter contracts of 
labour, and, if he is a landowner, conduct contracts of lease 
1 
and take on mortgages. Freedom of contract is therefore an 
essential auxiliary liberty of the principle institution of 
property. The property relationship also necessitates freedom 
of trade, which at the same time as being a supplementary 
liberty also has the effect of a natural selection of owners, 
excluding the uneconomical among them and retaining and 
strengthening the economical ones. We shall return to this 
point later in our analysis of classical liberal economic 
theory. 
In certain historical situations both auxiliary liber­
ties, freedom of contract and of trade, have analogous effects * 
1* Cf. Karl Renner, "Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts", 
pp. 63-69. 
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In other situations the two may serve different economic 
interests; the freedom of contract, for instance,may serve 
the interests of the monopolists, while freedom of trade serves 
those of the non-monopolists. It can also happen that liber­
ties and institutions which were previously in the position 
of supplementing other Institutions or liberties, from a 
certain moment on. cease to do so any longer, and on the con­
trary, exercise an opposing influence to the intended functions 
of the main liberty or institution they formerly guaranteed. 
Thus, for instance, do freedom of contract and of trade work 
against private property In the means of production from the 
time when a certain degree of monopolisation is introduced. 
These auxiliary liberties very often suffer infringement or 
even abolition and are replaced in the legal system by a form 
of the administrative act belonging to public law. If freedom 
of trade in a monopolistic economy appears to be leading to 
diminished profits, the modern twentieth-century state does 
not hesitate to encroach on these liberties, or even to abolish 
them by ordering undertakings by administrative act or statute 
to Join cartels, or by prohibiting the floating of new concerns. 
Regulations belonging to public law then replace supplementary 
liberties — the administrative act or the statute replace the 
4^" PaPer by Prof. D.H. Parry, "Economic Theories in English Case Law , Law Quarterly Review, 1931, p. 199. 
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rights of free contract and trade In their relationship with 
property in the means of production. 
The relation of private property in the means of pro­
duction to its supplementary institutions and liberties on 
the one hand, and of the totality of this legal complex to 
the economic and political dynamic on the other hand, is par­
ticularly clearly shown in Marxian sociology. Property in 
the means of production plus its auxiliary Institutions and 
liberties are called "production relationships" — i.e. 
1 
"social relationships in which the individuals produce". 
"This productive relationship is at the same time a legal 
2 relationship and a master-servant relationship" . Productive 
relationships are "relationships which are entered into by 
men in their social processes of life, in the production of 
their social life", and they have a specifically transitional 
3 
character". Within the framework of productive relation­
ships, the combination of the different productive forces by 
which the life of the community is maintained, is accomplished. 
We understand here under "productive forces" the technical 
knowledge available, the given personal and material means 
of production (for instance, qualities of land, raw materials, 
1. Karl Marx, "Lohnarbeit und Kapital", 1849. 
2. Karl Marx, "Kapital", Vol. Ill, 2, p. 524. 
3. Ibid., p. 415. 
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1 and fixed capital) in society. 
The relations "between productive relationships and 
productive forces, according to the Marxian theory, suffers 
in the course of historical development a typical change of 
function. When there is a tendency of the productive forces 
to expand (for example, by virtue of a permanent expansion 
of technical knowledge) "at a certain stage of their develop­
ment", it happens that, "the material productive forces of 
society come into contradiction with the given productive re­
lationships" or "what is only a legal expression for them, 
with the property relationship? within which they have hither­
to moved* These relationships, once forms of development of 
the productive forces, now become fetters hindering the de-
2 
velopment of those forces". This Marxian theory refers, 
however, only to the transition from one social order to 
another, in which each social order, the old and the new, is 
characterised by one principal institution — for example, 
capitalism by private property in the means of production, and 
socialism by communal property in the means of production. 
An analogous process occurs also within a given social 
order with regard to the principal institution characterising 
1. Karl Marx, "Theorien iiber den Mehrwert", Vol. Ill,p.427. 
i»e« in all essentials the data of modern economic theory 
apart from the subjective factor of individual wants. 
2. Karl Marx, "Die Kritik der Politischen Okonomie",(1859). 
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it and its relations with its auxiliary institutions and 
liberties. The relationship of such supplementary institu­
tions and liberties to the main institution or liberty can 
suffer a change of function in a like manner* With a certain 
degree of development of the productive forces within that 
society, the auxiliary institutions and liberties become fet­
ters on and hinder the aims of the principal institutions 
they hitherto guaranteed* They lose their supplementary 
character. In a period of relatively free competition, free­
dom of contract and of trade are means for the realisation 
of profit for the owner of the means of production* In this 
period the state guarantees their existence (by constitutional 
or simple legal guarantees of the liberties as such) or their 
function (for instance, by laws relating to unfair competition). 
In a period of monopoly economy the relationship is 
reversed. Freedom of trade facilitates at the same time the 
rise of competing undertakings undesired by the monopolist: 
freedom of contract gives outsiders the possibility of keeping 
themselves alien from the monopolist organisations or to quit 
them at will. Workers are given the possibility of joining 
trade unions by freedom of association, and In such circum­
stances when the profits of the monopolist undertakings tend 
to diminish, it can very well happen that the auxiliary in­
stitutions and liberties are abolished in favour of new 
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supplementary statutes and administrative acts more suited 
to the monopolist interests. 
(3) The Dual Significance of the Rule of Law:~ 
Connected with the conflict between sovereignty and 
human rights, is, in legal terminology, the dual notion of 
law; the political and the material notion. By the political 
notion of law we understand,therefore, every general norm and 
every individual command imputable to the state, whether just 
or unjust, convenient or inconvenient. Every decision of the 
sovereign state organ is lawa Law, therefore, is only voluntas 
and not ratio. Freed from all material qualities, this con­
ception of law is to be found most clearly formulated in 
Hobbes, For him, law is not "counsel", because"counsel is a 
precept in which the reason for my obeying is taken from the 
thing itself which is advised". Law is rather command, "which 
is a precept in which the cause of my obeyance depends on the 
will of the commander". "Law is a command of that person, 
whether man or court,^whose precept contains in itself the 
reason of obedience". "Law •..is the word of him, that by 
right hath command over others". Between the dominance of 
1. "Philosophical Rudiments", Molesworth ed. Vol. II C. XIV, p. 183. ' 
2. "Leviathan", Molesworth ed. Vol. Ill, CXVI, p. 147e 
Op. clt.. p. 185, the same Dialogue, Molesworth ed. Vol* VI 
p. 26: Law is a command of him or them that have sovereign 
power given to those that be his or their subjects, declaring 
publicly and plainly, what every of them may do and wh«.t they must forbear to do . 
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law In such a sense, and absolute sovereignty no antagonism 
can exist. If law is nothing else than the will of the stf.te 
in legal form, then the postulate of the rule of law can offer 
no limit to the power of the sovereign. Such a dematerialised 
law does not bind the legislator. The rule of the political 
notion of law and the existence of absolute state sovereignty 
are in reality only two different expressions for one and the 
same thing. 
Throughout, this postulate of absolute sovereignty is 
antagonistic to the postulate of rule of material laws. 
Material law is to be defined as such norms of the state as 
are compatible with defined ethical postulates, whether such 
postulates be those of justice, liberty or equality, or any­
thing else. This notion of law "corresponds" to the concep­
tion of law as norms, since the essence of norms is the 
reasonable principle (Logos) which it embodies. To this 
alone it owes its authority, and this principle is wholly 
transparent to the speculative intelligence» Opaque to reason 
are only the accidents of its realisation, and these are an 
1 
inevitable imperfection, not the ground of its authority. 
Not every voluntas is therefore in correspondence with the 
demand of a certain ratio. Material law and absolute sover­
eignty are clearly mutually exclusive. Absolute sovereignty 
1. M.B. Foster, "The Political Philosophies of' Plato and 
Hegel", Oxford, 1935, p. 114„ 
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implies that the legislator is materially unrestricted. This, 
however, is not the case if the legislator is allowed only 
to issue general, or just, or reasonable laws i.e. 3Lf a 
material law (for example, Natural Law) rules. In such cases, 
he is no longer sovereign* We can, however, only speak of the 
rule of a material law if there is a sufficiently great ex­
pectation (Chance) that the material law in question will be 
realised in the positive legal system, or that where a posi­
tive law is in contradiction with the material law, the posi­
tive is not carried out. The rule of material law cannot be 
said to exist if — as in the Middle Ages, and at the begin­
ning of modern times — the bearers of the state power have 
subscribed to a natural law justification of state sovereignty. 
From the bare assertion of a divine or secular natural law 
standing before positive law, we cannot, however, deduce the 
rule of material law. Under such circumstances, this would 
only be realised when this natural law is actually concretised, 
or when its pre-eminence over positive law is institutionalised 
(for instance by recognition of the right of resistance or of 
deposition of the bearer of sovereignty). There must also at 
the same time be a relative unanimity as to the contents of 
the Natural Law. 
The conflict between the political and the material 
notions of law is clearly expressed in the trial of the Five 
86 
Knights imprisoned by Charles I on the basis of his prerogative, 
and who appealed to the Court of Kings Bench for a habeas 
1 
corpus* Selden especially based his pleadings on the provi­
sions of the Magna Charta Chapter 39: "No freeman shall be ... 
imprisoned ... except by the lawful judgment of his peer and 
2 
(or) by the law of the land". But what is meant here by 
"law of the land"? If law means the order of the king for 
imprisonment, then the freedom guaranteed by the Magna Charta 
is non-existent# According to Selden's argument, if rights 
are to be guaranteed in this way, then "law" in this connec­
tion must mean "due process of law" — i.e. law must be taken 
in the material and not in the political sense. But as has 
been clearly shown by M<^Cechnie, in spite of Magna Charta, 
every king from John Lackland to Charles I had claimed an 
unlimited right of imprisonment (protective custody in modern 
terminology); and the significance of this clause of Magna 
Charta has been much over-exaggerated. Attorney-General 
Heath could well reply to Selden: "l£he law hath ever allowed 
this latitude to the king or his Privy Council ...» in 
1. Cf. "State Trials", III, p. 1 ff Selden's defence, 
Column 16 ff. Also cf. S.R. Gardiner, "Constitutional 
Documents of the Puritan Revolution", 3rd Ed. Oxford, 1906, 
p. 59; and S.R. Gardiner, "History of England from the Acces­
sion of James I", Vol. VI, p. 213 ff. 
2. Translation taken from McKechnie, "Magna Charta", 
2nd Ed. 1914, p. 375 ff. 
87 
extraordinary cases to restrain the persons of such freemen 
as for reasons of state they find necessary for a time for 
this present expressing the causes thereof"# 
P A R T  T W O  
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law in some Rational 
Political Theories. (The Disenchantment of Law) 
89 
The task of the second part of this book Is a dual 
one: first to demonstrate the distribution of spheres between 
sovereignty and the rule of material law in the most important 
rational political theories, and second to make clear the con­
nection between the legal theories of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries and divine and secular natural law* 
The second part, therefore, Is restricted in the first 
place to rational theories. All traditionalistic or charis­
matic theories remain unconsidered, and are only dealt with 
in Part III, where the reaction against the rational theories, 
the transvaluation of values by Fascism is considered. 
In presenting rational theories, it was necessary to 
choose between two possible alternatives. We could have 
dealt with all theories which have had any influence on the 
formation of political thought: but such an undertaking would 
have been synonymous with a history of the whole of political 
thought, an obviously impossible task, which could only have 
led to a number of vague and often repeated generalisations., 
We preferred, therefore, the second alternative, to select 
some of the theories — namely, those which have had an un­
doubtedly high degree of influence on the development of 
political thought. 
We may be reproached with having made an arbitrary 
selection, but there appeared to be no other way out of our 
difficulty. 
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A second consideration led us to make the choice we 
namely, that we wished to investigate the political 
theories from one point of view only, from the point of view 
of the relationship between sovereignty and material law, and 
that all other problems are for us only incidental and second­
ary in importance. Until now, this problem has only been 
dealt with by the way: it has never appeared as a central 
thesis. We therefore intend to investigate the question, and 
to ignore the usual problems such as whether a satisfactory 
solution of the question of obedience to the state has been 
arrived at, whether the answer of Hobbes is to be preferred 
to that of Locke, or that of Rousseau to that of Kant* In 
no case shall we expound the total political system of the 
theorist concerned, but shall always assume it to be already 
known. This emphasis laid upon a single problem justifies 
the monographic character of the work. 
We emphasised the necessity of rationalising the politi­
cal theories with which we are dealing. We have, therefore, 
avoided dealing with the metaphysical fundamentals of the 
various theories, which are often in any case incomprehensible. 
We have tried to divorce the political theory from its meta­
physical background, which on the average is very simple, be­
cause there usually is very little relationship between the 
political theory and the metaphysical system. We have also 
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attempted to introduce modern terminology and concepts, in 
order to make the theories understandable. We have the im­
pression that a simple repetition of words and notions in the 
theories used by their authors makes any exposition of the 
theory incomprehensible. 
If we go back, in dealing with the relation between 
sovereignty and material law, to the system of Aquinas, we 
do not do so for the sake of historical curiosity, but because 
the Thomistic Natural Law has indirectly influenced modern 
liberalism, and because at present we can see a revival of the 
philosophy, a renaissance, the social and political signifi­
cance of which will later become evident. Blaclcstone's term­
inology has been largely influenced by that of the Natural 
Law theory of Thomas Aquinas, and the influence of Scholastic 
1 
philosophy on Locke has been proved by Telkamp. Further, in 
Thomistic Natural Law the disintegrating tendencies which are 
inherent in any Natural Law system are especially evident« 
1. "Das Verhaltnis des John Locke zur Scholastilc", 
Munster i.W. 1927. 
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CHAPTER I 
Thomlst Natural Law 
1» Cicero's Natural Law: 
It is well-known that In Thomas Aquinas a number of 
trends merge together, and in particular the decisive influ­
ence of Aristotelian philosophy and of Cicero's theory of law„ 
The notion of material law was completely alien to 
Roman jurisprudence. For Republican Rome the statement of 
Gaius (I.Sect.3) had undisputed validity: "Lex est, quod 
populus Jubet atque constituit". Law was therefore every 
decision of the Comitia, which went back to the initiative 
of the magistrates. It was otherwise in Cicero's theory of 
law. The acceptance of the notion of material law by Cicero 
is conditioned by the extraordinarily strong influence which 
the Stoic philosophy had on him. The Stoics postulated that 
the state was only allowed to issue general norma In conformity 
with the Ideas of liberty and equality of the Stoic philosophy„ 
To the Stoics all men are brothers. Therefore a universal 
law should rule with the aim of realising this human equality 
of brotherhood. In Just the same way Cicero postulates the 
rule of material law, and hereby exercises an extraordinary 
1. Oo Dittrich, "Geschichte der Ethik", Vol. II. Leipzig, 
1926, pp. 32-53; William A. Robson, "Civilisation and the 
Growth of Law" (1931), p. 214. 
influence on Tbomlst Natural Law, and through this, a» w e l l  
as directly, on secular natural law. 
According to the Ciceronian theory all positive lawn 
1 
are nourished by the one divine law. The unwritten law of 
nature and of divinity is supposed to be the source of statute 
law* This natural law is eternal and unchangeable, directed 
towards the realisation of the common good. Positive lnw, 
however, has to be adapted to local and temporary conditions, 
it is particular law, which must not contradict the universal 
natural law. 
Is it possible to say that Cicero postulated the rule 
of material law in our sense? That is to say: does he allow 
a sufficiently great expectation (Chance) of the fulfilment 
of natural law, should it contradict positive luw? This 
question is to be investigated £hortly. 
In De legibus (I, 6, IB) he has defined the notion of 
law as follows: "Lex est ratio summa inaita in natura, quuo 
Jubet ea, quae faclenda sunt, prohibetque contrarla. Eadem 
ratio quom est in homlnis mente confirmata et confecta, lez 
1. Cf. exposition by Ch. H. Mcllwain, "The Growth of 
Political Thought in the West", London, 19S2. p. Ill, and 
Carlyle, Vol. I, p. 3 ff. 
2. All quotations from the Latin are taken from the 
Edition of the Teubnerbibliothek, Leipzig. "De Legibus", 
Vol. II, and Pro Cluentio, Vol. VIII. 
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est". In this statement, as in a similar cne in Republica 
(III, 31-35), obviously nothing is said, about our central 
question, whether the material law has "been given a sufficient­
ly high degree of probable fulfilment* In order to prove 
that Cicero postulates the nullity of positive law in the 
event of its contradicting natural law, the quotation in De 
legibus where he asserted that the laws stood above the 
magistrates, and that they were only the mouthpiece of the 
laws is often referred to: "Ut enim magistratibus leges ita 
populo praesunt magistratus vereque did potest magistrate 
legem esse loquentem legem autem mutum magistratum" (III, 1,2/ 
What does le* mean In this connection? Only positive, or cnlT 
natural law? The qusation is extraordinarily controversial 
1 
and in my opinion at present insoluble. In order to prove 
that by lex in this connection Cicero understood Natural law, 
it Is often said that wherever he means positive law he speaks 
of Jus civile, and whever he means natural law, he speaks of 
Lex. But the following quotation from his speech Pro Cluentio 
will prove the incorrectness of this assertion (53, 146, 147): 
"Mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis posita 
est in legibus. Ut corpora nostra sine mente sic civitas sine 
lege suis partibus, ut nervis, ac sanguine et membris uti non 
potest legum ministri magistratus ... circumspiste omnes rei 
1. Cf. Moritz Wlassak on the controversy, "Romische 
Prozessgesetze", Leipzig, 1888-9, Vol. II, pp. 1C8, 5, 6. 
publicae partes: omnia legum imperio et praesc.ripto flori 
videbitis". This speech Pro Cluentio is a typical lawyer's 
speech. In it Cicero first pays homage to the Lex Sempronis 
in order afterwards to prove that his client Cluentios cannot 
he punished under the Lex Sempronia. He did not at all enter 
into the question whether the Lex Sempronia itself was com­
patible with natural law according to the principle non nimta 
probare. Lex, therefore, can only mean positive and not 
natural law, and the assertion that in the above quotation 
from De legibus Cicero was referring to natural law cannot be 
maintained* In the same speech Pro Cluentio, however, the 
following sentence is to be found: "Iniquum tibi videtur, 
Acci, esse non isdem legibus omnes teneri. Primum, ut id 
iniquissimum esse confitear, eius modi est, ut coramutatis 
eius opus sit legibus, non ut his, quae sunt, non paroamus".1 
Here he demands unconditional submission to the Lex Scripta* 
This contradicts in itself the assumption that Cicero would 
postulate the rule of material law: but it provides no solu­
tion for our problem which deals with the Ciceronian legal 
system as a whole• Cicero here appears as an advocate, and 
by the emphasis he laid on the postulate of the citizen's 
duty of obedience to the Lex Scripta he hoped to buy the good- "i 
will of the Court. In my view, In the present state of re­
search, a decision as to whether the postulate of the rule of 
1. Pro Cluentio, pp. 55, 155. 
material law Is mere lip-service rendered by Cicero, or 
whether he intended to make the fulfilment of natural law 
highly probable in face of conflicting positive law, is Im­
possible. The impossibility of deciding the problem, however, 
is of eminent objective significance. If we aay with Carlyle 
that the period between Aristotle and Cicero is the dividing 
1 line between "ancient and modern political theory", Cicero 
then belongs to modern theory in which the conflict between 
the postulate of sovereignty and that of the rule of material 
law appears as a typical one. 
,-r. % ( H) Thomas Aquinas. 
The work of Thomas Aquinas arose in a time when the 
medieval "ordo" already carried the germs of its dissolution, 
and his contemporary, Duns Scotus (died 1308) is already a 
pioneer of an individualism which was determined to disinte­
grate the unified Medieval culture. However, the Summa of 
Thomas is still the expression of this "ordo", giving adequate 
place to every phase of human life. In this social system 
the coincidence of voluntas and ratio, of intellect and sen­
sibility, and of the legal structure and the strivings of men, 
provides a happy harmony. 
V*, X •<> • <% 
%. Bibliography: Robert Linhardt, "Die sozialen Prinzijilen 
des hi. Thomas (von Aquirf', Kreiburg i. Breisgau, 1932. 
Theodor Steinbuchel, "Christliches Mittelalter", Leipzig, 1935. 
Wilhelm Schwer, "Stand und Stundeordnung in Weltbild des Mittel 
alters", Paderborn, 1934. Martin Grabmann, "Mittelalterllcbes 
Creistesleben , Munchen, 1926. Charles H. Mcllwain, p. 325 ff. 
Bede Jarrett, "Social Theories of the Middle Ages 1200-1500", 
(^) Thomas Aquinas dist.ingulshed between domination 
bound by the norms of the Lex Naturalis (and therefore of 
practical reason), and a domination unbound by It. He him­
self always postulated the first type of domination. The 
norms of the first type he calls Laws: "Lex non est ipsum 
ius proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio iuris" (2, II, 5V,], 
ad 2). Law and concrete legal norms are therefore not identi­
cal. Law is the basis, is the standard of measurement, is a 
regula artis with the help of which the Just decision la ar­
rived at. 
By its relationship to the Lex Naturalis the Lex Is 
distinguished from the Lex Tyrannlca (1,11, 92,1 ad 4), and 
by its vis coactiva on the side of a legitimate authority 
from the mere admonltlo (2,11,65,2 and 1,11,90,3 ad 3). Not 
every norm of the state is therefore law. The Imperium login 
is limited. "The mensurans (legislator) is therefore himself 
again a mensuratus ..... law, so to speak, precedes in timo 
its constitution by the legislator in connection with the 
general order of nature and reason with the concrete historical 
1 
relations". As the norms of natural law are related to the 
common good and to the idea of equality, there follow three 
London, 1926. Carlyle, Vol. I. E. Troeltsch, "Die Sozial-
lehren der Christlichen Klrchen und Gruppen", Tubingen, 1912, 
English translation in two vols by 0. Wyon, London, 1931, 
under the title "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches". 
1. Llnhardt, p. 94. 
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conditions which have to be fulfilled by a norm of the state 
in order to be called law. 
Such a norm must first serve the bonum commune (ratione 
finis), because: "Lex est nullo privato commodo, sed pro 
communi civium utilitate conscripta" (1,11,90,2). Secondly, 
the norm must be just — i.e„ the burdens put upon subjects 
must correspond to the principle of proportionate equality 
(ratione formae). Thirdly the norm must be issued by the 
legislator within the limits of his authority (ratione 
auctoritatis), because: "Lex est quaedam rationis ordinatio 
ad bonum commune et ab eo qui curam communitatis habet 
promulgata" (1,11,90,4). 
Every norm fulfilling these three conditions is binding 
in foro conscientiae, and in foro externo. The postulated 
attitude of the subject towards such norms as do not conform 
to these three conditions is differentiated according to the 
following possibilities: 
Firstly it is possible that positive law contradicts 
the basic principles of the Lex naturalis and therefore of 
the Lex aeterna, for these basic principles are part of the 
Lex aeterna: "Lex aeterna nihil aliud est quam ratio divinao 
sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium, actuum et 
motionum" (1,11,93,1). The Lex aeterna is rooted in Gocl. The 
order of nature (Justitia naturalis) and the order of human 
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conscious activities (Ordo iustitiae) are of the same charac­
ter. The natural moral law is "but a portion of the general 
law of nature, and the general law of nature but a section of 
the Lex aeterna« Man accepts God and therefore also the Lex 
aeterna, and therewith necessarily participates in the Lex 
Naturalis. "Participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura 
dicitur lex naturalis" (1,11,91,2): "Omnia participant ali-
qualiter lego aeterna"(1,11,91,2). The human being is a 
rational creature endowed with the lumen naturale. The supreme 
principles of the lex aeterna are eternal and unchanging 
(1,11,94,5) even if their recognition and application can he 
damaged by passion (1,11,91,6)• In the main, their duties 
involved are, neighbourly love (social duties), maintenance ^ 
and propagation of life, and love of God (individual rights). 
If positive law conflicts with these basic principles of the 
lex naturalis, passive resistance on the part of the subject 
is not only right, but even a duty, for the lex naturalis is 
Indispensable — even God cannot dispense with it (1,11,100, 
8 ad 2). Passive resistance is a duty® So far as positive 
law and natural law coincide, positive lav/ Is compulsory also 
in foro conscientiae# "Si (leges humanae) iustae sunt, habent 
vim obligando in foro conscientiae a lege aeterna, de qua 
derivantur" (1,11,96,4). 
1. Linhardt, p. 104. 
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The second possible case Is that positive law although 
not indeed in conflict with the lex aeterna and thereby with 
the basic principles of the lex naturalis, but with the second­
ary natural law. The norms of the secondary natural law 
derive from the supreme principles of the lex naturalis, which 
of course also derive their power from the lex aeterna. They 
coincide on the whole with the Decalogue (1,11,100, 1 ad 11). 
They are not valid in all cases, although in most. They con­
stitute on the whole, a part from the Decalogue, that which 
the Roman jurist understood by Ius gentium in the sense of 
Gaius (Dig. 1,1,2 and 1,1,9), "Quod naturalis ratio inter 
omnes homines constituit ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes 
gentes utuntur". If positive law violates only these derived 
norms of secondary natural law, the subject is nevertheless 
compelled to obedience to the positive law» It binds him in 
foro externo, but not in foro conscientiae (1,11,95,1 ad 2) 
and (2,11,60,5). 
We see, therefore, that the Thomist system, by the 
partial recognition of the right of passive resistance and 
the equally partial concretisation of the lex naturalis, in­
stitutes a factual domination of the rule of material law, at 
least to a certain degree. The rule of material law is ex­
tended even further by the far-reaching coincidence of the 
material norms of behaviour in the various strata of society. 
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(tj) The Thomist natural law is on the whole a codiflea­s'/ 
tion of the feudal order. 
There existed ir. the Middle Ages no schism between a 
secular and a clerical social sphere. The conflict between 
church and state was not an antagonism of two societies, but 
a struggle between two officials — the Pope and the Emperor — 
1 
within one and the same society. In this feudal society 
there existed no modern state apart from Frederick II's Sicilian 
creation. In the secular sphere there was no sovereignty, yet 
the domination of the Pope in a certain period was genuine 
2 
sovereignty. The plenitudo potestatis is sovereignty„ The 
Pope is the last creator of law* Law is what the Pope deter­
mines. Already Gregory VII in his 27 Articles of the Dictatus 
Papae (1075) postulated the divine origins of papacy, its in­
fallibility, the unlimited and universal authority of the 
Pope over the whole of human society: he also established 
the right of deposition of bishops and kings, the right to 
absolve subjects from their duty of obedience to a secular 
power* Under Innocent III we find that "the Pope disposes of 
the income of the Church, he distributes the offices and bene­
fices arbitrarily, he is not only the supreme but the sole I 
law of the Church; the prelates are no longer only his vassals, j 
1, Figgis, "Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius",p.57. 
2. Figgis, p, 20 and Troeltsch, p. 242. Eng. Ed* p.246 ff„ 
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they are now his officials, and the lf-udal oath has become 
1 
the oath of office without any alteration In the wording", 
All lav7 in the secular sphere was on the whole private 
law. All political rights were attached to property in land. 
The king was always bhe highest and sometimes the biggest 
feudal lord. As there was no public law, fchere could be no 
statute specifically belonging to this sphere of law. Poli­
tical relations were therefore contractual relations. The 
contracts were obviously status contracts as they have been 
defined above. Society was static• There was no alteration 
of the hierarchy of ostates. Every member of society had a 
fixed place within this hierarchy of estates from which on 
the whole he was unable to move. The relation between the 
estates was hierarchical — a legal relationship of super-
and sub-ordination. All this is clearly In contrast with 
modern society with its constantly fluctuating class-structure 
and its legal equality. 
We have been accustomed since the time of Gierke to 
distinguish two forms of estate organisation: the authorltarl-
2 
an end the liberal (fellowship) types. It cannot be doubted, 
and recently it has been reasserted from the Catholic side, 
that the Middle Ages knew of no Liberal order of fellowship. 
1. Albert Kauck, "ftirchengeschlchte Deutschlands", Vol»TV, 
5.4. Ed. 1913, p. 714. 
2. Schwer, p. 20, Stelnbuchel, p. 274, Jarret, p. 94, 
and Carlyle, Vol. X, p. Ill ff» 
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1 
The estates were authoritarian estates comprising nobility, 
freemen, semi-freemen and serfs. The differences were based 
on birth, land and power. This authoritarian order was not 
only not independently changed by the Church; the Church also 
justified it ideologically, and even made itself a part of lt„ 
In the later Middle Ages the rising hierarchy of officials, 
and the lower ministerials and clerics joined the authoritarian 
order* By means of a combination of land with office, these 
new groups became an effective part of the order; tbe offices 
remained in their possession and were inherited by their 
heirs with the land0 It is well-known that the Church soon 
raised itself to the position of the biggest landowner, and 
from that time on it naturally became interested in the main­
tenance of serfdom, for the serf was necessary to the success­
ful cultivation of its property. The European social system 
at the time of Thomas Aquinas was entangled in a complex net­
work of feudal relationships from the East to the West and 
from North to South. Peasants and town-dwellers alike were 
unfree» The peasants were involved in the Dlenstrecht: the 
craft-guilds of the towns were estates of servitude. Even 
within the individual estates and their organisations in 
Gilds and corporations only a very limited degree of freedom 
existed. The Medieval estate organisation meant a society 
based on privilege. 
1. Figgis, "Political Thought p. 12, Schwer, p. 9, 
Steinbuchel, p. 272 ff. 
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(j>) This authoritarian order found its expression in 
the Lex naturalis. The division into estates is justified 
by Thomas Aquinas. He distinguishes between the sui and alleni 
juris (2,11,183,1), thus recognising the estate of serfdom. 
The rich had further, a higher, and the poor a lower place. 
The hierarchy consisted of the optimates standing on the top, 
the bourgeois middle strata (populus honorabilis), and the 
serving estates (vilis populus) at the bottom— and was justi­
fied by Thomas in this form. "Una hierarchis est unus prin-
cipatus id est una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis 
gubernatione, non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, 
si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent"(I,108,2). 
Slavery is obviously legitimate, even if it is only defined 
as a necessary evil. Property remains unscathed (1,11,94 ad 
105), and is in no way considered as the product of original 
sin, and the theory of original communism is rejected.. Pro-
2 
perty is a necessary institution. 
This justification of the authoritarian order in Aquinas' 
natural law system corresponded to the conviction of the whole 
3 
Church, expressed in the literature of his time. Even 
1. Troeltsch, pp. 252-302. English Ed. Vol. I, pp.257-280. 
Aquinas' system is here designated as one of reconciliation. 
2. Linhardt, p, 207. 
3« Jarrett, p. 104 ff. Carlyle, Vol. I, p. 109 ff. 
Schwer, p. 34 ff. Steinbuchel, p. 259 ff. 
Augustine had justified slavery with the doctrine of original 
sin, and his followers have tried to use the analogy of the 
hierarchy of angels to justify the feudal order. 
So long as feudal society was static, and so long as 
town and country were in equilibrium and the poor could main­
tain themselves adequately, it was possible that in the mind 
of the average member of society as well as in the minds of 
their theorists, norm and will should coincide. But even in 
the time of Aquinas this was no longer the case. Even in bis 
lifetime there were disintegrating tendencies. 
To these new conflicts there corresponded the fact 
that the relations between natural and positive law beceme 
problematical — the question of sovereignty was raised. At 
the same time as the natural order was no longer felt to be 
identical with human society — i.e. when the feudal hierarch 
ical order was no longer accepted as the obvious social order 
and the modern state began to emerge — the divergence betwee 
natural law and sovereignty became evident. The process of 
divorce of positive from natural law, by which positive law 
became self-sufficient and autonomous, then set in, a process 
which, from the analogy of Max Weber's famous generalisation 
of the "disenchantment of the world", we may call a "disen­
chantment of the law". This process of disenchantment is 
no unbroken one, progressing -uninterrupted through years. 
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Relapses are frequent; law and morals, law and natural law 
are often confused, but the process finally finds its ex­
pression in the Kantian legal theory. The concrete contents 
of the bonum commune to which natural law was related in 
Aquinas' system became controversial. There arose the ques­
tion whether this bonum commune was really identical with the 
existing authoritarian order of estates. The process of dis­
enchantment of the law had already begun. When, according 
to Germanic legal thought and Roman law, the monarch was as­
serted to be bound by law, any justification on any other 
basis of the existing monarch necessarily became dubious <, 
The real ideological conflict hinted at had to break 
out, and did so in three spheres: in the relation between 
the Church and secular society; within the Church itself; 
and finally, within the secular society itself. 
/#• The Disintegration of the Thomlst Natural Law. 
'I i In the social and political teachings of the New Testa­
ment are already to be found disintegrating elements. The 
recognition of every man as a rational creature, the recogni­
tion of the freedom of the soul, and, above all, of human 
equality before God, were historic acts of Christendom. "There 
can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor 
free, there can be no male and female! for ye all are one man 
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in Christ Jesus". "Every Individual by virtue of his eternal 
destination is at the core somewhat holy and indestructible".1 
It is true that the divine law of human equality had no secular 
Intentions — only the soul was free. But the idea contained 
a psychological dynamic which had to complete itself 1„ spite 
of the theory of original sin; this has been formulated by 
Prof. Barker in this way: "If the slave can be treated as a 
man in any respect, he ought to be treated as a man in all; 
and the admission, that he can be regarded as a man, destroys 
that conception of his wholly slavish and non-rational (one 
might say non-human) character, which was the Justification 
of his being treated as a slave".2 This is practically our 
fourth thesis: the recognition of freedom and equality in 
one sphere leads to the postulate of freedom and equality in 
others. 
The divergence of natural from positive law — of 
natural law from the social order _ occurred when the social 
substructure was no longer closed, no longer undisturbed, and 
appeared no longer negative in its function. The conflict 
between domination and norm, between will and Ratio, was often 
not only a theoretical possibility, but a social reality. 
1. Gierke-MaitlancL, p. 82. 
•lonl' E\!frker' "The Political Thought of Plato and Arlstot^' 
V0?!'lP-p!63|9.Slmllarly' T™"sch, P. 410. English £ans?" ' 
I on 
The relation of tho secular powov to tho Church »m) 
the Justification of tho secular pow»r at all, became pro­
blematical on tho basis of tho social and political touching 
of the New Testament in the now situation. Tho manifold 
possibilities of Interpretation of tho Now Testament are wn.11-
known: "Let every soul be in subjection to tho higher powers, 
for there is no power but of Ood; and tho powers that bo urn 
ordained by (Jod. Therefore, he that reslsteth bho powor 
withstandeth the ordinance of Ood"• (St. Paul to tho Romans, 
ch« XIII, v. 1-7.) Rut this statement calling, for obodlonco 
to the secular power is opposed to other statements such us i 
"Render unto Caesar tho things that are Caesar's"! or that 
commanding more obedience to Hod than is given to Cwosar. 
All constitute the word of Ood, which admit of varyi ng inter-
1 
pretatione according to the political situation. Frltr, Korri, 
in his fine work on Dante has expounded tho problem 1n this 
way: "la the task of a Christian social theory of forming a 
community of free individual souls at all possible? Tjoom not 
the liberty of the individual, ltgelf Its own aim, exclude 
the possibility of subordination under u communal organisation?" 
1. "Humana Civllltas, "fJtaat, Klrche und Kultur, e1n« 
Danteuntersuchung", Leipzig, lfJ13, p. lft. 
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(J) Not only the lnnor dynamics of the originally 
conservative Christian teachings and of the non-secular pos­
tulate of equality, but also the Interests of the Church It­
self tend In the some direotlon. The problem of revolution 
against the secular power becomes a political problem for the 
Church as soon as the emperore themselves adopt the Christian 
faith* The Church then determines not only to recognise the 
right of resistance, but even the duty of resistance, against 
1 
heretics and pagans. Further, the Church recognises the 
right of resistance against such emperors as are neither here­
tics nor pagans, but who refuse to submit to the will of the 
2 
Pope. For Ood, "I.e. the undisputed agent of tfod's rule", 
Is the sovereign to whom the secular power Is subject I subject 
not becauee of might, but because, as has b«en laid down by 
Boniface VIII In his "Dellberatlo", It Is Its mission to fulfil 
God's law, for the liberation of the human soul* 
A competing power, however, stood opposed to this claim 
to supremacy. Society was always conceived and postulated to 
Z be a unitarian one. It stands, as we learned, from the Thomist 
philosophy, under one lex aeterna. And a unity of execution 
1. F. Kern, "(iottesgnadentum u, Widerstandsrecht", p. 21&, 
and Figgis, "Political Thought .p. 17. 
2. Carl Schwltt, "Polltische Theologle", 2nd Kd» Mtlnchen 
und Leipzig, 1S24, p. 10. 
3. Gierke-Waltland, p. 9 ff. and Figgis, "Political 
Thought p. 57. 
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of the law corresponds to the unity of the law Itself. 
(Boniface VIII.) The factual superiority of the papal power 
over the secular had as its consequences that at first the 
2 Church society absorbed the secular one. Already under 
Gregory VII Sacerdocium and Imperium were joined hand in hand. 
The pope held both swords. Under Innocent III finally, the 
plenitudo potestatis had developed into sovereignty. The 
claim to sovereignty is deduced from the postulate of the 
rule of the divine law, which is issued from God himself. 
For the Church, the king who governs unjustly ceases to be 
3 
king. Rex and Rectum are indivisible. But who is to decide 
in each case whether a ruler shall forfeit his power? And 
what legal consequences follow upon such a forfeiture? The 
Church, transcending the formless right of resistance, or­
ganises the right of resistance and provides for punishments, 
ranging in severity from voluntary penance to declaratory 
deposition* These clerical punishments are later operated 
4 
in the secular sphere. The influence of the conflict around 
the postulate of a sphere of freedom is a dual one, in which 
1. Gierke-Maitland, p. 104, note 9. 
2. Figgis, "Political Thought p. 57, Gierke-Maitland, 
p. 105, note 10. 
3. Carlyle, Vol. I, p. 22 ff., Fritz Kern, "Gottesgnaden-
tum u. Wiederstandsrecht", App. XXIII and p. 396 ff. 
4. Carlyle, Vol. II, p. 203, Ch. H. Mcllwain, p. 220. 
Ill 
in every phase (from the Investiture struggle to Innocent III, 
and from Marsilius of Padua to the Monarchomachs) the postulate 
of a natural law guaranteed liberty is put forward by the 
rising, aggressive institutions. 
In the first phase, therefore, the Church determines 
to carry through its supremacy and its postulate of a sphere 
of freedom from the secular power as against the already es­
tablished feudal system. In this period the Church recognised 
an extraordinarily far-reaching right of resistance, going 
sometimes even as far as anarchism and fighting, especially 
1 
in the investitutre struggle. Thus, natural law was retained 
by the Church even after it had achieved its aim. The very 
attainment of its aim changed the function of this natural 
law from a revolutionary into a conservative one. It now 
became conservative, and was faced with two opposing forces: 
an extra-clerical and an intra-clerical one, both of which 
were primarily not Interested in the liberty of the individual 
from the state and in the postulate of democratic rights of 
individuals within the state, but were incidentally forced 
to support such postulates. 
In so far as the sovereignty of the state as against 
that of the Church was not simply alleged as a datum of the 
divine plan of the world (as in Dante) it was justified by 
I. Fritz Kern, "Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht". 
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the reduction of the will of the state to the wills of the 
individuals composing it, the realisation of which came for­
ward as a new value to smash the medieval system of values. 
The theorists in this category belong almost without exception 
to the nominalistic party of the Scholastics, especially 
William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua, The conflict of 
the nominalists with the Church is accompanied by the begin­
nings of the breaking free of secular natural law from the 
established divine one, which, after having shown its flexi­
bility for a long time, had now reached its limits. Natural 
lar and positive law which coincided in the philosophy of 
1 
Aquinas, stand unrelated in the nominalist philosophy. The 
process of dissolution of the feudal order had already reached 
such a stage that the obvious assertion of the coincidence 
of natural and positive law, or of material and political 
law, could be no longer accepted. In the nominalistic philo­
sophy the belief in the existence of a natural law is well 
maintained, but the political law is emancipated from it. 
The law becomes a conscious invention, the creation of the 
whole of human society, and nothing else. The naturality of 
the feudal hierarchical order can no longer be justified. 
One way to its negation is opened out by the separation of 
political from natural law. 
1. Troeltsch, p. 283. Eng. Ed. Vol. I, p. 269. Criticism 
of the Nominalists on the reconciliation ethics of Thomas 
Aquinas. 
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(^) As we are not concerned with the history of 
we deal now exclusively with a short presentation of those 
elements of the system of Marsilius of Padua which are relevant 
to our investigation. 
Marsilius of Padua postulates first a certain distribu­
tion of spheres between the Church and the State. Here the 
object of the Church is the morality of the conscience, while 
& 
that of the state is morality of deed. He declares society 
to be unitarian, but the Church is incorporated in it and 
subordinated to it. The postulates of Gregory or Innocent III 
and of Boniface VIII are, therefore, simply reversed. And in 
so far as Marsilius fights the exercise of the vis coactiva 
by the Church, he is in full agreement with nearly all Nomin­
alists and with Dante. 
The sphere of state sovereignty as defined in this 
way is now justified by two different arguments: 
In the first place he subordinates the secular power 
to material law— i.e. to Natural law (material justification). 
The legislator, electing the Pars Principans (Diet. I. Ch.XIV) 
stands himself under Its domination. By this, law becomes a 
dual command: on the one hand the command of the sovereign, 
1. Cf. edition of C.P. Previte-Orton, Cambridge, 1928. 
2. 
114 
the machinery of coercion (Liet. I, Ch. X) which can differ 
as tc content from the divine law; and on the other hand 
law is the science of the just — i.e. a natural law, an 
eternal and unchanging character standing above the state 
and limiting it„ This natural law is only to a small extent 
concretised, "but it is nevertheless sufficiently institution­
alised by giving the courts the power to depose the monarch 
(Diet, I, Ch. XV & XVI). By this the right of liberty of the 
state against the Church is oartially based on a right of 
liberty of the subject against the state. 
The sphere of sovereignty of the state against the 
Church is at the same time based on the liberty of the people 
within the state, and on the recognition of democratic rights 
of the people. The usual presentation of Marsllius of Padua's 
1 
theory is that he "with democratic radicalism" opposed the 
universitas civium to the pars principans. Sovereign being, 
according to such a presentation, the people as legislator 
(and he understood by "people" all enfranchised citizens), 
this right of the people to sovereignty is inalienable. The 
substance of the legislative power lay always with the peoplo 
or its elected representatives. The will of the state is the 
will of the people. The legislation institutes a monarch; it 
binds him; it corrects him; and it deposes him if necessary„ 
1. Gierke-Maitland, p. 46. 
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If such an Interpretation were right we would have to 
count Marsilius of Padua as a modern radical democrat„ That 
this is not the case has been convincingly shown "by Ch.McIlwain. 
It is true that in the system of Marsilius every form of gov­
ernment is supposed to be created by the legislator, and the 
best form of government is the constitutional monarchy, under 
the rule of material law, working for the common good of the 
community. But who is the legislator? The answer is given 
by Diet. I, Ch. XII. Does this Chapter contain the recogni­
tion of the modern principle of majority rule? Undoubtedly 
not; for the following statement appears: "I call it valen-
tiorem partem having In mind the number and the quality of 
1 
the citizens". An evaluation of the citizens according to 
their qualities openly contradicts the democratic majority 
principle# His Achilles heel, as in so many other theories, 
even up to the French Revolution and modern Fascism, lies in 
his definition of "people". "People" is not the modern people 
tf A I 3 
of free legally and politically citizens; it is, on the 
contrary, the pars valentior of the Middle Ages* 
"People" is therefore a thoroughly anti-democratic 
concept. It Is concerned with the totality of all those 
groups which, according to the medieval conception, are en­
titled to represent the genuine people. The anti-democratic 
lo Translation from Ch. Mcllwain, p. 303. 
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character of the system obviously does not exclude its revolu-
tionary Mrtms. 
We repeat that in the system of Marsilius every command 
of the state is justified in a dual way: genetically by its 
origin in the will of the people; materially by its contents — 
from natural law. 
(^) The second attack against natural law, now trans­
formed from a liberal into a conservative factor, and against 
the Church, arose from the Conciliar Theory. The defeat of 
the Conciliar Theory influenced the fate of the modern state 
and its relations with material law in two ways. The attack 
of the theorists of the Conciliar movement prevented the 
medieval ideas of natural law and the idea of people's sover­
eignty from falling into oblivion. The writings of Oerson 
and of Nicholas of Cusa exercised a far-reaching Influence. 
The victory of Papal sovereignty against the Conciliar Theory 
paved the way, on the other hand, for modern absolutism, and 
hereby for the modern centralised state. The political 
history lying at the roots of the Conciliar Theory, viz: the 
Babylonian imprisonment of the Church from 1309-1376, and the 
Great Schism — are assumed to be well-known. It is also 
well-known that this development of the Conciliar Theory arose 
from the claims of competing Popes for universal domination 
* 
(with all its consequences, and based on the justification 
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given by Gregory VII in hi a "Dictatua Papa*") and that Papal 
absolutism had necessarily to be victorious as soon as the 
Babylonian imprisonment came to an end and the Great Schism 
was healed. 
1 
Figgis rightly observed that: the decree issued by the 
Counoil of Constance in 1415, at the suggestion of Cteraon, is 
a revolutionary document of the greatest oonaequenoe, "Uon-
cilium generale fscions et eccleaiam catholicam repreaentans 
potestateni a Chriato immediate habet, cui quillbet cuiusounque 
status vol dignitatis, etiamal papalls exiatat, obedlre tenetur 
q 
in his quae pertinent ad fldem." The most accomplished for­
mulation is undoubtedly to be found in the work of Nicholas 
of Cuaa, "De Concordantla Catholloa". Here the iualienable 
right of the Christian man to freedom from the interference 
of the state, and to democratic liberties within the state, 
ia recognised as against the Papal claim to sovereignty. 
"Cum natura omnes sint liberi, turn omnia princlpatua ... et 
a sola ooncordantia et oonaensum subjecto." (IX.13.) It 
follows from this recognition of natural law that all consti­
tutions of human society have their roots in natural law. 
1. "Political Thought p. 41. 
2. Original Text, in .Figgis, p. 41. Trans1. by Mcllwaln , 
p. 34 aa follows: "A general Counoil constituting ami repre­
senting the Catholic Churoh, has authority immediately from 
Christ, which everyone in existence of whatsoever status and 
dignity, even of Papal, is bound to obey in those things 
which pertain to faith". 
lis 
"Omnes constitutio radlatur in jure naturale; et si el con-
tradlcit, constitutio valida esse nequit." (11.14.) And they 
are void if they contradict this natural law. It further 
follows in applying the principles to clerical society that 
the Papal claim to sovereignty cannot he justified. "Papa 
non est universalus Episcopus sed super alius primus et sacro-
rum Conciliorum non in Papa sed in consensu omnium vigorem 
fundamus." (11.13.) That he does not understand by "omnium" 
the totality of the people of the Church, but only the clerical 
aristocracy is of no decisive importance for us, for we are 
discussing only the immanent revolutionary force of his 
teachings. The significance of Nicholas of Cusa can hardly 
be overestimated. Whether it is right to call him the last 
2 
representative of Thomism, the last great medieval thinker, 
would appear to be extremely doubtful. The decisive charac­
teristic of the Thomist system, the assertion of the coinci­
dence of natural moral law and the legal order, is in reality 
completely lacking. Such an assertion would not have been 
feasible for Nicholas of Cusa; feudal society in his time was 
already disintegrating. It appears to us to be much more 
3 
correct to say that in his system Justice and the political 
1. Figgis, "Political Thought p. 68. 
2. Ibid., and Ch. Mcllwain, p. 349. 
3. As does also Borkenau, p. 43. 
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order are completely divorced. The emphasis laid on individual 
liberty and on democratic rights within the Church, leads to 
a sharp differentiation in his work between natural law con­
taining the rules of natural occurrences and morality, and 
the legal order containing normative commands emanating from 
the wills of men. Thus he is far away from the Thomist system; 
in fact he belongs, with Marsilius of Padua, to the modern 
theorists of natural law# 
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CHAPTER II 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Material Law: 
The Monarchomachs and English Natural Law. 
A. The Monarchomachs. 
1. The conception of the Divine Right of Kings in the 
sense of the seventeenth century, i.e., in the sense of royal 
irresponsibility, was completely alien to Germanic as well as 
to medieval law. Bracton conceived the king to be God's 
"vicar and minister on earth". 
Germanic and medieval monarchies were conceived to be 
neither undelegated by origin nor unlimited in practice. In 
this conception the Church and Germanic Law were unanimous. 
The king has to determine a law, the contents of which are 
aLready materially conditioned. The sole justification of the 
state is that it is a means for the realisation of the law. 
"Not the monarchy but the law shall be sovereign." This law 
which binds the monarch is according to Germanic and Anglo-
Saxon tradition customary law. It is conservative, i.e., it 
essentially protects existing rights. Any interference of 
the monarch with existing rights is legitimate only with the 
%. Kern, p. 143; Stubbs, I, pp. 213, 290. 
(l^sT^p18]^' R°b30n' "Civilisation and the Growth of Law" 
121 
1 Consensus Fidelium. This was generally recognised by the 
monarchs at the coronation (Trla Praecepta) which contained 
a genuine Promissio. The German coronation ceremony of the 
thirteenth century puts the following question to the monarch: 
"Are you prepared to administer and to defend the Kingdom 
which is granted to you by God, according to the justice of 
your fathers?" Only after the monarch had answered this 
question in the affirmative were the people asked whether 
they were prepared to submit themselves to his rule. This 
promissio, however, is no contract, i.e., it is not consti­
tutive but declaratory, because it only declares already 
existing objective law. To this subordination of the monarch 
to the law, there corresponds not only a right but even a 
duty of resistance on the part of the people. Injustice on 
the part of the sovereign can be opposed with force (Saohsen-
spiegel), consequently the right to murder the king is an 
Integral part of Germanic law. The subject does not own 
obedience but faith. Paith is a mutual relationship involv-
2 
ing mutual rights and duties. If the king violates his duty 
of keeping faith the people are automatically freed from 
their duty of keeping faith. This idea is formulated thus 
by Manegold von Lautenbach: "Only a faithful king has faithful 
1. Kern, Appendix VIII, pp. 317, 325. Stubbs, pp. 158, 141. 
Pollock-Maitland, I, p. 41. 
2. Kern, Appendices XX, XXI. 
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1 
subject8." If on© was convinced that the monarch had vio­
lated the law, one fought for the monarchy against the monarch. 
The frequency of medieval revolts, especially in the classical 
country of revolts, in Saxony between 1060 and 1070, bears out 
the radicalism of this right of resistance. The Church in its 
Canonic Law, has, as we have already shown, formalised and 
organised the formless rigjit of resistance by creating punish-
2 ments later adopted in the secular sphere. 
2. But who is entitled to exercise this right of resist­
ance? In order to answer this question it is necessary to 
refer back to the tradition of Roman Law which gave birth to 
the idea of people's sovereignty, that deadly foe of monarch-
3 
ical absolutism. Manegold von Lautenbach in his "Liber ad 
Gebehardum" (1083-5) already put forward the theory of people's 
sovereignty, and postulated the lex regla as a contract in 
which the people appear as master, and the king as the ser-4 5 
vant. For Lupoid von Bebenburg the electors were the repre­
sentatives of the people. They acted for the unlversltas 
1. Pollock-Maitland, I, p.524; Kern, p. 171: Figgis, "Political Thought", p. 29. 
2. Carlyle, II, p. 203. 
3. Gierke, "Althusius", pp. 71-2. 
4. Kurt Wolzendorff, "Staatsrecht und Naturrecht". 
5. Gierke, "Althusius", p. 125ff. 
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Ipsa voce et euctorltate. and are entitled to depose the 
sovereign. 
This theory of people's sovereignty does not, however, 
stop at the issue of means of repression against wrong-doing, 
but rather develops preventive means against the commission 
of su<*h wrong-doing as well; this was especially so in the 
period of "estates" as is shown by the German law books. The 
famous example is the judgment against John Lackland in 1202. 
A special formulation of this idea of the initiation of pre­
ventive measures is to be found in the Magna Charta. It is 
not decisive in this case that the king himself is bound to 
the fulfilment of certain aims, and that the right of resist 
ance is recognised as a sort of potential punishment for the 
king; the characteristic feature is not so much either that 
the Barons are entitled to use force to make the king complete 
the specified alms; rather is it that the barons are consti­
tuted as a permanent organ which has to supervise the per­
formance of the king18 duties, and if necessary, to enforce 
1 
them compulaorily. This, however, is not yet a recognition 
of the rigit of con dominium of the estates. This new agency 
did not function, in its place the estates developed and the 
controlling function of the new organ was transferred to the 
con dominium of the estates. It could not function because, 
1. Kern, p. 277, and Theodore P.T. Plucknett, "A Concise 
History of the Common Law", p. 23. 
\VA 
aa In ovary oaao of control or ono atato organ by another 
tho question at on a a ftroem — who control* tho control lorar 
1 
&L1 u ouatod 1 at lpao a oua t od <%af 
To this dovalopmout thorn corresponded a development 
from tho postulate or n responsible sacular power bo the de­
mand for political ri«hta within the atatoi !.«., to the 
poatulato or the roellaablon or people*a aovaroIttnty . Th« 
olalm ror domination or the oat at an in Just triad with tho 
aid or the technical legal category or the contract, Natural 
law, or whatever nama una «tv«» tho theory, haa only aonond-
ary functlona. Th1a aan bo nlumn In branch aa wall aa In 
fj 
ttnKllnh 1 of/Ml hlatory. Whan baaki dec Ureal "For onoe It 1a 
clear, that tho Prlnco holda his power upon conditions, H 
boo own a nocoogary to dlaoovor tho mnanti through which thoao 
oonditlona may bo enrorcod", tho tnoana Juab If3 ad by natural 
law Tor tho fulfilment or thoao oondltlona become decisive. 
Tho theme probandor natural l«w ia generally not a 11®^-
£i£iSa or tho pernor or tho ate to, but only tho dotormlnet 1 ou 
or a oortaln brand and oontont or Ita activity. a certain 
group domando either oxolualvo control, or In any caao, con 
—control or tho atato powar * The varloua 
syatoma of natural law are only ideologies of Justification 
which are given up aa aoon aa tho postulated political alma 
1. MoKeobnie, p. 476, 
2, Introduction to "Junius Brutus, a borotiao or blbortv against Tyranta", ho/idori 108-4, p, fl. 
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are attained. Political democracy — i.e., the integration 
of the will of the state through the free election of repre­
sentatives, and the majority principle — and natural law 
institutionalised by the right of resistance, are two contra­
dictory principles. Natural law disappears. When in a demo­
cratic era, natural law has a so-called renaissance, it has 
nearly always a reactionary end in view — viz., the limita-
« tion of the will of the people An so far as it becomes danger­
ous to the property system. 
This thesis, which can only be Justified by a social 
history of natural law, can only be very shortly dealt with 
here. Its co)»«r4tene8s is shown by the instance of the theory 
of the monarchomachs. Here it can be proved that it was never 
a question of carrying out the rule of material law, but of 
1 
carrying out certain political demands. 
3. The theory of the monarchomachs is undoubtedly rooted 
in the teachings of Calvin, who has made no original contri-
bution to the theory of state and law. Calvin's theory is Kot 
aaly only important in so far as he denies the right of re­
sistance and postulates obedience to the state; it also bears 
out his statement (1559, Instltutio rellglonls) that if there 
1. On the problem see, above all, Charles Labitte, "De la 
democratie chez les preaicateurs de le Ligue", 2eme ed. Paris 
1865; G.P. Gooch-Harold J. Laski, "English Democratic Ideas 
in the 17th Century", 2nd Ed., Cambridge 1927, pp.9-23; 
H.J. Laski, "Introduction to Junius Brutus", op.cit., and 
Kurt Wolzendorff, "Staatsrecht u. Naturrecht", op.cit. 
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are in a state, organs of the people for the limitation of 
the power of the prince, these organs have not only the right, 
but even the duty of opposing any excess of the sovereign 
power. Such organs are, in his view, the estates; and he 
declares: "Comme sont possible, aujourd'hui en chacun royaume 
les trois estats, quand ils sont assembles". (Institution 
Chrestienne, Libre IV, Ch. XX, p. 51.) This theory of Calvin 
contains nothing new. It is nothing but the presentation of 
the positive constitutional law; but Just because of his 
legal realism, his teachings could become the basis of the 
monarchomachlcal theory. 
The pamphlets of the Huguenots up to the St. Bartholo­
mew's night, are a clear expression of this constitutional­
ism, distinguished by an equally strong dislike of absolutism 
and of anarchism. This constitutional theory is mainly based 
on French legal history. It is never asserted that one is 
prepared to fight against the king; it is always alleged that 
one would fight for him in order to guard him from bad coun­
sel and to protect the throne from the claims of the Pope. 
As against this Huguenot theory, the Catholic Front 
postulated absolute obedience even to heretics. 
A change occurs after the Edict of Lonjumeau, which 
hurt Catholic pride (deposition of the Chancellor Michel de 
1'Hospital, 1568), and the Catholic Front becomes radicalised. 
n>7 
It demands the extermination of the heretics, whilo the 
Huguenot Front remains constant until the Night of St. Barth-
olomew whioh destroyed its belief in absolutism and led to 
a radicalism most dearly expressed by De Mornay: "L'Etat 
s'est ebranl$ depuis la Journ$e de St. Barth$l6my, depula 
dis-Je que la foi du Prinoe envers le sujet et du sujet envers 
le Prinoe, qu4 est le seul oiment qui entretient lea Stata 
en un, s'est si outrageusement dSmentie". 
In Hotman's Pranoo Oallioa, 1573, the contents of 
Natural law are very small. He tries to prove that historic­
ally the prinoe's power was always limited by the estates, 
and he does it on the basis of comparative legal investiga­
tions, The result is Calvin — positive law grants the right 
of resistance to the estates as the representatives of the 
people. As little natural-rightly is Buchanan's "De iure 
regnl apud sootos"; the deoisive faot in his work is that ho 
renders Sootch law absolute. The merit of his work is the 
introduction of the Qermanlo conception that the asoent to 
the throne is a genuine oontraot without regard to whether 
the monaroh is hereditary or eleoted. 
The Night of St» Bartholomew made a considerably daopor 
impression on the author of "Vindlcia oontra Tyrannos". Here 
induotive historical faots stand beside deduotlve natural law 
1. This word "natural-rightly" has been created by Maitland 
in connection with Oierke'a "Political Theory of the Middle 
Ages in accordance with the German MI "Naturrochtllch". 
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arguments. The positivist exposition of the relation subject 
and authority, with its denial of the right of individual 
resistance and its recognition of the right for the magistrate 
and the optimate, is historically in the same category as 
that of Hotman. Just as Hotman he introduces comparative 
legal investigations in order to show that the right of re­
sistance of the estates Is an empirical principle and general 
for all times. But for the first time he transcends Hotman 
and introduces genuine postulates belonging to natural law: 
viz« when all optimas, or only some of them, exercise tyranny, 
the right of resistance is transferred automatically to the 
people. The way in which he argues is interesting. It Is 
decisive that he does in fact base the right of revolution 
on two arguments to be found in the theory of Marsilius of 
Padua: genetically by the fact the king appears as the dele** 
gate of the people, and materially by the fact that he is 
bound by natural law* But is worth while mentioning that the 
1 
genetleal Justification has a partially reactionary character. 
"Though the sovereignty of the people is admitted, nay in­
sisted on, the sovereignty of the majority Is tacitly denied, 
where it might endanger the supposed interest and liberty of 
a part." 
1. Gooch-Laski, p. 14. 
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We can stun up by saying that the writings ol' the 
Protestant Monarchomachs corresponding to their Calvinist 
origins, show^ a remarkably small amount of natural law apart 
from du Plessis Mornay, who, however, lived In the free air 
of the Netherlands. The centre of gravity lies In the working 
out of the principles of positive law which recognise the 
right of resistance of the estates. 
In 1584 finally there ocourred a last change. With 
the death of Anjou the Hugenots become conservative* The 
real power goes over to the Ligue which carries out radioally 
the old theories of the Huguenots. 
Bouoher (1589) "De iusta Henricl tertll abdloatlono e 
Francorum regno, libitr quatuor", Justified in a natural-rightly 
way the right of deposition of the tyrant. But even ho under­
stood by the people entitled to depose him only the estates; 
and he approached the constitutionalism of the Huguonots again 
in his attempt to base his theory on historical investigations 
going baok (and rightly) even as far as feudal law* 
Rossaeus (1590) "De lusta rel publloyf chrlstianae in 
reges impios et haeretioos auotoritataeM, takes the via media 
by generalising the principles of positive constitutional 
law. In the oentre of his investigations he puts the duty 
of the monaroh to state and law« Prom the difference between 
the state and its highest organ, and the superiority of the 
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ends of the state as against those of the monarch, he deduces 
the right to depose the heretic monarch, or the summoning of 
the citizens to refuse to obey him. 
Mariana, ( Jbannis Marian!ae Hispani e Socletate Jesu 
de rege et regis lnstitutionae, Libri III), the famous Spanish 
Jesuit, worked out a genuine system of Natural law; hut this 
construction of natural law only hides his sole aim: viz. to 
break the power of the heretic monarchs. He also starts from 
the positive constitutional law, giving the estates the right 
of deposition; but Just as the work of de Mornay does, he 
transcends positive law and grants the right of revolution 
also in the case when a public! conventus is impossible. But 
even in this case, the individual has no right to revolt; he 
creates a substitute for the meeting of the estates — viz# 
an emergency meeting of the "men of public standing"• We 
may sum up by saying that the monarchomachlcal right of re­
sistance is far more justified by positive than by natural 
law, and therefore is a direct continuation of the correspond­
ing Germanic legal Institutions. 
Only the actual contents of state activity were of 
importance for the monarchomachs• The postulate of democratic 
freedom was equally alien alike to the Protestants and to the 
Catholics# Charles Labitte was therefore able to say: "La 
democratle calvlnisme et la democratic catholique ont done 
KVl 
1 
ete une flotion". And this very faot of oonuilete diain-
tereatednes8 in the basio problems of liberty and democracy 
haa to a large extent contributed to the strengthening of 
French absolutism* The right of the estates to resistance 
as an element of positive constitutional law haa, in conse­
quence disappeared; it disappeared as soon as the estates 
were granted con dominium by the constitution« With the rise 
of monarchical absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the right of resistance arose afresh in the 
theories of Althuslus, Orotius and Looke. Now, however, the 
importance of the natural law ideology beoame visible, with 
the same signifloaned in tho works of De Mornay and Mariana, 
1. Page 366. 
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B. English Natural Law. 
1* Natural law plays as small a r£le in England. The 
influence of Roman and Canonic law in Medieval England is 
still a much disputed question# We can assume as probable 
that their influence was stronger than is usually expected. 
Investigations such as those by Ch# Mcllwain and C.O. Haines 
in which traces of natural law can be found, seem to us in­
sufficiently formulated; firstly because the subject of the 
rule of natural law is too broad, and secondly because the 
relations of natural law to social interests are not suffi­
ciently taken into consideration# We have stressed very often 
that we understand by natural law, a system of norms which 
1# See: Ch. H. Mcllwain, "The High Court of Parliament 
and its Supremacy", New Haven, 1910. G.P. Gooch-H#J0 Laski, 
"English Democratic Ideas in the 17th century", 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, 1927. Ch. 0. Haines, "The Revival of Natural Law 
Concepts", Cambridge, Mass., 1930. Magna Carta Commemoration 
Essays, ed# H.E. Maiden, 1917. Sir Frederick Pollock, "A 
Plea for an Historical Interpretation lAr. XXXIX (1923), 165. 
William S. McKechnie, "Magna Carta", 2nd Ed. Theodore P. 
Plucknett, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review", Harv. L.R.XL 
(1926), 30. Sir Frederick Pollock, "Essays in the Law", 
London, 1922. F.W. Maltland, "The Constitutional History of 
England", Cambridge. Sir Frederick Pollock, "The Expansion 
of Common Law". Sir William S« Holdsworth, "A History of 
English Law", 4th ed. Ibid.* Sir Edward Coke, in The Cam­
bridge Law Journal, (5) 1935, p# 332 ff. Henri L^vy-Ullmann, 
"The English Legal Tradition, its Sources and History", 
transl. M. Mitchell, London, 1935, p. 222. 
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is not Identical with those rules or norms created by tho 
state, but which is supposed to correct, limit and modify this 
positive law* We therefore are not able to state with Pollock 
1 
and Haines that the existence of legal standards of conduct 
such as "reasonable", or "reasonableness", any more than the 
existence of equity, necessarily involves the rule of natural 
law. For these norms are not natural law In the sense de­
fined by us above, because the concepts of "reasonableness" 
and the question of equity are not used for the correction 
and limitation of the will of the state when that will is 
clearly and unambiguously expressed# The positive signifi­
cance of the legal standards of conduct and of equity will be 
dealt with exhaustively later on* It cannot be doubted that 
the terminology of the legal standards of conduct, as of the 
2 
equity principle, has been Influenced by natural law. They 
themselves, however, belong exclusively to the sphere of 
positive law* Only in the case of a court which has expressed 
its view that an Act of Parliament should be declared void, 
because it is In contradiction with the principles of "reason­
ableness" or of public policy or of equity, can we speak of 
the rule of natural law* But such circumstances have not 
1* Pollock, "The Expansion of Common Law", p. 108, 
"Essays", pp. 63, 68, 69, Haines, p* 39 ff* 
2* William A. Robson, "Civilisation and its Growth of 
Law" (1935), p. 231. 
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existed since Bonham's case. 
Secondly, in analysing a system of natural law we have 
to put the question: have political groups used arguments 
derived from natural law in their attacks on existing power 
positions, and how have they behaved with regard to natural 
law after their ends have been achieved? 
2* In the Middle Ages in England, as well as on the 
Continent, the thesis of the illimitability of the monarchical 
power was unknown. The monarch was supposed to be bound by 
customary law* In England as on the Continent, law in feudal 
times was not enactment but records. The Judges' decisions 
were taken on the basis of custom. The conception of the 
creation of law as the free deed of man was equally unknown* 
England and the Continent were alike ruled by this conserva­
tive customary law* It was class law directed towards the 
* maintenance of privileges. With this mental unity of law 
and ethics, customary law had taken on the character of a 
natural law standing above the king, who dared not violate 
it. The decisive question, however, is: who is to decide 
whether this customary law has been violated by the king? 
And the significance of the Magna Carta in its time does not 
lie in the recognition of natural law, but as we have already 
1. Mcllwain, p* 42 ff. 
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shown, in the creation of a permanent organisation with the 
function of deoiding whether the monarch has fulfilled his 
obligations» But since that time the political struggle in 
England has been concentrated in the question of the poli­
tical con dominium of the estates and as soon as this con 
dominium had been realised, natural law disappeared in Eng­
land. The positive law grants sufficient rights to the es­
tates as against the monarch, and the need for it no longer 
exists. Only in the seventeenth century when the rising 
bourgeoisie had not yet succeeded in winning those political 
rights for itself, did natural law begin to play a new r$le. 
In the revolutionary wars it is used by the different groups 
each for their own conflicting purposes. It was used and dis­
pensed with according to the needs of the moment, Just an in 
the struggles of the monarchomachs theories warn changed like 
shirts. Natural law had no independent significance in tl'ios* 
struggles and eventually disappeared from the Kngllsh scene. 
Sovereignty of Parliament had been established in the revolu­
tionary wars and it seemed no longer necessary. It is to lie 
noted, however, that this disappearance did not Imply that 
the conception of natural lew was never to be revived usetf\U."l;y 
in the future. 
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3# The best-known case is that of Bonham. Prof* 
Plucknett has, however, clearly shown it to he an isolated 
one, and the precedents used by Coke to be quite incorrect. 
I therefore do not think too much can be deduced from it as 
to the existence of the rule of natural law. The political 
character of the conflict between Coke and James I is so 
clear that further discussion of it would be superfluous« 
It seems inadmissible to maintain on the basis of Coke's wit­
ness that natural law played any decisive role in legal 
practice; for Coke was similar in this to Cicero — a pure 
advocate, "He approached both, history and law with a mind 
of a strenuous advocate* All through his life he never ceased 
2 to be an advocate of legal doctrines and political causes," 
Our theory becomes extremely clear with the instance of the 
struggle of the revolutionary parties; so clear, that Mcllwain 
himself has to admit the relative character of natural law 
in this period. He himself proves that natural law was a 
5 
double-edged weapon. 
4 
In Prynne's pamphlet, sovereign power of Parliament, 
1. 8 Co. 114 a (C.P.1610) and 2 Brown 1. 255 (C.P. 1610). 
2. Holdsworth, V, p. 475. 
3. p. 91. 
4. Gooch-Laski, p, 99, Mcllwain, p. 154. 
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the eubjeot of natural law, and the theory of people'* 
sovereignty are oombined* Selden on the other hand, (Tabl*> 
Talk," Law of Nature* and Tabla Talk'King") rejeots any theory 
of a natural law guaranteeing libertiesj i*e* any theory of 
the rights of man. Hut In his polltloal praotlee, an for 
instanoe in the aforementioned oeee of the five Knight*, or 
In Hampden's oaae, he le compelled to have reoourne to natural 
law* For the "law of the land", the supremacy of whloh he 
asserts, le a law dlstlnot from positive law, a hletorloally 
superseded law whleh has become In his view absolute* In 
oonsequenoe of his opposition he thorefore applied the natural 
law Ideology in spite of his theoretical denial of the rights 
of man. 
Similar to the theoretloal antagonism between Pryrme 
and Selden is that within the Levellers* Lilburne is at th« 
same time a liberal and a democrat* He postulates natural 
*f (L. l>«(rfik 
law and sovereignty^both at onoe* In his theory of Natural 
law, which appears to his opponents to be a total abrogation 
of the law, he asks for Free Trade and the abolition of 
monopolies and privileges* He stood in opposition to Cromwell, 
and )»he»eXa»«/ saw in a system of natural law, not only a limi­
tation of the power of the monarchy, but also an infringement 
of the authority of parliament* In "The Legall Fundamentall 
Liberty of the People of England", he asserts the nullity of 
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aots containing a prolongation of parliamentj he baaes his 
proof on Bonham's case, Iroton on the other hand, (Honda 
of tho Proposals), denied the theory of Natural law beoauae 
he could see no way of building a state on the baala of auoh 
an anarchical theory. But in his comprehensive statement, 
"The sole foundation of rights is the law of the land", 
natural law reappears in Just tho same way as in Seldon. 
In the writings of the Communists (John Hare, Hurtlab, 
Chamberlen and Winatanley), a radical natural law ideology 
is introduced and pursued to its logical conclusion of Com­
munism, especially after the abolition of the monarchy, bad 
harvests, high prioes and unstable wages had worsened the 
position of the people considerably# The principle of natural 
equality stands in the oentre of their propaganda* 
Cromwell himself in his well-known way takes the via. 
media. Theoretically he was an adherent of natural law, as 
is demonstrated in his often-quoted speech of Nov, 9, lft(H, 
where he deolares himself for Ma fundamental law, somewhat 
like a magna carta". He does not realise, however, in prac­
tice, this idea of natural law* to him the oreation of an 
efficient sovereign power was far more Important. 
It is well-known also that natural law was in addition 
to this a weapon in the hands of the Royalists, who considered 
it to be a security for the King. 
159 
4# With the stabilisation of the supremacy of Parlia­
ment, natural law definitely ceases to play a r$le in England. 
Even at the time of Henry VIII, the legislative charaoter of 
the Aots of Parliament could not be denied: the duty of 
1 judges to obey these Aots was uncontestable# Even in the 
sixteenth century, therefore, the current formula of the suprem­
acy of the law does not in any way mean the supremacy of natxir-
al law (of a material law), but exclusively the supremacy of 
a law created by parliament, a political law# And the prema­
ture death of natural law after an ailing life in England is 
due to just this early development of Parliamentarism# Eng­
lish natural law occupied a purely secondary position, as Is 
clearly demonstrated by English legal and constitutional 
history# 
It is obvious, however, that the identification of the 
supremacy of law with the supremacy of parliament in no way 
excludes the fact that in England oertain postulates were 
maintained with regard to the formal structure and contents 
of law# There was a very clear conception of the content and 
structure of law, even if it very often remained unexpressed# 
We mention this point now in order to return to It later in 
greater detail# On the Continent as well as in England, since 
the establishment of the sovereignty of the law In the seven­
teenth century, nLaww has always been understood to mean a 
1# Cf. Holdsworth, IV, p. 187. 
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general rule Issued by Parliament. Natural law Is authority 
by positive general rule. The premature death of natural 
law, guaranteeing liberties on the basis of the fundamental 
idea of people's sovereignty, has in fact however, paradoxi­
cally enough, contributed to the realisation of those very 
liberties contained in the natural law ideology. Whereas in 
Germany the bourgeoisie left the guarantee of its liberties 
to a pseudo-domination of the law and the courts (Rechtsstaats-
idee), in England the political struggle in and around Parlia­
ment could guard those liberties far better than could the 
1 
courts and the bureaucracy. 
1. A further example is offered by the French theory of 
the souverainte de raison, for instance in CJuesnay, du Pont 
de Nemours and others. This theory justified the monarchy. 
Marx (Die Heilige Familie) (Ch. VI, l,)has directed attention 
to the fact that "The doctrinaires who proclaim the sovereignty 
of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people", 
did this, "in order to exclude the masses and to dominate 
alone". To-day especially the revival of the sovereignty of 
reason against that of the people which has become dangerous 
for private property is very clearly shown in Barthelemy-Duaz, 
"Traite de droit constitutionel", 1933, p. 78. Cf. also the 
very clear discussion by Kirchheimer, "Remarques sur la theorie 
de la souverainete nationale en Allemagne et en Francd', in 
Archives de Philosophic du droit, IV, nos. 3 & 4 (1934, p«239ff)< 
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CHAPTER III 
1 
Bodln and Althuslas 
I> Bodln. 
The antagonism between absolute sovereignty and the 
rule of material law is very clearly expounded in the works 
of Bodin. The constitution of both spheres — of sovereignty 
and of liberty guaranteed by material law — stands side by 
side in his work because he does not demarcate one from the 
other. 
1. Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of 
2 the commonwealth which the Romans called ma.lestas. 
Sovereignty is the sovereignty of the prince. The 
state is not yet distinguished from its highest organ, and 
therefore the question of the highest power of the state is 
1. Roger Chauvire, "Jean Bodin, Auteur de la Republique", 
Paris 1914; J.W. Allen, in "A History of Political ThoughtG 
in the 16th Century", London 1928, p. 394; Priedrich Meineke, 
"Die Idee der Staatsraison", Munich u. Berlin, 1924, p. 70 ff.; 
Carl Scbmitt, "Die Diktatur", 2n ed. Munich u. Leipzig 1928, 
p. 25 ff.; J.N. Figgis, "Studies of Political Thought from 
Gerson to Grotius , Cambridge 1916, p. 123 ff.; Jean Bodln, 
"Les six livres de la Republique", Lyon 1588. 
2. "La souverainete est la puissance absolue et perpetuelle 
d'une Republique que les Latins appellent majestatem..." 
(I, VIII). 
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not yet separated from that of the highest power within the 
state, with very few exceptions. 
The absoluteness of the sovereignty implies firstly, 
the non-existence of a right of resistance; whereas in the 
theory of the monarchomachs the magistrates were entitled to 
call upon the troops to fight the illegitimate exercise of 
state power, Bodin denies the officials this right (III, IV), 
and they may never forget that their power derives solely 
from the prince. The absoluteness of the sovereignty implies 
secondly, the conception of political law. Law is only 
voluntas and not necessarily ratio. Every command of the 
absolute sovereign is law. The sovereign can issue general 
norms as well as individual commands. The prince can free 
himself by law from obligations which he himself had under­
taken to fulfil earlier in his career; for the prince is the 
a. creator and not the subject of positive law. Customary law 
also derives its validity from the command of the prince 
standing behind it — its validity from permanent exercise 
is denied in the same way as in the theories of Hobbes, 
Filmer, and later, Kelsen (I, X). 
1. "La loy n'est autre chose que le commandement du souveraii, 
usant de sa puissance" and "La loy ... prend sa vigour de 
celuy qui a puissance de commander a tous" (I, X). 
"Si done le Prince souverain est exempt des loix de ses 
predesseurs, beaucoup moins seroit-il tenu aux loix et or-
donnances qu'il fait; car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, 
mals II est impossible par nature de se dormer loy..." (I, 
VIII). 
Should the fall to r»oHyMo tiis 
p r out i se ^  • -powie-C-. Is tranI-7~ ¥III). 
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Prom the sovereignty of the prince it follows that all 
feudal power is derived necessarily from this very sovereignty. 
It is therefore an original power. In particular, feudal 
jurisdiction is the outcome of sovereignty and not of feudal 
domination. (V, II; III, V.) Consequently, the estates general 
stand under the sovereign prince. They may remonstrate, but 
they may not oppose the sovereign. In spite of his legal 
radicalism, however, Bodin does not disturb the factual dis­
tribution of power between prince and feudal organisation. 
This theory of sovereignty is characterised by two 
features: it lacks firstly a justification. It is true, as 
will be shown, that divine and secular natural law stand 
above sovereignty, but they do not justify it; they merely 
restrict it, as will be also shown In section 3. Even after 
the elimination of references to God and to the prince as 
God's Deptfcy on Earth, from his whole theory of sovereignty, 
1 
the main content of his 3ystem remains unchanged. He in­
tended rather to assert an analogy between the order of nature 
and the order of society as the basis for a justification of 
his theory of sovereignty. To him nature appeared to be the 
sum of the relations of super- and sub-ordination — in short, 
nature was essentially a hierarchy. Political society was 
to be composed in the same way. But an analogy is never a 
1. Allen, pp. 415-6. 
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proof, quite apart from the question of whether it can right­
ly be maintained. 
2. On the other hand, sovereignty is not asserted to be 
an absolute power in all relevant parts of his work. It is 
limited, at least partially, by the postulate of the rule of 
the material law, and sometimes even considerably limited. 
2 
The state was to be a "droit gouvernement". This, however, 
is a rule of material law. In this connection law Is not only 
voluntas, but also ratio. 
He at first postulates the principle and then proceeds 
Cv>ujictitv 
to chavae-terlae them. 
The aim of the law is justice. Law is the creation of 
the prince. The prince is the Image of God, so human law 
3 created by him must necessarily be the image of divine law. 
According to his second theory, and in contradiction to the 
first theory, divine and human natural law stand above the 
Prince, who Is bound by it and may not act contrary to it; 
his might does not therefore extend over divine and natural 
1. Borkenau, "Vom feudalen zum burgerlichen Weltbild", 
p. 119. 
2. "Republique est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs 
menages et de ce qui leur est commun, avec puissance souver-
aine" (I, I). 
3. "Car si la justice est la fin de la loy, la loy oeuvre 
du Prince, le Prince image de Dieu, II faut par mesure suite 
de raison que la loy du Prince soit faicte au modelle de loy 
de Dieu." (I, VIII. ) 
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1 
law. This introduction of the idea of right implies a polem­
ical attitude towards Machiavelli; for Prance, according to 
the contemporaries of Bodin, was governed "a l'italienne ou 2 
a la Florentine". It is doubtful whether Catherine of Medici 
actually read Machiavelli before the night of St. Bartholomew 
1572. Against the all-pervasive influence of Machiavelli 
Bodin intends to build the state on the idea of right and to 
limit it by this conception. In the preface to his book Bodin 
voluntarily attacks Machiavelli: "Macchiavell n'a jamais sonde7 
le gue de la science politique qui ne gist pas en ruses 
tyranniques". It is, of course, obvious that the external 
influence of the Machiavellian utilitarianism is apparent on 
nearly every page of Bodin's work. This principle of the rule 
of natural law is ptrwreNM^ised in three ways: 
3 The basis and essence of the state is the family. The 
family is nla vraye source et origine de toute Republique et 
membre principal© d'icelle" (I, II). No state can be called 
well-administered which is not constructed on the basis of 
1. "Mais quant aux loix divines et naturelles, tous les 
Princes de la terre y sont subjects, et n'est pas en leur 
puissance d'y contrevenir. Et par ainsi la puissance absolue 
des Princes et seigneuries souveraines, ne s'etend aucunement 
aux loix de Dieu et de nature." (I, VIII.) 
2. Meinecke, p. 64. 
3. Of. Chauvire, p. 304 ff. 
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1 
the family. In the constitution of the family he sees repro­
duced the two characteristic elements of the state: droit 
gouvernement, forbidding the enslavement of the wife and 
children, and the patrla potestas which is considered to be 
a kind of natural sovereignty. The state is composed of the 
individual 'mesnages." 
The recognition of this role of the family implies for 
him the recognition of property, for the family is based on 
property. Every kind of communistic egalitarianism is com­
pletely alien to him. Only the inequality of man can corres­
pond to human nature. The abolition of "mine and thine" ruins 
2 
the fundamental basis of the state. The sovereign therefore 
is not able to steal, for he may not transgress the limits 
which are put upon him by natural law. Only "with just cause" 
may the sovereign deprive a person of his property — i.e., 
either by sale or exchange, or by legal taxation, or as re-
3 
paration against enemies. The protection of property implies 
the inadmissability of the levying of taxes without the 
1. "II est impossible que la Republique vaille rlen les 
families, qui sont les pilliers d'icelle sont mal fondees." (I, iv.) 
2. "En otant les mots Tien et Mien, on ruine les fondements 
de toutes Republiques." (VI, IV.) 
3. "Aussi c'est mal parle de dire que le Prince souverain a 
puissance de voler le bien d'autruy et de mal faire; veu que 
£'est plutost impuissanco foiblesse et laschete de coeur. Si 
done le Prince souverain n'a pas puissance de franchir les 
bornes des loix de nature, que Dieu duquel il est 1'Image, a 
posees, il ne pourra aussi prendre lo bien d'autruy, sang 
cause qui soit juste et raisonnable, soit par achat, ou ex­
change, ou confiscation legitime, ou traittant paix avec 
I'ennemi." (I, VIII.) 
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consent of the people — i.e., of the estates general. Although 
on the one hand, as we have already mentioned he denies that 
the estates general participate in the sovereignty, and in 
spite of the fact that he subordinates them legally to the 
prince, he concedes them the right of consent to taxation. 2 
Allen, however, rightly denies that from the recognition of 
this right there must necessarily be implied the acceptance 
of the theory of people's sovereignty. The two have nothing 
in common. The prohibition of levying taxes without the con­
sent of the estates general is exclusively an element of the 
sphere of family liberty, and therefore of private property. 
The possessing family is an element of the state which may 
not be touched by the sovereign. 
Whereas he on the one hand, as we have mentioned, takes 
the view that the sovereign is not bound by positive law even 
3 in the case of the positive law being good and reasonable, he 
on the other hand maintains that the prince is bound by his 
own promises against other princes as well as against his 
subjects. This obligation to observe contracts follows from 
1. "II n1 est en la puissance de Prince du monde de lever 
impost a son plaisir sur le peuple, non plus que de rendre le bien d'autruy." (I, VI; VI, II.) 
2. p. 421. 
3. "Car quelquefois la loy civile sera bonne, iuste et 
raisonnable; et neamuoins le prince n'y doit etre suiet aucune-ment." (I, VIII. ) 
4. "Le Prince souverain est tenu aux contracts par loy 
Vlll'k)' soit avec son subject solt avecques l'etranger." (I, 
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the natural equality end from the foy du prince." 
Only the prince who keeps himself within those limit.a 
and who esteems divine natural law, and who above all does 
not destroy the family, who does not lay illegal commands 
upon the property of Ms sxibjects, and who does not break his 
promises, can be termed 'roy'. He who does not fulfil these 
2 
conditions is a tyrant ex exercltio. Bodin also recognises 
3 
in addition to thi3 the tyrant "absque titulo". As for the 
family, property and the obligation to fulfil contracts, it 
is a case of a sphere which belongs to private law and which 
aims at the constitution of a sphere of freedom from the 
sovereign power. Bodin also thinks it possible to limit 
sovereignty by constitutional laws: for instance, by the legls 
4 
imperil, relating to the state tnd implied in sovereignty. 
In the case of France he recognises as such limitations the 
lex salica and the prohibition of the sale of state territory; 
1* "L1obligation est double: l'une pour l'equite naturelle 
qui veut que les conventions et promesses soyent entretenues: 
l'autres pour la foy du Prince." (I, VIII.) 
2. "Or la plus noble difference du roy et du tyran est, que 
le roy se conforme qjix loix de nature: et le tyran les foule 
aux pieds." (II, IV.) 
3. "Qui, de sa propre auctorite, se faict Prince souveraln, 
sans election, ny droit successlf, ny sort, ny iuste guerre, 
ny vocation speciale de Dieu." (II, V.) Chauvire, p. 322. 
4. "Loix qui concernent l'6tat du Royaume et de l'etabllsse-
ment d'Icelui ... annexees et unles avec la couronne." (I, 
VIII. ) 
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1 
the land belongs to the state — to the Republic. (VI, II.) 
3. According to our definition, we can only say that 
in Bodin's theory the rule of material law is instituted be­
cause he concedes to natural law the expectation that it will 
be carried out even if positive law is antagonistic to its 
fulfilment. Such an expectation can, as we have shown, be 
created fey the otatre in ltrfl by the positivlsation or insti­
tutional I sat I on of the norms of natural law; this can be 
achieved either by the recognition of, for example, the right 
of resistance, or when such a degree of ^ ooltlvfsation is 
unattainable, by sufficient concretisation of the norms of 
natural law. If this is not done, the declaration of the 
rule of natural law becomes mere lip-service paid in the 
attempt to cover the actual absolute sovereignty of the prince. 
Bodin fundamentally denies the right of resistance; but 
only the active right. He admits in certain ways the exist­
ence of a passive right of resistance. The official has to 
carry out even such commands of the sovereign as violate the 
norms of natural law, except in the case of those commands 
Involving the infringement of divine natural law. But even 
in this case the magistrate is only allowed the refusal to 
obey, and has no such right as in the theory of the 
1. This is one of the cases already mentioned, in which he 
already makes a distinction! between sovereignty and the bear­
er of sovereignty. 
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Monarchomachs, to call upon the troops and to organise resist­
ance with a view to deposing the prince. The same applies to 
the subjects in their relationship with the magistrates. (Ill, 
IV and III, V.) Bodin, howeveror is not logical In his working 
out of the problem, for obviously there arises at once the 
question, what ought to be done with those magistrates and 
citizens who appeal to divine natural law in order to justify 
their passive resistance^ If the prince demands their punlsh-
ment#Bodin has no answer to the question. He has not even 
1 
seen the problem. Bodin therefore gives no room for an ade­
quate institutionalisation of natural law. By the fact that 
he denies the active right of resistance, that he concedes a 
passive right for extreme cases, but does not guarantee It by 
the assurance of freedom from punishment, he has delimited 
himself from the monarchomachs. 
On the other hand, however, we have to admit that the 
norms of natural law are concretised in his work. Family, 
property, prohibition of levying taxes without consent of the 
estates general, the recognition of the principle that con­
tracts have to be fulfilled, the recognition of constitutional 
laws binding the sovereign, all these are undoubtedly adequate 
concretlsations of his rules of natural law. 
1. Allen, p. 417. 
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4. Which social function applies to this system of 
natural law in its relation with the notion of sovereignty? 
The answer to this question can only be given by treatment 
of the system on the basis of a Sociology of Knowledge. 
Politically, Bodin belongs to the middle group of the 
"politicians". He is therefore socially part of the bour­
geoisie. The dual face of the theory corresponds to the dual 
interest of this stratum of society to which he belonged: on 
the one hand they were interested to establish the strongest 
coercive state power possible , and on the other hand to 
canalise the exercise of thi3 coercive power in the direction 
of their own interests. The emphasis in Bodin's theory is 
laid on sovereignty; this corresponds to the desire to estab­
lish a strong coercive state power; and the current incom-
plate interpretation of the theory of the state put forward 
by him bears out the importance of this task. It was essen­
tial if the suicidal civil war was to be ended. "To the 
Politiques, the Divine Right of Kings was rather the natural 
right of the State, it expressed the refusal to ruin the 
1 
State for the sake of religious questions." The subordination 
of secular to religious matters was attacked by him. as also 
by Michel de l'Hopital — and even more strongly as Bodin 
rejected all kinds of religious dogmas whether Calvinist, 
1. Figgis, p. 126. 
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Reformed, Mohammedan or Jesuit. He condemned atheism it is 
1 true, but he was the adherent of a natural religion. 
The demand for a strong coercive power of the state 
could no longer be divinely justified, but only immanent!/. 
There were two reasons for this: the idea of the Divine 
Right of Kings had broken down under the onslaught of the 
Monarchomachs and had already become anachronistic. Bodiri 
therefore replaced the divine justification by the juridical 
idea of sovereignty. Further, the state could no longer be 
adequately justified on the basis of its mere existence — 
as in the theory of the Divine Right of Kings — but only by 
i13 performances. We saw that this immanent justification 
has taken on only a negative character in Bodin's theory, 
for he fails to admit any behaviour of the state contrary 
to Natural law. 
This last limitation of state activity did not only 
correspond to the necessity of an adequate justification of 
state power, but also to the interests of the social group 
to which he belonged — i.e., to the bourgeoisie, which needed 
a limitation of state power. Bodin has laid down his econom­
ic beliefs in a pamphlet published in 1568, "Reponse aux 
2 
Paradoxes de M. de Malecstroixt". In this pamphlet he objects 
1. Chauvire, p. 148ff., p. 161ff. 
2. This has since been published under several different 
titles. 
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to the devaluation of money and emphasises the necessity of 
Free Trade; he proves the eoonomio determination of foreign 
political relations. His struggle against equality and collec­
tivism has already been mentioned, as also has his postulate 
that sovereignty found its limits in the family and in property, 
and that the sovereign stood under the obligation to keep his 
promise. 
This last limitation Whioh he ereots as against sover­
eignty shows at the same time that he did not want to disturb 
the feudal hierarchical structure of the state. If his legal 
radicalism made him assert the Juridioal subordination of the 
ostates under the crown, this did not correspond to a similar 
social and political radicalism. The "contract" In his time 
and in his work is essentially different from the exohnnge 
oontract of the modern bourgeois sooiety. It is the status 
contract of the feudal sooiety — the sooiety element by whloh 
that sooiety was constituted, and by which every contracting 
partner has his placo allocated in the hlerarohy of estates. 
The keeping of these contracts, therefore, implies the main­
tenance of the feudal order. The recognition of the estates 
general as organs of taxation, and as a means of voicing public 
grievances, also serves this dual aim of the bourgeoisie — 
protection of itself at the same time as of the feudal order. 
1. Chafcvlr6, pp. 482-3. 
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His theory, therefore, has three aspects: it Institutes 
a  s t r o n g  s t a t e  w h i c h  g r a n t s  o r d e r  a n d  s e c u r i t y ,  a n d  t h e  a c t i v ­
ity of which is always in harmony with the interests of tho 
estates, and in particular with the interests of the Third 
Estate, the bourgeoisie, which still finds its place and its 
subsistence within the feudal order. 
Sovereignty and material law therefore stand side by 
side, and are thereby opposed. The spheres are nearly equally 
divided between the two constitutive elements of tho modern 
state. The historical position necessitates emphasis on sover­
eignty. This system of equilibrium, however, could function 
in social reality only so long as the Interests of the crown 
1 
and of the estates were Identical, and so long as tho feudal 
order itself was not disintegrated. 
2 
II. Althuslus. 
As against the theory of sovereignty put forward by 
Bodin, that of Althusius signifies an important advance In « 
direction which we shall attempt to describe beloo. The feet 
1. As Chauvire remarked, Bodin assumed a loyalty on thn pert 
of the estates towards the crown. 
2. "Politica Methodice Digesta of Johannes Althualus", nil. 
C.J. Friedrich (1932). J.H. Figgis, "Studios of J'olUI 
Thought from Gerson to Orotlus", Cambridge 191C, p. P,'30ff. 
Otto Gierke, "Althusius", 2nd ed., Breslav 1'JOri. P'rerir. Morkennu, 
"Vom Weudalen zum btlrgerl lchen Weltbild", p. Iggff. Kurt 
Wolzehdorff, "Staatsrecht u. Naturrecht. . . " , p. IFJOdd. 
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that his work was an advance, does not, however, confliot with 
the fact that Althusius refuses to use the conception of sover­
eignty, and constantly polemises against Bodin. It is a mere 
commonplace to-day that he owes much to Bodin, and font\j*a 
continuation of his work. We can take it for granted that the 
politics of Althusius are the outcome of the struggle of the 
Netherlands, and of his social situation as syndic of the 
Calvinist Emden — the outcome of his calvinist conviction and 
of the struggle against the Lutheran princes. The intention 
of his politics was to justify the revolt against Spain, a 
revolt of not only national but of considerable social sic-2 b 
nificance. 
.Figgis rightly draws attention to the fact that the 
secession of the Netherlands created the Althusius theory of 
sovereignty as well as the natural law system of Grotius. What 
Figgis does not see, however, is that the dualism of the two 
systems also corresponds to the dualism of the struggle — to 
the two sides of the struggle, the national and the social 
sides. In the war of Liberation of the Netherlands the struggle 
centred around the secular power of the state as well as 
around the demand for a sphere of freedom from the state. The 
presentation of Althusius1 theory of the state in detail would 
1. C.J. Friedrich, Introduction, p. LIX. 
2. Friedrich, ibid., pp. XXIX, XXXVII; Figgis, ibid., p.218ff.; Borkenau, ibid., p. 122ff. 
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appear to be superfluous after the works of Gierke, W0l201nl0r.fi' 
and the excellent introduction by Friedrioh which has to bo 
ranked even above Gierke's interpretation: oxoept that but for 
the work of Gierke it is doubtful whether it would have been 
possible. 
1. The starting-point of his theory of the state is tho 
necessity and even the sacredness of the state. Individuals 
have no free choice whether or not they wish to oome under the 
command of a state. Herein lies the difference with Orotiua 
and with all other liberal contract theorists for whom a free 
choice is possible. 
Althusiua, in contrast with the Monarohomachs, is 
opposed to the necessity of the dual rule of Prince and Es­
tates, and postulates with Bodin the existence of a sole bear­
er of sovereignty: the "people" instead of the prince. This 
implies the foundation of the state on 0 social contract by 
which the sovereign is primarily determined, and followod by 
another contraot of subjeotion, by whlob the people delegate 
their sovereign power to the various organ*) of the state. 
Althusius is a natural law thoorist in the souse that 
we called Hobbes, Spinoza and Pufendorf natural law theorists. 
Natural law is here no system of norms the validity of which 
is left undisturbed by the erection of a state. They constitute 
1. C.J. Priedrich, Introduction, p. LXX.. 
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a theory of the emergence of the state from a pre-supposed 
state of nature, the laws of which compare with those of ex­
ternal nature. 
Man in the state of nature is not just considered to be 
a wolf — and in this way Althusius is distinguished from 
Machiavelli — rather has man to be considered as possessing 
many virtues, although not the perfection assigned to him by 
Locks. He stands between the two extremes with a distinct 
leaning towards a slightly pessimistic view of his character­
istics. The state created by the social contract is the pro-
1 
perty (proprletas) of the people. This state owns the majestas. 
1118 corpus symbioticum is sovereign. The notion of ma.lestas 
corresponds to that of sovereignty. To the fore of his defini­
tion of sovereignty, however, stands the legal power of the 
state to issue a constitution; this is similar to our defini-2 
tion of sovereignty. In defining this legal power he carefully 
evades every use of the notion of sovereignty.FThe highest 
megistrate is only the bearer, the administrator, of sover­
eignty, the property and the usufruct of which lies with the 
people. 
3 
But who is the 'people'? Here, as in all other bourgeois 
theories of the contract, lies the real Achilles heel of the 
1. C.9, 4 (p. 88). "Nam et regni proprietas est populi..." 
2. Cf. C.J. Friedrich, p. XCI. 
3. C.9, 16. 
f I ux vUA* tVo v> , 
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argument. Althusius Is in no way a democrat. Democracy for 
him is no 'good' form of government, even if he recognises it 
to be a possible form. In Althusius' work — as also in 
Hobbes' work — democratic Caesarism after the example of 
1 William of Orange is no longer postulated. The totality of 
2 
citizens elects ephors. which, in his Calvinistic torminology 
are the officials who In their turn elect the highest magis­
trates — the summus magiatratus — and influence the exercise 
3 of his power by consultation and advice. The exercise of 
sovereignty lies entirely with the monarch. A monarchy is 
the best form of government, even if the substance of sover­
eignty lies with the people represented by the ephors. The 
mass of the people, the plebs (vulgus), Is only an object of 
rule, since their role as subjects has ceased. As soon as the 
highest office of magistrate is instituted the theory is there­
fore one of an absolute monarchy of democratic origin, imply­
ing the extermination of all privileged rights of the estates, 
and even their exclusion from the formation of the political 
will. 
1. Borkenau, p. 131. 
2. C. 18, 48 (p. 143). 
3. C. 18, 91 (p. 151). 
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2. In open contradiction to this theory of sovereignty 
stands Althusius' theory of natural law. 
On the one hand les and jus, law and right, are identi-
1 
fied. Law is voluntas, and not necessarily ratio. Law is the 
command of the supreme magistrate after the hearing of the 
2 
representative assembly. As against the absoluteness of the 
legislature he only gives certain recommendations such as that 
the legislature should refrain from exercising its legislative 
power as far as possible, a recommendation which is common to 
3 
all natural law theorists, and in which Roscoe Pound sees a 
specifically puritan element. 
On the other hand, however, positive law stands under a 
material law, a natural law consisting essentially of the last 
4 
six commandments. This natural law, as in Bodin, is concret­
ised by the rights of the property-owning patriarchal family, 
joined together in communities, in turn joined together in 
provinces, which finally create the state by contract and in­
stitute the supreme magistrate. This natural law is institu­
tionalised by the recognition of a corresponding right of 
resistance. 
1. C. 18, 91 (p. 151); 29, 2 (p. 275). 
2. 29, 4 (p. 275); 29, 5 (f. 276). 
3. "The Spirit of Common Law", p.l. 
4. C. 10, 7 (p. 96). 
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The tyrant absque titulo is a public enemy, which every­
one has the right to drive away. Thus far Althusius follows 
the tradition of the monarchomachs, but it is decisive that 
he demands a right of resistance against the tyrant quod 
exercitium, and even defines this right exactly and the condi­
tions under which such a forfeiture of the monarchy takes 
place. He who applies 'absolute power' is a tyrant quod 
exercitium. In this case, however, only the ephors have an 
active right of resistance, the subjects have only a passive 2 
right. The ephors can banish the tyrant, condemn him to death 
and behead him. 
Because of these natural rightly elements one can hardly 
agree to Figgis' characterisation of Althusius theory: "All 
power is concentrated at a single centre, and every form of 
right or liberty is of the nature of a privilege, tacitly or 
expressively granted by the central authority, which may be 
king, nobles, or people." If Althusius postulated an absolute 
1. C. 38 (p. 337) 1. Tyrannis igitur est justae et rectae 
administratione contraria, qua fund^menta et vinicula univers­
alis consociationis obstinate, perseveranter insanabiliter 
contra fidem datam et praestitum juramentum, a magistratu 
summo tolluntur et evertuntur. C.39, 9. 
2. C. 38, 28 (p. 382). "Cognita tyrannidis natura videndum 
nunc est de remedio, quo tempestive ilia tollaturj quod con-
sistit in resistentia et exauctoratione tyranni, soils ootlm-
atibus concessa." C. 38, 65 (p. 390). "Quid vero de subditis 
et privatis ex populo sentiendu est? Nam quae hactenus diximus 
de ephoris, personis publicis dicta sunt. Plane hi privati, 
quando magistratus tyrannus est exercitio, quia non habent 
usurn et jus gladii, neque co jure utentur .... sed quiesent 
et injuriam patientes, jugurn tyranni ferent..." 
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monarchy in this way, the psychological dynamic of his theory, 
and of its reception, would appear to drive in a revolution­
ary direction, "because of the original democratic institution 
of the absolute monarchy. The acceptance of the theory would 
appear to lead to the implication of a right of the people to 
withdraw legal power delegated by them to the monarch — the 
more so as Althusius asserts that the substance of sovereignty 
remains permanently with the people. 
This revolutionary dynamic is further nourished by the 
elements of natural law which contain not only the usually 
recognised laws of existence but distinctly moral demands. 
These finally come to mean a sphere of liberty from the sover­
eign power of the state, and at the same time the canalisation 
of the exercise of sovereignty in the desired direction. These 
remnants of natural law, although only partially concretised 
in the Althusian system, are nevertheless open to interpreta­
tion. In these natural law elements, as in the democratic 
conception of the origin of sovereignty, lies the continuity 
of development with the monarchomachical theory, which we saw 
was almost completely based on positive constitutional law, 
the importance of which necessarily ceases when the feudal 
system to which it was attached had come to an end. In putting 
forward the demands of the monarchomachs, justified not only 
by means of positive law, but even (although in a contradictory 
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way) with the help of natural law, Althusius paved the way for 
a revival of natural law ideology after the breakdown of the 
feudal state and the formation of a centralised absolutist 
1 
system. The union between democratic ideology (the theory of 
people's sovereignty) and liberal ideology (natural law theory), 
forms the ideological basis of the revolution of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, just as the peasants' revolt in Eng­
land in 1381, and in Germany in the Reformation period, drew 
nourishment from the same sources. 
1. Wolzendorff, p. 223. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Grotius and Pufendorf. 
1 
Hugo Grotiua. 
Grotius offers relatively little to the solution of our 
problem, as his work is mainly devoted to the discussion of 
international law. 
1. The social order, and therefore natural law, is to 
be directed towards the maintenance of an adequate respect of 
property, the obligation to fulfil promises, and to pay dam­
ages where contracts are violated, and towards the just punish­
ment of guilt. (Prol. 9, p.12.) Natural law therefore postu­
lates the maintenance of a particular legal system. The idea 
2 
of a distributive justice is expressly rejected. Law may not 
differentiate according to the degree of wisdom, or according 
to the property and birth of a man. It is exclusively 
1. Literature: 
Grotius, "De jure belli ac pacis libri tres", translated 
by F.W. Kelsey (Classics of International Law), Oxford 1925. 
W.S.M. Knight, "The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius", London 
1925. Erik Wolf, "Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius", Tttbingen 
1927. L. Neumann, "Hugo Grotius", Hamburg 1884. 
2. Prol. 9, p.13. "Long ago the view came to be held by 
many that this discriminating allotment is a part of law ... 
nevertheless law ... ha3 a far different nature because its 
essence lies in leaving to another that which belongs to him, 
or In fulfilling our obligation to him." 
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concerned with the maintenance of the existing system of pro­
perty. The basic principle of natural law is the statement, 
already valid in the state of nature, that contracts have to 
be fulfilled. This is almost the "mother of municipal law". 
(Prol. 16, p.15.) Grotius sees, as later also Pufendorf with 
less clarity, that law needs a machinery of sanctions if it 
is to be maintained valid. (Prol. 19, p. 16.) Nevertheless 
he asserts that it is, "not entirely void of effect" (Prol. 
20, p.16.) This effect consists, as will be shown, in the 
recognition of a right of resistance. 
His natural law is a system of moral norms deduced from, 
and coinciding with rational nature, but containing commands 
and prohibitions. His starting-point, as well as his later 
2 expositions, show that he perpetually confuses law and morals. 
This natural law has as its contents not only the regulation 
of things lying outside the domination of the human will, but 
it is mainly concerned with the human will itself, and espe­
cially with property which itself derives from the will of 
man, and which once introduced, becomes part of natural law. 
1. Bk I, C.I.X, 1, p.38. "The law of Nature is a dictate 
of right reason which points out that an act, according as 
it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in 
it a duality of moral baseness or moral necessity; so that 
in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God." 
2. Meinecke, "Staatsraison", p. 261. 
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(Bk I, Ch.I, X, p. 39.) This natural law is unchangeable — 
even God cannot alter it. (Bk I, Ch. I, X, 5, p.40.) 
Human nature is directed towards sociation. Man has a 
definite "appetitus societatis". 
Besides this natural law, there also exists vollt* onal 
law, which is either of human or of divine origin. (Bk I, 
Ch.I, XIII, p. 44.) The main part of human law is the muni­
cipal law, which derives from the civil power. Civil power 
is that "which bears the sway over the state". "The state is 
a complete association of free men joined together for the 
enjoyment of rights and for their common interests." (Bk I, 
C.I, XIV, p. 44.) In addition to the municipal law there is 
also law which is not directly constituted by the power of the 
state, but which is subject to it: the commands of the father 
over the son, or of the master over the servant, for instance, 
come under this category. 
The sovereign Is a power, "whose actions are not subject 
to the legal control of another, so that they cannot be ren­
dered void by the operation of another human will". (Bk I, 
C. Ill, VII, p. 102.) Therefore the sovereign can alter his 
own decisions arbitrarily. 
Sovereignty does not always lie with the people: for a 
whole people can give itself into slavery. It is also untrue 
to say that domination is always exercised in interests of the 
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people. (Ek I, Ch. Ill, VIII, pp. 104, 109.) A right of 
resistance against a "tad king".is, however, rejected. Among 
other reasons, it is rejected becaxise it seems to him extreme­
ly difficult to decide whether a certain action of a given 
king can be considered good or bad. (Ek. I, Ch.III, IX, p.111.) 
The difference in private law between property (full 
proprietary rights, patrimony), and usufruct, corresponds to 
the distinction in public law between sovereignty itself and 
the bearer of sovereignty. This is always the presumption 
that the king, if kingship derives from the will of the peopLe, 
has only the usufruct of sovereignty, so that in this case, 
the people has the right to prevent the alienation of sover­
eignty. (Bk I, Ch. Ill, XIII, p. 119.) 
What is, however, the postulated relationship between 
the eternal and unchanging natural law and the sovereignty 
which is to be considered as the highest power; between general 
norms and individual decisions? C-rotius postulates that natur­
al law binds all kings — even the patrimonial ones. This is 
as compatible with sovereignty as is the fact that the king 
can bind himself by contracts with his subjects or with God. 
(Bk I, Ch.III, VI, p. 121.) Thus far the principles are clear. 
The complications in his exposition begin with the problem of 
the institutionalisation of his natural law. With this 
1. Bk I, C.III, XIV, p.120. "Sovereignty must in itself be 
distinguished from the absolute possessor of it." 
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question of the rights of resistance the eternal dilemma of 
the bourgeois who loves peace, security and order, but does 
not want interference with his property and his freedom, be­
comes clearly visible. Grotius starts with the assertion that, 
"If the authorities issue an order that is contrary to the law 
of nature or to the commandment of God, the order should not 
be carried out". (Bk I, C.IV, I, p.138.) In the state of 
nature obviously every man can rightly resist any wrong. In 
civil society, however, the principle is reversed. The state 
has been erected, "in order to maintain public tranquillity": 
therefore the state can limit in the interests of public peace 
and security, and to such an extent as seems necessary, the 
right of resistance deriving from natural law. He tries to 
prove this statement by endless historical surveys and quota­
tions from Sophocles, Euripides, Sallust, Seneca, Tacitus, the 
Old and the New Testaments. (Bk I, C.IV, II, pp. 139-40.) In 
his view the theory of Junius Brutus is wrong, as the right of 
resistance which Brutus attributes to the magistrates starts 
from the incorrect assumption that a subordinate magistrate 
has more rights than the subject himself. The right of resist­
ance is only alienable by the state in cases "of extreme and 
imminent peril". He Is, however, careful to add that even in 
such a case of extreme emergency, "the person of the King must 
be spared". (Bk I, C.IV, II, p.151.) "This law which we are 
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discussing — the law of non-resistance — seems to draw its 
validity from the will of those who associate together in the 
first place to form a civil society; from the same source, 
furthermore, derives the right which passes into the hands of 
those who govern. If these men could be asked whether they 
purpose to impose upon all persons the obligation to prefer 
death rather than under any circumstances to take up arms in 
order to ward off the violence of those having superior author­
ity, I do not know, whether they would answer in the affirma­
tive, unless perhaps, with this qualification, in case resist­
ance could not be made without a very great disturbance in the 
state, and without the destruction of a great many innocent 
people." (Bk I, C. IV, VII, p. 148.) As later was the case 
with Locke, he uses Barclay &r the justification of this 
right of resistance. 
2. The decisive progress in the system of Grotius lies 
in the fact that the right of resistance deriving from natural 
law is sharply distinguished from the right of resistance 
granted by the constitution itself. In all cases where the 
constitution delegates to the people a con dominium or a right 
of deposition, or other constitutional rights, one can property 
speak of a right of resistance. (Bk I, C. Ill, VII, p. 154.) 
This revolutionary right granted by positive law comprises 
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the following cases: a ruler who is responsible to the people 
and whose power is delegated from that of the people, and who 
violates the law, can be punished with death; a king, 'who 
has renounced', or a king, 'who alienates his kingdom, or 
places it in subjection to another', can be punished by a 
right of resistance belonging to positive law. The positive 
right of resistance is further given if the constitutional 
power is districted between the king and the people, and if 
the king tries to alter its distribution in his own favour. 
The right of revolution is constitutionally given against the 
king, who, 'sets out with a truly hostile intent to destroy 
a whole people', or if a people has expressly reserved to 
itself the right of resistance. Finally, the people have the 
right to resist a usurper. (Bk. I, C. IV, VIII-XV.) 
3. Grotius' theory of the state and law is the first 
theory to be almost completely bourgeois. It is almost a 
secular theory, because natural law is directly founded on 
reason. Natural law once recognised by reason becomes inde­
pendent even of God. Divine and human nature are divorced. 
The break with the Schoolmen has definitely been made* Grotius' 
theory is further almost completely rational; i.e., it is 
orientated by the will of man. But the people who create the 
will of the state are not conceived in a democratic way. 
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Grotius postulates a rule of material law; by this, however, 
the state has been delivered over to the struggles of the 
social groups which can destroy it on the basis of the natural 
rightly right of resistance. The state is therefore not con­
ceived as an independent autonomous unit; Grotius, unlike 
Pufendorf, belongs to the Harmonists who believe in a coinci­
dence of common and individual interests (Prol. 4). He be­
lieves that it might be possible to prevent the dissolution 
of the state by the simultaneous postulation of the rule of 
natural law. 
The rule of material law is the rule of moral norms, 
and his morality is that of the bourgeois, who, however, ha3 
to a large extent charitable motives. The postulate of the 
rule of law has therefore not yet taken on the purely disguis­
ing function which it later assumes. This can be shown, for 
instance, in his theory of contracts. The contract is based 
on the equality of the contracting partners. (Bk II, C. VIII, 
p.246.) The contracting partners must have 'the freedom of 
choice1 (Bk II, C. X, p. 348) which implies in his view an 
equality of the two mutual performances. "The equality de­
manded in the principql act of contract is that no more be 
exacted than Is just." (XI, p.349.) Consequently he rejects 
monopolies; state monopolies, he admits, but private monopo­
lies must sell at a fair price and may never use their power 
to close markets. (BK II, C. XI, XVI, p.353. ) 
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If Samuel Pufendorf. 
Pufendorf is often considered as a typical representa­
tive of rationalistic natural law. If one understands by 
natural law, a system of material norms guaranteeing the free­
dom of men from the state, then this cannot be applied to 
Pufendorf. The distinguishing feature of Pufendorf is that 
he rationally justifies the coercive power of state with the 
systematic capability of a Continental jurist, and that he 
rationally deduces the aims and purposes of the state. There 
is no place in his system for individual freedom — for ius 
naturae: as we have already emphasised more than once, for 
the rule of material law to be a real thing, there must be 
a sufficiently great expectation of its fulfilment even if 
positive law contradicts it. 
1. The starting-point of Pufendorf*s natural law system 
is the freedom of human action based upon the will and activ­
ity of man. Human action is free because it is based on the 
freedom of the will. But usually these individually free 
wills do not coincide. They diverge and can only be brought 
together by law. (De off. I, c.l, 2 (p.3)) and (c.II, 1 (p.l2)). 
Law in this sense is a political law - i.e., the command of 
/i™S1^Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis. Libri Duo. (1660), transl. William Abbott Oldfather (Classics of Inter­
national Law) Oxford 1931. (2) De Officio Hominis et Civis 
juxta Legam Naturalem, Libri Duo (1673),transl. T.G. Moore, 
(Classics of International Law) Oxford 1927. 
173 
1 
the sovereign power. (De off. I, c.II, 2 (p.12)). Thus far 
It is legitimate. 
Law is divided into divine and human law, which in turn 
can be either natural or positive law. (De off. I, c.II, 16 
(p. 16).) 
Natural law contains the fundamental principles and the 
inferences drawn from them. (Elem. I. def. XIII, 16, p.159) 
and (II, obs. IV, 5, p.242). The two fundamental principles 
2 
of natural law derive from human nature. According to these 
principles man is a beast; but he is even worse than a beast 
because the forces of his intellect put him in a position to 
commit evil consciously. (De off. I, c.III, 5, p.18. ) Man 
is malicious end easily impassioned. On the other hand he is 
helpless, and therefore "adapted to promote mutual interests". 
(De off. I, c.III, 7, p.19.) Man is therefore a genuins 
political animal. Already in the state of nature he honours 
God and is thereby distinguished from the animals. (De off. 
II, c.I, 3, p.89.) He is free, and his own master. Thus far, 
the natural state is distinguished from the civil state. (De 
off. II, c.I, 5, p.89. ) The sole ruler in the state of nature 
is God. From these two characteristics of man in the natural 
state, he deduces the two basic principles of his natural law 
1. "Law ... is a decree by which a superior obliges a subject 
to conform his acts to his own prescription." 
2. "Man shares with all the animals that ... he holds nothing 
dearer than himself, end is eager to preserve himself." (De 
off. I, c.III, 2 (p. 17).) 
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system. First, the law of sociability. (De off. I, c.III, B, 
9, p.19.) Natural law teaches how the behaviour of man is to 
make a good member of the community of him. Man has to main­
tain sociability so far as is within his power, and he must 
therefore approve the means to the realisation of this socia­
bility^" 
The second basic principle is the law of self-preserva-
2 
tion. (Elera. II, obs» IV, 4, p.242. ) This law obliges and 
entitles man to protect his life and his body and all that 
belongs to him to the utmost within his power. 
These twe fundamental principles can, however, conflict. 
Natural harmony between individual and common interests as it 
Is assumed in the theories of the Physiocrats and the classic­
al economists like Adam Smith, is not only not asserted, but 
as is shown by his remarks in De off. I, c.V, 5, p.28, appar­
ently even rejected; although he expresses the hope that such 
a harmony might arise If man tended hi3 body and soul carefully. 
1. "Those which teach how man should conduct himself, to be­
come a good member of human society, are called natural laws." 
"The fundamental natural law is this: that every man must 
cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies. From 
this follows that, as he who wishes an end, wishes also the 
means, without which the end cannot be obtained, all things 
which necessarily and universally make for that sociability 
ere understood to be ordained by natural law, and all that 
confuse or destroy it forbidden. The remaining precepts are 
mere corollaries, so to speak, under this general law, and 
the natural light given to mankind declares that they are 
evident." (De off. I, c.III, 8, 9, (p.19).) 
2. "That any one whatsoever should protect his own life and 
limbs, as far as he can, and save himself and what is his own." 
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(De off. I, c.VIII, 2, p.45.) This conflict between the law 
of sociability and the law of self-preservation is resolved 
in the state of nature by struggle and self-defence; in the 
civil state, however, such self-defence appears inadmissible. 
(De off. I, c.V, 12, p.32.) These two natural laws are unique. 
All other norms of natural law are rationally deduced from them. 
The law of self-preservation has been guaranteed by 
Pufendorf1s assertion of natural equality among men. (Elem. 
II, obs. IV, 22-23, pp. 259-268) and (De off. I, c.VII, p.42ff.) 
Natural equality does not, however, mean legal, political or 
even social equality. It means simply that in the state of 
nature every man possesses the same strength end therefore 
equal chance of self-preservation. Whether he can realise 
this chance in civil society Is not at all clear. 
Prom the principle of equality he infers the following: 
The prohibition of bodily injury, the rape of women, of libel 
and of adultery or the violation of property; the obligation 
to keep promises and to pay damages where contracts are broken; 
no man shall be judge in his own case, and the duty of the 
judge is to give a fair hearing to both parties. Indirectly 
from the principle of self-preservation and directly from the 
law of equality follow certain results, which are elucidated 
1. "A man tends to promote the advantage of others indefin­
itely, if he thoroughly cultivates his own soul and body, so 
that useful actions may emanate from him to others." 
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further In the De Officio. They form in reality, .the kernel 
of Pufendorf's natural law system. They are what English 
legal science calls purisprudence, and German legal science, 
Allgemelne Rechtslehre. He rightly sees that the principle 
of the fulfilment of contracts is a supplementary guarantee 
of property, and that the statement 'pacta sunt servanda' 
is the "basis of the calculations cf the exchange process. (De 
1 
off. I, c.IX, 3, p.48. ) This obligation to keep promises is, 
however, not an unconditional one, hut is conditional upon 
the legitimacy of the contract concerned. (De off. I, c.IX, 
1, p.48. ) As the principle of the necessity for the fulfil­
ment of contracts Is deduced from the law of equality,« it only 
operates if the contract itself complies with the principle 
of equality; i.e., if every contracting partner draws an equal 
gain from the contract. Pufendorf is of the opinion that a 
realisation of the principle is only possible where prices are 
2 fixed by statute or market custom. (De off. I, c.XV, 3, p. 74.) 
1. "For, but for this, we should lose the greatest part of 
the advantage which is apt to arise for the race from the 
interchange of services and property. And where there Kja& is 
not the necessity of keeping promises, one could not "build 
one's calculations firmly upon the support of others 1" 
2. "All onerous contracts ... have this feature that equal­
ity must be preserved in them, in other words, that each of 
the contracting parties make an equal gain; and where an in­
equality arises, the one who has received less acquires a 
right to demand that this lack be made good, or the contract 
be broken off entirely. This, however, is particularly the 
vase in states, where prices are fixed by the usage of the 
markets or by law." 
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Private property Is introduced by the will of God and 
by the expressed or implicit consent of men. (De off. I, 
1 
c.XII, 2, p.62. ) 
Considerably poorer is the system inferred from the 
principle of sociability. The paramount principle is, "that 
every man promote the advantage of another so far as he con­
veniently can", (De off. I, c.VIII, 1, p.41), and the obliga-
2 tion not to disturb human society is stressed. He expresses 
the hope that the advantage of the one might become the ad­
vantage of the other. (De off. I, c.VIII, 2, p.49, ) In any 
case, all the deductions from the principle of self-preserva­
tion are equally to be deduced from the law of sociability. 
2. The decisive progress of Pufondorf's system lies In 
this thesis of the factual validity of the natural law norms. 
He alleges that their validity Is incomplete and Insufficient 
for the needs of social life. (Elem. II, obs.V, 1, p.273.) 
Law is only valid if it Is fitted out with sanctions. Every 
valid law comprises two parts: a rule of conduct (what is, and 
what is not to be done), and the appropriate sanction to this 
rule of conduct (the punishment to be applied on its infringe­
ment). (De off. I, c.II, 7, p.14) and (De off. II, c.XII, 4, 
1. "By the will of God, the consent of men In advance, and 
an agreement at least tacit, property in things, or ownership, was introduced." 
2. "That he should hot disturb human society, or in other 
words, that he should not do anything whereby society among men may be less tranquil." 
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p.124). Natural law, however, does not know of any punishment. 
It does not know of any law-suit for the fulfilment of con­
tracts. Their fulfilment is "left solely to the divine Judg­
ment Seat". (Elem. I, def. XIII, 18, p.160.) The fear of God 
and the individual conscience, which operate in the case of 
natural law to enforce fulfilment of contracts, in no way 
1 represent sufficient sanctions. (De off. II, c.V, 8, p.104.) 
2 (De off. I, c.V, 7, p.104.) 
3. The inefficiency of natural law in guaranteeing peace 
resulted in man's being compelled to erect the state. Only in 
and through the state can peace and security be fully accom­
plished. (Elem. II, obs. V, 2, pp 274, and 15, p.286.) The 
state is based on contract, i.e., on two compacts and one de­
cree. (De off. II, c.VI, 7, p.107.) A contract is first made 
in which men declare their intention of erecting a state; "all 
together and singly must agree"; then afterwards the form of 
government is determined by a decree, and finally a compact is 
concluded with all those persons to whom the power of the 
state has been delegated. 
The state having arisen, in this way, is now a legal 
person whose will is to be imputed to all, and whose aim is 
1."Natural law is not sufficient to restrain man from evil. 
Neither fear of the Divinity nor sting of conscience are 
sufficient." 
2. "Genuine and principal reason why the patriarchs, aban­
doning their natural liberty, took to founding states, was 
that they might fortify themselves against the evils which 
threaten man from man." 
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the maintenance or common peace and security. (De off. II, 
1 2 
C*VI, 10, p. 108.) and (5, p.107). The state organ consti­
tuted by the decree can be a monarch, the senate or the people. 
The forms of government are therefore monarchy, aristocracy, 
or democracy. All three forms of government are different 
organisationally, but are really aspects of the one concept 
of the state. (De off. II, C.VIII, 3, p.113.) Pufendorf 
therefore draws a sharp line of demarcation between sovereign­
ty of the state and sovereignty of a state organ. 
Monarchies are to be preferred to all other forms of 
the state because the rapidity of the decisions of state is 
of great utility, and the monarch can carry out such decisions 
alone, whereas in democracies and aristocracies assemblies 
must meet. (De off. II, C. IX, 6, p.117.) Mixed constitutions 
are considered unhealthy, although constitutional limitations 
of absolute power are deemed expedient. "It Is wise to cir­
cumscribe the exercise of his authority by certain limits." 
(De off. II, C.IX, 6, p.117.) The presumption in every case 
1. "A state is defined as a composite moral person, whose 
will intertwined and united by virtue of the compacts of the 
many, is regarded as the will of all, so that it can use the 
powers and resources of all for the common peace and security." 
2. "Wills of many can be united in no other way than if each 
subjects his will to the will of one man, or one counsel, so 
that henceforth, whatever such as one shall will concerning 
things necessary to the common security, mu3t be accompted the 
will of all, collectively and singly." 
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speaks against a patriarchal type of government. (De off. II, 
C. IX, 6, p.117.) 
4. What are the relations between the state and natural 
law now? The answer is that no connection "between the two ex­
ists at all — i#e., that the state is to be conceived sover­
eign in an absolute sense. The sovereignty of the state is 
supreme, (Elem. I, def. IV, 1, p.18); its authority is absolute. 
(Elem. II, obs. V, 18, p.289.) It is independent of any other 
power, and can act according to its own discretion. It Is not 
1 
obliged to render account to anyone. It is not bound by human 
2 
laws which are its own product. Law Is therefore command and 
3 
not ratio. "Laws are actually proceeding from the one who has 
supreme command." (Elem. I, def. XIII, 10, p.194. ) The citi­
zen is subject to every command of the state, whether this 
takes the form of a general norm or of an Individual decision. 
"Finally citizens are bound to obey particular commands of 
their rulers no less than the general laws." (De off. II, c. 
XII, 9, p.126.) The legitimate sphere of positive law is 
1. De off. II, C.IX, 1, p.116. "Every authority by which an 
entire state is ruled, in any form of government, has this 
quality, that it is supreme, that It Is not dependent on Its 
exercise on any man as a superior, but operating according to 
its own judgement and discretion so that its acts cannot be 
nullified t>y any man as a superior." 
2. De off. II, C.IX, 3,p. 116. "Superior to human and civil 
laws as such and thus not directly bound by them. For those 
laws are dependent upon the supreme authority in origin aa 
well as in duration." 
3. De off. II, C.XII, 1, p.124. "Civil laws which are decrees 
of the civil rulers by which it Is enjoined upon the citizens 
Vtfhat they ought to do in the civil life and what they should 
leave undone." 
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determined in the same way as in the theory of Spinoza. The 
legislator can demand everything he has the power to carry 
out. Therefore, he is only deprived of the power of regulating 
psychological processes. Forms of freedom such as prevailed 
before the existence of the state are consequently inadmissible. 
Even property is granted by the state. Prom this conception 
it follows that if the monarch has directly transferred pro­
perty to a citizen the decision as to the content of the rights 
of ownership must rest with him. If all property is acquired 
by "own industry" the owner is subject to state intervention 
in three ways: the state can prescribe the use of the property 
in accordance with the interests of the state even to details 
of amount, quality and method of transference. The state can 
transfer to itself under normal circumstances a small amount 
of property — for instance, in the form of taxes — for he 
who desires protection must pay. Finally, in emergency cases 
the state may confiscate the whole of the property. (De off. 
II, C.XV, 1-4, p.136.) In his absolutist system there is no 
place for a limitation of the sovereignty of the state. 
If laws clash with human natural law, the positive laws 
of the sovereign have precedence. It Is true that the welfare 
of the people is the raison d'etre of the state. The state 
1. Elem. 1, def. XIII, 19, p.162. "Objects of civil law is 
in general all that which can be effectively enjoined by a 
supreme human- authority. The inner acts of the mind in regard 
of which laws are enacted in vain, are excluded because, for­
sooth, it is beyond the power of other men to know whether 
obedience has been rendered. 
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has been granted the power of the people for this purpose. 
(De off. II, C. XI, 3, p.125), and the character and the ex­
tent of its sovereignty are derived from this aim. But, as 
x Gierke has conclusively shown, this object of the state refers 
to the state of nature, and therefore, like every natural law 
in the civil state, is nothing but an obllgatio ^perfecta. 
It is therefore impossible to speak of the rule of material 
law because this purpose of the state is not in fact fulfilled. 
So far as divine natural law or individual decisions 
are in conflict with positive law, the gravest difficulties 
confront Pufendorf, as he himself admits. He rightly sees 
that the deduction of the state from the will of the subjects 
implies the admissibility of a right of resistance. "Just as 
he who confers upon a second person authority over himself, 
contracts at the same time the obligation not to resist his 
bidding, since, forsooth, that would imply that someone has 
the right to command in such a way, however, that the other 
person retains the authority to resist." (Elem. II, obs. V, 
p.287.) He therefore investigates "how far this obligation 
not to resist extends". It is in his view a matter for the 
individual conscience to decide whether to retreat before 
violence and violate the commands of religion, or whether to 
offer resistance. If the secular power commits the folly of 
— 
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issuing commands in conflict with human or divine natural law, 
the blame does not lie with the citizen, "but with the sover­
eign, and in the main the citizen should not revolt. Only if 
in carrying out such commands the citizen himself would commit 
a sin, or if he would prefer death to the carrying out of the 
command, or if the command seems reasonless — then the sover­
eign becomes na free enemy" against whom a right of resistance 
has to be recognised because he himself no longer treats his 
subjects as subjects but as enemies. But even in such a case 
the right of resistance is only granted if the citizen finds 
it impossible to escape or to hide himself. (Elem. II, obs.V, 
17, pp. 287-8.) In De Off. II, C.XII, 8, p.126, the solution 
1 to the problem is reduced to a mere formula. 
We see, therefore, that the right of resistance unwill­
ingly conceded is practically meaningless, and is In no way 
institutionalised. In the first place, the motive and the 
object of the right of resistance are very directly limited. 
Its exercise depends upon the sovereign issuing a command, 
the citizen himself carrying out this command, the command 
violating natural law, and the citizen seeing no possibility 
of escape or of hiding. A right of resistance against the 
1. "To the civil law, in so far as they do not openly con­
flict with the divine law, the citizens owe obedience, not 
from mere dread of punishment, but from an intrinsic obliga­
tion, confirmed by the natural law itself; for among Its pre­
cepts Is this also that one must obey lawful rulers." 
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general misrule of the sovereign which does not proscribe 
certain remedies to the subject is of little value. Further, 
an individual right of resistance is on]y admitted in a very 
limited sphere. The conception that all power lle3 with the 
people, which is entitled to deposo and to punish kings, is 
rejected as a perilous error, in spite of his assertion of 
the contractual basis of the state. (Elem. II, Obs. V, 20, 
p.291. ) There is no right of resistance on the part of tho 
people even against a king who degenerates into a tyrant, bo-
cause it is impossible to decide whether he is actually ruling 
tyrannically. (Elem. II, Obs. V, 21, p.292.) Only the In­
dividual concerned has the right of resistance. T-Tis fellows 
are not allowed to help him, because the violation of the 
rights of one citizen does not absolve the others from their 
duty of obedience. (Elem. II, Obs. V, 22, p.293.) Parties 
and all intermediate powers between citizens and central 
authority are Inadmissible. 
The right of resistance in Pufendorf's system is there­
fore a quantlte negligible. 
5. Pufendorf's system of state and law Is one of on-
lightened despotism. The first element of the bourgeois state, 
the sovereignty of the state, appears there, but not the second 
element of the bourgeois state, namely, the sphere of individual 
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freedom. This attitude is politically intelligible. Pufendorf 
was a bourgeois by descent and education, a jurist by pro­
fession, and a state servant in Sweden and Brandenburg. He 
combined historical training, political experience and legal 
knowledge to a rare degree. His political confessions appear 
in his famous book, "De statu imperii German!ci ad Laelium 
fratrem Dominium Trerzolani liberunus", appearing under the 
pseudonym, Severinius de Monzanbano, Geneva, 1667. The Holy 
Roman Empire of the German nation appeared to him as a monster. 
The constitution of the Empire appeared to contradict entirely 
all natural demands. Universality of currency, freedom of 
transport and trade, judicial reform, seemed to him necessary, 
but their introduction Impossible without the establishment 
of a strong central power of the prince. In order to be able 
to satisfy the interests of the rising bourgeoisie, he became 
the jurist of enlightened despotism, and his master, the Grand 
Elector, had already dealt the final death-blow to the estates, 
and exterminated the intermediate powers between citizen and 
state. 
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CHAPTER V 
Hobbes and Spinoza 
1 
I. Hobbes. 
Our fundamental thesis, that the Introduction of the 
postulate of the rule of material law and of a rational and 
secular justification of the state, necessarily leads to 
revolutionary consequences, can be demonstrated in Hobbes' 
system very clearly; although Hobbes is generally considered 
to be quite immune from any such disintegrating tendencies. 
Hobbes appeared to an enlightened period as a second 
2 
Machiavelll. His one aim was supposed to be the foundation 
1. Literature: Paul Johann Abselm Peuerbach, "Anti-Hobbes", 
o 1798. Ferdinand T<j>ennies, Thomas Hobbes, "Leben und Lehre", 
1k£ju~ 3rd ed# Richard Honigswald, "Hobbes und die Staatsphilosophie/. 
Z. Lubiensky, "Die Grundlagen des ethisch-politischen Systems 
von Hobbes". Munchen, 1932. Julius Lips, "Die Stellung des 
Thomas Hobbes zu den politischen Parteien der grossen englisch-
en Revolution". With an introduction by F. Toennies. Leipzig, 
1927. John Laird, "Hobbes", London, 1934. C.I. Vaughan, 
"Studies in the History of Political Thought before and after 
Rousseau", Vol. I, p. 25 ff. Manchester, 1925. Thomas Hobbes, 
"English Works", Molesworth Ed. 
2. Cf. Feuerbach, "Antl-Hobbes", p. 3. 
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of pure despotism, and all petit-bourgeois looked on Mm 
with mixed feelings. It can even be said that the traditional 
Liberal English political theory is ashamed of Hobbes. Such 
an interpretation is, at least since Toennies1 book, quite 
out of date, and it is astonishing that it could have arisen 
at all, because there is hardly another political theory 
which is formulated with such clarity and accuracy as that 
of Hobbes. 
1. In the first part of ~bhis work we have already 
presented the concept of law as it is developed in Hobbes' 
theory of the state• This notion of law is nothing but the 
legal formulation of his conception of sovereignty. We have 
seen that in the quotations cited above law appears only as 
voluntas, and not necessarily as ratio: law and right are 
therefore identical, and law and the state are identical 
orders. The usual interpretation of Hobbes maintains that 
there is no law in his system outside the state — that the 
state is the sole creator of the law, that it can alone 
decide what is right and what wrong, that it itself can do 
no wrong, that obedience to the law of the state precedes 
1 
all duties of the conscience in importance — that, in fact, 
any form of natural law is lacking. 
Eg. Carl Schmitt, "Die Diktatur", 2nd ed. Munchen-Leipzig, 
1928, pp. 22-3, and M.B. Poster, "The Political Philosophies 
of Plato and Hegel", Oxford, 1955, p. 147. 
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Such interpretations, however, suffer in that they 
unduly exaggerate certain tendencies in his system — and it 
will be our task to show that a genuine natural law does in 
fact exist in Hobbes1 theory, and that the apparently monistic 
theory is in fact, like all other bourgeois theories, a dual 
one* In spite of the immediate incoherence of positive law 
and natural law, in spite of the direct deduction of law from 
the state, there is a natural law serving to limit the abso­
lute sovereignty of the state, and arising from the fact 
that the existence of the state itself is justified by natural 
law, so that the law of the state and natural law are brought 
into an indirect relationship. 
2» Hobbes differentiates sharply between natural and 
positive law: "These dictates of reason, men used to call 
by the name of laws, but improperly, for they are but conclu­
sions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conserva-
1 
tion and defence of themselves"• By this conception of 
natural law and natural rights, Hobbes is marked off from all 
other natural law theorists like Grotius, Locke or Aquinas, 
and because of this it is often questioned whether he should 
be classed among the natural right theorists at all# In his 
view, natural law was not a pre-conceived idea, the validity 
1« "Leviathan", Molesworth,III, C.XVI, p. 147. 
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of which was not to toe challenged* Rather does he trace 
natural law from the toasic Instincts of man, so that men 
cannot withdraw from its Jurisdiction. "The Law of Nature 
is a precept or a general rule, found out toy reason, toy which 
a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his 
1 
life." That, however, implies that his natural law is materi­
ally determined, for its central task is the preservation of 
man. In conformance with natural law are such measures and 
actions as serve the realisation of this aim, and in this 
way the state is at first rationally justified. Only in the 
state, only through a strong central coercive power machinery 
can peace and security toe guaranteed and human life be secured. 
In the state of nature men are wolves. The state of nature 
is the war of all against all* Prom this Justification of 
the state it follows that there must be some indirect limita­
tion of the sphere of state sovereignty, for natural law de­
mands the preservation of human life and if state law does 
not conform with such demands which of the two laws is to 
have precedence — natural or positive law? Hobbes declares 
himself in favour of the precedence of natural law, thus 
abandoning implicity his political concept of law. His first 
natural law is, "Every man ought to endeavour peace", and if 
this proves Impossible, "by all means we have to defend 
1. "Leviathan", Molesworth, III, C.XW, p. 117. 
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ourselves". In order to guarantee peace we have to "transfer 
to another such rights as being retained hinder the peace of 
mankind™. Further, fifteen eternal and immutable natural 
laws postulate that men are under the obligation to transfer 
their rights to the state, to keep promises, and so on. But 
how can these natural laws be realised if men are really 
wolves? How can the sayings of the New Testament have any 
validity in such a world? For instance: "Do as ye would be 
done by"? This objection against Hobbes has already been 
raised by Rousseau. - If these natural law norms have pre­
cedence over positive law, is a state law not calculated to 
aid the preservation of human life, but likely even to operate 
contrary to this principle, to be considered valid? His 
answer, which we have already anticipated in a general way is: 
i. 3 Covenants not to defend a man's own body are void". From 
this basic principle he infers certain concrete consequences. 
No one "is bound to confess a crime". No one is compelled 
to kill himself or other people. Universal compulsion to 
serve in the army is illegitimate. 
The way in which Hobbes, in dealing with a problem 
of the delimitation of the sphere of sovereignty abandons 
his usual clarity is characteristic. He clearly postulates 
1. "Leviathan", Molesworth,III, C.XIV, pp. 117-8). 
2. Cf. his fragment on "L'Etat de Guerre", printed by 
Vaughan, "Political Writings of Rousseau", Vol. I, p<, 305. 
3. Jl1 c-p/PJ 
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the duty of obedience on the part of* the citizen to all posi­
tive laws „ But sometimes he abandons this unconditional 
obedience and arrives at such vague formulations as for in­
stance: "Law of Nature obliges always in conscience (in foro 
interno) but not always in foro externo". The phrase, "not 
always" implies that natural law obliges even sometimes in 
foro externo, so that the postulate of unconditional obedience 
is met by the antagonistic postulate of a right of resistance. 
Those vaguenesses and contradictions within Hobbes1 system 
2 which have been enumerated in literature on the subject are 
historically understandable• Although he strongly maintained 
the creation of a strong state power, it appeared necessary 
to him almost as strongly to deny the pre-state character of 
liberty and property which he considered to be only rights 
3 
granted by the state: he did not want to make the state too 
much of an all-devouring Leviathan. Further, his ethical and 
political theory was still strongly influenced by Medieval 
conceptions, and although no other man contributed so much 
to the destruction of the domination of scholasticism. He is, 
in spite of this, able to use to a very large extent, the 
1. "Leviathan", Molesworth,III, C.XV, p, 145. 
2* Lubiensk^j, pp. 179-185; also Georg Jager, "Ursprung 
der modernen Staatswissenschaft und die Anfange des modernen 
Staates", in Archiv f. Geschichte der Philosophie, VI, XIV, p. 570; and John Laird, p. 205. 
3. "Leviathan", Molesworth,III, C.XVIII, p. 165. 
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very weapons forged by scholasticism to break its own 
supremacy. 
We have therefore to state that his natural law as a 
system of material norms stands above the state, that its 
primary content is the preservation of human life, and that 
consequently the power of the state is limited by the stronger 
natural law: "if the sovereign commands a man though justly 
condemned to kill, wound or maim himself; or not to resist 
those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, 
air, medecine or other things without which he cannot live, 
2 yet hath that man the liberty to disobey". He does not 
answer the question as to what he understands by "other things" 
which are indispensable to life. Here as with the problem of 
the validity of natural law Hobbes is deserted by his usual 
clarity of exposition. The phrase "other things without 
which he cannot live" would appear to be open to Inter­
pretations. It can be interpreted so widely as to include 
almost socialist elements in the natural law system. Our 
assertion that the postulate of a restriction of the sphere 
of sovereignty by material law must necessarily lead to dis­
integration of the status quo, applies equally to Hobbes. 
1, Laird, pp. 57-59. 
2. "Leviathan", Molesworth,III, C.XXI, p. 204. 
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3, In addition to that, the disintegrating function 
of the rationalistic justification of the coercive power of 
the state and law, are clearly indicated in Hobbes' system. 
This phenomenon has often been described. In the struggle 
around the problem of whether the state is the creation of 
God or of "human nature", the latter is historically speaking 
undoubtedly the most progressive; but both answers are 
equally illusions. Both hide the real cause of the rise of 
the state. The indivdualistic justification of the natural 
law ideology has a psychological dynamic which, as has been 
2 
demonstrated by Gierke, was already observed by a contemporary 
of Hobbes, Johann Friedrich Horn in his book, "Politicorum 
3 pars architectorum de civitate (Traj.a.Rh.1664)". Horn had 
already undertaken to prove the immanently revolutionary 
character of the Hobbesian theory. And Friedrich Julius 
Stahl, who in his book, "tJber die gegenwartigen Parteien in 
Staat und KIrche", (Berlin, 1883) divides political parties 
into those desiring /dae-fer-^leglslaliojl, and those desiring 
revolution, and tries to prove that all revolutionary parties 
have close connections with natural law, and are of an Indi-
vidualist character. In contrast he claims that^parties In 
1. Cf. Max Horkheimer, "Anfange der burgerlichen 
Geschichtsphilosophle", Stuttgart, 1930, p. 56. 
2* "Althusius", p. 70. 
3. Horn, apparently the most important contemporary critic 
of Hobbes, is not even mentioned in the paper by J.A. Thomas, 
"Some contemporary firitics of Hobbes", Economica, 1929,p.185. 
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^©woh- of -loguli-aul/loiV recognise something higher than man, 
something that is unconditionally binding, an order given by 
God, standing above the will of the people; and he character­
ises the revolutionary parties as follows: "It is a revolu­
tion to oppose civil society to the state of nature, and 
thereby to set men free from all traditions of law and custom, 
to reduce the well-ordered society to an original chaos, and 
to take from this chaos the standards by which social order 
is measured. It is a revolution to destroy the whole public 
body of the state, the whole moral order of the nation, and 
to leave nothing, except the rights and mutual security of 
individuals. It is, finally, the essence of revolution to 
deny the authority power in its own right, founding it on the 
will of the people". 
"The natural law Grotius to Kant is a scientific founda-
1 
tion for revolution." Obviously the aim of Hobbes is not 
to Justify absolute monarchy; no one who has ever read his 
works could come to this conclusion. He intended to consti­
tute the autonomy of the state itself independent of the work­
ings of the social forces and conflicts within it. Whether 
he stood on the side of the monarchy or of revolution, his aim 
was nothing but the conquest of the dualism of the monarcho-
machs. This intention found its clearest expression in the 
1. P. 23. 
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choice of the terms, in the sharp division between sovereignty 
and the bearer of sovereignty (state equals "commonwealth"). 
All his definitions provide for the possibility of a non-
monarchical state; thus for instance when he defines law as 
n 1 command of that person whether man or court", or "law is a 
command of him or them that have sovereign power", he is never 
deserted by the consciousness of the necessity of justifying 
the supremacy of the state as such, and not of one of its 
organs* The possibility of a revolutionary interpretation 
3 
of Hobbes has induced some scholars to count him from the be­
ginning as a partisan of the Roundheads. That, however, is 4 
untrue. Hobbes in reality always put his conscience at the 
disposal of the strongest political power of the moment. He 
had experienced the Great Refro^Attffog in which, during the 
struggle between the parties the state itself had been in 
6 
danger of dissolution# It appeared to him, therefore, that 
a legal order as such was good, independent of its function 
in the social life of the people, and without regard for the 
social substructure it preserved. His views, which, however, 
1. "Philosophical Rudiments", Molesworth,II.CXIV, p. 183. 
2. "A Dialogue", Molesworth, VI, p. 26. 
3• Cf• Lips• 
4. pp. ^ 46-7. 
5. Max Horkheimer, "Anfange der burgerlichen Geschichts-philosophie", p. 39. 
6. Laski, "State in Theory and Practice", p. 18. 
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have not been carried to their logical conclusion arose in 
the period which "must have given to lovers of security the 
same sense of vertigo which has been produced in our own day 
tl ^ by Bolshevism. 
The sovereignty of the state is based on necessity, 
that of monarchy, however, only on expediency. The necessity 
for a strong, central, coercive state machinery consists in 
the fact that without the contract of subjection by which the 
state was created, anarchy would prevail; "for before consti­
tution of sovereign power ... all men had right to do all 
things, which necessarily causes war: and therefore this 
propriety being necessary to peace and depending on sovereign 
2 power in order to preserve the public peace". The great ad­
vantages and disadvantages of a monarchy based on expediency 
are, however, "any subject may be deprived of all he possess-
eth", "may as well happen, where the sovereign power is in an 3 
assembly". 
If the state rests on a contract how is it possible, 
apart from the case of a conflict with natural law, to con­
stitute the duty of obedience on the part of the citizen to 
prevent a change in the form of government: i.e* how ife it 
possible to exclude a right of resistance based not on natural 
1. E.P. Carritt, "Morals and Politics", pp. 32-3. 
2. "Leviathan", Molesworth, III, C.XVIII, p. 165. 
3. Ibid.. C.XIX, p. 175. 
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law but on democracy? Why is the people not allowed to re­
pudiate the contract, or at least to deprive the sovereign 
of his right and might, and to put another in his place? In 
answering these decisive questions Hobbes falters, as has 
/ / 1 been clearly shown by Frederic Atger. In De Corpore Politico, 
2 
and in De Cive, Hobbes puts forward the old translation theory, 
the definite renunciation of the rights of the subjects on 
the creation of sovereignty„ In the "Leviathan", on the other 
hand, the contract which established representative state 
power at the same time definitely instituted that organ of 
the state which represented it. But even in that case a 
democratic right of deposition cannot be excluded, as G.P 
3 
Gooch rightly observed, "His theory of the contract did not 
even close the door to rebellion". Hobbes deduces the inad­
missibility of a change in the form of government from the 
contract of subjection which everyone concludes with everyone. 
He dubs as liars those who claim to justify the right of re­
sistance with reference to a contract with God# "This pre­
tence of a covenant with God is so evident a lie even in the 
pretenders own conscience, that it is not only an act of an 
1. "Essai sur l'Histoire des Doctrines du Contrat Social", 
1906, p. 176. 
2. "De e&rpore Politico" (II,1,S.23,3), "De Cive" (II, 
5,6). 
3. G.P. Gooch, "Political Theory", p. 48. 
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unjust, but of a vile and unable disposition." Those also 
are wrong who declare that sovereignty can be forfeited; 
they are wrong because the sovereign "maketh no covenant with 
his subject beforehand". He cannot conclude any such contract 
with the people as a whole, because the people as a unit does 
not exist. In spite of this opposition to a democratic right 
of resistance the system provides for a degree of democracy, 
and Hobbes would be the last to deny its rights. The fact 
that the state is based upon the contract of all with all 
implies the original existence of democracy. "Those who met 
together with intention to erect a city were almost in the 
very act of meeting a democracy, for in that they willingly 
met they are supposed obliged to this observation of what 
shall be determined by the major part; which while that coven­
ant lasts or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is 
a clear democracy; for that convent whose will is a will of 
2 all the citizens hath the supreme authority." 
Democracy is, therefore, "of necessity" the first form 
of government, "because an aristocracy and monarchy require 
nominals of persons agreed upon which agreement must consist 
*.• in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of 
the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually 3 democracy". 
1. "Leviathan", Molesworth, III, C.XVIII, p. 160. 
2."Philosophical Rudiments", Molesworth, II, p. 96. 
3."De Corpore Politico", Molesworth, IV,II, p. 158. 
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It is, therefore, not surprising that his works, to­
gether with those of Bellarmine and Buchanan in Oxford 1685 
were burned. It is not surprising that he was suspected by-
all political parties in the struggle, and that Clarendon 
summed him up to Charles II as follows: MI never read a book 
which contained so much sedition, treason and impiety". 
In Hobbes1 work are to be found all the constituent 
elements of the bourgeois state and society. Toennies has 
shown that free competition corresponds to his theory of the 
bellum omnum contra omnes. However, his notion of a violent 
and destructive competition is in strong opposition to that 
type of competition postulated by Adam Smith, although both 
start from the maxim of competitive equality,. Hobbes asserts 
the approximate equality of all individuals in the state of 
nature. Only in making such an assumption was it possible for 
him to develop sovereignty from competition. Just as in Adam 
Smith's theory of competition between equal competitors, 
sovereignty could only arise in making this assumption. 
Hobbes has created the basic character of the bourgeois 
Machtstaat. a wide sphere of absolute sovereignty# Anyone 
who believes the bourgeois state to be a negative, a weak 
state, or a fiction even, will find Hobbes1 theory unbourgeois 
in character — for instance, fascists, and social reformers. 
That, however, is incorrect. In postulating a strong central 
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power of the state he also at the same time demands a sphere 
of economic and cultural freedom for the individual citizen: 
"The liberty to sell and otherwise contract with one another, 
to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trait 
of life and institute their children as themselves think fit, 
and the like" This freedom, however, is not conceived to 
exist before the state; although he sees clearly that without 
a strong state power, property relationships as he knew them 
2 
could not be guaranteed. 
3 
II« Spinoza. 
Spinoza's theory of the State, especially the relation­
ship between Sovereignty and liberty, is the subject-matter 
4 
of diametrically divergent interpretation, Gierke sees in 
1* "Leviathan", Molesworth, III, p. 199. 
2. "Elem." Molesworth, IV, p0 84. 
3, Robert A. Duff, "Spinoza's Political and Ethical 
Philosophy". Glasgow, 1903. Sir Frederick Pollock, "Spinoza, 
His Life and Philosophy". London, 1899, W. Eckstein, "Zur 
Lehre vom Staatsvertrag bei Spinoza", Zeitschr. f. offentl. 
Rechttfj Band XIII, 1933* W. Eckstein, "Die rechtsphilosophische 
Lehre des Spinoza im Zusammenhang mit seiner allgemeinen 
Philosophie"• (Im Archiv f« Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 
Vol* 26, 1933.) Adolf Menzel, "Beitrage zur Geschichte der 
Staatslehre". Wien und Leipzig, 1929* C.F. Vaughan, "Studies 
in the History of Political Thought Before and After Rousseau". 
Manchester, 1925, Vol. 1, p. 62 ff. Spinoza, "Tractatus 
Teologico-Politicus", 1670. (TTP) "Tractatus Politicus" (TP). 
(Opera ed. van Vlooten & Land, 3rd edition, 1913.) 
4« Gierke-Barker, 1, p. 112. 
201 
Spinoza the representative of a pure State-Absolutism recog­
nising no sphere of freedom for the individual. The assertion 
of the existence of such subjective rights is called by him 
n 1 a series of sophisms". Menzel asserts on the other hand 
that the rights of men have hardly been more clearly defined 
than in the Tractatus Teologico-Politicus; and Sir Frederick 2 
Pollock rejects all assertions which charge Spinoza with 
State-Absolutism, and reaches a conclusion similar to Menzel'a. 
Here and there it is even asserted (for instance in Eckstein's 
papers^that Spinoza is a genuine theorist of Natural Right, 
recognising a natural law guaranteeing freedom. 
How are such contradictions possible? Menzel1s inter­
pretation seems to me to be incorrect. Gierke's is partially 
right, however only partially; because beside Spinoza's theory 
of State-Absolutism there stands a theory of the legitimacy 
the factual which can justify every possible nuance between 
the extremes of absolutism and anarchism, according to the 
distribution of factual power between State and Society. 
Moreover, we do not attribute any decisive significance to the 
changes in Spinoza's theory of the State. In the TTP (pub­
lished 1670), the granting of liberty is apparently desirable 
1. P. 575. 
2. P. 292. 
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although not stated to "be obligatory. In the TP (1676) this 
is only occasionally mentioned* The reason lies, as Menzel 
has shown convincingly in various places in the change in the 
political situation in the Netherlands which had occurred in 
the meantime. The friendship of Spinoza with Jan de Witt is 
well-known. He was a member of the Republican party, which 
mainly represented aristocrat interests, and was hostile to 
William of Orange and the Staatholders• In 1672, LouisXlV 
invades the Netherlands, the Republican government falls, 
there is a rising of the mob, and his friend Jan de Witt is 
murdered in the neighbourhood of his house. To this murder 
Menzel attributes the fact that in the TP the postulate of 
the Sovereignty of the State is still more emphasized than 
it was in the TTP. But even admitting that, there seems to 
be no decisive difference between TTP and TP. On the contrary, 
all ideas which are expressed in the TP are already foreshadow­
ed in the TTP, so that the essence of his attitude has not 
changed. 
1* His derivation of the absolute Sovereignty of the 
State is similar to that of Hobbes. 
The natural state is characterised by the absence of 
ethical norms. That, however, does not mean that his state­
ments are those of a sociology free from judgments of value, 
1. P. 282 ff. 
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that ia to say of a non-normative character# This assertion 
is generally based on his scientific programme, which he 
formulates in this way* Whereas others have bewailed or 
derided the qualities of men, have praised or blamed them, 
he wanted to understand them with the detachment with which 
he would contemplate a mathematical problem. He wanted, in 
his own words, to consider human actions Just as if he had 
to deal with lines, planes, and geometrical bodies« It is 
true, indeed, that mathematics do not contain statements of 
an "ought"• What one commonly calls natural law does not 
in itself contain such norms, but statements belonging to the 
category of existence, namely relating to the character of 
• the natural state, and to the emergence of the State out of 
it. His theory of the State is, however, not sociology. 
His laws are, in spite of his assertion, statements belonging 
to the category of essence and not of existence, so that here 
no difference can be found between him and Hobbes. For his 
theory of natural law — better, of the state of nature — 
which in itself is compounded of statements of the "is", has 
within his system only the function of showing those presup« 
positions which must be given in order to Justify the coercive 
power of the State; that is to say, to elicit the consent of 
men to the form of the State. 
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4, The state of nature is characterised by complete 
freedom and the factual equality of all men. In the state 
of nature, men are not bound by laws* It is the natural law 
of the state of nature that every individual strives to pre« 
serve himself, without any consideration except that which 
he has to take for himself. All men are entitled to act ac­
cording to their desires and inclinations, whether they are 
fools, insane, or healthy. Everything which man does, he 
does by force of a natural law. The state of nature does not 
prohibit anything, neither fraud nor hatred. For nature is 
not directed by human reason which aims only at the benefit 
of man and his preservation. In the cosmos, man is only a 
Modus, driven by necessity to act in the way in which he does 
act. 
1. Opera, van Vlotan & Land, Vol. 3, 1913. "Et quia lex 
summa Naturae est, ut unaquaeque res in suo statu, quantum 
in se est, conetur persevare, idque nulla alterius, sed tanturn 
sui habita ratione, hinc sequitur, unumquodque individuum jus 
summum ad hoc habere, hoc est (uti dixi) ad existendum et 
operandum prout naturaliter determinatum est. Nec hie ullam 
agnoscimus differentiam inter homines Ratione praeditos et 
inter alios, qui veram Rationem ignorant^ neque inter fatuos, 
delirantes, et sanos. Quicquid enim unaquaeque res ex legi-
bus suae naturae agit, id summo jure agit, nimirum quia agit, 
prout ex Natura determinata est, nec aliud potest.... Ex 
quibus sequitur, Jus et Institutum Naturae sub quo omines 
nascuntur, et maxima ex parte vivunt, nihil, nisi quod nemo 
cupit et quod nemo potest, prohiberej non contentiones, non 
iram, non dolos, nec absolute aliquid quod Appetitus suadet 
aversari. Nec mirum, nam natura non legibus humanae Rationis, 
quae non nisi hominum verum utile et conversationem intendunt, 
intercluditur, sed infinitis allis, quae totius Naturae, 
cujus Homo particula est, aeternum ordinem respiciuntj ex 
cujus sola necessitate omnia individus certo modo determinan-
tur ad existendum et operandum." 
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Men who are in the state of nature typically factually 
free and equal are not subjected to any other power. They 
are therefore sui juris and not alienus juris. He understands 
by alieni juris all those men living under foreign power 
(potestas). But as the state of nature is governed by strug­
gle, and the fight may end in the subjugation of some, in 
spite of typical autonomy man can already in the state of 
nature become alienus juris in relation to other men. 
The need for security drives men in the State, that is 
to say to the formation of a contract. In so far, his con­
struction is almost entirely identical with that of Hobbes. 
Against this, it has been asserted that the decisive differ­
ence lies in the fact that in Hobbes' theory the.contract is 
the constitutive element of the State, the voluntary deed of 
•I men, whereas in Spinoza's theory men are driven into the State 
I 
by the necessity of natural law, so that the contract only 
2 
describes an actual happening. This contradiction, however, 
seems to be wrong, because the drive resulting from the natural 
law is in Spinoza's theory only motive, whereas the formation 
of the State itself is a voluntary deed of men. However, the 
interpretation of the contract is of no decisive significance. 
The centre of gravity lies in the question which tasks are 
1. TP XI, 30, 11, 9-11. 
2. Menzel as against Gierke's "Althusius" 2nd Edition. p. 343, 3rd Edition, pp. 379~80. * 
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assigned to the State, and what Is to be the relationship 
between State and individual. 
Man receives security only from the State. Only with 
the help of the State can men obtain their rights. Only the 
1 
State excludes the blind force of the state of nature. In 
the contract, therefore, everyone transfers his whole liberty 
to the State, so that the State receives absolute sovereignty 
over men* This sovereign power is not limited by any laws 
whatsoever* Everyone is under obligation to obey the sover­
eign, In concluding the contract all partners put themselves 
wholly at the mercy of the State. Therefore having acted as 
reason and necessity required, they are now absolutely com­
pelled to obey all commands of the sovereign, however absurd 
they may be. If they refuse to do so, they are public 
1. TTP, Ch. XIV. "Quod si etiam consideremus, homines 
absque mutuo auxilio miserrime et absque Rationis cultu 
necessario vivere, ut in Cap, 5 ostendimus, clarlssime vide-
biraus, homines ad secure et optime vivendum necessario in 
unum conspirare debuisse, ac proinde affecisse, ut jus, quod 
unusquisque ex Natura ad omnia habeat, coolective haberent, 
neque amplius ex vi et appetitu uniuscujusque, sed ex omnium 
simul potentia et volumtate determinaretur. Quod tamen 
frustra tentassent, si, nisi quod appetitus suadet, sequi 
vellent (ex legibus enim appetitus unusquisque diverse 
trahitur); adeoque fIrmissime statuere et pacisci debuerunt, 
ex solo Rationis dictamine (cui nemo aperte repugnare audet, 
ne mente carere videatur) omnia dirigere, et appetitum, 
quateraus in damnum alterius aliquid suadet, fraenare, neminique 
facere, quod sibi fieri non vult, jusque denique alterius 
tanquam suum defendere." 
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1 enemies acting against reason. 
The sphere of the State comprehends not only secular 
but also divine matters. The Jus Divinum is law only if it 
has become positive law, that is to say, part of the law of 
the State; if not, it is only intuition. The State decides 
what is just and unjust, what is equitable and inequitable. 
Justice, reason, and neighbourly love receive therefore validi­
ty only through the command of the sovereign. The Dei Regnum 
can only exist through the medium of the sovereign power. 
Divine laws are valid not through the commands of God, but 
2 only through the medium of the temporal sovereign. 
1« TTP, Ch. XXV. "Si ... unus quisque omnem, quam habet, 
Potentiam in societatem transferat; quae adeo summum Naturae 
jus in omnia.•• Ex quo sequitur, summam Potestatem nulla lege 
teneri, sed omnes ad omnia ei parere debere: hoc enim taciti vel expresse pacisci debuerunt omnes, cum omnem suam potentiam 
se defendendi, hoc est omne suum jus, in earn trastulerunt» 
Quippe, si aliquid sibi servatum volebant, debuerant simul 
sibi cavere, quo id tuto defenders possent; eum autem id non 
fecerint, nec absque imperii divisions, et consequenter des­
truction, facere potuerint, eo ipso se arbitrio summae 
potestatis absolute subriserunt. Quod cum absolute fecerint, 
idque (ut jam ostendimus) et necessitate cogente, et ipsa 
Ratione suadente; hinc sequitur, quod, nisi hostes Imperii 
esse velimus, et contra Rationem, Imperium summis viribus 
defenders suadentem, agere, omnia absolute summae potestatis 
mandata exequi etiam jubet." | 
2. TTP, Ch. XIX. "At, ut verae Rationis documenta, hoc 
est ... ipsa divina documenta, vim juris absolute haberent, 
necesse fuisse, ut unusquisque jure suo natural! cederet, et 
oranes idem in omnes, vel in aliquot, vel in unum transferrent: 
et turn demum nobis primum innotuit, quid justitia, quid in-
justitia, quid aequitas, quidque iniquitas esset. Justitia 
igitur, et absolute omnia verae Rationis documenta, et conse­
quenter erga proximum charitas, a solo imperii jure, hoc est 
...a solo eorum decreto, qui jus imperandi habent, vim juris 
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Justice and injustice are, therefore, only possible in 
the State. 
His notion of the law is, therefore, the political 2 
notion. 
The statement that contracts have to he fulfilled is, 
therefore, not valid in the state of nature. It is valid 
only as a part of the positive law of the State. Property is 
equally only a category of positive law. The state of nature 
knows no property. In it everyone possesses only what he can 
3 conquer by naked force. 
et mandati accipiunt. Et quia (ut jam ostendi) in solo justi-
tiae et charitatis, sive verae Religionis, jure Dei Regnum 
consistit, sequitur, ut volebamus, Deum nullum regnum in 
homines habere, nisi per vim mandati a Deo immidiate non acci­
piunt, sed necessario ab iis, vel mediantibus lis, qui jus 
imperandi et decretandi habent; adeoque non, nisi mediantibus 
iisdem, concipere possumus, Deum in homines regnare, resque 
humanas secundum justitiam et aequitatem dirigere. Quod ipsa 
etiam experimenta comprobatur; nam nulla divinae justitiae 
vestigia reperiuntur, nisi ubi justi regnant." 
lo TP, 11,18. "Ex lui, quae in hoc capite ostendimus, 
perspicuum nobis fit, in statu natural! non dari peccatum." 
2. TP, IV,5. "Videmus itaque, quo sensu dicere possumus, 
Civitatem legibus teneri, et peccare posse. Verum si per 
legem intelligamus Jus Civile, quod ipso Jure Civile vindicare 
potest, est peccatum id, quod Jure Civile fieri prohibetur, 
hoc est si haec nomina genuino senso sumantur, nulla ratione 
dicere possumus, civitatem legibus adstrictam esse, aut possere 
peccare... At Jure civilis pendent a solo Civitatis decreto. tr • • • • • 
3. TP, 11,23. "Sed omnia omnium sunt, qui scilicet potes-
tam habent sibi eadem vindicandi." 
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The reason of the State has precedence of everything. 
The highest law of the State is its own good. The State can 
2 violate its own principles if the common good demands it. 
The State, therefore, transforms all men from sui juris into 
alieni juris. The State alone is sui juris. The State itself 
3 is as free as men were free in the state of nature. Thus in 
the extension of the sphere of State Sovereignty Spinoza goes 
farther than Hobbes. He goes practically to the utmost pos­
sible limit. In this he is followed only by Rousseau, with, 
however, one fundamental difference. Rousseau, as we shall 
see later, postulates only conditionally absolute Sovereignty 
for the State, that is only if it has a certain political 
structure (pure democracy); because for Rousseau only the 
political form of the State and its social substructure 
guarantee the Tightness of the exercise of State Sovereignty. 
Spinoza, however, concedes absolute Sovereignty to every 
State regardless of its political structure and its social 
substructure. 
Spinoza's binding of the citizens to absolute obedience 
does not, however, imply that he is indifferent to the poli­
tical structure and to the nature of State activity. On the 
1. TP, 111,16. 
2. TP, IV,5. 
3. TP, IV,5. 
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contrary. In numerous places he gives recommendations as to 
the content of the exercise of Sovereignty, and the form of 
the State. These, however, as must be asserted again and 
again, especially against Menzel, are only recommendations, 
lacking any element of institutionalisation. 
a) Spinoza recommends that the domination of the State 
should not be its aim. Men should not be kept in terror, 
but should be freed from terror, so as to live/securely as 
possible and to be able to realise their freedom; for the true 
end of the State is freedom. Wherever it is only by terror 
that the citizen is deterred from insurrection, one can speak 
negatively of the absence of war, but one cannot speak posi­
tively of peace. Peace is not only something negative, but 
rather the will to fulfil joyfully the commands of the State/ 
A State whose peace depends upon the inertia of its citizens, 
or upon the fact that the citizens are driven like cattle, 
may be considered as a solitude rather than a State.2 Stronger, 
2M'8- "?*"• cuJuscunque Imperii sit status facile ex fine Status Civilis cognoscitur: qui scilicet nullus 
alius est, quam pax vitaeque securitas. Ac proinde illud 
imperium optimum est, ubi homines concorditer vitam transigunt et cujus jura inviolata servantur." ' 
2. TTP,V,4o "Civitas, cujus subditi, metu territi, arma 
non capiunt, potius dicenda est, quod sine bello sit quam quod 
pacem habeat. Pax enim non bello privatio, sed virtus est. 
quae ex animi fortitudine oritur: est namque obsequimum con-
stans voluntas id exequendi, quod ex communi Civitatis decreat 
fieri debit. Ilia praetera Civitas cujus pax a subditorum 
inertia pendet, qui scilicet voluti pecora ducuntur, ut tuntam 
servire discant, rectius solitudo quam Civitas dici potest•" 
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however, than his enthusiastic desire for a coincidence of 
the will of the State with those of individuals, is his 
scepticism as to the possibility of realising this ideal. 
According to him, no State is secure whose maintenance depends 
upon faith. 
b) His recommendations with regard to the political 
structure have undergone a change which has been mentioned 
by Menzel. In his later years he openly advocated aristocracy. 
In the TTP, however, he gives preference to democracy, and 
this for two reasons* On the one hand, in a democracy every-2 
one is obedient to himself, "ut nemo suo aequali servire 
teneatur", and on the other hand, democracy is the nearest 
3 approach to the state of nature. "Democratia maxime ad 
statum naturalem accedit." Absolute monarchy is rejected, 
although in his opinion it is probably more durable than any 
4 
other form of State. Constitutional monarchy in which the 
ruler is subject to the law, and the law is the declared 
will of the king, but not every will of the king is law, is 
5 
to be preferred to absolute monarchy. The postulate of a 
1. TP, I, 6. "Imperium igitur, cujus salus ab alicuius fide pendit .... minime stabile erit." 
2. TTP, V. 
3. TTP, XX. 
4. TP, VI,4. 
5. TP, VII,1. "Ut omne jus sit regis explicata voluntas Jus sit." 
212 
share in power by the concilium transforms the monarch of his 
constitutional ideas practically into a shadow king. By 
aristocracy he understands that form of the State in which 
1 the ruling power is exercised by selected people. If domina­
tion is based upon law, even if in consequence of a census 
only few have suffrage, we can speak only of democracy, not 
of aristocracy. His conception of democracy embraces there­
fore that form of government which we usually understand by 
aristocracy, and his praise of democracy corresponds to his 
political position, and is in fact a panegyric of aristocracy. 
His theory of the aims and the form of the State is, 
however, as must be repeated again and again, only put forward 
as a recommendation. The passion with which he makes these 
recommendations does not render them absolute in character. 
2m The distribution of the spheres of sovereignty and 
freedom is, according to Spinoza, identical with the distri­
bution of power between State and individual (society). The 
Potentia of a person, that is to say the power over the world 
which confers the natural right, is a function of the actual 
power which stands at the disposal of that person. Everyone, 
therefore, has as much right as he has might. The State as 
exercising the highest might, has, therefore, also the highest 
1. TP, VIII,1 
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right. The Individuals possess as much right as they are able 
1 to dispose of might. 
If, however, right is equal to might, It follows appar­
ently that except within very narrow limits no universally 
valid statement can be made as to the relation between Sover­
eignty and liberty. This theory fully Justifies according to 
the existing distribution of power every status between the 
extremes of Absolutism and Anarchism* The only universal 
limit of Sovereignty, and therefore the only universally 
existing realm of freedom, is determined by the impossibility 
of regulating psychic phenomena by any kind of external, and 
therefore of political, interference. Consequently all those 
cases which he mentions as limiting the Sovereignty of the 
State fall within this category of the inalienable liberty 2 
of thought and of feeling. 
1. Cf. Robert A. Duff, p. 146 ff. and TTP, XVI, TP 11,4. 
"Per ijus itaque Naturae Intelligo ipsas Naturae leges seu 
regulas secundum quas omnia fiunt, hoc est Ipsam naturae 
potentiam; atque adeo totius Nature, et consequenter unius-
cujusque individui Naturale Jus eo usque se extendit, quo ejus j 
potentia; et consequenter quicquid unusquisque homo ex legibus 
suae naturae agit, id summo Naturae Jure agit, tantumque in 
Naturam habet, juris quantum potentia valet." 
2o For a similar formulation see Pufendorf Elem. 1, def. 
XIII,19. "Objects of civil law is In general all that which 
can be effectively enjoined by a supreme human authority. 
The inner acts of the mind in regard to which laws are enacted 
in vain are excluded therefrom, because for sooth, it is be­
yond the power of other men to know whether obedience has 
been rendered," 
2X4 
If he Identifies the limits of the power of the state 
With the limit of the possibility of carrying out its com­
mands, so that the state has no power where its citizens 
cannot be compelled to obey either by threats or rewards/ 
this only means that the subjects have essentially the liberty 
of thought and feeling. If it is possible to compel them in 
everything else, the frontier which he erects is practically 
meaningless. This is shown by all his concrete examples, as 
for instance that no one can be compelled to love a man he 
hates; or that the soul is free. Thus he can conceive only 
of a freedom of opinion, not of a freedom to express one's 
opinion. But according to his theory, even this inner free­
dom of feeling and thought could be withdrawn, if it were 
possible to detect by new instruments the physical equivalents 
of thought and feeling. 
This poverty of the recognised sphere of individual 
freedom is contradicted by his passionate stand for freedom 
of opinion. He fought against any restrictions of that 3 
freedom, and vehemently advocated freedom of religious expres­
sion, but in the TP dealt only incidentally with these demands. 
1. TP, 111,8. 
2. TP, 111,10. 
3* TTP, VII. 
4. TTP, VII. 
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3« As against this interpretation three objections 
could be raised. 
a) In Chapter IV of the TTP, he asserts that it is 
false to maintain that the positive law of the State, that 
is the exercise of Sovereignty, could he arbitrary, for those 
men who are the instruments of the State activity are also 
a part of nature. Therefore he demands that we should not 
only investigate the nearest causes of their actions, but 
consider the interdependence of the causes in the whole pro-
cess of the world. It may be true that the will of the ruler 
is the nearest cause of the law of the State# But this will 
of the ruler on its side follows from compelling motives. 
This assertion, however, does not contain any kind of limita*-
tion of the power of the State, unless one imputes to Spinoza 
a very banal optimism. It is rather a justification of State 
Absolutism, for even tyranny is right because it is a part 
of nature. 
b) The second objection is usually based upon his 
1 
famous letter to Jelles, There he writes: "With regard to 
politics, the difference between Hobbes and me, about which 
you inquire, consists in this that I ever preserve the natural 
1„ Cf, "The Correspondence of Spinoza". Ed, Wolf, London, 
1928, Epist. 50. 
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right intact. So that the Supreme Power in a State has no 
more right over a subject than is proportionate to the power 
by which it is superior to the subjects. This is what always 
takes place in the State of Nature". That he does not Tinder-
stand by natural right a Jus Naturae with an unchangeable 
content, is clearly shown by this passage. The sentence only 
confirms that Spinoza did not, and could not, construct any 
absolute boundary between Sovereignty and liberty. 
c) Finally he considers the construction that man in 
concluding the contract hands over all his rights to the State, 
as a mere theory, because no one could transfer so much that 
1 
he ceased to be a human being. 
But what constitutes a human being? The answer is 
given in Chapter XX of the TTP; only freedom of the soul, 
only freedom of the inner life* For in this chapter he ob­
serves that no one could transfer his power to think and to 
Judge freely and independently. 
An exception, however, is given in his assertion that 
2 
no compulsion can be maintained to commit suicide# This is 
lo TTP, XVII, "Contemplatii precedentis Capitis de jure 
natural! uniuscujusque in cardem translato, quamvis cum praxis 
ita lnstituti possit, ut ad candem magis ac magis accedat, 
umquam tamen fiet, quin in multis mere theoretica maneat. Nam 
nemo unquam suam potentiam et consequenter neque suum jus ita 
in alium transferre poterit, ut homo esse deslnat." 
2. TP, 111,10. 
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an apparent inconsistency which is, however, irrelevant to 
European civilization0 On the other hand, however, he main­
tains in opposition to Hobbes, that conscription is justified. 
And he himself saw clearly that individual liberty is only a 
private virtue, but that the virtue of the State is security. 
Thus it is clear that within Spinoza's theory there is no 
universally valid limitation of the power of the State; that 
in some circumstances he sacrifices the freedom of the in­
dividual, just as in other circumstances he sacrifices the 
2 
existence of the State, Vaughan is, therefore, partly right 
in observing that the right of the individual eventually re« 
turns to life, even if through the alias of might« He is 
only partly right, because the statement that right equals 
might contains no fixed boundary of the sphere of Sovereignty. 
4» His theory has, therefore, a dual face; and in 
this we are in opposition to nearly every interpretation of 
Spinoza*s theory of law in the State* To the dualism of 
State Absolutism on the one hand, and the theory of the legi­
timacy of the factual on the other, there corresponds the 
dualism of the interests he represents• The State is absolute 
1. TP, 111,10. 
2* P. 79. 
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in order to the maintenance of security, which appears to 
him as a bourgeois to be the highest good. We saw, however, 
that he is not indifferent as to the content of the exercise 
of Sovereignty and the political structure of the State. To 
the recommendations already mentioned may be added some others. 
We mentioned that there is not the slightest indication of an 
adherence to the idea of democracy. This can be seen in his 
treatment of the problem of the sui and alien! juris, a fact 
to which Menzel has drawn attention* All men are alieni juris 
in the State because the State is the sole master?" but this 
lack of freedom is only in relation to the State. Nothing is 
here said as to the mutual relationship of the citizens. In 
this relationship certain groups of men are always alieni 
juris in relation to other groups, when they live in their 
physical or psychical power; as for instance the wife and 
children are subject to the patria potestas, and the servants 
to the potestas of the master. Those groups of men living 
under foreign power are also, as alieni juris, not entitled to 
political equality, so long as they are under foreign power. 
,1# fJ1??* "Videmus itaque, unumquamque civem non 
exequi 11 esse, cujus omnia mandata tenetur 
* 2\«T£l XI»3' 1,E5,<aictis in Praec. Art. patet, nos posse imperii Democratic! diversa genera concipere: sed meum insti­
tution non est de unoquoque sed de eo solumnodo agere. ni quos 
omnes absolute, qui solis legibus patriis tenentur, et praetera 
sui juris sunt, honesteque vivunt, jus suffrajii ni supremo Consilio habent, numeraque imperii subeundi." 
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If they are able to break this domination, they become free 
and equal. By this proposition the notion of political 
equality which is the basis of democracy is arbitrarily re­
stricted to certain groups of citizens, in accordance, how­
ever, with his social position and with the convictions of 
his contemporaries« His theory of the political structure 
of the State is socially the typical construction of the 
propertied classes» This becomes still clearer when we con­
sider his suggestions as to the exercise of Sovereignty. In 
Chapter V of the TTP he describes the ideal society based upon 
division of labour, exchange of commodities, and mutual help; 
a society which becomes State by the institution of enforce­
able legal norms. In this chapter he decisively postulates 
freedom of trade* This attitude towards the problem of 
commerce is largely determined by his friendship with the 
brothers de la Court, whose views are quoted with approval 
2 in the TP. 
The strong State, therefore, implies political domina­
tion by the bourgeoisie, and secures the free exchange of 
1* TP, II,9« "Praeterea sequitur, unumquemque tamdia 
alterius esse juris, quamdia sub alterius potestate est ..»• 
eatemus sui juris, quaetemus vim omnem repellere damnumque 
sibi iliaturn ex sui animl sententia vindicare, et absolute, 
quatenrus ex suo Ingenio vivere potesto" 
2o TP, VIII,21. "quae prudentissimus belga v. H." 
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commodities. Against a State which does not realise this 
social and political aim, however, there is in fact a right 
of revolution following from his proposition of the identity 
of right with might# This theory of the legitimacy of the 
factual serves in the first place to crush the power of the 
people, whom he quite understandably hated. In his view, 
plebeians should have no protection by the State, as they 
have already the advantage of their great numberso On the 
contrary, the State should protect itself against their great 
numbers, and it does this best by giving some office to the 
1 
plebeians. The proposition that right equals might serves 
in the second place to fight against the danger of monarchy. 
Generally speaking, the theory of the legitimacy of the 
factual is the theory of the ruling class, and is a conser­
vative theory; but here it becomes the theory of the opposi« 
tion, that is of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy united in 
opposition to the Monarchy; an opposition which feels itself 
powerful and is powerful, and which has not yet played out 
its role, but trusting its power hopes to be able soon to 
translate its might into right. 
1. TP, VIII, 4-6, 13-14. 
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CHAPTER VI 
John Locke"^ 
1. One postulate of Locke's political theory is the 
securing, as against the state, of the liberty of individuals, 
which is conceived of as existing before the state. But to 
present only this element of his political theory is to give 
an incomplete and one-sided interpretation. As certainly as 
he extended the realm of individual liberty as against the 
sphere of state sovereignty, so certainly did he constitute a 
sphere of state sovereignty which Is by no means insignificant. 
It is true that the word "Sovereignty" does not occur in his 
writings; but this fact must not lead us to assume that he was 
ignorant of the reality. 
2 
His starting-point is the alleged identity of the law of 
reason with the law of nature, which is asserted to be a part 
1. Bibliography: John Locke, "Of Civil Government, Two Treatises ; Charles Bastide, "John Locke", 1907* H R Fn* Ron-nna 
of John Locke", London 187* H^olS"' 
England from Locke to Bentham" (Home University Library), Pashal Larkin, "Property in the 18th Century with 
„ renco to England and Locke", (Cork University Press 
ppf 130ff VaUghan' "Studies in Political Thought"?Bd.l, 
2. Cf. Chapter on Thomas Aquinas. 
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of the divine law. This divine law is perceived by reason. 
"Reason is natural revelation whereby the Eternal Father of 
light and fountain of all knowledge communicates to mankind 
that portion of truth^which he has laid within the reach of 
the natural faculties". 
The natural law is binding on everyone. Its content is 
the prohibition of self-destruction, the equality of all men, 
and the injunction that no one is to injure his neighbour, 
neither his life, his liberty, nor his health. He who violates 
these principles does not live according to the laws of reason 
2 and must therefore be punished. 
Like all those theorists of natural right who seek to 
construct a sphere of freedom as against the state, he starts 
from an optimistic valuation of human nature, and assumes the 
universal harmony of self-interest and common interest. His 
description of the natural state contains an implicit criticism 
jj of Hobbes. He writes always with an eye on Hobbes. The natur­
al state is^a state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and 
preservation. But the question then arises why, in such cir­
cumstances, the state is necessary. The state is justified in 
1. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk LV, Ch. IX. 
2. 11, Ch. II, 6-8. 
3. Vaughan 1, p. 131. 
4. 11, Ch. Ill, 19. 
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the same way as In Hobbes1 theory; that is to say, it exists 
in order to exclude the possibility of violent conflicts, to 
preserve the rights of natural liberty, and to protect property. 
These are the motives for the formation of the social contract. 
Property, however, does not only mean a power over things, bub 
it includes also individual liberty and the protection of the 
2 body. This property already exists in the state of nature. 
It is therefore not created by the state, as is the case in 
the theories of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Rousseau; but is asserted 
to be a right prior to the state. Thus the principle elements 
of the state of nature are maintained even after the creation 
of the state. The natural state is not entirely replaced by 
the civil society, as is the case in the Absolutist theories; 
it is rather only limited by the civil society; and this only 
in so far as such limitation seems necessary for the protec­
tion of the remaining core of t?he natural state. In terms of 
legal procedure, this means that there exists a legal presump­
tion for the existence of the state of nature and against the 
coercive power of the state. 
If, however, the aim of the social contract is to pre­
serve the state of nature as far as possible, it seems neces­
sary to limit the sovereignty of the state arising from the 
1. 11, Ch.II, 11; also 11, Ch.V, 34; and 11, Ch.XI, 134-137; 11, Ch. XVI, 183. 
2. 11, Ch. V, 27. 
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social contract, in order to prevent an antagonism to the 
raison d'etre of the social contract. This limitation is 
achieved by two factors, a material one and an institutional 
one; that is to say, by the introduction of the rule of a 
material law on the one hand, and by the separation of powers 
on the other. 
2. In agreement with Hooker, Locke postulates the rule 
of the material law. Only the law shall rule, and the law is 
the rule of the people. The rule of the material law implies 
first that the legislative power cannot dispose arbitrarily 
2 of the lives and property of individuals. Applying the old 
oategorles of private law, he concludes, from the proposition 
of Roman law, that no one can transfer more rights than he 
himself possesses. As the state of nature does not grant to 
the people the right to affect liberty and property, so they 
M 
1. 11, Ch. XI, 134. "The great end of men's entering into 
society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and 
safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the 
laws established in that society, the first and fundamental 
positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the 
legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law 
which i3 to govern even the legislative. This legislative 
is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred 
and -unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it." 
2. "Through the legislative, whether placed in one or more, 
whether it be always In being or only by intervals, though it 
be the supreme power in every commonwealth, yet, first it is 
not, nor oan possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people." 
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cannot transfer such power to the state. From the above 
restrictions of the sovereignty of the state as to property, 
it follows that it is inadmissible to raise taxes without the 
2 consent of the people or of the representative organs. The 
idea of protection of property is so strong that in his view 
although soldiers are under obligation to obey even the most 
desperate commands of their superior, he cannot take away even 
3 the smallest amount of their property. 
It appears to him that such a limitation of the posi­
tive law of the state by natural law can only be realised if 
4 the positive law has the character of a general rule. By 
"standing laws" he understands general rules, as his quotation 5 
by Hooker shows. 
v I 
1. 11, Ch. XI, 135. "For hobody can transfer to another 
more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an absolute 
arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy 
his own life, or take away the life or property of another." 
2. 11, Ch. XI, 140. "But still it must be with his own con­
sent - i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by 
themselves or their representatives chosen by them; for if any 
one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by 
his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he 
thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government." 
3. 11, Ch. XI, 139. "But yet we see that neither the ser­
geant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth 
of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to 
perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his 
money." 
4. il, Ch. XII, 144. "But because the laws that are at once, 
and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force." 
5. The quotation from Hooker occurs in Ch. XI, 136. 
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This obligation of the state to exercise its rule only 
through general rules reconcilable with Ratio is valid in his 
view for every form of government, even for a democracy. 
3. Organised security for the rule of the material law 
as against positive laws is achieved by the institution of 
the separation of powers, which implies that legislation has 
2 
precedence of the two other powers. All other elements of his 
theory of state and law are deduced from these basic principles. 
The legislative power is always in the hands of parlia­
ment. A delegation of this legislative power to other organs 
appears to him inadmissible, as the people has not transferred 
3 
a corresponding right. Executive and federative power are de­
rived from the legislative power, and are legitimately united 
in one hand, although they are distinct from one another. For 
1. 11, Ch. XI, 137. "And therefore, whatever form the common­
wealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared 
and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and unde­
termined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far worse 
condition than in the state of Nature if they shall have armed 
one or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force 
them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees 
of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that 
moment, unknown wills, without having any measures set down 
vtfhich may guide and Justify their action." 
2. li, Ch. XI, 134. "This legislative is not only the 
supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable 
in the hands where the community have once placed it." 
3. 11, Ch. XI, 141. "The legislative cannot transfer the 
power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a 
delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass 
it over to others." 
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both need might, and it ia inexpedient to place the power of 
1 
the state in various hands. Generally the view is held that 
in Locke's theory there is no real distinction between the 
2 executive and the federative power. We shall, however, see 
later that this objection against Locke is not valid, but that 
the federative power fulfills a certain distinct function 
within his system. The rule of the material law is suffi­
ciently institutionalised by the recognition of a right to 
resistance. We shall deal with it later. What, however, 
happens when we suddenly discover that not all men are good; 
that sometimes they are "grasping hucksters, quarrelsome 
3 
tyrants, rebels". In general one has to remember, what Locke 
himself very incautiously admitted, that the positive law is 
4 always only a very incomplete image of the natural law. 
Finally, the state does not exist in isolation. It 
exists in a community with other states. It is impossible in 
face of war to consider the state of nature between the states 
as a paradise. 
1. 11, Ch. XII, 148. "Though, as I said, the executive and 
federative power of every community be really distinct in 
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at 
the same time in the hands of distinct persons." 
2. On the whole matter, see Laskl, p. 40. 
3. Vaughan 1, p. 169. 
4. 11, Ch. VIII, 111. 
Theao throe objections are met by Locke by the Institu­
tion of the prerogative. By prerogative he understands the 
right of the executive and the federative power to Issue in­
dividual decisions and commands outside, and even against 
valid general norms. Prerogative is therefore a discretionary 
power not bound by laws. The bearer of the prerogative can 
therefore act without law, even against law. There is not 
even the need for an Aot of Indemnity. The exeroise of pre­
rogative is only functionally restricted by his postulate 
that it is to be used for the public good. 
The sovereignty of the state comprises, as we have seon, 
two things; the right to issue general norms, and the right 
to issue individual commands. The antagonism which we men-
& 
tioned on page $ as a possible one, is excluded by Locke 
through his affirmation of the precedence of the power of 
issuing individual commands before the power of promulgating 2 
general norms. The additional reasons for the recognition of 
prerogative power are, according to Locke, the unpredicta­
bility of future events by the legislativej the rigidity of 
1. It must, however, be noted here that in oortain circum­
stances he affirms the existence,pf such limitation of the 
prerogative by general rules. (11, Ch. XVIII, 206.) 
2. 11, Ch. XIV, 160. "This power to act according to dis­
cretion for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative." 
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general norms, which when applied in their rigidity may often 
have an inequitable effect; and the fact that the legislative 
assembly is not always sitting, and works too slowly on account 
of the great number of its members. 
The pre-eminence of the prerogative over general norms 
is so great that there is not even conceded to the people a 
right of resistance against its exercise. There is left to 
1 
them only the appeal to Heaven. Between the executive which 
exercises its prerogative, and the legislative power, there 
2 is no Judge on earth. 
5. At this point we must consider his theory of the 
right of resistance. The right is admissible only against a 
despot. But who is a despot? Despotic power is defined as 
arbitrary power which deprives a man of his life at the dis-
3 cretlon of the despot. 
Despotism can firstly be the outcome of conquest. A 
4 right of resistance is always given against the robber. 
1. 11, Ch. XIV, 168. "And where the body of the people, or 
any single man, are deprived of their right, or are under the 
exercisp of a power without right, having no appeal on earth 
they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment." 
2. 11, Ch. XIV, 168. "Between an executive power in being, 
with such a prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon 
his will for their convening, there can be no Judge on earth." 
3. 26, Ch« XV. 172. "Despotical power is an absolute, ar­
bitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life 
whenever he pleases." 
4. 11, Ch. XVI, summing up under 196. "The short of the 
case in conquest is this: The conqueror, if he have a just 
cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all that 
230 
Despotism can therefor© be the consequence of usurpation 
(domestic conquest). Finally, the most important case of 
despotism is tyranny. By tyranny, he understands the exer­
cise of power without corresponding right. This tyrant is 
therefore a tyrannus quoad exercltium. Even James I, whom 
he quotes in Chapter VII, expressed the view that a king can 
only act according to law, and becomes a tyrant wherever he 2 
abandons the law. Against such a tyrant the right of resist-
3 ance is thus granted. Violence can only be met by violence. 
Such a right of revolution is considered to be politically 
actually aided and concurred in the war against him, and a 
right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and 
estates, so he injure not the right of any other. Over the 
rest oi the people, if there were any that consented not to 
the war, and over the children of the captives themselves or the possessions of either he has no power." 
1. 11, Ch. XVIII, 199. "So tyranny is the exercise of 
power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to; and 
J3* raaklnS use of the Power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private, separate advantage 
• v 
2; 11, Oh. XVIII, 202. "Wherever law ends, tyrsnny begins, 
if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever 
in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and 
makes use of the force he has under his command to compass 
that upon the subject which the law allows not, ceases in 
that to be a magistrate, and acting with authority may be 
opposed, as any other man who by force invades the richt of another." 
3. 11, Ch. XVIII, 204. "That force is to be opposed to 
nothing but to unjust and unlawful force. Whoever makes any 
opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemna­
tion, both from God and man; and so no such danger or con­
fusion will follow, as is often suggested." 
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harmless and legally legitimate. It is politically harmless 
because if several individual persons offer resistance, their 
act does not destroy the stability of the state. If, however, 
the act of the tyrant concerns the majority of the people, or 
if the injury done to an individual is so important that it 
is felt by the majority of the people, the revolution becomes 
an accomplished fact which in any case cannot be prevented. 
The legal argument for the right of revolution is based 
upon the view that he who exercises violence without law puts 
himself into a state of war with the society. And for the 
Justification of such revolutionary right, even Barclay is 
quoted, who considers self-defence as a part of the law of 2 
nature. 
The question now arises how such right of resistance 
can be reconciled with the recognition of prerogative power. 
We have already seen that resistance must not be offered to 
the exercise of the prerogative. Locke himself does not deal 
expressly with this problem. But we can gather from the 
structure of his theory that a right of resistance is admis­
sible against the exercise of the prerogative when the 
1. ii, Ch. XVIII, 208-9. 
2. 11, Ch. XIX, 232, 233-39, "In whatsoever he has no 
authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for where­
soever the authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes 
like other men who have no authority." 
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prerogative power degenerates into despotism. The decision 
as to when such degeneration has occurred is left to the con­
science of the individual. 
We find, therefore, the following distribution of spheres 
in Locke's political theory. 
6. We find first a realm of undisputed state sovereign­
ty, which in the main coincides with the sphere of competence 
of the federative power. The specific realm of the preroga­
tive is foreign policy, that is, the power of war and peace, 
the conclusion of leagues and alliances. In spite of the 
extraordinary significance of foreign policy for the life of 
the state, its conduct can only to a very limited extent be 
based on precedents or on general abstract norms; because the 
carrying out of foreign policy depends to a great extent upon 
2 the actions of other countries, and these cannot be predicted. 
The sphere of foreign policy is thus one of completely free 
discretion. 
1. 11, Ch. XII, 146. "This, therefore, contains the power 
of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the trans­
actions with all persons and communities without the common­
wealth, and may be called federative if any one pleases; so 
the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the nagie." 
2. 11, Ch. XII, 147. "And though this federative power in 
the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the 
commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by 
antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive, and 
so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of 
those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public 
good." 
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The distinction between the federative power which is 
dominated by prerogative, and the executive power, is thus 
not only not inexplicable, but conditional on the imperial­
istic character of Locke's political system. It is well known 
that the absolutism of Charles II and James II, together with 
their religious intolerance, had led to a growing conflict 
with the American colonies; a conflict which reached its 
climax in 1683, when Massachusetts abolished the Charter. 
Only the revolution of 1689 made possible a solution of this 
conflict, and led to the restoration of colonial self-govern­
ment. Locke himself stands consciously in the imperialist 
tradition which was initiated by Cromwell, the first conscious 
imperialist, and which was, moreover, continued in the re­
actionary period of Charles II and James II. In Locke's life­
time the economic and financial importance of colonies for 
England as a centre of trade, shipping, and finance became 
increasingly evident,, Locke himself was bound to this im­
perialistic trend by personal interests and connections. He 
was for a time partner with Sir W. Colleton In the Bahama 
1 
Street trade. His friendship with the Earl of Peterborough, 
2 
the commander of the English fleet, Is also well known. His 
3 
hostility towards Prance has very often been represented. 
1» Cf. H.A. Pox Bourne, Vol.1, pp. 292, 311. 
2. Cf. ibid., Vol.11, p. 508. 
3. Cf. Charles Bastide, p. 132. 
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To this sphere of undisputed state sovereignty — the 
sphere of the prerogative — belongs also a part of the execu­
tive power; that is, in so far as the executive power seemed 
necessary for the maintenance of the newly-emerged bourgeois 
state. We have already seen that commands of the executive 
not based upon general norms, issued even against the existing 
legal order, are declared to be admissible when they are 
directed to the good of the community. Concretely, the good 
of the community was for him, in its political aspect, the 
maintenance of the rule of William of Orange and the crushing 
of all Jacobite attempts at restoration; and socially, the 
maintenance of the existing order of property. In so far as 
auch individual measures served these two ends, it was in 
Locke's mind to invest the executive power with the prerogative. 
7. Between sovereignty on the one hand, and the rule of 
law on the other, Locke recognises a second sphere, which we 
may call the realm of discretion. When the executive acts 
outside, or against, the positive law, there is always the 
possibility that it may abuse its power. The extension of 
this abuse of the executive may lead to despotism, which can 
1. 11, Ch. XIV, 161. "This power, whilst employed for the 
benefit of the community and suitable to the trust and ends 
of the government, Is undoubted prerogative, and never is 
questioned." 
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be resisted. But If there is no despotism, but only a misuse 
of the executive power, that is to say, if tho actions of the 
executive are still reconcilable with the good of the commun­
ity, there remains to the oitizen only the appeal to Heavon. 
Tlie Staatsralson requires, however, the admission of such a 
sphere of discretion; and even if it is desirable that tho oxe 
cutive should forbear to interfere arbitrarily with freedom 
and property, there is no guarantee against such interference. 
The extension of the executive power must be tolerated for the 
security of the commonwealth against unpredictable events. 
Loolce could concede such wide powers to the executive because 
he himself was filled with a strong faith in the new monaroh, 
William of Orange. 
8. Finally, we find as a third sphere that of the mate-
^aw guaranteeing liberty. It is undoubtedly true that 
this sphere has the widest extent. The content of the mate­
rial law is sufficiently concretised, and is institutionalised 
by the right of resistance. 
(a) The postulate of the rule of the material law is 
related to the social sub-structure of a relatively equally 
distributed small- and medium-scale property. The material 
law serves the maintenance of this distribution of property. 
The absense of monopolies, that is to say the relative 
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©quality of possessions, alone makes possible government 
through the medium of general norms. We shall now only touch 
upon this problem, and shall later deal with it fully. If 
the legislator is confronted with few monopolies, he is com­
pelled to have recourse to individual regulations. If, how­
ever, in an economy of free competition, he is faced with a 
multitude of relatively uniform units, he must promulgate 
general rules if he is to deal equally with all these units. 
By property, Locke understands small- and medium-scale pro­
perty, and therewith also labour power. By labour power, 
however, he understands not that of the dependent manual 
worker, but exclusively that of the capitalist entrepreneur. 
This capitalist entrepreneur class, together with the nobility, 
gentry, end clergy, constituting the "people". The worker 
has no place in his system. Even the Interests of the poor 
2 receive no consideration; and when he rejects slavery, he 
hastens to insert in "The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina" 
(Article 110) the sentence "every free man of Carolina shall 
have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves of 
3 
what opinion or religion soever". Larkin has pointed out 
that "according to Locke's view of the state there should be 
1. Larkin, p. 67, and further, M. Beer, "History of British Socialism", London 1929, Vol. I, pp. 192-3. 
2. 11, IV. 
3. Cf. on his contradictions as to slavery, Larkin, pp.76ff. 
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no propertyless people. But he did not dwell on the full im-
1 plications of the above statement". The psychological dynamic 
of the repetition of Locke's theory shows, however, that it 
could very well become the basis of a petit bourgeois social­
ism, and we shall later find an analogous dynamic in the 
Kantian theory of law. 
In Locke's system the postulate of the rule of the mate­
rial law has thus a threefold function, as later in the whole 
period of liberalism. We shall now work out these three 
central aspects of the liberal system of law. 
The postulate has in the first place the function of 
establishing equality. But this equality to which it refers 
is not any kind of social equality intended to transcend 
classes, but is limited to the sphere of the possessing class; 
within this class equality shall exist, and it existed in 
Locke's time as well as in the following period up to the 
beginning of monopoly capitalism, anyhow to a certain extent. 
Even the political antagonisms within the bourgeois class 
diminished in this period. There were no decisive conflicts 
between trade and industrial capital on the one hand, and 
agrarian capital on the other, after 1660. Especially there 
was, as in Prussia, not only no social antagonism between 
landed gentry and trade and finance, but, as Guy MiSge put it 
1. Larkin, p. 65. 
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in his "New State of England", "business men and industrialists 
hastened "to^exchange the hurry of trade for the pleasure of 
country life". 
The legislative power is mainly at the disposal of this 
relatively united class. It is distributed "between gentry, 
merchants, and aristocracy on the one hand, and on the other 
the king, who in his turn maintains close relations with the 
City. The composition of the House of Commons presented by 
Edward and Annie Porritt reflects the composition of the econ­
omically rxiling classes. After the seventeenth century came 
the entry of traders, merchants, goldsmiths, and lawyers, who 
bought Cities and Boroughs; and this, together with the county 
franchise still based upon the 40s. Freeholder's Act of 1430, 
left the House of Commons the monopoly of gentry, merchants, 
industrialists, and their paid agents, the lawyers; so that 
the legislative machinery should run in the direction dictated 
by their interests, or rather be prevented from running. 
The second significance of the postulate of the rule of 
the material law is the function of disguising interests, 
which perhaps only in the Kantian theory of law is as clear 
as in Locke's theory. In paying reverence to the "law", one 
can conceal the fact that the "law" is made by man; one can 
hide the majority which gives a content to this "law". Rule 
1. Quotation from Larkin, p. 36. 
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of law means rule of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, of that 
part of the people which has at its command property and edu-
 ^ // 
cation; Besltz und Bildung, to use the Kantian phrase. 
The third function of the material law consists in 
rendering calculable the process of exchange. If the public 
power may only interfere with liberty and property on the 
basis of general norms, the economic subject is protected 
against arbitrary interference carried out without such auth­
ority. By this the calculabllity of the process of exchange 
is considerable increased. 
Locke's is therefore a typically Whig system. It is 
the expression of a genuine national liberalism. His system, 
which claims to know no sovereignty, proves to be a typical 
bourgeois system of state and law, in which sovereignty is 
not called sovereignty but prerogative. The spheres of pre­
rogative and of discretion make it possible for the state to 
carry out a strong foreign policy, to maintain order within, 
to crush political opponents, and especially to prevent the 
Jacobite restoration. By the sphere of the rule of the mate­
rial law the position of the economically ruling classes is 
sanctioned, and the legal foundations of a system of competi­
tion are laid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
1 
Rousseau 
The first modem thinker to see and solve the problem 
of a synthesis of material law and sovereignty, of liberty 
and rule, is Rousseau. His problem is the solution of the 
question how it is possible for the individuals to become 
members of a community, without giving up their autonomy; that 
is to say, how it is possible to realise at the same time the 
State and liberty, to realise material Justice within the State. 
The interpretations of Rousseau are legion0 Sometimes 
he is regarded as an anarchist, sometimes as an absolutist; 
sometimes the logical consistency of his system is praised, 
sometimes his theory is held to consist of a number of 
1. Ernst Cassirer, "Die Philosophic der Aufklarung", 
Tubingen, 1928; "Das Problem Jean Jacques Rousseaxl1, Archiv 
fur Geschichte der Philosophic", Vol. 41, 1932, p. 210 ff. 
C.E. Vaughan, "The Political Writings of J.J. Rousseau", 2 
Vols, Cambridge, 1915. E.H. Wright, "The Meaning of Rousseau", 
London, 1929. Harold Jo Laski, "The Age of Reason. Studies 
in Law and Politics", London, 1952. Georges Gurvitch, "L'Idee 
du Droit Social", Paris, 1932. E.P. Carrit, "Morals and 
Politics", Oxford, 1935, p. 56 ff. Alfred Corban, "Rousseau 
and the Modern State", London, 1934. Kurt Wol%ndorff, 
"Staatsrecht und Naturrecht in der^Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht 
des Volkes gegen rechtswidrige Ausubung der Staatsgewalt", 
Breslau, 1916, p. 351 ff. A. Schinz, "La Pensee de J.J. Rousseau", Paris, 1919. Egon Reiche, "Rousseau und das Natur­
recht", Berlin, 1935. 
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irreconcilable contradictions. 
We wish to establish at this point, that Rousseau is 
a state-absolutist# He recognises no sphere of individual 
freedom as against the State# Therefore any interpretation 
which regards him as belonging to the school of enlightenment, 
as for instance Gierke's, is wrong. But he is distinguished 
from all earlier state-absolutists, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, 
and Pufendorf, by the fact that he makes the surrender of all 
natural rights of the individual to the State dependent on the 
fulfilment of two conditions: a political one, the realisa­
tion of pure democracy; and a social one, the realisation of 
economic and social equality. Only if these conditions are 
fulfilled may, and must, the individual wills be made powerless 
as against the will of the State. In respect of all States 
which do not realise these conditions, Rousseau can be con­
sidered either as an agnostic, or even to a great extent as 
a revolutionary. This is shown clearly in the "Contrat Social!', 
Ill, 10, There he maintains that the State dissolves itself 
and the citizen recovers his natural liberty, and is no longer 
bound to obedience, if the prince no longer administers the 
2 State in accordance with the law and usurps the sovereignty. 
1« See "Exposition of Interpretations" by Corban, p« 28 ff. 
2. "Le cas de dissolution de l'fttat peut arriver de deux 
manleres: Premierement, quand le prince n'administere plus 
l'Etat selon les lols et qu'il usurpe le pouvoir souverain." 
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resistance. Here, Rousseau returns to the monarchicfideas. 
The second conception which shows that Rousseau, unlike 
Spinoza and Hobbes, cannot be regarded as an unconditional 
state-absolutist, follows from his theory of the people's 
sovereignty; for the people always disposes of the power of 
the State, and the institution of the authorities is not a 
part of the social contract, but of a special collective act. 
It is just this insertion of social and political factors as 
constitutive elements, which makes extremely problematical 
every idealistic interpretation of Rousseau such as those of 
Franz Haymann, Moritz Liepmann and Paul Natorp, and even that 
of Ernst Cassirer, who starts from the specific problematics 
of the Kantian idealism; the antimony between nature and 
liberty and the solution of this antagonism in the sphere of 
transcendence. 
It cannot, therefore, be decided here whether the 
Convent was right or wrong in claiming Rousseau's teaching 
for itself; but there is no doubt that Rousseau exercised 
over it an enormous influence. However, his hold over the h 
spirit was more important than his influence on the formation f! 
1. "Contrat Social", III, 18. "Les depositaires de la 
puissance executive ne sont point les ma£tres du peuple mais 
ses officiers." 
2» Cf. as to the influence on the Revolution: Egon Zweig, 
"Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constitutient", Tubingen, 1909, p.72. 
1 
2 
of the institutions of the French Revolution. 
!>13 
It is certain that Rcvuaaoau spoke of the theory of 
I 
the Salut Publique as a "Maxime Execrable". But to deduce 
from this that the Montagne wrongly appealed to Rotiastaau wnems 
to me unconvincing, because the theory of the 3alut Pub11que 
lies more or less explicitly at the bottom of all political 
theories, even if it is given another name. One could even 
add that- Houaaeau was hostile to any kind of centralisation, 
especially to the centralisation of public life in the capital. 
In his "Projet de Constitution pour la Corse", we find the 
following passage! "Or, si lea vllleo sont nulnlblea, les 
capitales le sont encore plus; une oapitale est un gouffre 
0& la nation presque entidre va perdre sea moeura, sea lots, 
son oourage et aa liberty. De la capltale a'exhale une pnat-.e 
2 
continuelle qui rulno et ditrult enfln la nation". 
Thua if with Aulard and Hedwig Hintae, we aee in the 
atruggle between Montagne and Glronde ohiefly the rivalry 
between Paris and the provinces, it oannot be doubted Whore 
Rouaaeau'a aympathies would have atood# Even ao, theae objec­
tions do not aeem to me to be deoiaive# The deoialon as to 
the inner relationship between Montagne and Rouaaeau depends 
in my view aolely upon whether Robespierre'a party denlred 
1. "Economic Politique", In Vaughan, Vol. T, p. 203. 
2. Vaughan, 2, 317. 
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to realise the two conditions of Rousseau's state-absolutism. 
It is not possible to decide this question here; it is enough 
to have put it. 
Our interpretation treats the work of Rousseau as an 
organic whole. 
j^.In the "Discours sur 1'InegalitS, Rousseau gives an 
analysis of the existing society. I cannot admit that his 
Discours has nothing to do with political theory, as Vaughan 2 
asserts. Such a conception would mean the elimination of 
every sociological analysis from political theory, and the 
admission only of philosophical speculation as its legitimate 
3 
tasko The Discours is certainly negative, as every analysis 
2> is negative; but nevertheless, analysis is the indispensable 
basis, explicit or implicit, of every political theory. 
In the Discours, the sociological cause of the inequali­
ty of man is shown; the reasons why men drift into the wivil 
society. In the "Contrat Social", on the other hand, he shows 
4 
the way to a new and a better society. In the Discours, 
Rousseau sets himself the task of discovering the basis of a 
theory of natural law, that is to say, of determining the 
5 
nature of men. 
1. Vaughan, 1, 126. 
2. Ibid.. 14. 
3. Ibid., 9. 
4. E.H. Wright, 71. 
5. Vaughan, 1, 137. "Les modernes ne reconnaissent, sous 
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In the Discours, he rightly distinguishes between the 
two constitutive elements of the inequality between men, the 
natural or physical and the moral0 Thus he develops an em­
pirical theory of the natural state, in whiah he rejects 
both the theory of the beHum omnium contra omnes of Hobbes, 
and the paradisical ideal of Locke, and recognises man as an 
isolated individual who is neither good nor bad (ni bon ni 
mechant); as a neutral which only through society can be made 
either active or passive# It seems to be clear that this 
description of the state of nature is more adequate than any 
of those which preceded it. The Discours embodies the con­
ception that property is the basis of society in the famous 
proposition which Anatole Prance has used in his "Penguin 
Island", that in the very moment in which a man fenced a 
piece of land and declared "This belongs to me", and found 
men who were simple enough to believe it, civil society 3 
emerged. Finally the Discours disposes of all fictitious 
le nom de loi, qu'une regie prescrite^a un etre moral, c'est 
a dire intelligent, libre et considere dans ses rapports avec 
d'autres etres." "Mais tant nous ne reconnaltrons point 
l'homme naturel, c'est en vain que nous voudrons determiner 
la loi qu'il a recue." 
1. Vaughan, I, 158-9. 
2. H.J. Laski, "Political Thought from Locke to Bentham". p. 59. 
3. Vaughan, "Discours", I, 169: "Le premier qui ayant 
enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire: Ceci est a moi, et trouva 
des gens assez simples pour le crolre, fit le vral fondateur 
de la societe civile". 
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interpretations of the emergence of the State, Not through 
conquest, and not through combination of the weak, does the 
State emerge. He does not indicate the positive cause of its 
emergence, but he assumes it; the Social Contraot. 
In the Discours, however, he analyses the social func­
tion of the State, which consists in laying new burdens on 
the weak, in giving new power to the rich, in destroying 
natural liberty, and in creating the right of private property, 
with the resulting inequalities. The State is a sinister 
2 expedient of the rich (une ruse funeste des riches). 
In the Discours we already find two conceptions of 
extraordinary significance; on the one hand, that the group-
conflicts within human society, and the conflicts of human 
nature with human society, are empirically caused; and on the 
other hand, the establishment of a new responsible agent, 
human society as the causal factor which frees the individual 
3 
from the natural law. "It is society which makes man a tyrant 
against nature, and a tyrant against himself." As against 
all philosophical systems of early bourgeois society (such 
as the rationalism of Descartes, the metaphysical idealism of 
1. Vaughan, I, 182. 
2. Ibid., 181. 
3. Cassirer, "Aufklarung", p. 209. 
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of Berkeley, said the sensualism of Locke) in which the belief 
in the absoluteness and indeterminateness of law and the State 
corresponded to the indeterminateness of external nature, and 
a3 against the philosophical conception of early bourgeois 
systems which transferred the mechanism of natural science to 
cultural science, that is, to history, Rousseau introduces the 
notion of the society into the bourgeois system — and thereby 
destroys it. It is true that Rousseau was a child of the 
period of enlightenment, and that he accepted its criticism 
of feudalism and traditionalism; but at the same time his 
cultural pessimism prohibits his believing in a natural harmony 
of the world. This cultural pessimism of his is apparent in 
1 
his two Dijon prize essays . Rousseau therefore does not 
belong to the school of natural law« Such an interpretation 
sets us in direct opposition to Gierke, who considers Rousseau 
2 
to be the final stage in the sequence of natural law theorists. 
Rousseau's central assumptions, that all conflicts are empiric­
ally conditioned and are the work of society, distinguishes 
him from all other natural theorists. These two assertions 
have undoubtedly a revolutionary significance. If the human 
1. "Si le retablissement des sciences et des arts a 
contribue a epurer les moeurs." "(Quelle est l'origine de 
l'inegalite parmi les hommes, et si elle est autorisee par 
la loi naturelle." 
2. "Althusius", p. 117. 
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creature is empirically conditioned, if human society is the 
author of the tyranny of men against themselves and against 
nature, then it rests with the will of men whether they will 
abolish this tyranny by a change of the society; for no God 
helps them* Thus even the Discours opens the way for the 
postulate of the overthrow of the civil society and for the 
struggle for liberty. We may add, however, that neither his 
sociology, nor his solution, is that of modern socialism. He 
has not experienced the industrial revolution, as did Karl 
Marx after him. He was therefore not in a position to recog­
nise that human liberty is annihilated by certain productive 
relationships, and is replaced by necessity; and that only 
the transformation of these relationships makes possible the 
passage from the sphere of necessity into the realm of liberty. 
Even after one has read the Discours, it remains incomprehen­
sible how the impression could arise that Rousseau postulated 
a return to nature, inasmuch as he rejected this wrong Inter­
pretation. 
2« Against the actual society examined in the Discours 
and found to be bad, the ficonomie Politique and the Contrat 
Social undertake the task of finding a genuine and true human 
community, which can dispense with the motives of power, 
avarice, and vanity, and which is wholly founded on common 
1. See note 1 to the "Dlscours". 
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submission to a law internally recognised as "binding and 
necessary. His aim is a synthesis of Hobbes and Grotius; a 
society in which individual will and general will coincide, 
and thus in which only the general will is valid; in which 
freedom and laws are at once realised; in which right means 
might, and might means right. To establish this true communi­
ty in which particular wills and the general will are identical, 
in which the isolation of the state of nature is overcome in 
favour of a realisation of morality and humanity, men must 
enter into the social contract, which is only a social con­
tract, and not one of subjection or domination. By this con­
tract they cede all their natural rights to the State. Each 
one surrenders his person, his power, and his property, to 
the general will, and receives in return a new freedom as a 
2 
part of this whole. Thus individual liberty is undoubtedly 
given up in Rousseau's system, but not simply annihilated as 
in the systems of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Pufendorf; it is abol­
ished in a Hegelian sense, that is, annihilated in the sphere 
of individuality and restored in the collective sphere. The 
existence of pre-State liberty as a right is inconceivable, 
1. Cassirer, p. 210. 
2. "Contrat Social", I, 6. "Chacun de nous met en commun 
sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la supreme direction 
de la volonte generale et nous recevons encore chaque membre 
comme partie indivisible du tout." 
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whether It be a question of political, economic, or social 
1 
liberty. Within these limits, it is admissible to speak of 
Rousseau as the protagonist of a state-absolutism which goes 
even farther than the conception of Spinoza and Pufendorf* 
2 
So far, Gierke is right. But we cannot subscribe to Gierke's 
judgment, that Rousseau's constructions which aim at limiting 
and directing this absolute State are nothing but a series of 
inconsistencies and sophisms. 
We have already seen that the negative freedom, liberty 
as against State, is replaced by political liberty, a freedom 
within the State; for his aim is to find a structure of society 
in which each one remains as free as he was before the surrender 
5 
of the original human rights to the State. 
3# This is, however, nothing but a pious desire, and 
it has to be investigated how far his social programme is 
institutionalised in his system. 
a) We have first to deal with his postulate that a 
surrender of the natural rights of men to the State takes 
place only in so far as this surrender has significance for 
the activities of the State. In this, his theory does not 
1. "Contrat Social", I, 6. "Ces clauses, bien entendues, 
se reduisent toute a vine seule: savoir, 1'alienation totale 
de chaque associe avec tous ses droits a toute la communaute." 
2. "Althusius", pp. 116, 117. 
3e "Contrat Social", I, 6. "Trouver une forme d'associa­
tion qui defende et protege de toute la force commune la 
personne et les biens de chaque associe, et par laquelle 
chacun s'unissant a tous, n'obeisse pourtant qu'a lui meme, 
et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant." 
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depart from the usual theaea of such theorists of natural 
law as Spinoza and Pufendorf. In the final text of the "Con-
trat Social", however, he prudently and realistically adds | 
that the State Itself decides whether the surrender of particu- j 
lar individual rights is of significance for the State or not. j 
This sentenoe was characteristically laoklng In the first 
1 
draft of the "Contrat Social". It follows, therefore, that 
he does not indicate a binding limitation of state-absolutism, 
but only expresses a desire that the State may not assume 
more natural rights than Is necessary for the carrying out 
of its functions. As, however, this pious desire belongs to 
the stock of all state-absolutists, and constitutes no binding 
limitation of State activity, it follows that in this Rousseau 
differs in no way from a normal state-absolutist. 
b) His second limitation of Sovereignty lies in the 
postulate that the State may only Issue general laws. The 
General Will is absolute. In the same way as nature gives 
man absolute power over his limbs, the social contract gives 
2 
to the State absolute power over its members. This sovereign­
ty is indivisible and inalienable, but It Is not arbitrary, 
1. Vaughan, II, 44. "On convlent que tout ce que chaeim 
aliSne par le pacte social de aa puissance, de ses biens, de 
sa liberte, c'est seulement la partie do tout cela dont 
l'usage lmporte a la communautS; male 11 faut oonvenlr axiaal 
que le souverain seul est juge de cette Importance." 
"Contrat Social", II, 6. 
2. "Contrat Social", II, 4. "Comme la nature donne a 
chaque homme un pouvolr absolu sur tous les membres, le pacte 
social donne au Corps politique un pouvoir ab^olu aur tous 
lea slens et c'est ce meme pouvolr qui, dlrlge par la volonte 
gen£rale, porte, comme J'ai dit, le nom de souveralnete." 
C.S. II, 4. 
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1 
for the general will in action is law. This means that the 
general will may express itself only through general laws. 
Expression other than through general laws is closed to it. 
Here lies the decisive divergence from Locke, who by the in­
stitution of the prerogative opens the way to the entry of 
lawless power into his system, which is usually designated 
as realising the rule of law. In Rousseau's definition of 
2 
the general will its activity through general laws is implied# 
"Par la meme raison que la souverainete est inalienable, elle 
est indivisible; car la volonte est generale, ou elle ne l'est 
pas; elle est celle du Corps du peuple ou seulement d'une 
partie. Dans le premier cas, cette volonte declaree est un 
acte de souverainete et fait loi; dans le second, ce n'est 
qu'une volonte particuliere, ou un acte de magistrature; c'est 
'5 
un decret tout au plus." There are two propositions in this 
passage; first, that the generality of the will can only mani­
fest itself through general laws; second, that idea and 
reality, the categories of essence and of existence, coincide, 
that is to say, that to quote Christian Morgenstern, what may 
not be, cannot be: "Le souverain, par cela seul qu'il est, 
est toujours tout ce qu'il doit etre". Rousseau does, however, 
! 
admit that in practice idea and reality do not always coincide, j 
1. Cf. e.^> "Contrat Social", III, 1, where he speaks of 
"la volonte gen£rale ou la loi". 
2. J.H. Wright, p. 78. 
3. "Contrat Social", II, 2. 
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in so far as he identifies the general will with the will of 
the majority. 
But what is a law? and does the rule of such law really 
guarantee the freedom of man? 
In the ficonomie Politique, the postulate of the rule 
of law was already the focal point of his doctrine. The law 
was the author of justice and liberty, the source of material 
equality. It was "la voix celeste qui dicte a chacun citoyen 
les prSceptes de la raison publique et lui apprend a agir 
selon les maximes de son propre jugement et a n'etre pas en 
2 
contradiction avec lui-meme". There the generality and uni­
versal applicability of the law was already stressed, with 
all its consequences, that the State may bestow honours, but 
3 
may never grant privileges. In the first draft of the "Con-
trat Social", the postulate of the generality of all laws was 
still deduced from the aim of the State, namely the furtherance 
of the common good, by the fallacious process of reasoning 
that because every law should further the common good it must 
4 
necessarily be general, like the will which is its source. 
1. ^ "Contrat Social", II, 2, note of 1762. "Pour qu'une 
volonte soit generale, il n'est pas toujours necessaire qu'elle 
soit unanime, mais il est necessaire que toutes les voix soient 
compteesj toute exclusion formelle rompt la generalite." 
2• Vaughan, I, 245. 
3. Ibid., 246. 
4* Ibid., 492. 
254 
This is obviously a fallacious reasoning, because he never 
proves that the common good can only be furthered by general 
laws. The generality of thf> law thus has reference to its 
source as well as to its validity. The ultimate formulation 
1 
is to be found in the final text of the Social Contract. 
Prom the postulate of the generality of the law he deduces the 
inadmissibility of laws with retroactive effect; since every 
retroactive law is in a real sense individual. The objects 
of retroactive laws are facts already realised in external 
nature, and can therefore be enumerated. Thus retroactive 
laws are not faced with an indefinite, but with a definite, 
number of already accomplished facts. This proof of his 
proposition of the Inadmissibility of retroaction is, however, 
not to be found in Rousseau's work; but in his Projet pour 
la Constitution de la Corse, he upheld the proposition in the 
2 
most rigid manner. Moreover, he found it hard to come to 
1. "Contrat Social", II, 6. "Quand tout le peuple statue 
sur tout le peuple, il ne considSre que lui-meme; et s'il se 
forme alors un rapport, c'est de l'objet entier sous un point 
de vue a l'objot entier sous un autre point de vue, sans 
aucune division du tout. Alors la matiere sur laquelle on 
statue est generale comme la volontfi qui statue. C'est cette 
acte que j'appelle un loi. 
Quand je dis que l'ob^et des lois est toujours general, 
j'entends que la loi considere les sujets en corps et leo 
actions comme abstraites, jamais un homme comme lndlvidu ni 
une action particull^re. Ainsi la loi peut bien statuer qu'il 
v aura des privileges, raals elle n'en peut donner nommement 
a personne; ... en un mot, toute fonction qui se rapporte~a 
un objet individuel n'appartient point a la puissance legis­
lative." 
2. Vaughan, II, p. 343. "Mais nl les lols agralres, ni 
aucune loi ne peuvent jamais avoir l'effet r|troactif; et l'on 
ne peut confisquer nulles terres, acquises legitimement, en 
quelque quantite qu'elles puissent etre, en vertu d'une loiyss 
aefende a'en avoir tant." lWvi> 
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this conclusion, since he wanted to prevent the accumulation 
of land in one hand; nevertheless, he denied the admissibility 
of retroaction, even for the sake of the disintegration of 
large-scale landed property, and only suggests that accumula­
tion should be prevented. 
The State exists only if it rules through general laws. 
"Qu'ils obeissent et que personne ne commande, qu'ils servent 
et n'aient point de maitre; d'autant plus libre en effet, que 
sous une apparent sujetion, nul ne perd de sa libertS que ce 
1 
qui peut nuire a celle d'un autre." But is the generality 
and universal applicability of the law really a guarantee for 
the' realisation of the desired systhesis between individual 
and collective wills? The answer can only be that the pos­
tulate of the generality of the law guarantees but a little, 
since he gives to this postulate only a formal character, as 
is shown by the passage already quoted. The legislator may 
grant any privilege, may carry out any differentiation,whether 
just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, provided only that 
the external form of the generality of the laws is maintained, 
and that in his law he carefully avoids the mention of in­
dividuals . 
1. "Economie Politique", Vaughan, I, 241. 
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c) This rule of the general law is, according to 
Rousseau, only capable of realisation if no intermediate powers 
are inserted between the people and the law; if, that is, the 
legislative power not only rests with the people, but is actu­
ally exercised by them. He therefore vehemently rejects poli­
tical representationj and his characterisation of the British 
1 
parliamentary system is well-known. But we must admit that 
he himself hardly believes in the possibility of realising 
this ideal; and he recommends for Corsica a mixed Government 2 
and a States-General. The decisive point is, therefore, that 
the sovereignty of the people actually resides in the people, 
and not in the representative assembly. "Whereas earlier 
writers (the apologists of the right of revolution) considered 
the sovereignty of the people to be a mere potential (latent) 
power, which breaks out and puts an end to a tyrannical Gov­
ernment if necessary, it is according to Rousseau a necessary 
and permanently actual power; the people, all of it, cannot 
cease for a moment itself to exercise it really and fully. 
There is thus no further need for a justification of revolu­
tion as undertaken by Locke, but the whole conception of revo-
3 
lution becomes obsolete." 
1. "Contrat Social", III, 15. 
2« Vaughan, II, 515, 551. 
5. Friedrich Julius Stahl, "Die Philosophie des Rechts", 
1847, Vol. I, p. 505. 
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Only the administration of the laws does not lie with 
the people, but in the hands of the Government which carries 
out the general will as the arm of the law, as "force appli-
quee a la loi". Sovereignty, however, does not lie with the 
Government but with the legislature; that is, with the people, 
with the general will, which is at bottom nothing but the 
majority. 
It follows, therefore, that none of Rousseau's state­
ments as to the relation between individual and general will, 
or as to the relation between law and general will, gives the 
slightest indication that his system is anything but one of 
naked state-absolutism. 
II. 
1. This interpretation has to be fundamentally re­
vised, however, when we keep in view that state-absolutism 
is only postulated in relation to a certain social substructure, 
and that the annihilation of the individual wills is made 
dependent upon the realisation of his social postulates. 
1. Vaughan, I, pp. 237-241. "Je prie. mes lecteurs de 
bien distinguer entre l'economie politique, dont j'ai a 
parler et que j'appelle Gouvernement. de l'autorite supreme 
que j'appelle Souverainete: distinction qui consiste en ce 
que l'une a le droit legislatif, et oblige, en certains cas, 
le Corps meme de la nation, tandis que 1'autre n'a que la 
puissance executrice, et ne peut obliger que les particuliers 
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Rousseau himself did not see the social substructure corres­
ponding to his political system as clearly as he grasped the 
essence of political democracy. He himself, as has often been 
emphasised, saw only in a City State the necessary substruc-
1 ture for the realisation of democracy. A compact territory, 
simple manners, and simple popular wants, appear to him to be 
2 
the necessary conditions for the functioning of such democracy. 
Even Corsica seems to him too large, and in his draft for the 
Corsican Constitution he sums up as follows: "un gouvernement 
purement d&mocratique convient a une petite ville plutot qu'a 
3 
une nation". If this were true, one would have to agree to 
the Judgment that Rousseau's theories do not present any de~ 
4 
cisive progress. 
2. Rousseau, however, did postulate the organic struc­
ture of society, if not very clearly, even if he denies the 
admissibility of intermediate powers between the individual 
and the law# This interpretation of Rousseau will be strenu­
ously opposed, because it is usually asserted that any idea 
of organic democracy is completely foreign to Rousseau's 
theory• We find, however, a confirmation of our view in 
1. "Contrat Social", II, 10. 
2. Ibid., Ill, 4. 
3. Ibid., II, 313. 
4. Laski, "Political Thought from Locke to Bentham", p. 60. 
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1 
the ficonomie Politique. There he maintains that every larger 
society is composed of smaller ones of various sizes. Each 
such immediate society stands in a dual relationship: to its 
members the society is itself a general will; to the State, 
2 
it is only a particular will. This theory shows extraordinary 
progress when considered in relation to atomistic constructions 
of democracy, since countless conflicts of interests can be 
solved within each particular organisation. 
3. Rousseau's second contribution consists in his anal­
ysis of the civil society and of the function of private pro­
perty. Vaughan has shown that his views on private property 
3 
fluctuated considerably, a sign of uncertainty with regard to 
this central problem. He has, however, made an essential 
contribution, a fact which has not yet been adequately appre­
ciated. 
In the Discours, private property is described as at 
once the baSis, and the curse, of society. The famous passage 
has already been quoted. 
1. "iSconomie Politique", Vaughan^ I, 242. "Toute societe 
politique est composee d'autres societies £lus petites de 
differents especes, dont chacune a ses interets et ses maximes 
... tous les particuliers qu'un interet commun reunit en com-
posant autant d'autres... Ce sont toutes ses associations 
tacites ou formelles qui modifient de tant de manieres les 
apparences de la volonte publique par 1'influence de la leur." 
2. "La volontl de cette societe particuliere a toujours 
deux relations: pour les membres de 1'association, c'est une 
volonte generale; pour la grande societe, c'est une volontl 
particuliere." 
3. Vaughan, I, 169. 
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In the ficonomie Politique, private property still re­
mains the basis of society, but it is no longer a curse, and 
has become a blessing* It is even held to be more important 
than liberty, because it is the foundation of life, because 
it can more easily be stolen, and because it is the foundation 
of true society. 
In the Gontrat Social, as a result of his absolutist 
conception of the State, he takes the view that man in the 
state of nature has only possession and no property; that 
property is first conferred on men by the social contract as 2 
a better right. This is not much. This assertion is, as 
we already know, common stock of all state-absolutists, of 
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Pufendorf. They all regarded property 
as a right delegated by the State, without, however, having 
the slightest intention of altering the existing distribution 
of property. They were only compelled by the inner logic of 
their constructions to come to this conclusion, which probably 
appeared to them extremely undesirable. 
Not so Rousseau. Anyone who has read the passage in 
his "Emile" will know the nature of the social substructure 
1* V, I, 259, "II est certain que le droit de propri6t6 
est le plus sacre •.. et plus important, a certains Sgards, 
que la liberty meme." 
2• "Contrat Social", I, 1; I, 9. 
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underlying his Ideal of the State. Property is to lie private, 
that is to say, derived from labour, which means that it 
shall be equally distributed. Then alone ia it not only not 
dangerous, but oven beneficial. This is also a condition of 
the rule of the general will and the general lawsj if property 
is equally distributed, then the legislator, if he wishes to 
realise the idea of social Justice as Rousseau demands, can 
only govern through general laws. But, as will be shown later, 
if the legislator is faoed with monopolies, he must promulgate 
individual laws, since in this case he is confronted with in­
dividual situations. There is also the fact that equally 
distributed property does not confer power on the owners, in­
vests them with no privileges, and thus prevents a perversion 
of the rule of the State by monopolists and makes it possible 
that the General Will really contains all individual wills. 
1. "Emile", livre 5, Vaughan, Vol. 2, p„ 152. "II est 
inviolable et sacr$ pour elle tant qu'll demeure un droit 
partlculler et lndlvlduel: sltot qu'il esfe consider^ comme 
yommun a tous les cltoyens, 11 est soumis a la vpiont5 K$n-
erale, et cette volonte peut I'aneantlr. Ajnsl le souveraln 
n'a nul droit de toucher au blen d'un partlculler. nl de 
plusleurs. Mais 11 peut lealtlmement s'emparer du blen do 
tous..." 
"This right is inviolable and sacred for the State, 
so long as it remains private and individual. But directly 
it is considered as a right common to all citizens, it is 
subordinated to the general will, and the general will can 
annul it. The sovereign has no right to touch the possessions 
either of one individual or of several. But it has every 
right to appropriate the possessions of all..." 
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This proposition of the equal distribution of property has 
been put forward with the same insistence in his Lettre de 
1 2 la Montagne; and in his Corsican Constitution* 
This is one of the alternatives proposed by Rousseau 
for the formation of the social substructure of his political 
system. 
The other, which he formulates in an even shorter and 
more aphoristic way, is also to be found in his draft for the 
Corsican Constitution; State Property<> "Loin de vouloir que 
l'etat soit pauvre, je voudrais au contraire, qu'il eut tout, 
et chacun n'eut sa part aux biens communs qu'en proportions 
3 
de ses services." 
Thus he postulates either equal distribution of private 
property, or communal property. In his system there is no 
place for a property order in which there are differences be­
tween rich and poor, between owners of the means of production 
and dependent workers, between monopolists and non-monopolists. 
According to his theory, the General Will can only be the ex­
pression of all the individual wills of which it is composed, 
1. "Lettres de la Montagne", Vaughan, II, p. 284, lettre 9, 
"qui craint les exceptions aime les lois". 
2. V, 2, 342, 343. "Tous veulent que les conditions 
soient egales pour tous et la justice, n'est que cette 
egalite" 
3. Vaughan, Vol. 2, p. 337. 
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if the decisive matter of conflict, the class struggle, is 
non-existent. 
I admit that these conclusions are not fully developed 
in Rousseau's theory. It may even be doubted whether he was 
conscious of the implications and logical consequences of his 
statements; but that they are indicated cannot be doubted. 
We find, therefore, that with Rousseau the complete 
surrender to the State of the individual will and of natural 
liberty is made dependent upon the realisation of full politi­
cal democracy, with complete political equality for all citi­
zens without intermediate political powers; upon the organic 
structure of society; and upon the rule of general laws, in 
a society in which property is either equally distributed 
among the citizens or is in the hands of the State# The rule 
of law has, therefore, an entirely ethical function. 
4. According to such an interpretation, Rousseau's 
theory is, in fact, an interpretation of the Marxian theory 
of the withering away of the State; of the emergence of a 
society free from external rule which administers itself. 
This appears at first sight to be an extraordinarily curious 
result, as no political writer has postulated with such force 
the absolute sovereignty of the State. Nevertheless, the 
final result of his theory is that in a society based upon 
political freedom and on the social substructure which he 
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demands, the State must necessarily become obsolete, because 
the decisive conflicts are lacking. Rousseau himself has 
formulated this idea with extraordinary olarity in another 
way. In his draft of the Corsican Constitution, he emphasises 
that if property really is particular property, that is to 
say weak and dependent, the Government needs very little 
force, and can direct the work of government so to speak with 
1 a gesturo of the hand. 
In this, his theory really resembles that of Marx. For 
Marx, a society without political domination which administers 
itself Is the necessary final stage of a historical process 
In which the State withers away, after the proletariat has 
become Identical with the nation and has abolished the then-
existing property system. Marx has, therefore, filled In 
Rousseau's logical structure with history. Here Rousseau 
stands at the frontier of bourgeois thought. German idealism, 
which is built upon him, has not, with the exception of Hegel, 
made any significant contribution to the theory of State and 
law. 
1. Vaughan, II, p. 355. "Car la propri£t£ particullSre 
etant si faible et si dSpendante, le Gouvernement n'a beooln 
que de peu de force et conduit pour alnsl dire les peuules 
avec un mouvement du dolftt," 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Kant and Fichte 
1 I. KANT. 
It is generally agreed that Kant transformed the social 
contract, which Rousseau regards as an ideal to be realised 
in history, into a transcendental Idea; that is to say, into 
2 
a rational principle for the judgment of all constitutions. 
Whether this departure from Rousseau has proved healthy in 
political practice is an open question* In my view, no phil­
osophy has proved more disastrous for German political thought 
than the Kantian theory of the State and of the law, which, 
by banishing the idea of law into the sphere of transcendence, 
"leaves actual law and actual morals at the mercy of empiricism 
3 
and the blind forces of tradition". Professor Ginsberg's 
1. Bibliography: Wllhelm Metzger, "Gesellschaft, Recht 
und Staat in der Ethik des deutschen Ideallsmus", Heidelberg, 
1917. Emil Lask, "Rechtsphilosophie"in "Die Fhllosophie Im 
Beglnn des 20. Jahrhunders", Heidelberg, 1907. Friedrlch 
Julius Stahl, "Die Philosophie des Rechts in geschichtllcher 
Darstellung", Heidelberg, 1847. Victor Basch, "Les Doctrines 
Politlques des Philosophes Classiques de 1'Allemagne", Paris, 
1927, p. 60 ff. E.P. Carritt, "Morals and Politics", Oxford, 
1935, p. 80 ff. Edward Caird, "A Critical Account of the 
Philosophy of Kant", Glasgow, 1877. Kurt Llsser, "Der Begrlff 
des Rechts bei Kant (Kantstudien, Erganzungsheft, No. 58), 
Berlin, 1922. Werner Haensel, "Kants Lehre vom Widerstands~ 
recht (Eantstudien, Erganzungsheft, No. 60), Berlin, 1926. 
2. "tJber den Gemelnspruch", p. 131 • 
3. Morris Ginsberg, in "Modern Theories of Law", London, 
1933, p« 51. 
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criticism of Stammler's philosophy of law applies equally to 
that of Kant, and of all the Idealists with the exception of 
Hegel. Marx in his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of 
law characterised as follows this influence of the German 
Idealist philosophy: "The Germans have thought in politics 
what other peoples have done. Germany was their theoretical 
conscience# The abstraction and unreality of their thought 
always kept pace with the one*-sidedness and inadequacy of 
their social and political actuality". 
1. It is doubtful whether Kant linked up his theory 
1 
of law with his theory of ethics• His is in any case not a 
2 
love or a power ethic; it is purely legal (Rechtsethik). It 
is secular, which implies the rejection of all ethical theory 
based upon belief and revelation. It is, however, not based 
upon the principle of happiness# For whether or not happiness 
can represent the moral law can only be taught by experience; 
and the moral law must not be derived from experience, because 
it would in that case be arbitrary. The moral law must on the 
contrary be based on a universal law. Finally, the conception 
1. The decision is mainly dependent upon the interpretation 
of his conception of ethics* If with Lisser (p. 4) one con­
strues a broader sense of ethics, law is subordinated to ethics. 
Further, according to Lisser, ethics as a system of ends com­
prises the law. Finally, according to Lisser, all obligations 
belong, as obligations, to ethics. The opposite interpreta­
tion, which seems to me to have more foundation, is to be found 
in Metzger's book, p. 83. 
2. Metzger, pp. 17-21. 
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of happiness is subjective; that is to say, it is subject to 
interpretation and is arbitrary. The theories of Eudaemonism 
and Hedonism are therefore rejected. 
Kant seeks, therefore, to discover the "formal" princi­
ple of morality which, precisely on the ground of its formality, 
shall have universal validity. All material principles are 
empirical and therefore valueless for the determination of the 
idea of morality. In reality, however, Kant, as has very 
often been shown, has by no means discovered the formal prin­
ciple of morality, but like his predecessors has conceived 
1 
the usual dogmatic material system of ethics. 
The formal element in the Kantian theory of ethics is 
the logical principle of universality and legality. Every 
human action shall, therefore, appear as an individual case 
of a universal law. No human action must be an exception to 
this universal law; "because the unvariedness of the laws by 
which events take place, is the formal notion of what is 
called Nature, i.e. an order of things determined according 
to an unvaried universal law, the formula of the ethical im­
perative might be expressed thus: "Act as if the aciom of 
thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law 
1. Metzger, p. 47. 
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1 
of nature". Human reason,therefore, produces in the sphere 
of human activities formally analogous to those laws which 
are discovered by it in external nature "by the process of 
classification. 
If the universality of the law is the objective element 
of his theory of ethics, its subjective elements are morality 
and legality. The subjective element is called legality if 
man obeys the objective order of the law, not for its own 
sake, but for external motives such as fear. The subjective 
element is called morality if he considers it as his moral 
duty to fulfil a legal obligation. This discrimination between 
morality and legality seems at first to be clear, but it is 
inconceivable how it is compatible with his premise of the 
universality and formality of the ethical law. 
2. The content of his ethical theory is very clearly 
shown in the four instances which he gives in his Grundlegung 
der Metaphysik der Sitten, and which he reaches on the basis 
of a classification of duties under perfect duties, whose 
1. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 2. Abschnitt, 
trans. J.W. Semple, 3rd edition 1871, p. 34. "Weil die All-
gemeihheit des Gesetzes, wonach Wirkungen geschehen, das-
jenige ausmacht, was eigentlich Natur im allgemeinsten Ver-
stande (der Form nach), das ist das Dasein der Dinge heisst, 
sofern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist, so konnte 
der allgemeine Imperativ der Pflicht auch so lauten: Handle 
so, als ob die Maxime Deiner Handlungen durch Deinen Willen 
zum allgemeinen Naturgesetz werden sollte." 
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non-performance is unthinkable, and imperfect duties; and 
further under inner duties, or duties to myself, and external 
duties, or duties to others. Thus he regards suicide as un­
thinkable because it cannot be thought of as a universal law 
of mankind. The other three instances are famous. They all 
show that his duties are mainly concerned with the maintenance 
of the existing state, the guaranteeing of existing rights# 
In the further expositions in his Metaphysics he expressly 
deduces the prohibition of interference with liberty and 
2 property from this principle of reason. 
All these negative duties of non-interference are per­
fect duties, that is to say their non-existence is unthinkable. 
The positive duties, however, such as the promotion of culture 
and of happiness, are only imperfect duties, whose non-per­
formance may indeed be conceivable, but may not be willed. 
All the elements of a love ethic are completely absent. He 
3 even deals contemptuously with such ethics. 
3« The separation of internal and external duties, 
however, is of far-reaching significance. This distinction 
is in no sense new, but it is carried impressively further 
by him. The duties towards oneself are construed as legal 
1. II. Abschnitt, trans. Semple, p. 43. 
2. II. Ibid., p. 44. 
3. Ibid.» pp. 36, 37• 
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claims of the homo noumenon (humanity) against the homo 
phenomenon. They are derived "from the right of humanity 
in our own person", as Kant explains when dealing with the 
famous formula of Ulpian "honeste vive, neminem laede, suum 
1 
cuuique tribue". By this separation of internal and external 
duties, and by the divorce of legality and morality, his ethic 
is completely separated from law. Law has become autonomous. 
Consequently he distinguishes two kinds of legislation, an 
2 
ethical and a juridical. The juridical legislation, being 
the norms of legality, has the characteristic that it lays 
stress upon the factual performance of duties, even if such 
performance has been under compulsion. As for the ethical 
legislation, the norms of morality, the decisive question is 
the motive of the performance of duties. "The science of 
law holds the essentials of those duties which exist independ­
ently of all motives of their performance; the science of 
morality, the essentials of all duties which themselves con-
3 
stitute motives." Further, "ethical legislation is that 
1„ "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, Einteilung der 
Rechtslehrtf, A, trans# W. Hastie, 1887, p. 54. 
2. "Rechtslehre", Einleitung II, pp. 15-16, 20 ff. trans. 
Hastie, p. 15. 
3. Prom the "Lose Blatter" ed. by Reicke, quoted Metzger, 
p. 71. "Die Rechtslehre enthalt den Inbegriff der Pflichten, 
die unabhangig von alien Bewegursachen zu ihrer Beobachtung 
stattfinden, die Tugendlehre aber den Inbegriff der Pflichten, 
die sich selbst zur Bewegursache machen". 
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which cannot be external, although the duties it prescribes 
maj he external as well as internal« Juridical legislation 
is that which may also be external. Thus it is an external 
duty to keep a promise entered into by contract; but the in­
junction to do this merely because it is a duty, without re­
gard to any other motive, belongs exclusively to the internal 
legislation. We must add that the legal duties are of uncon­
ditional validity, whereas the ethical duties are only of con­
ditional validity. The reason is that a right or a claim only 
corresponds to the genuine, the legal, title* "To all duty 
there corresponds a right considered as a title (facultas 
moralis generatim) but all duties do not impose rights of 
another (facultas juridica) to compel someone. These are 
2 
specially called legal duties." At bottom this distinction 
is nothing else but a very complicated formulation of the old 
antagonism between the natural law, valid for the inner con­
sciousness, and the binding positive law valid externally. 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", Einleitung III, 
trans. Hastie, p. 23• "Die ethische Gesetzgebung (die 
Pflichten mogen allenfalls auch aussere sein) ist diejenige, 
welche nicht ausserlich sein kannj die juridische ist, welche 
auch ausserlich sein kann. So ist es eine ausserliche Pflicht, 
sein vertragsmassiges Versprechen zu halten; aber das Gebot, 
dieses bloss darum zu tun, weil es Pflicht ist, ohne auf eine 
andere Triebfeder Rucksicht zu nehmen, ist bloss zur ausseren 
Gesetzgebung gehorig." 
2. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre", Einleitung II, 
trans. Semple, p. 197. "Aller Pflicht korresppndiert ein 
Recht als Befugnis (facultas moralis generatim) betrachtet, 
aber nicht aller Pflicht korrespondieren Rechte eines Anderen 
(facultas juridica), jemanden zu zwingen, sondern diese heissen 
besonders Rechtspflichten." 
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However, the process of the dissenchantment of the law, 
of the rigid divorce of law and morality, of positive and 
natural law, is here complete. Only positive law is valid. 
Any kind of extra- or supra- positive law, which could bind 
or correct positive law, is excluded# His theory is, therefore, 
the justification of a pure positivism. Law is nothing but 
the right to compulsion. 
4. But how is this compulsion of the law to be justi­
fied? 
a) The central idea of his theory of law and ethics 
is the conception of liberty• This liberty, however, is nega­
tive, it is the juridical notion of liberty. This conception 
aims at the maintenance of the existing legal situation# It 
does not aim at a furtherance of alien purposes, "And there 
is the like contradiction in saying that we ought to design 
the perfection of another and to hold ourselves obliged to 
further it; for the perfectness of another, when considered 
as a person, consists in this, that he can Impose upon himself 
his own end, agreeably to his own understanding of his duty; 
and it is in repugnancy to Impose on me as a duty the doing 
that which singly the other person can accomplish." 
1. "Metaphysik der Sltten, Tugendlehre", Eialeitung rv, 
trans. Semple, p. 201. "Ebenso ist es ein Widerspruch, eines 
anderen Vollkommenhelt mir zum Zweck zu machen und mich zu 
deren Beforderung fur verpflichtet zu halten. Denn darin 
besteht eben die Vollkommenheit eines anderen Menschen als 
einer Person, dass er selbst gemigend ist, sich seinen Zweck 
nach seinem eigenen Begriff von Pflicht zu setzen, unSt es 
widerspricht sich, zu fordern (mir zur Pflicht zu machen), 
dass ich etwas tun soil; was kein anderer als er selbst tun 
kann•" 
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The primary duty is only and exclusively the mainten­
ance of rights, of my own rights as well as of those of others. 
All other duties such as neighbourly love or care for the 
moral perfection of others are either secondary, or are even 
inconceivable. Liberty consists, therefore, in forbearing to 
disturb the legal order, and in the compulsory performance of 
duties imposed by this order. The primary idea is everyone 
for himself and God for all. Everyone has the greatest 
liberty; but this liberty is not arbitrariness, for it is 
restricted by universal laws which make calculable any inter­
ference with these liberties# The best society is, therefore, 
that which has highest degree of freedom and therefore thorough­
going antagonism of its members, and yet the most exact deter­
mination and security of the limits of this freedom, so that 
the freedom of each member can oo-exiat with the freedom of 
1 
all others. In this formulation we find the postulate of 
freedom of competition on the one hand, the postulate that 
any interference with this freedom Is only tolerated on the 
basis of universal laws on the other hand. Here the basic 
elements of the modern bourgeois State, of the German Reehto-
staat, are already visible, which Is asserted to be the idea 
1. "Idee zu oiner allgemeinen Geschlchte", 5. Satz, "die 
die grosste Freihelt, mlthln einen durchganglgen Antagonlairrus 
ihrer Glleder, und doch die genaueste Bestimmung und Sicherung 
der Grenzen dieser Preiheit hat, damit sle mit der Prelheit 
anderer bestehen konne." 
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of the State as such. 
b) How is the relationship between law and the State 
determined? His theory of the State diverges in one point 
from that of the theorists of natural law. His state of nature 
is already a legal relationship, namely the sum of all rela­
tions under private law, that is the struoture of a competitive 
society working on a basis of co-ordination* Therefore the 
state of nature owns "juridical forms of society, such as 
1 
Marriage, Parental Authority, the Household, and such like". 
The state of civil society (status civills) is distinguished 
from the natural state only by the absence of public law which 
realises the idea of distributive Justice. "The non-Juridical 
state is that condition of society in which there is no dls- 2 
tributive Justice. It is commonly called the Natural state." 
The state of nature is, therefore, a state which already knows 
property, even if it is only provisional, and in whioh con-
3 
tracts can be concluded; but in which legal protection is 
lacking. It is, therefore, a state of lawlessness but not 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", I Tell, 3* 
Hauptstuck, p. 41, trans. Hastie, p. 156, "rechtraassige Gesetze 
(z.B. eheliche, vaterliche, hausllche uberhaupt und beliebige 
mehr)". 
2. Ibid., p. 41, trans. Hastie, p. 156. "Der nicht recht-
llche Zustand, das 1st derjenlge,^in welchera keine austeilende 
Gerechtigkeit 1st, helsst der naturllche Zustand (status 
naturalis)." 
3. Ibid., I Tell, 1.Hauptstuck, p. 9. 
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necessarily of injustice. It is a state of potential bellum 
omnium contra omnes. 
The idea of right which aims at the maintenance of law 
postulates categorically that men leave the state of nature 
and of mere private law, and enter the civil society, that is, 
the state of public law — the State as such* "A Civil Con­
stitution is objectively necessary as a Duty, although sub­
jectively its reality is contingent. Hence, there is connected 
with a real natural Law, a Right, to which all external Acqui-
1 
sition is subjected." 
c) By this statement the State has become the logical 
postulate of private law, and as private law is essentially 
the law of private property and of freedom of contract, the 
State has become the categorical postulate of private property. 
By the raising of private property to the rank of the supreme 
principle of the State, his beautiful logical construction, 
his transcendental justification of the State, collapses. 
His arguments comprise a genuine vicious circle. In order to 
be able to construct the law and the legal duties, he has to 
assert the existence of provisional private property in the 
I. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", I. Teil, 2. Haupt-
stuck, p. 15, trans. Hastie, p. 90. "Die burgerllche Ver-
fassung, obzwar ihre Wirklichkeit subjektiv•zufallig ist, ist 
gleichwohl objektiv, das ist als Pflicht notwendig. Mithin 
gibt es in Hinsicht auf dieselbe und ihre Stiftung ein wirk-
liches Rechtsgesetz der Natur, dem alle aussere Erwerbung 
unterworfen ist." 
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state of nature. This provisional property "becomes with the 
help of the State a permanent institution. 
But no reason is given why the state of nature must necessarily 
and originally know provisional private property. His theory 
of law and State is simply a dogmatic assertion of the same 
type as those of all natural law theorists. He himself gives 
a very clear formulation; "Prom the condition of private 
right in the natural state, there arises the postulate of 
public right. It may thus be expressed: "In the relation of 
inevitable co-existence with others, thou shalt pass from the 
state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the 
condition of a distributive justice. The principle of this 
postulate may be unfolded analytically from the conception of 
right in the external relation, contradistinguished from mere 
might as violence". 
The logical act and at the same time the transcendental 
idea for the evaluation of all States is the social contract. 
The social contract is the source of all law, not historically 
but systematically; it is therefore the origin, not the begin-
2 
ning, of all law; and it is also the criterion of all law. 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre". I. Teil, 3. 
Hauptstuck, p. 42, trans. Hastie, p. 157. "Aus dem Privat-
recht im natiirlichen Zustand geht nun das Postulat des offent-
lichen Rechts hervor: Du sollst im Verhaltnis eines unver-
meidlichen Nebeneinanderseins mit alien anderen aus jenem 
heraus in einen rechtlichen Zustand, das ist den einer aus-
teilenden Gerechtigkeit ubergehen* Der Grund davon lasst 
nich analytisch aus dem Begriff des Rechts im ausseren Ver­
bal tniss im Gegensatz der Gewalt (violentia) entwickeln." 
2. Lisser, p. 18. 
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Therefore "the act by which a people is represented as con­
stituting itself into a State, is termed the original contract. 
This is properly only an outward mode of representing the idea 
by which the rightfulness of the process of organising the 
Constitution, may be made conceivable. Acoording to this repre­
sentation, all and each of the people give up their external 
freedom in order to receive it immediately again as members 
of a commonwealth". The liberty which the citizen receivos 
1 
back is that of a "regulated order of dependence". 
6, The State constructed in such a way "is the union 
of a number of men under Juridical laws. These laws, as such, 
are to be regarded as necessary a priori — that is, as follow­
ing of themselves from the conceptions of external right gen­
erally — and not as merely established by statute„ The form 
of the statute is thus involved In the idea of the State, 
2 |i 
viewed as it ought to be acoording to pure principles of fight"„ 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", II Teil, 1. 
Abschnitt, p. 47, trans. Hastie, p. 169, "der Akt, wodurch 
sich das Volk selbst zu einem Staat konstitulert. elgentlich 
nur aber die Idee desselben, nach der die Rechtmassigkelt 
deaselben allein gedacht werden kann, 1st der ursprungliche 
Kontrakt, nach welchem alle (omnes et singull) im Volk ihre 
aussere Freiheit aufgeben, um sle als Glleder elnes Gemeln-
wesens, das 1st des Volks als Staat betrachtet (unlversl) so-
fort wieder aufzunehmen". 
2. Ibid,, p. 45, trans Hastie, p. 165, "1st die Vereinlgung 
einer Merige Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen. Sofern dleee als 
Geset^e a priori notwendlg, das 1st aus Begrlffen des aussern 
Rechts uberhaupt von selbst folgend (nicht statutarlsch) oind, 
1st seine Form die Form elnes Staats uberhaupt, das 1st der 
Staat In der Idee, wie er nach reinen Rechtsprinzipien sein 
soil, welcher jeder wirklichen Verelnigung zu einem gemeinen 
Wesen (also im inneren) zur Rlchtschnur (norma) dlent". 
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By this, Kant fundamentally accepts Rousseau's construction, 
but whereas Rousseau, by this political principle of pure 
democracy and his social postulate of economic equality, offers 
a genuine chance that the individual wills might be merged in 
the general will in a true unity; and thereby the natural liber­
ty is only formally transformed into political liberty and is 
nevertheless equally maintained; in Kant's theory nothing is 
left but the postulate that the State ought to realise the 
idea of right. "Freedom is independence of the compulsory 
will of another, and in so far as it can co-exist with the 
freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one 
sole, original, inborn right, belonging to every man by virtue 
of his humanity." This formula reveals that the natural 
liberty of men is completely lost in the State; for the deci­
sion whether my freedom can co-exist with that of the other 
members lies with the sovereign State alone. The conception 
of the social contract implies, therefore, a complete surrender 
of liberty. The reservations which Kant makes with regard to 
individual liberty are nothing but a repetition of the banali­
ties of the natural law theory of Spinoza and Pufendorf. They 
It "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", Einleitung, 
Einteilung B, trans« Hastie, p. 56.# Denn die "Freiheit" 
(Unabhangigkeit von einer anderen notigenden Willkur), "sofern 
sie mit jedes anderen Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz 
zusammen bestehen kann", das "einzige urspriingllch Jedem 
Menschen^craft seiner Menschheit zustehende Recht" . 
contain nothing but*, the or etui of freedom of thought (in,) fool-
i"g# ior instance, such assertions as that no one oan oompol 
mo to be happy in his way, or that the State cannot. decide 
that the people shall make no progress in enlightenment. 
The decision of the sovereign Stat© As absolute; therr 
is no appeal against it# The subjects may complain, but In 
no case may they oppose the decisions of the State. A right 
of resistance is inconceivable, and cannot have a place* In Mny 
constitution whatsoever. "For, whoever would restrict the 
supreme power of the State must have more, or at least equal 
power, as compared with the power that la so restricted| and 
if competent to command the subjects to resist., ouch « one 
would also have to be able to protect them, and If he in to 
be considered capable of Judging what is right 1n every ease, 
he may also publicly order resistance. But such a one, and 
not the actual authorityj would then be the supreme power; 
which is contradictory." The right of resistance Is on the 
whole denied because there can be no arbiter between people 
1. "Metaphysik dor SlfcLen, Heclitslehre", II. Tell, 
1. Abochnitt, Allgemelne Anmerkung A, trans. Has tie, p. :17!i, 
"Dunn der, welcher die Stwatagewalt elnschranken soil, iuumh 
doch mehr oder wenlgstens gle.1ohe Macht haben als derlenlgo, 
weloher eingeschrankt wlrd; urul als ein rechtjnKsslger'(Sebn.ter. 
der den llntertanen bofohle, sioh ku wJdersetaen. muss er n t^ 
uuch bchutHen konnon und in jedem vorkommendon Fa lie reditu-
kraftig urteilen, ml thin offentlich den Wldnral.and befehllgnn 
konnen. Alsdann 1st aber nloht Jener, sondern d.1eaer der 
oboroto Bofehlahaborj welches sioh widerspriohb 
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and sovereign. Kant's attitude towards revolution is, there­
fore, clearly defined, although his contemporaries regarded 
him as a partisan of the French Revolution. 
By this construction, the existing sovereign power is 
glorified with the aid of the idea of righto If, however, 
the revolution has succeeded, Kant is realist enough to recom-
li mend obedience to the newly-emerged sovereign power# 
6. Is there no limit to this State-absolutism? 
a) The idea of right does not offer any restriction 
of the activity of the sovereign State. Either the idea of 
right is formal, in which case nothing concrete can be deduced 
from it; the derivation of anything concrete from this idea 
of right would be possible only through arbitrary insertions 
during the process of deduction* We shall attempt to make this 
clear, from the example of Kant's justification of the death 
penalty. He distinguishes the "judicial or juridical punish­
ment (poena forensis) .... from natural punishment (poena 
naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does 
not come within the cognisance of the legislatoro Juridical 
punishment can never be administered merely as a means for 
promoting another good either with regard to the criminal 
himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed 
A . \V M<\ StA M —— 
lf0 "Metaphysik der Sit ten, Rechtslehre", II Teil, 1. 
Abschnitt, allgemeine Anmerkung A. trans. Hastie, p. 181. 
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only becauaw the individual on whom it is inflicted has com-
i 
mitted a crime.... The penal law is a categorical imperative". 
Punishment is, therefore, justified by the idea of justice. 
"For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would 
no longer have any value in the world." Retaliation also 
demands the death penalty; "even if a civil society resolved 
to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members 
the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before 
the resolution was carried out. The murderer must die." 
Prom this idea of retaliation he deduces the impossibility 
of any mercy. "But whoever has committed murder, must die. 
There is in this case no juridical substitute or surrogate, 
that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice. 
There is no likeness nor proportion between life, however 
painful, and death; and therefore, there is no equality be­
tween the crime of the murder and the retaliation of it but 
what is juridically accomplished by the execution of the 
2 
criminal." 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", II Teil, 1. Ab-
schnitt, allgemeine Anm. E, trans. Hastie;> p. 195, "richter-
liche Strafe (poena forensis) von der naturlichen Strafe 
(poena naturalis), wodurch sich das Laster selbst^aft und auf 
welche der Gesetzgeber gar nicht Rucksicht nimmt' . Diese 
richterliche Strafe "kann niemals bloss als Mittel, ein anderes 
Gute zu fordern, fur den Verbrecher selbst oder fur diejDurg-
erliche Gesellschaft, sondern muss jederzeit nur darum uber 
ihn verhangt werden, weil er verbrochen hat... Das Strafgesetz 
ist ein kategorischer Imperativ". 
2.Trans. Hastie, pp. 196, 198, "wenn die Gerechtigkeit 
untergeht. so hat es keinen Wert mehr, dass Menschen auf^Erden 
leben". "Wenn die Menschheit heute untergehen sollte, musste 
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Is it, however, really true that his rigorous theory 
of punishment follows logically from his idea of the State, 
that is, from the social contract? It is well-known that 
Beccaria came to the opposite conclusion. According to him, 
the death penalty is irreconcilable with the idea of the social 
contract, as that punishment must go beyond the portion of 
natural liberty which the individual surrendered in entering 
the State# Radbruch likewise deduces from the theory of the 
social contract the conceptual impossibility of the death 
1 
penalty. "The individual cannot be thought of as consenting 
to the death penalty® One could prove the consent of one's 
own reason for every kind of punishment which leaves to the 
punished his life, in however miserable a form. The death 
penalty, however, cannot be proved to serve the interests of 
the criminal, as it annihilates the subject of this interest." 
All these deductions are arbitrary, because from the principle 
of the social contract no concrete conclusion can be derived. 
Kant himself dealt contemptuously with Beccaria1s deductions, 
and maintained that he reached this result through the "com­
passionate sentimentality of a humane feeling", and he con­
tinues: "the individual who, as a co-legislator, enacts penal 
vorher der letzte im Gefangnis beflndliche Moder sterben... 
Der Morder muss sterben." "Hat er gemordet, so muss er 
sterben. Es gibt hier kein Surrogat zur befrledigung der 
Gerechtigkeit. Es 1st keine Gleichartigkelt zwischen einem 
nocb so kummervollen Leben und detn Tode, also auch keine 
Gleichheit des Verbrechens und der Wiedervergeltung als durch 
den am Tater gerichtlich vollzogenen Tod." 
/j  ^ <3. r 1> 5-
205 
law, cannot possibly be the same person who, as a subject, In 
punished according to the law; for qua criminal, he cannot 
possibly be regarded as having a voice In the legislation, 
1 
the legislator being rationally viewed as Just and holy" . 
By this kind of logic, as I1'.J. Stahl has shown, it is possible 
to prove the illegality, not only of tho death penalty, but 
of every kind of punishment• For if the criminal is conceived 
of as rationally as Radbruch desires, then It is impossible 
2 
to see why he should consent to imprisonment0 If, however, 
one conceives of the criminal as rational in the Kantian sense, 
it would even be possible to prove the Impossibility of crime. 
A rational man does not commit crimes« Rut Just as one can 
prove the conceptual necessity of the death penalty, so to 
speak as a logical catharsis, so also one can prove a genuine 
claim on the part of the murderer to be exeouted. Thus Just. 
as little as from the idea of the social contract, can a way 
be found from Kant's ethic to his idea of retaliation, even 
3 
if one asserts such a relation between law and ethics. The 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Hechtslehre", II Toil, 1. Ab-
schnitt, allgemeine Anm. E. trans. Hastie, 201. "Ich als 
Mltgesetzgeber, der das Strqfgesetz diktiert, kenn unmogllch 
dieselbe Person sein, die als Untertan nach dem Gesetz be-
straft wirdjdenn als ein solcher, namlich als Verbrocher, 
kann ich unmogllch eine Stimme In der Gesetzgebung huben. 
Der Gesetzgeber 1st hellig." 
2. F.J. Stahl, "Die Philosophic des Kechte", 2 vols, 
p. 701. 
3. Thus e.g. Emil Lssk, Rechtaphllonoph.1 e, In "Die 
Phllosophle lm Beginn des 20. Jahrhundert", p. 209. 
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reason for such arbitrary deductions has often "been shown. 
The transcendental method makes any concrete result impossible. 
P.J. Stahl, and in recent times Erich Kaufmann, Max Ernst Mayer, 
and Morris Ginsberg, have all shown this, Stahl himself said 
that Kant's theory of retaliation was impossible to understand. 
Peuerbach believed on account of this theory of retaliation 
that Kant was senile when he wrote his philosophy of law. But 
the real reason seems to be that the conception of freedom 
represents a mere negative principle of speculative reason, 
and that consequently the notion of the individual and that 
of freedom are purely rationalistic conceptions which have 
nothing to do with the sociological notions of personality 
and liberty# The individual in the Kantian system is a uni-
1 
versal man, who is at the same time an individual. This is 
that natural man whose core, stripped of all individual quali­
ties, is always the same. The consciousness of this indi­
vidual is nothing more than the general feeling of mere exist­
ence. He is that infinitely perfect being, a mere logical 
being. Thus it is understandable why as an individualist 
Kant attributed so extraordinarily strong an individuality 
to the State. If he assigned to the creative activity of man 
2 
an unheard-of sphere of power, this in no way prejudiced the 
1. Georg Simmel, "Kant", p. 254. 
2. Ibid., "Problemenfder Geschichtsphilosophie", Munchen 
u. Leipzig, 1919. 
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sovereignty of the State, nor did it lead to anarchy, since 
a pre-established harmony of all individuals was assumed; and 
could be assumed, since these individuals are mere logical 
points of attribution. 
It follows, therefore, that the introduction of the 
idea of law constitutes no limitation of the sovereignty of 
the State. 
b) Is a limitation of the sovereignty of the State to 
be found in the introduction of the general law? As with 
Rousseau, the general or universal law is the central point 
of Kant's legal theory. His postulate that the State should 
only rule through general laws goes so far as to exclude the 
application of the principles of equity and of pardon. Equity 
is in his view a law without sanction, ."a dumb goddess who 
cannot claim a hearing of right. Hence it follows that a 
Court of Equity, for the decision of disputed questions of 
right, would involve a contradiction". 
But the generality of law guarantees but little. The 
11! 
general law can have a twofold significance. Its generality 
can as in Rousseau's system, have a merely nominal significance; " 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", Anhang zur Ein-
leitung I, trans. Hastie, p. 51, "stumme Gottheit, die nicht 
gehort werden kann". "Hieraus folgt auch, dass oin Gerichts-
hof der Billigkeit (in einem Streit anderer uber ihre Rechte) 
einen Widerspruch in sich schliesse." 
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that is to say, its content may be any arbitrary, any individu­
al, any unjust regulation, provided only that the legislator 
avoids mentioning individuals or individual conditions. Such 
a general law, which only demands a certain dexterity on the 
part of the legislator, constitutes only a slight limitation 
of the State's activity as will be shown in the last part of 
this book. 
Alternatively, the general law can have a material con­
tent. If this is the case, Hegel's criticism at once becomes 
relevant. In his early work, "Uber die wissenschaftlichen 
Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts", (p. 22), which unfortunately 
has not been translated into English, the concept of the gen­
erality or universality of the law is considered to be not 
only useless, but also from its consequences immoral, and this 
idea is further developed in his Phenomenology and his Philoso­
phy of Right. Hegel refers to the passage in the "Critique 
of Practical Reason" in which Kant investigates the problem 
whether we are at liberty to embezzle a deposit, if the de­
positor cannot prove that he has made the deposit. Kant asks 
whether such prohibition to embezzle a deposit can be thotight 
of as a universal law, and he answers that if such a provision 
could be thought of as a universal law, no deposits would any 
longer be made. As against this, Hegel replies, if there were 
t 
1. "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft", I Tell, I. Buch, 
1. Hauptstuck, p. 4 Anm. 
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no deposits at all, what contradiction would be present? The 
fact, that there are no deposits, will contradict other neces­
sary determinents.. and he goes on to say whether an aim may 
be raised to the rank of a universal law can only "be answered 
if we already know whether an aim is worthy of being thus 
exalted. It is possible to regard every aim as a universal 
law, and there is nothing which cannot be transformed into a 
moral law by such elevation} and as the aims of men necessari­
ly collide, the existence of colliding general laws is con­
ceivable. Hegel concludes that if Kant raises the institution 
of private property to the rank of a universal law, he assumes 
that his interest in private property is shared by all men. 
But everyone is free to repudiate private property and can 
thereby arrive at entirely different universal laws. That 
is the reason why Hegel considers the conceptions of the 
universal law in the Kantian theory to be immoral; for when­
ever a desire is powerful enough, no objection can be raised 
against its being elevated to the rank of a moral obligation. 
Every drive of men can be given the validity of law* Kant 
thus accepts State and property as facts which he does not 
question, and he only investigates with his transcendental 
method the conditions of the possible existence of State and 
property, and he finds as the main condition the duty to 
fulfil contracts. Hegel's criticism is in the main identical 
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with our assertion that the transcendental method makes it 
impossible to reach any concrete results. Therefore the in­
troduction of the notion of the universal or general law 
through which the State should rule has either if it is formal 
no decisive function of limiting the activity of the State, 
or if the notion is given a concrete content it has a purely 
disguising function. The instances of Kant's theory show that 
his universal law is in fact materially filled, and that the 
main material is the maintenance of private property. In 
Kant's theory, therefore, the notion of the general law has 
mainly a disguising function; that of conferring on the exist­
ing property system the dignity of a moral principle„ 
c) Finally, the last question is how far the political 
organisation of the State as suggested by Kant gives any 
guarantee for the realisation of the idea of law and the limit­
ation of State sovereignty. Kant postulates the separation 
of powers, with the precedence of the legislative power, and 
the subordination of administration and justice to the unl-
1 
versal law. The combination of the three powers in one hand 
appears to him as despotic. A government cannot promulgate 
legislation, it can only issue decrees which concern decisions 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", II Teil, 1. Ab-
3chnitt, p. 45, trans. Hastie, p. 165. 
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in particular cases and are alterable# The administration 
of justice lies in the hands of judges who are subject to 
the law alone# Their office is merely the application of 
laws. The legislative power belongs to the united will of 
the peopleo "The people" are the citizens (cives) who enjoy 
legal freedom, civil equality, and civil independence, and 
therefore alone have the franchisee They are thus the sui 
juris of Spinoza, who alone are active citizens, whereas all 
the others are called passive citizens« "The apprentice 
a servant who is not in the employ of the State, a minor 
(naturaliter vel civiliter) all women, and, generally, every 
one who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his 
own industry, but as it is arranged by others (the State ex­
cepted), are without civil personality, and their existence 
1 
is only, as it were, incidentally included in the State." 
Only the property owner has the franchise; and Kant's theory 
of property is as compared with that of Locke a Prussian reac­
tionary one. His theory of right shows that only the landed 
proprietor is to control the political destiny of the State. 
"It is a question as to how far the right of taking possession 
1. p. 46, trans. Hastie, pp. 167, 168. "Der Geselle ... 
der Dienstbote (der nicht im Dienst des Staats steht); der 
Unmundige, alles Frauenzimmer und uberhaupt jedermann, der 
nicht nach eigenem Betriebe^sondern nach der Verfiigung anderer 
(ausser der des Staats) genotigt ist, seine Existenz (Nahrung 
und Schutz) zu erhalten, entbehrt der bugerlichen Personlich-
keit, und seine Existenz ist gleichsam nur eine Inharenz 
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of the soil extends? The answer is, so far as the capability 
of having it under one's power extends, that is just as far 
as he who wills to appropriate it can defend it, as if the 
soil were to say: "if you cannot protect me, neither can you 
command me". 
Kant, as Marx recognised, wrote the German theory of 
the French Revolution. His theory, provided that theories 
have any political influence at all, is responsible for the 
defeat of the German bourgeoisie in 1813, 1848 and 1860, and 
prevented the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie# It 
is the typical liberal theory of the Rechtsstaat, which was 
operative in the State from 1812 to 1918, with its monarch 
who based his strength on landed property and education, on 
a bourgeoisie which is politically in a state of subjection 
and is content with making money; whose property is protected 
by the separation of powers, the independence of judges, and 
the exercise of sovereignty through the medium of general laws 
which perpetuate the existing property order and veil the 
political dominationo The natural law has disappeared; but 
1. "Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre", I Teil, 2. Haupt-
stiick, 1. Abschnitt, p. 15, trans® Has tie, p. 91. "Wie weit 
erstreckt sich die Befugnis zur Besitznehmung eines Bodens? 
Soweit, als das Vermogen, ihn in seiner Gewalt zu haben, das 
ist als der, so ihn sich zueignen will, ihn verteidigen soil, 
gleich ob der Boden spr&che: wenn Ihr mich nicht beschutzen 
konnt, so konnt Ihr mir auch nicht gebieten." 
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with it, democracy also. Kant's original contribution is, 
however, the principle that the maximum of liberty is guaran­
teed only if every State activitity which interferes with 
freedom and property can be attributed to a general law® The 
natural law has by this been changed to general laws<> 
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II. FICHTE. 
Fichte develops the two constitutive elements of the 
theory of the State and the law, sovereignty and freedom, with 
basic completeness, and indeed one after the other. In his 
first period, he evolved a system of freedom as against the 
State; in the second a system of absolute freedom of the State. 
Between the two periods there can be found various attempts 
at a synthesis, in which the two elements stand unreconciled 
side by side. Pichte belongs to the transitional period be­
tween rationalism and romanticism* He ha3 often been called 
the last rationalist and the first romanticist# His influence 
is due not to the originality of his system, nor to the clarity 
of his theory, nor to the depth of his ideas, but to the ex­
traordinary vigour which his personality, entirely devoid of 
compromise, lent to his philosophical outlook• 
I. 
1. The antagonism of the two systems is already visible 
in his ethic. This ethic knows two values, the self and the 
1. Bibliography: Emil Lask, "Fichtes Idealismus und die 
Geschichte", 1914 (anastatischer Neudruck. Marianne Weber, 
"Fichtes Sozialismus und sein Verhaltnis zur marxschen Doktrin", 
1900. Wilhelm Metzger, "Gesellschaft, Recht und Staat in der 
Ethik des deutschen Idealismus", Heidelberg, 1917. Victor 
Basch, "Les Doctrines Politiques des Philosophes Classiques 
de lfAllemagne", Paris, 1901, p. 72 ff. H.C. Engelbrecht, 
"Johann Gottlieb Fichte", New York, 1933. Reinhard Strecker, 
"Die Anfange von Fichtes Staatsphiloscphie", Fichte, Samtliche 
Werke, 8 vols, ed. J.H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845-6, quoted as GW. 
"Fichtes Nachgelassene Werke", 3 vols, ed. J.H. Fichte, Bonn, 
1834, quoted as NW. 
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others; the realisation of the individual personality, and its 
sacrifice for the community. Whereas Kant — without success, 
as we have seen — only arranged the given aims in order of 
priority, Fichte seeks to show in his ethic the ultimate and 
absolute^value: the development of man towards absolute per­
fection. He describes this process as a continuous progress 
2 
from a limited to a less limited condition, until the end ap-
3 
pears as absolute freedom from all restraint; as absolute 
It-
independence and self-activity, so that the development is the 
c ® becoming God In an endless process. 
This idea is clearly expressed in his revolutionary 
6 7 
pamphlet, and in his lectured, of 1794. The ultimate purpose 
of human life is to subdue every irrationality and to rule 
according to its own laws* In his Sittenlehre of 1798 this 
8 
idea finds the following formulation: "Independence, our 
ultimate aim, consists • in this, that everything is depend­
ent upon me, and I am not dependent upon anything; that In my 
1. GW VI, p. 300, 1794. 
2• GW VI, p. 72. 
3. "System der SittenlehrS, GW IV, p. 166, 1798. 
4. GW VI, p. 58 ff. 
5. GW IV, p. 256. 
6. "Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums 
uber die franzozische Revolution", 1793, GW VI, p. 86 ff. 
7. GW VI, p. 297 ff. 
8. GW IV, p. 329. 
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whole world of sense there happens what I will; absolutely, 
and only because I will it... The world must become to me 
what my body is. This aim however is unattainable, but I 
shall approximate to it... This approximation is my final aim". 
Pichte, however, sees that man lives in society, and 
therefore as early as 1794 he begins to construct accordingly. 
"Man is appointed to live in society; he shall live in society; 
he is incomplete as man and contradicts himself if he lives in 
1 
isolation." And in 1798 he declares that "Everyone shall 
2 
live in society". 
But how can the sovereignty of the individual be recon­
ciled with the necessity of social life? 
The recognition of the freedom of the individual implies 
according to Fichte the recognition of others. Other individ­
uals are not external nature which is to be conquered by men; 
3 
so the apparent antagonism of the moral law to itself is 
4 
solved by what can be called a system of co-ordinating morals. 
This theory does not represent any progress. At bottom it is 
nothing but an exposition of the natural law theory that all 
men are free and equal, and superior to external nature. In 
1. GW VI, p. 306. 
2. GW IV, p. 234. 
3. GW IV, p. 230. 
4. Metzger, p. 125. 
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spite of this system of co-ordinating morals, the individual 
man is considered as isolated, even if, unlike Kant, Pichte 
early recognised as an ethical aim care for the moral perfection 
of others. 
2. In 1798 there occurs the first change. After that 
1 
time, the self is only a means and the others become the end. 
"To each one, all except himself are the end. No one is an 
end to himself." All, however, are only means in the service 
of the realisation of reason. 
2 
A second change is to be found in his Lectures, which 
now in an open polemic against the period of enlightenment 
assert that "the species alone really exists". 
Here he undertakes a complete reversal of his ethic, 
3 
and declares that in reality the individual does not exist. 
He demands the sacrifice of the individual for the species, 
and states that "the individual should forget himself in the 
4 species, and should merge his life in the life of the whole". 
In his ethic three different systems can be distin­
guished: that of absolute individualism, from which there is 
no way to the State; that of co-ordinating morals, which can 
1. GW IV, p. 253. 
2. "Vorlesungen liber die Grundzuge des gegenwartigen 
Zeitalters (GW VII, pp. 26, 188. 
3. GW VII, p. 38. 
4. GW VII, p. 35. 
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lead to the foundation of the State only If a pre-established 
harmony of all individuals is accepted; and finally, that of 
an ethic of the species, in which the freedom of the individual 
disappears• 
II. 
To this changed ethic there correspond various changes 
in the theory of law and the State. FIchte, indeed, ruthlessly 
separated law and ethics; but this phase is preceded by a gen­
eral theory of natural law, in which his Jacobin ethic finds 
expression in a Jacobin theory of the State. 
1. In his Contribution for the Rectification of the 
1 
Judgements of the Public on the French Revolution the State 
finds no place at all« This pamphlet is a confession to ; the 
ideals of the French Revolution, which was acclaimed with en­
thusiasm by Schiller and Goethe, Klopstock and Herder, by 
historians and jurists, and even by Kant. They were all pro­
foundly influenced by the Revolution, which divided the whole 
of European civilization into two camps, Fichte's pamphlet 
is a defence of the principles of the French Revolution as 
against the literary reaction begun by Burke, who had found 
disciples in Germany. In this pamphlet, man lives always in 
10 GW VI. 
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the state of nature. The State is superfluous# It is in no 
way distinguished from a private association. 
In his theory of law Piehte distinguishes between innate 
and acquired rights. The former are inalienable and comprise 
those actions which are enjoined on me. The acquired rights 
are alienable, and consist of those actions which are only 
permitted to me. Of the innate rights he says "No man can be 
bound save by himself; to no man can a law be given, save by 
himself• If he permits a foreign will to Impose a law upon 
him, he waives his humanity and makes himself a beast: and 
1 
this he may not do". 
But what are the innate as opposed to the acquired 
rights? He distinguishes between the rights of "unchangeable 
spirituality" (unveranderlichen Geistigkeit) and those of 
"changeable sensuality" (veranderlichen Sinnlichkeit). It is 
impossible to alienate the former, even if one should wish to 
do so. The latter are divided into internal and external 
rights. The internal are inalienable; of the external (the 
capacity to act on external nature and persons), a minimum 
2 
is equally inalienable, for everyone must live. The rest 
of the external rights can be alienated by means of a contract. 
1. GW VI, p. 81. 
2. GW VI, p. 178. 
Ol)jJ 
All legal changes must take the form of contracts, which are 
either contracts of exchange or of gift. It is, however1, an 
inalienable right of man to break any contract. Thus those 
who are oppressed can at any time dissolve the contract by 
which they have sold themselves into dependence and slavery. 
"It is an inalienable right of man, even on one side, and as 
soon as he desires, to annul any of his oontraots; immutability 
and eternal validity of any contract is the ultimate violation 
1 
of the essential rights of humanity." Therefore anyone can 
leave the State at any time; anyone can establish a new State 
within the territory of the State. Decisions of the majority 
have no validity. 
Curiously enough, property belongs to the Innate and 
inalienable rights. It is, however, a right conferred not 
by occupation but by labour. He accepts, therefore, Locke's 
cultural property theory, as against the reactionary theory 
of Kant, The original property consists of our physical and 
Intellectual forces. His theory and property, with the pos­
sible swing to the right for the full product of labour has 
therefore socialistic Implications, 
This pamphlet also contains, however, a confession of 
faith in free competition. "Give freedom to trade, with the 
natural heritage of man, with his powers", and it will be 
1. OW VI, p. Ill, 
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found that social problems can be solved without State inter­
vention, without "drastic agricultural laws". But he demands 
free competition on the basis of equality of property, and, 
obviously influenced by Momoro, he asserts "that all men have 
a legal title to an equal portion of land, and that the soil 
1 
is to be distributed in equal portions". 
This system of Pichte's realises the rule of the material 
law# Man is under a dual law, that of his nature on the one 
hand and that of the contract, i.e. the positive law, on the 
other. The latter is, however, entirely under the natural 
law; and here he is in opposition to Spinoza and Pufendorf. 
In a passionate polemic against Hobbes, he takes Locke's posi­
tions and carries it to its logical conclusion, by maintaining 
that the state of nature does not cease, but continues, to 
2 
exist in the State# The State has no place in his system# 
3 
"No one is cultivated, but everyone has to cultivate himself." 
The task of Fichte's State is to render itself superfluous. 
"The State, like all human institutions, which are mere means, 
has as aim its own annihilation: the end of all government 
4 
is to make government superfluous." As with Rousseau who 
1. GW VI, p. 121# 
2# GW VI, p. 132. 
3. GW VI, p. 90. 
4« "Bestimmung des Gelehrten", GW VI, p. 306. 
300 
reduces State activity to a "mouvement du doigt", and as later 
with Marx and Engels, the final gjlrrvof the State is its aboli­
tion . 
One can therefore consider Fichte's theory of 1793 as 
the German physiocratic theory. 
2.Between this early system and the late system of 1812 
and 1813, there occur some intermediate systems, which in the 
main are characterised by the fact that Pichte discovers the 
political concept of the law, and finds himself confronted 
with the task of reconciling it with the conception of the 
material law. 
As early as 1796, in order to escape the implications 
of the social contract conception, he asserts the existence 
of an objective Reason. This mediatory theory is: logically 
based upon a divorce of the form and content of the social 
contract. At this period the contract for him is character-
2 
ised as to its form by the free submission of the citizens. 
Its content, however, "the positive law", is determined "by 
the nature of the thing"• He even arrives at a categorical 
denial of the rights of men, equal in dogmatic certainty to 
his earlier assertion of their existence. "There is no con­
dition of original rights, and no original rights of mens., 
1. Cf. esp. "Grundlage: des Naturrechts, 1796. GW III. 
2. Ibid., p. 160. 
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1 
Original right is therefore a mere fiction." Having in the 
meantime become sceptical of the liberal democratic conception 
democracy for him is now an "absolutely illegal constitu­
tion" — he leaves the decision as to what is consistent with 
the nature of things to the executive. He now rejects the 
separation of powers. He even contests the possibility of 
distinguishing the executive from the judiciary; but his mis­
trust of the executive leads him to suggest instituting an 
3 ephorate, which is to control the executive. But the conflict 
between the executive and the people as to the "nature of 
things" is in this intermediate system decided in favour of 
the people by granting to them a right of resistance. This 
right, however, contrary to his theory of 1793, is denied to 
the individual, and only granted to the people as a whole; 
for the characteristic reason that "The people is never a 
rebel, and the term ''rebellion' used in relation to it, is 
4 
the most extreme absurdity which has ever been uttered". 
Let us leave out his further attempts at compromise, 
and turn immediately to his final system, his Rechtslehre of 
1812 and his Staatslehre of 1813. 
1. ' GW III, p. 112. 
2. "Grundlage des Naturrechts", 1796. GW III, p. 159. 
3. GW III, p. 160. 
4. GW III, p. 182. 
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2. The final break with the Period of Enlightenment 
appears in his lectures of 1804 and 1805 on the Grundziige des 
1 
gegenwartigen Zeitalters. The period of enlightenment appears 
to him as that of "complete sinfulness". Consequently his 
conception of law and State changes. The idea of the Ralson 
d'Etat and of the sovereignty of the State makes its appearance. 
The State is now recognised as a coercive power, and charac-
2 
terised as domination. It is no longer regarded as a private 
association, but it is an "indivisible organic whole". Neither 
is the State an economic unit, nor a legal category; it is, 
or should be, a cultural State, combating barbarism, subduing 
3 
nature to men, and furthering the arts. It is now a unity, 
4 
an organic natural product. It now becomes "an absolute 
duty dictated by the conscience to unite with others to form 
5 
a State". On the other hand, he still maintains the exist­
ence of rights of men, especially of freedom of religion and 
freedom of science. The State has, however, a right to 
mobilise all the forces of the citizens, but always with the 
final aim of rendering itself superfluous# 
1. "Die Grundziige des gegenwartigen Zeitalters", GW VII, 
p. 3. 
2o GW VII, p. 157. 
3e GW VII, pp. 157, 143, 162. 
4. "Grundlage des Naturrechts von 1796, GW III, p. 202. 
5. GW IV, p. 236. 
1^ 01^  
3. Assisted by the iiupresa ton made upon him by M ;i 
i light from the French in 1807, the dual conception, Stat.o 
and nation, gains an ever stronger hold over him. Hit* many 
1 
small works of this period show his attempt to construct a 
strong State on the basis of the free nation,, All his theories 
are anti-monarchical; they represent in short the anti-liberal 
aide of Jacobinism. Above all, however, he discovers Mach\a-
2 
velli, but. a" first only with regard to foreign policy, '.'ho 
ideal of the self-sufficient State becomes, under the Influ­
ence of the Napeleonlo wars, the central conception. On this 
basis he now constructs a system of State socialism, which, 
however, is mainly individualistic; a system which is tho 
logical consequence of his altered political conception on 
the one hand, and of his cultural theory of property on tho 
other. In 1007 his idnas were summarised as followst "Since 
the Frenoh Revolution the doctrine of the Rights of Man and 
of Freedom and of the original equality of all — which are 
certainly the eternal and indestructible basis of all social 
organisation against which no State dare offend, but with 
whioh alone no State oan be erected or administered — have 
been accentuated too much by some of our own philosophers in 
3 
the heat of the battle...", 
1. See Engelbrecht, pp. 95-107. 
2, "tlber Macchlavelll als Sohriftsteller unci Htellen aun 
selnen Schriften", 1807. NW ITT, p. 401. 
30 NW III, p. 4 SB, trans. Kngelbrccht, pp. II.O- 111. 
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lie denies now that property is a right pr©ceding the 
State. The validity of contracts depends now upon the will 
1 of the State, that is, on positive law. There remains only 
the postulate of the sanctity of the homej the rest Is a cen­
tralised police State, a "geachlossener landelsBtaafc"! In 
which there in no room for chance, for genius, or for luxuryi 
8 
which la ruled by the purest rationalism. Now it is "the 
object of the State to give everyone his due, to Invest Mm 
g 
with hlei property and then to protect him In It". A systhesls 
of this "content" of the State with the "form" of reason, as 
4 In Machiavellianism and Idealism, to use Melneoke's expression 
Id, indeed, attempted only In 1010, and In this connection we 
wish to emphasise that his solution is based rather on impulse 
(5 
than on ratiocination. It is decisively important that 
Flchte now abandons the rational Justification of the State. 
Tt in true that in his Orundsstfae des ^e^enwartlMen %eltalters. 
a rational Justification Is still to be found* The State has 
the task of abolishing feudal privileges, of liberating; the 
peasants, of restoring legal equality, of becoming a cultural, 
1. "Angewandtes Ffaturrecfct", aw iii, p. 806, 
2• "JDer geachlosaen© Mandelsstaat", 1800, ftW 11%, p, 610. 
25. "Handelsstaat", OW 111, p. m9, 
4. p. 406. 
Melnecke, p# 463. 
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1 
and not only an economic or a legal, State. On the other 
hand, F'ichte always takes the view that religion, science, and 
2 
virtue must never become aims of the State. Under the influ­
ence of the Napoleonic oppression, the species which is to be 
realised by the State becomes for him the nation# The nation 
now becomes the means of regenerating the world. His conception 
of the nation, however, is only applied in the field of foreign 
policy* Pichte is far from Identifying the existing reaction­
ary State with the nation. For him, the concept of the nation 
3 
is still the Jacobin conception. This nation of free and 
equal citizens is the substructure which creates the State, 
and which the State must dominate in order to be able to live. 
In this relationship between State and nation there is, how­
ever, an Intellectual indecision, which Fichte has not solved 
because it was impossible to reconcile his two postulates, the 
absolute State and the free democratic nation. It was im­
portant to create German unity; to weld together into a nation 
the various peoples on the basis of freedom, and to confront 
the family with this free nation; but as important as the 
creation of the nation was the reconstruction of an efficient 
State machinery, as it had broken down in and after the 
Napoleonic wars. The ultimate task seems even in Fichte1s 
theory to be constant; "The State as the supreme administrator 
of human affairs and the guardian of those who are under age, 
1. GW VII, p. 181. 
2. GW VII, p. 166. 
3» Sngelbrecht, p. 158. 
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which in the exercise of its powers, is answerable only to 
God, has the absolute right to coerce them — that is, the 
children — for their good* The relation between this State 
and the nation is similar to that in the ideology of Italian 
2 
Fascism. Meinecke considers Fichte's conception of the 
nation to be merely a rational and not a historical conception. 
It seems, however, to be more important to emphasise the fact 
that in Pichte's theory the nation is moulded by the State. 
The motive which led Italian Fascism, in contrast to German 
National Socialism, to put the State above the nation and to 
make the nation the object of the State — namely, the in­
efficiency of the pre-Fascist State — was equally decisive 
in Pichte's case. He thus becomes the herald of State-abso­
lutism, just as it is of Italian Fascism. 
His last works are an attempt to justify this new 
3 
Machiavellianism of the State. In his Rechtslehpe of 1812, 
law and morality, positive law and natural law, are sharply 
distinguished, and any relation between positive and natural 
law is denied. Every law Is now positive law. "Outside the 
State there is no law; there Is no natural law, but only the 
1. "Reden an die deutsche Nation", GW VII, p0 436. 
2. "Weltburgertum und Nationalstaat", Bk. I, ch. 6. 
3. NW II, p. 493. 
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1 
law of the State." Consequently law Is now related to might; 
2 
"Might is the condition of law". By this is postulated the 
absolute sovereignty of the State, that is to say the formal 
rule of the political law. All rights are delegated by the 
State; and therefore also property. The State is the sole 
3 
owner of land. Trade is a monopoly of the State; the mer«-
4 
chants are officials of the State. 
How Is this system of complete absolutism reconcilable 
with his individualistic starting-point, which he has never 
completely abandoned? It would be idle to recapitulate here 
all his metaphysics, to present his fallacious arguments and 
the logical plunges he takes in order to prove the necessary 
identity of the will of the individual with that of the State. 
He finally reaches no other conclusion than Spinoza's; 
5 
that only the spirit is free. Two institutional ways of 
escape are provided for a limitation of the State activity, 
namely educational Institutes, which the State is to set up 
6 7 
for the education to liberty, and the rule of the best. 
1. NW II, p. 515. 
2. NW II, p. 514. 
3. NW II, p. 548. 
4. NW II, p0 568. 
5. NW II, p, 537. 
6. NW II, p. 540. 
7. NW II, p. 629. 
508 
"In theory the judgment of the people Is correct, because 
there is no higher judge* But what of practice? One can 
trust a select group of wise men far more than a majority 
1 
which was constituted God knows how." But how these wise 
men are to be found does not become clear. We may be spared 
2 
the examination of his Staatslehre of 1813. Here he again 
attempts to restore reason, after having enthroned pure might 
(voluntas). He now suggests that an areopagus of teachers 
3 
and instructors of the people should select the ruler0 
We have not dealt with FIchte's theory, because it 
contains any original contribution. State-absolutism has 
been far more clearly presented by Hobbes and Spinoza, Pufen-
dorf and Kant; the natural law theory, far more convincingly 
by Grotius and Locke. We have only considered Fichte's 
theories because his work comprises every conceivable rational 
theory of law and the State, from a pure natural law system 
whose sole aim is liberty, via all possible compromises, to 
State-absolutism; and because it clearly demonstrates the 
dependence of political theory on political reality. 
1. NW II, p. 633; trans. Engelbreclrt, p. 137. 
2. GW IV, p. 369. 
3. GW IV, p. 450. 
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CHAPTER IX 
1 
Hegel 
In Hegel's theory of State and law there stand irre­
concilably side by side the rights of men and State sovereign­
ty, the rational justification of State and law and State 
absolutism. The dialectical synthesis of sovereignty and the 
rights of men is with him a mere postulate or metaphysical 
concept. By this assertion we say nothing against the dia­
lectical method, especially nothing against materialistic 
dialectics. 
It Bibliography: Franz Rosenzweig, "Hegel und der Staat", 
2 vols. Berlin, 1920. R. Haym, "Hegel und seine Zeit", 1857. 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Kegels in "Gesammelte 
Schriften", Vol. IV, 1921. Wilhelm Metzger, "Gesellschaft 
Recht und Staat in der Ethik des deutschen Idealismus", 
Heidelberg, 1917. Hermann Heller, "Hegel und der nationale 
Machtstaatsgedanke in Deutschland", 1921. Paul Vogel, "Hegels 
Gesellschaftsbegriff und seine geschichtliche Fortbildung 
durch Lorenz Stein, Marx, Engels und Lassalle" (Kantstudien 
Erganzungsheft, No. 59, 1925)* Julius Lowenstein, "Hegels 
Staatsidee, ihr Doppelgesicht und ihr Einfluss im 19. Jahr-
hundert", Berlin, 1927. Victor Basch, "Les Doctrines Poli-
tiques des Philosophes Classiques de L'Allemagne", Paris,1927, 
p. 111. E.F. Carritt, "Morals and Politics", Oxford, 1935, 
pp. 105, 159. M.B. Forster, "The Political Philosophies of 
Plato and Hegel", Oxford, 1935. Hegel, "Vorlesungen uber die 
Philosophie der Geschichte", herausg. von Lasson, 1922. 
"Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts", herausg. von Lasson, 
1921, englische transl. by Dyde, "Schriften zur Politik und 
Rechtsphilosophie", herausg. von Lasson, 1913, containing 
"tJber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts", 
p. 396. 
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In Hegel's paper, which has already "been mentioned, on 
the scientific treatment of natural law (liber die wissenschaft-
lichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts (1802-3), he deals 
with and criticises in the first part the empirical, that is 
to say, the pre-Kantian, natural law. He rightly shows the 
dogmatic character of this natural law, especially in the in­
stance of Hobbes1 theory of the state of nature„ This theory 
is dogmatic because only one factor, be it impulse or human 
will, makes absolute, and from this, State and law are deduced; 
and because there is no criterion as to "where lies the fron­
tier between the incidental and the necessary, which must thus 
remain in the chaos of the natural state, or in the realm of 
human abstraction, and which has to be omitted". Hegel, how­
ever, uses an even stronger criticism of the critical natural 
law of Kant and Fichfce, of the divorce of legality and morali­
ty, and of Fichte's idea of the ephorate, which idea, however, 
Fichte later abandoned, as we have already seen,, The third 
part of this paper, the positive part, need not be dealt with 
here, as we have to consider it later in dealing with his 
Philosophy of Right. It is, however, decisive for the third 
part that private property and the State become the destiny 
1. "Wo die Grenze zwischen dem Zufalligen und Notwendigen 
gehe, was also im Chaos des Naturzustandes oder in der Ab~ 
straktion des Menschen bleiben und was weggelassen werden 
musse 
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of men, whereas still in 1798 Hegel praised the wisdom of 
the Solonic legislation, and saw in private property a per­
version of liberty. 
I. 
2 The decisive change in Hegel's theory begins in 1805. 
1. After that, the free will of man is the primary 
principle of the State. In his "System der Sittlichkeit" of 3 
1802, he still identified negative freedom, and crime. Now, 
however, the free man who realises himself appears as the 
fundamental maxim of the State. His is not the negative 
juridical conception of freedom which we find in Kant's system, 
but the philosophical conception. Man shall not only, as the 
Kantian ethic demands, emancipate himself from his desires; 
rather he shall fulfil them. In so far as Hegel bases the 
State upon the free will of men, he accepts the rationalist 
4 
principle of the natural law. Thus the individual man must 
not disappear within the State. "Free will reconciles all* 
And in this way the reconciliation takes place as well 
1. Rosenzweig, I, 159. 
2. Metzger, p. 302; Rosenzweig, I, p. 191: Lowenstein. p • 32 . 
3. "Schriften zu Politik und Rechtsphilosophie", p. 450. 
4. Lowenstein, p. 40. 
312 
through the individual advantage as through general interests. 
Individuality shall no longer be sacrificed."1 
Hegel, therefore, sets himself the same problem as 
did Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte; that is, the problem of how 
the individual will and the will of the State can be made 
identical; of how the State and individual liberty can be 
realised at one and the same time, and in the same spheres 
of life« We have already considered Rousseau's solution, 
which presupposes the fulfilment of certain political and 
economic conditions. Kant and Pichte transfer the solution — 
if any to the sphere of transcendence* 
Obviously such a synchronisation of the individual will 
with that of the State is possible only if the interests of 
all those men who found the State are parallel; that is to 
say if a certain homogeneity of interests is either given or 
guaranteed. 
2.For the solution of this problem, Hegel Introduces 
the second principle of the State, which one could perhaps 
g 
call Montesquieu's principle, that is, history, in which the 
objective spirit, the spirit of the people, realises itself. 
As against this objective spirit, the individuals are to some 
1. "Der freie Wille ist es, der alles vermittelt* Und so 
geschieht die Vermittlung ebenso gut durch den individuellen 
Vorteil wie durch allgemeine Interessen. Die IndividUftlitat 
soli nicht mehr aufgeopfert werden." Lectures on the Philoso­phy of History, p. 497. 
2. For Montesquieu's influence on Hegel, cf. Metzger. d»317 and Dilthey, pp. 8, 17, 31. ' ^ ' 
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extent accidentals. "Whether the individual exists or not, 
is a matter of indifference to the objective ethical order, 
which alone is steadfast# It is a power, by which the life 
1 
of individuals is ruled." The individual working for his 
own ends and his own interests furthers at the same time uni­
versal purposes. He acts not only for himself; not against 
"the order of the universe but for it; for It is the cunning 
of the Idea, that it allows the passions to work for it". 
In isolation the individual is nothing. The individual can 
enjoy his freedom only in the State. 
The conception of the spirit of the people is, however, 
not that of romanticism and of the historical school„ It is 
known that Hegel rejected both, and that he designated as 
barbarism the conception that men are governed by instincts, 
feelings, and customs, without a consciousness of whether 
3 
these are good or bad. The spirit of the people is a 
1. Ob das Individuum sei, gilt der objektiven Sittllch-
keit gleich, welche allein das Rleibende und die Macht 1st, 
durch welche das Leben der Indlviduen regiert wird." "Philoso­
phy of Right", section 145, addition. 
2. "Die Weltordnung, sondern fur sie, denn es 1st die 
List der Idee, dass sie die Leidenschaften fur sich wirken 
lasst." "Lectures on the Philosophy of History", p. 83. 
3. "Philosophy of Right", section 260. We should like 
to draw attention to an important observation of Metzger's, 
p. 313, note 1. Metzger points out that in 1007, in the first 
edition of the Encyclopedia, the people still played the 
principal role; and that it is only in Hegel's "Philosophy of 
Right" of 1821, that Is, after his removal to Berlin, that 
the people Is superseded by the State. Since this observation 
of Metzger's is undoubtedly true, the construction of the 
State from the two elements, freedom and the people, appears 
to be no longer possible. It cuts, however, at the root of 
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self-conscious moral substance (die selbst-bewusste sittlioiie 
Substanz). What that means, I do not know* I am not in a 
position rationally to understand this conception, I can only 
feel it. 
Kegel, however, meant by this and similar formulae to 
transcend the natural law, and the dissolution of t he State 
by natural law thinking. On the other hand, he clearly recog­
nised the historical significance of natural law« He saw in 
the struggle for the negative, juridical, freedom, by the 
natural law theory, a necessary historical process# Accord­
ingly the French Revolution appeared to him as a glorious 
1 
sunrise * 
Finally he arrives at the famous formula, "The State 
2 
is the realised ethical idea or ethical spirit". And "the 
ethical system is thus the conception of freedom, developed 
into a present world and also into the nature of selfcon-
3 
sciousness"« 
Lowenstein's interpretation, which, precisely on the ground 
of Hegel's conception of the people, sees in the State created 
by Bismarck an embodiment of the Hegelian idea* It appears, 
therefore, that Hegel does not apply the dialectical method 
to the construction of the State. The State is not deduced 
from the two moments: individual and people, as the moment 
people disappears in the "Philosophy of Right?, and is replaced 
by the State. It follows, therefore, that the State is a 
philosophical and political a priori concept. 
10 "Grundzuge", p. 928. 
2o "Der Staat ist die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Idee." 
"Philosophy of Right", section 257. 
3. "Der zur vorhandenen Welt und zur Natur des Selbstbe-
wusstsein3 gewordene Begriff der Frelhelt." "Philosophy 4f 
Right", section 142. 
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II. 
If I am unable rationally to understand the assertion 
of a coincidence of freedom and the spirit of the people in 
the State, just as little as I am able rationally to understand 
similar formulations in Kant, Fichte, and Rousseau, then it 
seems to me more fruitful to present the relation of liberty 
and State sovereignty in various instances. 
1. Starting from the conception of Roman Law, Hegel 
develops first the conception of the person, and reaches, in 
agreement with the natural law, the postulate of the legal 
equality of men. His postulate is "A person must give to his 
freedom an external sphere in order that he may reach the 
1 
completeness implied in the idea". To his repudiation of the 
separation of legality and morality, corresponds the intro­
duction of the philosophical conception of freedom into the 
postulate of the freedom of the person; so that his conception 
comprises both the juridical and the philosophical liberty. 
2• From these basic principles of liberty and the 
person, he deduces the theory of property. Each personal 
right is a property right, and only in and through property 
can the idea of the person be realised• Manifestly influenced 
by Adam Smith, he develops a cultural theory of property; use 
and labour, and not only possession and legal title, constitute 
1. "Die Person nruss sich eine aussere Sphare ihrer Frel-
heit geben, um als Idee zu sein." Section 41. 
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property. Thus the concept of property, just as that of the 
person, has a dual content: negatively, property confers 
rights of defence, and positively, rights of use, Hegel, 
therefore, implies in the notions of person and property a 
system of political and economic rights of freedom. "It is 
fully 1500 years since through the influence of Christianity 
the freedom of the person began to flourish, and at least in 
a small section of the human rank as an universal principle. 
But the recognition here and there of the principle of the 
1 
freedom of the property is, as it were, a thing of yesterday.-" 
Thus free property makes possible free initiative. 
One essential perception is, however, lacking; and in 
this Hegel is "behind the Physiocrats and Adam Smith. He lacks 
the perception that only equality of property makes free ini­
tiative possible for all; that only in a given state, one of 
equally distributed property, can sovereignty emerge from 
competition; and that only this state of equal property dis­
tribution guarantees the parallelism of individual wills* He 2 
himself rejects the postulate of equality. 
1. "Es 1st wohl an die anderthalbtausend Jahre, dass die 
Freiheit der Person durch das Christentum zu erbluhen ange-
fangen hat und unter einem ubrigens kleinen Teil des Menschen-
geschlechts allgemeines Prinzip geworden 1st. Die Freiheit 
des Eigentums aber 1st seit gestern, kann man sagen, hier und 
da als Prinzip anerkannt worden." "Philosophy of Right", 
section 62, note last paragraph. 
2« "Philosophy of Right", section 200. 
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Beside the postulate of freedom of property, and In 
connection with It, there stand those of freedom of trade, 
of contract, of religion, of the press, and of the equal ac-
oess of all to all publlo offioes•> He even demands the recog­
nition of the rights of minorities, suoh as the right of con-
-1, 
scientlous objection for the Quakers. These political and 
economic liberties are, however, not oonoeived as existing 
before the State; they are only granted by the State. They 
are for Hegel products of a historical prooess, ohlldren of 
2 
the civil society. In long disoussiona, he explains that 
freedom does not mean freedom to do, and especially to write, 
what one wants; "These views belong to the undeveloped orudity 
3 
and superficiality of fanoyful theorising". Rather, freedom 
implies restraint. The State limits freedom, and action 
against the State before Courts or administrative tribunals 
was to him unthinkable; so that a guarantee for the rights 
of freedom Is only given if the interests of the State and 
those of the oivil society are identioal. If they diverge, 
the same dilemma occurs as in all rational theoriesj the 
State either abolishes the rights of freedom, or the civil 
society abolishes the State. 
1. "Philosophy of Right", section 270, note. 
2. Esp. "Philosophy of Right", section 319, note. 
3. "denn solches Reden gehort der noch ganz ungebildeten 
Rohelt und Oberflachlichkelt des Vorstellens an." 
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III. 
1. Here we are faced with the theory of the civil 
society. This civil society is distinct from the State. It 
is the society which the individual enters after having left 
the family* It is "the realm of difference, intermediate 
1 
between the family and the State" • The notion of the civil 
society is thus a historical conception. It denotes the 
society which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centur­
ies, especially in England and Prance, after the collapse of 
the mediaeval order. 
The civil society is the society of egoism; "but it is 
an egoism, however, which through the interdependence of social 
men "becomes a link in the working of society itself, "The 
individuals in the civic communities are private persons, who 
pursue their own interests, as these interests are occasioned 
by the universal, which appears as a means, they can be ob­
tained only in so far as individuals in their desire, will 
and conduct, conform to the universal and become a link in 
2 
the chain of the whole." 
1. "die Differenz, welche zwischen die Familie und. den 
Staat tritt." Section 182, addition. 
2. "Die Individuen sind als Burger dieses Staats Privat-
personen, welche ihr eigenes Interesse zu ihrem Zwecke haben. 
Da dieser durch das Allgemeine vermittelt ist, das ihnen 
somit als Mlttel erscheint, so kann er von ihnen nur erreicht 
werden, insofern sie selbst ihren Willen, Wollen, Tun auf 
allgemeine Weise bestimmen und sich zu einem Gliede in der 
Kette dieses Zusammenhanges machen." "Philosophy of Right", 
section 187. 
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The civil society has three functions; the satisfac­
tion of needs in a society based upon division of labour, 
"the recanting of want and the satisfaction of the individual 
through his work, through the work of all others and through 
the satisfaction of their wants"; the realisation of the 
necessary freedom by protection of property and the adminis­
tration of Justice; and finally the necessary intervention 
in such freedom against possible mischances, and care for the 
common interests by means of police and corporation. 
The civil society is, like that of Kant's theory, a 
society of private law, having as its main function the pro­
tection of property. Work is sacred. "Industry and trade 
have now become moral." "Through the dependence and co­
operation involved in labour, subjective self-seeking is con­
verted into a contribution towards the satisfaction of wants 
of all others. The universal so penetrates the particular 
by its dialectic movement, that the individual, while acquir­
ing, producing, and enjoying for himself, at the same time 
g produces and acquires for the enjoyment of others." This 
1. "Die Industrie und Gewerbe sind nunmehr sittlich 
geworden. 'Lectures on the Philosophy of History", p. 888. 
*21 "inJ4eser Abhangigkeit und Gegenseitigkelt der Arbeit und der Befriedigung der Bedurfnisse schlagt die subjektive 
Selbstsucht in den Beitrag zur Befriedigung der Bedurfnisse 
aller Anderen um — in die Vermittlung des besonderen durch 
das allgemeine als dialektischer Bewegung, sodass indem leder 
fur sich erwirbt, produziert und geniesst, er eben damit fur 
den Genuss der TJbrigen produziert und erwirbt." "Philosoohv of Right", section 199. 
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theory placea Hogel among the true harmonlata such an the 
Physiocrats and Adam Smith. Ho himself often apeaka with 
approval of Adam Smith, Joan-Haptlate Say, and David Rlowrdo. 
2. Society is divided into eatatea aooordlng to the 
activities of man. But this estate order, which he proclaims 
in his Philosophy of Right, has praotloally no connection 
with the mediaeval order of estates. Hogel not only recognlson 
free access to professions, but expressly demands it. The 
first estate, the universal estate, comprises officials, 
teachers, and officers; the second and third, peasants and 
trades respectively. Ho does not recognise a fourth estate 
of dependent workers. Obviously the phenomenon of poverty 
did not escape his notice; he even saw that acciwnulatlon of 
g 
riches on the one side produces poverty on the other. He 
had even seen tho phenomenon of the replacement of men by 
machinery; and he acclaimed this process, because he saw In 
it the progress of history. He objected to the unhlstorlool. 
conception of the natural law, which praised the happy etato 
of nature which had been destroyed by the civil society. 
Hegel has even boon callod the founder of modern Uerman econ-
3 
omic theory; but concede^ to the fourth estate of workers 
1. Rosenzwelg, II, pp. 120-1. 
2. "Philosophy of Right", sections 244, 263. 
3. Vogel, p. 107. 
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a place in his system of estates he could not. Had he done 
so, he would not have been able to construct the State; for 
it cannot be too often repeated, that such a rational con­
struction of the State is only possible if harmony of the in­
terests of all those groups which form the State is presup­
posed. To introduce the fourth estate into his system with­
out abandoning this presupposition, it would have been neces­
sary to accept the proposition that the interests of dependent 
workers and those of landed property and capital are identical* 
This assumption, however, he could not make without doing 
violence to reality; consequently, the fourth estate is missing. 
What remains is his belief in the identity of interest of the 
other three estates, from whose competition and collaboration 
sovereignty emerges. The centre of gravity lies so essentially 
in the first estate, that in reality this universal estate of 
the bureaucracy and army becomes the bearer of the State, and 
1 
the realisation of the ethical will. 
3. This civil society, based upon property, freedom 
of contract, and freedom of trade, is guaranteed as to its 
fundamental institutions and supplementary liberties by the 
legal order. The law serves to punish injuries to property, 
2 
and to ensure undisturbed personal security. The passage 
1. Poster, p. 160. 
2. "Philosophy of Right", section 230. 
322 
in section 188 of his Philosophy of Right, in which he enumer­
ates the three elements of the civil society, shows very 
clearly that he considers private property to be the principal 
institution, whereas the liberties are regarded as supplement­
ary; that is, as serving the institution of property. Conse­
quently "right enters into being only because it is serviceable 
for wants". The law is general, irrespective of whether it 
is statutory or customary. For "the right of the subject to 
economic freedom is secured by the condition that the determina­
tion of law by reason shall stop short of the particular de-
2 
tail of execution". The generality of the law is in his 
view the essential guarantee of freedom* But he gives the 
preference to statutory law, so as to exclude arbitrary deci-
3 
sions of the Judges. The only Law is positive Law emanating 
from the authority of the State, (section 212). The adminis­
tration of justice is the bringing of a concrete case under 
the general norm, (section 214). But this is not all; the 
activity of the judge is not merely the activity of a machine, 
(section 211, addition). Even the will of the Judge, controlled 
1. "doch nur in Existenz, well es nutlich fur die Be-
durfnisse", "Philosophy of Right", section 209, addition. 
2. Foster, p. 121. 
3. Here — section 211 — he criticises the English Common 
Law, but rightly observes that the Common Law is written law. 
Here is also to be found the criticism of Savigny and the 
defence of Thibaut, without mention of their names. 
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by positive law, has decisive significance, (section 214). 
The Courts must be independent. They must administer the 
law "without the subjective instigation of private interest". 
Considerations of equity must find no place in the decisions 
of the judges, (section 223). The administration of Justice 
must be publicly carried out, (section 224). 
4. This society, based upon property, freedom of con­
tract, and of trade, and protected by the legal order, must, 
however, be subject to State interference in such matters as 
the war against crime, (section 232), the repulsing of dis­
turbances of the external order, and so on. This is the task 
of the police, (section 231), which also has authority to 
create the external conditions for the functioning of free 
competition by lighting the streets, building bridges and 
roads, and taking measures for the protection of public health, 
(section 236, addition). The police has the further task of 
keeping in check poverty, (section 241), which grows through 
the accumulation of capital. Consequently checks must be 
provided, and the country must be colonised,, The corporations, 
which,together with the family, constitute the moral root of 
the State, (section 255) are to unite the estates and undertake 
1. "ohne die subjektive Empfindung des besonderen Inter-
esses", (section 219). 
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the care of their members« They are, however, not autonomous 
bodies, but are under the control of the State, (section 255, 
addition). Police and corporations are thus corrective and 
supplementary institutions of free competition. 
IV. 
Individuals, the family, corporations, the oivil society 
— this is the sequence which leads to the State. 
1. The State is distinct from the civil sooiety, which 
Is only one of its elements, as Hegel repeatedly emphasises. 
The State has an existence of its own# In the State as an 
Idea the antagonisms of needs are solved in a higher sphere. 
The State as an Idea stands above the civil society. The 
family and society are the two structures in which man lives, 
and through which he prepares himself for the State. But 
in reality it is true that the only bearer of the State is 
1 
the civil society. The civil society is not only one element 
of the State; it is in truth the State. It subordinates it, 
makes it its servant. According to Hegel, the State is in 
relation to the family and civil society a higher power, for 
both shall be subordinated to it, but at the same time the 
State is their "indwelling end", (section 261). It goes 
without saying that the State does not rest on a contract. 
1. Rosenzweig, II, p. 154. 
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Its subjective basis is patriotism, (section 268), that is 
to say the free consent of the citizens; because, in the 
spirit of Freiherr von Stein's thought, genuine patriotism 
can only grow out of free consent. It is possible also that 
the historical example of England may have been effective. 
English democracy, as against French absolutism, had shown 
that an efficient organisation of State activity is possible 
also in a State dependent on free consent; and that it can be 
successful even in great wars. The French revolutionary wars 
had confirmed this experience, and taught that patriotism is 
indissolubly bound to liberty. 
The State 13 the organisation of the general Interests 
of society through the medium of its particular Interests. 
One could perhaps formulate in this way the Hegelian theory of 
the State, (section 270, addition). 
2. Hegel adheres to the principle of the separation 
of powers as a guarantee of freedom, (seotion 272)• But this 
distinction between the three powers must never lead to their 
estrangement, any more than it is the meaning of the principle 
that the three powers should be mutually restrictive; for this 
would lead in his view to the destruction of the State. Thus 
for him the unity of the purposes of the State is of decisive 
importance; and distinction between the powers is for him as 
for Max Weber only a necessary consequence of the increasing 
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complexity of State activity. The three powers are the legls~ 
lative, that is, "the power to fix and establish the universal; 
the executive, that is, "the power which brings particular 
spheres and individual cases under the universal"; and the 
monarchical, the power of final decision — "In this function 
the other two are brought into an individual unity* It is at 
once the culmination and beginning of the whole. This is a 
1 constitutional monarchy". 
3. This formulation could lead us to conclude that 
Hegel identifies sovereignty of the State with sovereignty of 
the State organs; this, however, is not the case, as section 
279 shows. "The monarch is not sovereign: only the State is 
sovereign; but sovereignty is monarchical: the sovereign 
2 
State demands the monarchical individual." Thus the power 
of the State Is identified with that of the prince; for the 
monarchical power has, as section 276 shows, received all the 
moments of totality. It comprises the right to promulgate 
general norms as well as to issue individual decisions. We 
may be spared the extremely complicated justification of this 
1. "die Gewalt, das Allgemeine zu bestlmmen und festzu-
setzen"; "die Subsumptlon der besonderen Spharen und elnzelnen 
falle unter das Allgemeine"; "in der die unterschiedenen 
Gewalten zur Individuellen Einheit zusammengefasst sind, die 
also die Spitze rand der Anfang des Ganzen — der konstitu-
tionellen Monarchie 1st". (Section 273.) 
2. Rosenzweig, II, p. 144. 
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theory. The decisive point is that sovereignty does not mean 
only the right to Issue general norms, but also individual 
decisions; and that these can only be made by a person. 
4. In Hegel's theory no institutional limits to the 
exercise of monarchical sovereignty are to be found. For If 
the State is integrated by the monarchy, If the majesty of 
the monarch is the sole guarantee of unity, then limitations 
of the power of the monarch are inconceivable« Here in reality 
is the key to Hegel's theory. By the rationally unproved 
identity of the "ethical will ... with the will of the ruler" 
it becomes true that "the State Is the necessary condition of 
its exercise, but it will be true also that its exercise is 
confined to a limited body of men. In their will alone abso­
lute Sittlichkeit will be realised and the possession of this 
freedom and the realisation of this Sittlichkeit will presup­
pose the existence of another body of men excluded from par-
1 
ticipation in either. Neither property nor political freedom 
nor the postulate that the State rules through general norms 
constitute in Hegel's system limitations of the monarchical 
power, although he himself asserts the existence of a subject­
ive limitation in the conscience of the ruler, and an object­
ive one in law and the constitution, (section 286). But the 
1. Foster, p. 162. 
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content of the law is itself determined by the sovereign. To 
this power of the monarch belongs the right of pardon, (section 
284), the right to appoint officials, (section 285), and the 
right to issue commands to subordinate officials, (section 284). 
5. In contrast to the monarchical power which is de­
cisive, the executive power has merely to apply already es­
tablished decisions of the monarch. Its function is adminis­
trative, (section 287). The monarchical and the executive 
power stand to each other in the relation of actes gouverne-
mentaux to actes administratifs• The function of the executive 
embraces the administration of justice. Government and the 
administration of justice both involve the application of 
norms. In this, Hegel is distinguished from Montesquieu, 
who knew no internal administration, as his attention was 
centred upon England where internal administration was con­
centrated in Parliament and therefore did not present itself 
to him as a distinct function. Hegel, however, had the 
Prussian bureaucracy before his eyes, and therefore, as we 
have already shown, and as sections 290-294 prove, bureaucracy 
as the first and universal estate plays a decisive role in 
his construction of the State. Only the bureaucracy can 
guarantee the freedom of the citizens. This assertion proves 
the sureness of Hegel's historical insight. Legality of ad­
ministration is guaranteed, not by the right of resistance, 
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but by permanent institutions such, as the bureaucracy; and 
the interaction which, in spite of their separation, takes 
place between the State and the civil society. This guarantee 
is strengthened by the distinction between the three powers, 
(section 290), and by self-government, (section 295). Self-
1 
government "supplements from below the control from above". 
6. The merging of civil society and State takes place 
in the sphere of legislation as well as in that of self-gov­
ernment. Legislation is the creation of general norms, that 
is to say, of "those internal affairs, whose content is uni-2 
versal". As for foreign policy, its conduct on the basis of 
general norms appears to him impossible,(sections 521, 322), 
and here he is in agreement with Locke« The definition of 
general norms is a true liberal one — interferences with 
liberty and property — as may be gathered from the very com­
plicated section 299. They create duties and rights. 
Legislation does not rest with a parliament; he knows 
no parliament. He always repudiated universal and equal suf­
frage, precisely because parliament considers the citizens 
only as isolated atoms. His praise of the system of estates, 
which in relation to the legislative process have only an 
1. "die in das einzelne Benehmen nicht reichende Kontrolle 
von oben, von unten erganzt", section 295. 
2. "ihrem Inhalt nach ganz allgemeinen inneren Angelegen-
heiten", section 321. 
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advisory function, is well-known. He is conscious that, "by 
the recognition of such advisory rights for the estates of 
the State is drawn into the civil society, (section 311)« 
For the estate of landed proprietors is Ma support at once 
to the throne and to the community", (section 307). The third 
estate comprises the "fluctuating side of the civic community". 
V. 
1. In Hegel's system two elements can he disceraed: 
the rational Justification of the State on the one hand, and 
history as a datum on the other, that is to say the coercive 
machinery of the State as represented by the monarch and the 
bureaucracy. His rational arguments are not carried to their 
logical conclusion. "Hegel is guilty of indecision, in ex­
plaining the philosophy as the existence of the Absolute 
Spirit, and at the same time refusing to allow himself to 
accept the real philosophic-individual as the Absolute Spirit." 
Freedom of the citizens is guaranteed neither by the 
right of resistance, nor "by admission to a share in political 
power, nor by the separation of powers. Protection is trans­
ferred exclusively to the civil society, which by its free 
consent justifies the State. 
1. "Hegel macht sich einer ... Halbheit schuldig ..., 
indem er die Philosophie fur das Dasein des absoluten Geistes 
erklart und sich zugleich dagegen verwehrt, das wirkliche 
philosophische Individuum fur den absoluten Geist zu erklaren." Karl Marx, "Die Heilige Familie", 6. "Kapitel", la. 
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Thus Hegel's conception of the State is not that 
of the Machtstaat (as it is presented by Heller); and this 
neither with regard to the internal nor to the external policy 
of the State. Even if the decision of the monarch is consid­
ered to be the constitutive element of the State, the tcemnants 
of natural law are still preserved intact# As far as foreign 
policy is concerned, Hegel never glorifies war, as is shown 
especially by his criticism of Haller, (section 258). He re­
jects Machiavellian methods in foreign policy, and emphasises 
the importance of keeping international treaties, (section 333). 
If he expresses the view that war is the last resort for a 
decision as between States, (section 334), and rejects the 
Kantian assertion of the possibility of eternal peace, (section 
333, note), he rendered to the science of politics a far great­
er service than did Kant, because he recognised the forces 
driving towards war, and unlike Kant, did not veil them. 
His Ideal State was, as has been shown definitely by 
1 
Franz Rosenzweig, the Prussian State of the reforms of Freiherr 
von Stein. Liberation of the peasants, freedom of trade, 
local self-government, the recognition of the existence of a 
bourgeoisie, with the correctives of corporations and police; 
these were the foundations of the State which he accepted as 
2 
obvious. Rudolph Haym has already drawn attention to the fact 
that Hegel's State could appeal to Stein and Humbolt. 
1. Rosenzweig, ii, p. 161 ff. 
2» Rudolf Haym, p. 391. 
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2. His solution of the problem of a synthesis of 
liberty and sovereignty, of the rights of men and the State, 
depends, therefore, on a series of assumptions which must be 
analysed briefly. 
a) The first, a philosophical, problem, is how far 
the dialectic philosophy of history is compatible with the 
assertion that the State is the realisation of the ethical 
idea. It is only possible because for Hegel history ends 
with the attainment of the "modern" epoch, Just as for the 
Marxist theory history ends with the realisation of the class­
less society. 
b) Identity of liberty and the State is only possible 
if the interests of the civil society and of the State, that 
is to say of the monarch and the bureaucraoy on the one hand, 
and of landed property, industry, and trade, on the other, 
are basically identicalo This in turn presupposes that the 
civil society itself has a common and united interest# Hegel 
assumes this# For him, as a harmonist who has studied and 
accepted Adam Smith and J.B. Say, the competitors who pursue 
their own interests realise, by virtue of a world plan, the 
common interest# The Hegelian theory, in its acceptance of 
an identity of the interests of landed proprietors and of 
industry and trade, Is pre-Ricardlan; and it implies that no 
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account is taken of the existence of a working class as a 
social and political reality. 
It is true that the problem of the fourth estate did 
not in Hegel's time present any difficulty; "but an identity 
of the interests of landed proprietors and industry and trade 
within the civil society certainly did not exist. 
3. If one accepted the Hegelian theory of the State 
without reference tc the two assumptions upon which it is. 
based, it could become a weapon in the hand of reaction, and 
could be transformed into the theory of the Machtstaat which 
it has become. It is undoubtedly true that Hegel himself is 
guilty of this interpretation. In the preface to his Philoso­
phy of Right, June 25, 1820, he praised the Prussian State; 
the State of broken promises, of disappointed hopes; a State 
which cared nothing for free institutions» One cannot excuse 
Hegel on the ground that he was not realist enough to recog-
1 
nise the true character of the Prussian State. At all events, 
his theory served first the State of the Restoration, and 
afterwards that of Bismarck. It was made to serve the cause 
of absolutism, as the young Hegelians already observed* But 
his conception could just as easily become the revolutionary 
theory of Marxism, if one took into account the existence of 
the fourth Estate of workers, and proves the theory of the 
harmonists to be a false doctrine. This has been done by 
Marxism. 
1, As does Lowenstein, p. 62. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Totalitarian State's Criticism of 
the Liberal theory of Law 
It belongs to the commonest tricks of a certain type 
of political science to confront the idea of one type of 
State with the reality of another; to confront the ideology 
of a political idea with the sociology of an antagonistic 
theory. We do not assert that this trick is always consciously 
applied; very often it is applied with such nonchalance that 
it might be supposed that the authors are quite unconscious 
of the inadmissibility of such proceedings. In this way, 
Italian Fascism confronts the idea of the corporate State 
with the reality of liberal capitalism; National Socialism, 
the idea of a leadership State with the alleged sociology of 
Parliamentary democracy; Bolshevism, the idea of the Soviet 
system with the sombre reality of bourgeois democracy. This 
is not only done in pamphlets published by the propaganda 
ministeries of the countries concerned, but it is part of the 
habitual equipment of their theorists. Victories won by such 
methods are easily won. The beautiful and enticing pictures 
painted of the proffered State theory appear of course prefer­
able to a conception of the State whose functioning is depicted 
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in the darkest colours. This struggle with unequal weapons 
is as regards the public always won "by the stronger weapon, 
the more if this Utopia is helped forward by more or less 
gentle coercion. 
It must be obvious for a science of politics that an 
idea can only be confronted with an idea, and a reality only 
with another reality. 
The outstanding example of the above type of pseudo-
science of politics is the fight of the present-day German 
political science against liberalism and democracy and for 
the Ideology of the national socialist leadership State. In 
spite of the diversity of conceptions of the constitutive 
elements of the national socialist ideology, there exists a 
complete harmony of the whole of German political science 
with regard to the wickedness of liberalism and democracy. 
Hundreds of pamphlets and works which have only the remotest 
connection with politics paint the devilish picture of liberal 
democracy, very often only to procure for themselves an alibi 
towards the new master. 
Prom the abundance of the National Socialist pamphlets 
and works only a few specimens of the vilification of liberal­
ism and democracy shall be given here. "The blood rises 
against formal reason, the race against rational purposive 
action, honour against profit, union (Blndung) against arbi­
trariness which is called liberty, organic totality against 
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individualistic dissolution, readiness to fight (Wehrhaftlg;-
keit) against bourgeois security, politics against the 
supremacy of economy, State against society, people against 
individual and mass." This quotation from the pamphlet of 
the philosopher Ernst Krieck, the successor of Heinrich Rickert, 
can be regarded as an epitome of the National Socialist criti­
cism of the liberal system. All other criticism concerns 
certain specific phenomena of the liberal system, its economic 
theory, its theory of society, and its conception of the State 
and of the law. 
2 The liberal State is considered to be "neutral", 
3 "negative", a "fictitious State, a mere machinery, and Lassade's 
description of the liberal State as a night-watchman State is 
4 
now generally admitted. This negative State is alleged to be 
5 
without substance, without the capacity to reach decisions, 
unable to determine whether anything is good or bad, beautiful 
or ugly, just or unjust. Liberalism is a mere degeneration 
of the idea of freedom. It leads to anarchy. It is dissolv­
ing, materialistic, and this applies also to Marxian socialism, 
1. "Nationalpolitische Erziehung", 1933, p. 68. 
2. Ernst Forsthoff, "Der totale Staat", Hamburg, 1933,p.13. 
3. "Der totale Staat", p. 14. 
4. Hans Gerber, "Staatsrechtliche Grundlagen des neuen 
Reichs", Tubingen, 1933, p. 16. 
5. Etwa Ernst Rudolf Huber, "Die Totalitat des volklschen 
Staats" in "Die Tat", 1934, Heft 1, p. 30. 
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which Is considered, to be a mere variety of liberalism# De~ 
1 
mocracy Is the rule of the unorganised mass. It knows no 
people, but only a mass of Robinson Crusoes. Fundamentally, 
democracy is without political domination, or the domination 
2 
is anonymous. The principle of democracy is that of the 
3 
"direct counting of noses". Parliament is the Stage for 
unrestricted competition, for the most naked battle of inter­
ests, for the hunger for power. It is dominated by pluralistic 
4 private organisations. The law of liberalism is mechanistic. 
5 
It serves only private interests. It is merely static. Under 
the influence of Franz von Liszt, crime has been regarded as 
a mere natural phenomenon. The penal code has been regarded 
6 
as the Magna Charta of the criminal. Fundamentally liberalism 
and law are mutually exclusive. Their alliance is only based 
7 
upon necessity. The judge is only a machine for the adminis­
tration of justice. The liberal theory of the State and law 
1« Julius Binder, "Der Deutsche Volks3taat", Tubingen, 
1934, p. 17. 
2. Otto Koellreuter, "Vom Sinn und Wesen der nationalen 
Revolution", Tubingen, 1933, p. 17. 
3. Dr. von Leers (Deutsche Hochschule fur Politik), in 
the Introduction to Karl Lohmarm,"Hitlers Staatsauffassung", 
Berlin, 1933, p. 10. 
4. Carl Schmitt, "Huter der Verfassung", Tubingen, 1931. 
5. Friedrich Schaffstein, "Politische Strafrechtswissen-
schaft", Hamburg, p. 8. 
6. a.a.O. p. 9. 
7. Heinrich Lange, "Liberalismus, Nationalsozialismus 
und burgerliches Recht", Tubingen, 1933, p. 5. 
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has been created especially under the Influence of "racially 
1 
alien" theorists (artfremder Theoretlker). The State of 
the Weimar Constitution is described as a State of pluralistic 
parties. Trade Unions and Masters' organisations; Churches 
and political parties; the federal States; the policracy, 
that is to say, the domination of the public works undertaken 
by the State; and the State bureaucracy; all shared in the 
exercise of State power. This is only a very modest selection 
from National Socialist criticism of the essence and function 
of liberalism and parliamentary democracy. Both appear as 
monsters whose — negative — force is considered to be so 
powerful that it has corrupted all ideas and all institutions. 
This negative Leviathan has ruined all German racial institu­
tions and ideas. 
1. Carl Schmitt, "Staat, Bewegung, Vollf, Hamburg, 1933, 
p. 13. Schmitt means F.J. Stahl and Hugo Preuss, creator of 
the Weimar Constitution, and Carl Schmitt's predecessor In 
the chair of constitutional law in the Handelshochschule. 
Berlin. Carl Schmitt raised a beautiful memorial to him in 
a speech which has also been published as a pamphlet (Carl 
Schmitt: Hugo Preuss, sein Staatsbegrlff und seine Stellung 
in der deutschen Staatslehre, Tubingen 1930) . I quote two 
paragraphs showing how Carl Schmitt changed his opinion of 
Hugo Preuss, the "racially alien" theorist, — who by the way 
was the favourite disciple of Otto von Gierke — after Hitler's 
access to power. In his speech on Preuss, Schmitt praised the 
"independent spirit of a man whose life and work have proved 
the connection of free bourgeois education with the Constitu­
tion of the State", and he continued: "the history of the 
German bourgeoisie shows that this connection Is not incidental 
but essential, and the fate of the German intelligentsia and 
education will therefore be Inseparably linked with the fate 
of the Weimar Constitution'*. (My Italics.) 
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These attacks are by no means new* They arc as old as 
liberalism and democracy. But what distinguishes Pasolsts 
j 4 
Catholic counter-revolutionaries fromj Marxian Socialists 
is the universality and the vehemence of the attaoks against 
liberalism, and especially the fact that Fascism completely 
denies any degree of liberty; whereas Marxian socialism at 
least believes in the restoration of liberty in a classless 
society. One has only to read for instance the criticism of 
1 Donoso Cortes, the Spanish Catholio counter-revolutionary. 
"Dissolution of all continuity, of honour and glory, destruc­
tion of love for family and home, finally oomplete annihila­
tion of the family and the nation. Neither family nor nation 
can exist, and can as little be understood, without the con­
nection with past and future, without the bond of honour and 
glory, and without that great dual love, love for the home 
ft 
and for the father's house, which are the two firm bases. 
That is the picture whloh the Spanish counter-revolutionary 
gives of liberalism and of Proudhon's socialism. 
We have, therefore, to restate the liberal theory of 
society of the law and the state. 
1* Quoted from the new German edition executed by Ludwlg 
Fischer, "Der Staat Gottes", Karlsruhe, 1933, p. 293. 
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A. THE RECHTSSTAAT AND THE RULE OF LAV/1 
(The Problem Stated) 
I* The German Theory of the Rechtsstaat. 
The legal form of a system "based upon political and 
economic freedom differs in Germany and in England. The 
specific German phenomenon is the so-called Rechtsstaat> The 
specific English creation is the unison of the two notions of 
the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law. 
1. Otto Bahr, "Der Rechtsstaat", 1864. J.C. Bluntschli, 
"Allgemeine Staatslehre", 6th edition, 1886, vol. I. 
A.V• Dicey, "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution", 8th edition, London, 1915* "Lectures on the 
Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during 
the Nineteenth Century", 2nd edition, London. John Dickinson, 
"Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United 
States", Cambridge (Mass.), 1927. Peter Drucker, "Friedrich 
Julius Stahl", Tubingen, 1933. Fritz Fleiner, "Institutionen 
des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts", 8th edition, Tubingen, 1928. 
Rudolf Gneist, "Der Rechtsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichte 
(in Deutschland", 2nd edition, Berlin, 1879. Hermann Heller, 
Bechtsstaat oder Diktatur?" Tubingen, 1930. C.G. Haines, 
"The Revival of Natural Law Concepts", Cambridge (Mass.),1930> 
"The American Doctrine of Hudicial Supremacy", 2nd edition, 
Berkeley, 1932. W. Ivor Jennings, "The Law and the Constitu­
tion", London, 1933. Harold J. Laski, "The State in Theory 
and Practice", London, 1935. Gerhard Masur, "Friedrich Julius 
Stahl, "Geschichte seines Lebens 1802-1830", 1930. Otto Mayer, 
"Deutsche Verwaltungsrecht", 3rd edition, Munich and Leipsic, 
1924. Robert von Mohl, "Geschichte der Literatur der Staats-
wissenschaften", vol. I, 1855; "Encyklopadie", Tubingen, 1859; 
"Politik", vol. I, Tubingen, 1862. Franz Neumann, "Koalitions-
freiheit und Reichsverfassung, Die Stellung der Gewerkschaften 
im Verfassungssystem", Berlin, 1932. Dietrich Schindler, 
"tJber den Rechtsstaat in Festgabe fur Max Hubert", Zurich, 1934. 
Carl Schmitt, "Verfassungslehre", Munich and Leipsic, 1926. 
Friedrich Julius Stahl, "Die Philosophie des Rechts", vol.11, 
"Rechts- und Staatslehre auf der Grundlage christlicher Welt­
anschauung", 3rd edition, Heidelberg, 1856. Lorenz von Stein, 
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By Rechtsstaat. two different things can toe understood. 
For the pure science of law every State is a Rechtsstaat, be 
it democracy or dictatorship, "be it a Fascist or a Bolshevist 
State. Even absolute monarchy and Fascist dictatorship are 
Rechtsstaaten. since they become objects of the pure theory 
of law only because we are compelled to conceive of the un­
limited power of the monarch or of the dictator as derived 
from a basic norm« In this sense the idea of the Rechtsstaat 
1 
is interpreted by Laski: "But the idea of a Rechtsstaat is 
a purely conceptual notion. It is a category of essence and 
not of reality. It makes the rulers of the state bound by 
the law they make; but it still leaves them free, through the 
use of the appropriate organs, to make the law. The Hitlerite 
state, equally with that of Great Britain or France or Czecho­
slovakia Is a Rechtsstaat in the sense that dictatorial power 
has been transferred to the Fuhrer by the legal order.... The 
idea of a Rechtsstaat is always qualified by the fact that 
the state is able, through its sovereignty, to change the sub­
stance of the law". Such a conception of the Rechsstaat makes 
"Rechtsstaat und Verwaltungsrechtspflege"ln Zeitschrift fur 
das Privat- und offentliche Recht, herausgegeben von Grunhut, 
vol. 6 (1879), p. 399 ff. Richard Thoma, "Rechtsstaatsidee 
und Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft" in Jahrbuch des offentlichen 
Rechts (1910), IV, p. 196. C. Th. Welcker, article "Staats-
verfassung" in Rotteck-Welcker, "Staatslexikon", vol. XV, 1843. 
1, Laski, "The State in Theory and Practice", pp. 177-178. 
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it possible for us to make every phenomenon called State the 
subject of normative jurisprudence. Such a conception is 
neither right nor wrong; it is simply meaningless. 
Prom a historical point of view, the notion of the 
Rechtsstaat is a political one, and therefore, like every 
political conception, a polemical one. The word itself, but 
1 
not the substance, is, according to Rudolph Gneist, due to 2 
Robert von Mohl. Lorenz von Stein already declared: "For 
it is clear that properly speaking there is no State without 
law. In a certain sense, every State is a Rechtsstaat. We, 
3 
however, attach a special meaning to this word". 
We must, therefore, first determine clearly this special 
meaning. The notion of the Rechtsstaat appears already com­
pleted in the Kantian system. The Rechtsstaat is the creation 
of the bourgeoisie as an economically rising but politically 
stagnant class. This class identifies its State with the 
State as such, and thereby denies the character of Rechtsstaat 
to every other State, characterising it as a non-Rechtsstaat. 
even as a State of wrong (Unrechtsstaat). 
The essence of the Rechtsstaat consists in the divorce 
of the political structure of the State from its legal organi­
sation, which alone, that is to say independently of the 
1. Rudolf Gneist, a.a.O. p. 333, Arun. 2. 
2. Robert von Mohl, "Geschichte der Literatur der Staats-
wissenschafterf', vol. 1, p. 296 ff. 
3. Lorenz von Stein, "Rechtsstaat und Verwaltungsrechts-
pflege", p. 350. 
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political structure, is to guarantee freedom and security. 
In this separation consists the difference between the German 
Rechtsstaat and the English doctrine of the relation between 
the supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law. 
The Rechtsstaat is, therefore, not the specific legal 
form of democracy, but it is neutral as regards the political 
structure. This radical separation of the form of the State 
from the legal structure is completed in the work of Priedrich 
Julius Stahl: "The State is to be a Rechtsstaat; that is the 
watchword, and expresses what is in reality the trend of modern 
developement• It shall exactly define and inviolably secure 
the direction and the limits of its operations, as well as 
the sphere of freedom of its citizens, by means of law; thus 
it shall realise directly nothing but that which belongs to 
the sphere of law. This is the conception of the Rechtsstaat, 
and not that the State shall only apply the legal order with­
out administrative aims, or even only secure the rights of 
the individuals. It signifies above all not the aim and 
content of the State, but only the method and the nature of 
1 their realisation". It is characteristic that not only the 
liberals such as Rudolf Gnelst, Lorenz von Stein, and Otto 
Bahr reached this formulation, but even Stahl, the author of 
the Christian conservative theory of the State; and that 
1. Friedrich Julius Stahl: "Rechts- und Staatslehre", 
3rd edition, vol. II, p. 137. 
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1 2 Gneist as well as Bahr gave to it his assent. The postulate 
that the State has to have the character of a Rechtsstaat was 
developed by Stahl in a series of biting polemics against de 
Maistre and Bonald, in a criticism culminating in a denial 
3 
that the monarch is the representative of God on earth, and 
ending with the statement that the monarch "may not rule against 
the law, but only through the medium of the bureaucracy, and 
4 
only with representation of the people11. It may be noted 
that Stahl, who had been appointed to Hegel's chair in Berlifa 
University in order to combat Hegel's influence, himself shows 
clearly in this formulation the influence of the Hegelian 
philosophy of law. Similar formulations are to be found in 
Otto Bahr's work. According to him, a Rechtsstaat is given 
if the postulate is fulfilled that the State makes the law 
the fundamental condition of its existence, and that all life 
within its boundaries, of the individual as well as of the 
State in relation to its members, must move within the limits 
of the law, "In the realisation of the law the State realises 
5 
the first germ of its own Idea." For Rudolf Gneist, a State 
is a Rechtsstaat if it fulfils four conditions: everyone 
must know exactly his duties; no citizen must bear more burdens 
1. Rudolf Gneist, a.a.O., p. 33. 
2. Otto Bahr, ibid., pp. 1-2. 
3. Cf. Masur, ibid., p. 211. 
4. Friedrich Julius Stahl, "Recbtsphilosophie", vol.II,p.88. 
5. Otto Bahr, a.a.O., pp. 2, 5. 
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than his fellows; private law must carry out the protection 
of the person and of property insistently, jealously, and 
energetically in the various spheres of its functioning; and 
finally, the relation between citizen and State must be sub-
1 
ject to the control of administrative tribunals. 
This praise of the idea of the Rechtsstaat, which in 
Welcker's words belongs to the highest grade of culture, be­
longs as has been shown by Dietrich Schindler, to the period 
of early liberalism. In this period, however, the Rechtsstaat 
theory does not merely stress the negative character of the 
State, that is to say the protection of liberty and the main­
tenance of the legal order; on the contrary, in opposition to 
Stahl. the idea of the Rechtsstaat was made to serve the cul-
2 
tural and welfare activities of the State. This aspect of 
the Rechtsstaat was especially stressed by Robert von Mohl in 
3 
his Encyklopadie of 1895: "Its essence consists in that it 
protects and furthers all natural aims recognised by the 
people as the life aims of the individuals, as well as that 
of the community. For this purpose it takes care that all 
activities of its citizens and that of the governing power 
are carried out within the limits of an all-embracing legal 
system; and that in the aggregate of life within its boundaries, 
1. Rudolf Gneist, a.a.O., pp. 24-25. 
2. Hermann Heller, "Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur?", p. 8. 
3. Robert von Mohl, "Encyklopadie von 1859", p. 106,p.328ff. 
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in the relation of the individuals to each other as well as 
in the relation of the whole to its parts, the law is not 
violated. On the other hand, it furthers the various powers 
of its citizens and the interests resulting from them, in so 
far as their own powers are insufficient and in so far as the 
object justifies the application of the total power. The es­
tablishment and maintenance of the legal order is therefore 
not its sole, not even its most important aim, but is the 
dominant character, the inviolable negative side of all its 
operations". The characteristics of the Rechsstaat are in 
Mohl's theory equality before the law, care for the mainten-
ance of individuals in all suitable cases, equal access of 
all competent citizens to all public offices, and finally, 
personal liberty. This material conception of the Rechtsstaat. 
which has been called by Heller the social Rechtsstaat. is 
however lost after the debacle of the revolution of 1848, In 
the later development, the relation of the Rechtsstaat to the 
cultural and welfare aims of the State comes last. In the 
succeeding period of liberalism, only the negative aspect is 
understood by Rechtsstaat. In this period the already men­
tioned differentiation between the changeable aims of the 
State on the one hand, and the equal and unalterable form 
through which every State must realise its aims on the other, 
becomes constitutional reality. In this theory the strange 
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alliance between throne and altar on the one hand, and the 
1 competitive economic system on the other, is consummated. 
After this, the essentials of the Rechtsstaat are there­
fore as follows. The fundamental principle is the legality 2 
of administration, that is to say, the postulate that the 
administration of the State is bound by its own laws, and 
that every interference of the State must be reducible to 
such laws» This implies the supremacy of the law and only 
of the law; but of a certain type of law, namely of the general 
laws# Prom this it follows that the relation between the 
State and individuals must be determined in advance by formal 
rational law. The interference of the State with liberty and 
property must be predictable and calculable; in Stahl's words, 
it must be exactly defined. Prom this it follows that those 
interferences must be controllable, and indeed by independent 
judges• 
This idea of the Rechtsstaat is indifferent in the 
first place as to the aims pursued by the State, and secondly 
— and this is decisive — as to the form of the State. 
Whether it be republic or monarchy, democracy or aristocracy, 
is without significance, provided only that these essentials 
of the Rechtsstaat are fulfilled. 
1, Drucker, p. 8. 
2. Thoma, p. 204. 
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The Rule of Law and the Supremacy of Parliament, 
By this Indifference as to the political structure, by 
this irrelevance of the genesis of the law, the concept of the 
Rechtsstaat is clearly distinguished from the English doctrine 
of the Rule of Law; but from the Rule of Law in its relation 
to the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament* This correla­
tion of the two doctrines is to be found clearly in Blackstone's 
Commentaries, and is the consequence of the disappearance of 
a genuine natural law during and after the Great Revolution. 
For Blackstone, the supremacy of Parliament is the keystone 
of the constitutional system. Parliament can do anything 
which is not naturally impossible. This supremacy of Parlia­
ment shall realise at the same time the rule of law* The 
2 correlation of the two doctrines is dated by Roscoe Pound from 
the 10th November, 1612, when Coke, on the occasion of the 
Case of Prohibitions opposed the claim of King James I to be 
himself a judge; and this identity of the two doctrines is 
clearly established in the Petition of Rights of 1628. Here 
natural law finally ceases, and the supremacy of the law 
becomes the supremacy of Parliament. The correlation of the 
two doctrines has been conclusively established in Dicey1s 
famous book. In our view, chapter xiii, which deals with the 
1. "Commentaries?1, Vol. I, p. 160, with the quotation from 
Coke's "Fourth Institute", p. 31; and Dicey, "Law of the 
Constitution", p. 39. Further see G. Haines, "The American Doctrine", p. 9. 
2. "Spirit of Common Law", p. 60. 
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relation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of 
law seems to "be decisive® Dicey clearly recognises the logical 
antagonism between the two fundamental conceptions; but as an 
essentially political thinker he comes to the conclusion that 
"this appearance is delusive; the sovereignty of Parliament 
as contrasted with other forms of sovereign power, favours the 
supremacy of the law, whilst the predominance of rigid legality 
throughout our institutions evokes the exercises, and thus 
increases the authority of parliamentary sovereignty". 
It is just the co-ordination of the genetic determina­
tion of the content of the law by Parliament with a certain 
structure of the legal system which appears to him as a secure 
guarantee for the maintenance of political freedom. 
His first thesis is, therefore that the sovereignty of 
Parliament furthers the rule of the law of the land. The fact 
that the commands of Parliament "can be uttered only through 
the combined action Af its three constituent parts .... pre­
vents those inroads upon the law of the land which a despotic 
monarch such as Louis XIV, Napoleon I, or Napoleon III might 
effect by ordinances or decrees or which the different consti­
tuent assemblies of Prance and, above all, the famous Conven-
2 
tion, carried out by sudden resolutions". The monopoly of 
1. Dicey, "Law of the Constitution", p. 402. 
2. Ibid., p. 403. 
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legislation by Parliament, with the balance between the Houso 
of Commons, the House of Lords, and the King, also strengthens 
the power of the judges, who up till now have always refused 
to interpret an Act of Parliament in another way than is 
necessitated by the wording of the Act; and, finally, explains 
the absence of administrative Law. 
His second thesis is that the supremacy of the law 
1 
strengthens the sovereignty of Parliament. The law is rigid 
and by its rigidity very often hinders the activities of the 
executive . If the executive power desires to act efficiently 
and purposefully, It must be freed in certain circumstancos 
from the rigidity of the law# This exemption, however, can 
only be granted by Parliament, either in advance or by an 
Act of Indemnity. "A statute of this kind Is the last and 
supreme exercise of Parliamentary sovereignty. It legalises 
2 illegality." 
This solution does not appear to him as merely fciraal, 
for the fact that the wide discretionary powers of the execu­
tive always necessitates a parliamentary delegation introduces 
the control of judges. "Parliament is the supreme legislator, 
but for the moment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver, 
that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by 
1. Ibid., p» 406. 
2. Ibid., p. 409. 
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the judges of the land." 
The supremacy of the law means, therefore, the supremacy 
of that law enacted by Parliament, that Is to say, of statutory 
law, which is historically and politically opposed to the su­
premacy of the Common Law. This doctrine of the supremacy of 
enacted law arises historically in the very period when the 
creative power of the Common Law was denied* The seventeenth 
century, which brings the triumph of the bourgeoisie, brings 
at the same time that of Parliament and of the supremacy of 
parliamentary legislation. Prom then on, statute law is dom­
inant, although the Common Law was more fully developed. This 
2 idea has been clearly formulated by Blackstone. 
The contradictions and inefficiencies of Dicey's con­
structions have been conclusively proved by Mr. Jennings' 
book. But this criticism does not concern the decisive socio­
logical problem, for it cannot be denied that Dicey's construc­
tion has functioned, and is even operating now. It is unde­
niable that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, 
that is to say sovereignty and material law, or the political 
and the material conceptions of law, had the same meaning in 
Dicey's day. It has therefore to be investigated why no 
social antagonism corresponded to the logical one which Dicey 
himself recognised. Dicey's formulation also shows clearly 
1. Ibid., p. 409. 
2o Vol. I, p. 87. 
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the fundamental difference "between the English and the German 
doctrines. In the British doctrine, the centre of gravity 
lies in the determination of the content of the laws by Par­
liament. The German theory is uninterested in the genesis 
of the law, and is immediately concerned with the interpreta­
tion of a positive law, somehow and somewhere arisen. The 
German theory is liberal-constitutional; the English, democratic-
constitutional. This difference explains the existence of a 
fully developed science of law in Germany, and the non-exist­
ence of such a science in England. The English bourgeoisie 
translated its will into law through the medium of Parliament; 
the German bourgeoisie found given laws which were systematiaed 
and interpreted in a very refined way in order to secure the 
maximum of liberty against a more or less absolute State. The 
social causes of these two divergent theories on the function 
of law in political and social life are to be dealt with in 
the following chapters. 
Ill. Theses on the Construction of the Legal System in a 
Competitive Society. 
The legal system of that period centres around: 
1. The conception of personal political and economic 
liberty, which implied a presumption for liberty against the 
right of the State to intervene (the so-called pre-State 
character of freedom). 
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2. This freedom Is guaranteed by formal rational laws. 
This means: (a) by general laws; (b) by the application of 
general laws by independent judges (the formal structure of 
the legal system). 
The legal system was related: 
a) economically, to a system of free competition 
which found its legal expression In freedom 
of contract and freedom of trade (the material 
structure of the legal system) . 
b) It was socially related to a state of affairs 
in which a working class as an independent 
movement did not exist, in which therefore 
the existence of class conflicts was simply 
ignored (the social structure of the legal 
system). 
c) It was politically related to a system of 
separation and distribution of powers; in 
Germany, to a system in which the bourgeoisie 
did not play a decisive political role; in 
England, to a system in which the bourgeoisie 
determined the content of the law, and 
political power was shared between Crown, 
nobility, and bourgeoisie (the political 
structure of the legal system) . 
4. The force which integrated that society, based 
upon personal, political, and economic freedom, Into a State, 
was the conception of the nation (the Irrational basis of 
society). 
These are the theses, which ought to stand at the end 
of this chapter, but with which, for didactic reasons, we 
begin, and which shall be interpreted in the following pages. 
We shall proceed as follows: first we shall analyse 
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the economic substructure upon which the legal system is 
erected; then we shall turn our attention to the political 
substructure and deal exclusively with the German development, 
as the corresponding English political history is well-known. 
In this connection we have to define the concept of the nation, 
and the function it performs as an integrating factor in the 
modern competitive society. Finally, we shall analyse the 
various elements of the liberal legal system, and lay stress 
on its formal structure; because its material elements, such 
as freedom of contract and freedom of trade, have been dealt 
with so often that they need no emphasis here. 
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B. THE SUBSTRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF LIBERALISM 
Section 1. The Economic Substructure 
and the Material Structure of the Law 
INTRODUCTION 
The presentation of the legal system of liberalism 
and of the economic structure adequate to it offers extraordin­
ary methodological difficulties, which will be indicated here 
without being developed. In the first place the presentation 
of the legal system of liberalism alone is a task beyond the 
powers of a single man; and certainly one which would demand 
a long period of preparatory work, and which cannot be com­
pleted in a few pages. This preparatory work has not yet 
been fully done. The following pages offer, therefore, only 
a sketch which endeavours to present the ideal type of liberal 
legal system. By an ideal type, is to be understood, accord­
ing to Max Weber, "one of those syntheses which one usually 
designates as ideas of historical phenomena,... This mental 
picture unites certain relations and processes of historical 
life in a cosmos of relations which is considered to be 'con-
1 
sistent". The ideal types are therefore "structures in which 
1» "Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre", p. 176. 
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we construct relations in violation of objective reality, which 
1 
our fantasy, trained by reality, considers as adequate". The 
ideal type "is a mental structure which is not itself a reality, 
but with which reality is measured and with which it is com­
pared". If, however, the ideal type does not describe reality, 
it is on the other hand not an a priori concept. It derives 
on the contrary from reality, it stands therefore between the 
transcendental a priori notions and an individualising his­
torical description. It is attained by the elimination of 
certain individual features, and by the emphasising of others 
which appear as essential for the constitution of the ideal 
type. 
But why may we neglect certain historical phenomena, 
and consider others as essential? Is it not true that every 
selection is arbitrary? Is not, therefore, the very notion 
of the ideal type a purely arbitrary one? Is there any stand­
ard of measurement indicating which individual historical 
features are necessary for the constitution of the ideal type, 
and which are only incidental? The justification on the basis 
of Max Weber's theory of knowledge, namely the basing of his 
methodology on the philosophical relativism of the South-West 
Kantian School of Germany, is undoubtedly inadequate. Another 
answer can, however, not be given here0 It may suffice to 
1. Ibid., p. 194. 
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assert that the Tightness of the construction of the ideal 
type can "be proved by the convincingness of the results of 
1 the investigations. 
The second methodological difficulty which presents 
itself here lies in the co-ordination of various partial types 
and of various partial structures into a structural whole* 
What gives us the right to say that the ideally typical con­
struction of the liberal Rechtsstaat is related to the ideally 
typical construction of the liberal economic system? The 
problem of co-ordinating phenomena from various spheres has 
2 already been stated by ibhn Stuart Mill, as Morris Ginsberg 
observes. "When states of societies and the causes which 
produce them are spoken as the subject of science, it is im­
plied that there exists a natural correlation among their 
different elements• That not every variety of combination of 
these general facts is possible, but only certain combinations; 
that, in short, there exist Uniformities of Co-existence be­
tween the states of the various social phenomena. And such 
is the truth..." They are the a)(iomata media, the middle 
1. Cf. Morris Ginsberg, "Sociology", 1954. Hermann I. 
Grab, Der Begriff de3 Rationalen in der Soziologie Max Webers", 
Karlsruhe, 1927, Karl Mannheim, "Historismus", in Archiv fur 
Sozialenwissenschaft", 1924. Karl Mannheim, "Mensch und 
Gesellschaft in Zeitalter des Umbaus", Leiden, 1955, ppl25-149. 
2. "A System of Logic", Bk. IV, Chap. X, paragraphs 2-6. 
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principles which, in John Stuart Mill's theory, justify the 
co-ordination of the various partial structures of various 
special relationships into a total structure and into a total 
relationship, and which then in their turn can be made fruitful 
for further sociological investigations. 
I. The Social System of Adam Smith and the Material Structure 
of the Law. 
The general law which, as we saw, "became increasingly 
the central consideration of the liberal system of law, was 
related to the economic theory of classical liberalism; this, 
however, was not only an abstract theory, but at the same 
time the description of a reality. 
1. This liberal theory was from its beginnings based 
upon metaphysics. It consisted of a combination of experience 
and belief. The characteristic expression of this reconcilia­
tion theory is to be found in Bolingbroke's works* For him, 
the Identity of self-interest and common interest is an ob­
vious and undeniable fact. — "That true self-love and social 
are the same" and the two noblest gifts to mankind are natural 2 
reason and supernatural revelation." "The revelation of 
the instincts of self-love through reason to benevolence", 
that is for Bolingbroke the golden rule of life. God rules 
1. "Works", vol. I, p. 319. 
2, Ibid., vol. IV, p. 319; and Walter Sichel and W. Ludwig. 
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in his theory, as generally in the Deism of the eighteenth 
century, through the medium of general laws which can "be 
learnt "by experience. 
The classical expression, however, is to be found, 
apart from the writings of the Physiocrats, in the system of 
1 
Adam Smith. 
Adam Smith "belongs undoubtedly to the school of natural 
law. His Wealth of Nations is but a part of a total system 
which, as his Theory of Moral Sentiments shows, should provide 
a complete theory of society. The world is ruled by one 
natural law, and is developing according to that natural law. 
2 
Adam Smith, as his Theory of Moral Sentiments shows, accepts 
the ideas of Hutcheson and Mandeville, ana attempts to combine 
the fundamental elements of both theories and to merge them 
into unity. Hutcheson is rejected in so far as he denies 
the motive of egoism to human activities. The benevolence 
which was asserted by Hutcheson to be the sole motive of all 
1. Bibliography: Adam Smith, "An Enquiry into the Wealth 
of Nations", Cannan Ed.; "A Theory of Moral Sentiments", 
6th Ed. 2 vols, 1790; "Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue 
and Arms", Cannan Ed., Oxford, 1896. Walter Hasbach, "Die 
allgemeinen philosophischen Grundlagen der von Quesnay be-
grundeten politischen Okonomie", Leipzic, 1890. Leslie 
Stephen, "History of English Thought in the 18th Century", 
2 vols, London, 1927. James Bonard, "Philosophy and Political 
Economy", London, 1922. Gunnar Myrdal, "Das politische 
Element in der nationalokonomischen Begriffsbildung", Berlin, 
1932. Eduard Heimann, "Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus", 
Tubingen, 1929. Adolf Loewe, "Economics and Sociology"with 
a foreword by Morris Ginsberg, London, 1935. Franz Bohm, 
"Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf", Berlin, 1933. 
2a II Part VII, section II, ch. Ill, pp. 286, 305. 
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human actions "'may, perhaps, be the sole principle of action 
of the Deity" (p. 296), "but not that of men. He, however, 
accepts from this "amiable system" the view that human egoism 
must be limited; that therefore economic and social activities 
must have an ethical bgsis, and that this ethical foundation 
must never be abandoned* Prom Mandeville,on the other hand, 
he adopts the conception that egoism is the central motive 
of human activities, without, however, accepting the view of 
the social function of vice. 
Consequently, Adam Smith divides human drives into the 
selfish and the benevolent, and thereby, like all theorists 
of natural law and later Hegel, is confronted with the ques­
tion of how it is possible to construct a society in which 
self-interest and common interest stand side by side; in 
which, therefore, sovereignty emerges from competition0 The 
solution of this problem he finds in the belief that the pur­
suit of individual egoistic interests leads automatically, 
by reason of a world plan, to a realisation of the common 
interest; that, therefore, because of the coincidence of all 
human interests, sovereignty must necessarily arise from 
competition, provided, however, that this natural law which 
realises the world plan is not disturbed by external inter­
ferences . It must, therefore, be pointed out, with all possi­
ble emphasis, that the system of Adam Smith is based upon two 
assumptions: that the Individual interest is embodied in the 
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common Interest, and that therefore the aim of the society 
1s the realisation of the common and not of the individual 
interest which is only one means — or "better, the only 
means — for the realisation of this aim,, Thus far, classical 
liberalism stands in the tradition of mercantilism, with the 
decisive difference that the method for the attainment of the 
idea of welfare is basically distinguished from that of 
mercantilism. 
All these ideas are clearly expressed in Adam Smith's 
works. "As every individual endeavours so much as he can, 
both to apply his capital in the support of domestic industry 
and so to direct this industry that its produce may be of 
the greatest value, every individual necessarily labours to 
render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. 
He generally, indeed, never intends to promote the public 
interests, nor knows how much promoting it .... he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
1 
of his intention." His belief that nature, "which is the 
2 
polite term for God", leads to a realisation of this identity 
2 
is so strong, his conviction that "whatever is, is right" is 
so deep, that he thinks it better that the individual should 
1, "Wealth of Nations", I, Bk. IV, ch. II, p. 421. 
2. Leslie Stephen, "History", Vol. II, pp. 70, 73. 
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not even know that he pursues communal interests by acting 
egoistically„ "The Happiness of mankind «... seems to have 
been the original purpose intended by the author of nature 
when he brought them into existence" and "The rich only select 
from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They con­
sume little more than the poor and in spite of their natural 
selfishness and rapacity though they mean only their own 
conveniency, they divide with the poor the produce of all 
their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to 
make nearly the same distribution of the necessities of life 
which would have been made, had the earth been divided into 
equal portions .... and thus, without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society and afford 
1 
means for all the multiplication of the species." 
This asserted harmony is in the first place a harmony 
on the commodity market, in the sense of a coincidence of 
demand and production. In his view, only that can be produced 
perpetually which encounters effective demand; whereby he 
2 assumes an ever greater surplus. 
It is now of decisive importance to indicate the real­
istic conditions for the functioning of this harmonic system, 
that is to say, for the emergence of sovereignty from competi­
tion « For only if we know what conditions must exist in 
1. Adam Smith, "Theory", Vol. I, part IV, chap. I, p.466a 
2. Cf. Eduard Heimann, "Soziale Theorie des Kap it all sinus" pp. 8, 9. 
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historical reality in order that the struggle of the competi­
tors may not degenerate into the bellum omnium contra omnes 
of Hobbes, can we guard against the temptation to divorce 
the postulate of free competition from the social system as 
a whole; that is, to absolutise the postulate of free compe­
tition and to transfer it to a social system for which it 
never was intended, as was done soon after Ricardo. For the 
generalisations of classical economy are nothing else than 
1 
a system of sociology sui generis. 
2. Competition means struggle; but this struggle is 
to move within ordered limits# Adam Smith's picture of com­
petition has nothing to do with the description which Hobbes 
gives of the natural stateo Competition must never lead to 
the ruin of a fellow-competitor0 The individual advantage 
must never be attained by the injury of a brother competitor. 
"One individual must never prefer himself so much even to 
any other individual as to hurt or injure that other in order 
to benefit himself, though the benefit of the one should be 
2 
much greater than the hurt or injury to the other." This 
more ethical formulation is now clearly applied to competi­
tion in the economic sphere. "In the race for wealth and 
honours and preferment, each may run as hard as he can and 
1. Adolf Loewe, "Economics and Sociology", p. 40. 
2. Adam Smith, "Theory", Vol. I, part III, chap„ III, 
p. 359. 
strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all 
his competitors# But if he should Jostle, or throw down any 
of them the indulgence of the spectator is entirely at an end. 
1 It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of." 
V Thus there is to be found in Adam Smith the rudiments 
of a theory of competition which has since been developed by 
German Jurisprudence, namely the distinction between competi­
tion in efficiency (Lelstungswettbewerb). and restrictive 
2 competition (Behlnderlngawettbewerb). The difference between 
the two kinds of competition 1b in the first place in the aim 
of the struggle. The competitors in a free market fight for 
existence or for economic improvement. The monopolist fights 
either to abolish the freedom of the market, or, when he has 
succeeded in doing this, to fortify or to complete the mono­
polistic position. By a monopolist — this is a marginal 
definition — we understand anyone who succeeds in obtaining 
from his customers better terms than those he would receive 
under conditions of free competition. Consequently, not only 
1. Adam Smith, "Theory", Vol. I, Part II. Section II. Chap. II, p. 206. 
2. Cf. Lobe, "Die Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs", 
Leipsic, 1907. G.H. Nlpperdey, "Wettbewerb und Existenzver-
nlchtung", in "Kartell Rundschau", 1930, p. 128 ff. Franz Bohm, "Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf". 
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the aim of the struggle, but also the methods, are different,. 
A competitor in a free market seeks to realise his own economic, 
success. He therefore engages in such activity as is not in 
itself combative, but which becomes so only by the fact that 
everyone seeks to attain identical aims. The monopolist, 
however, fights in order to frustrate the aims of others, but 
not necessarily in order to attain for himself economic suc­
cess which he often realises only after the struggle is over. 
Competition serves according to the classical theory 
the purpose of selecting the competitors. In this it has 
institutional significance. Competition is an instrument of 
the economic system, and not only a means to the attainment 
of profits. This selection is brought about on the demand 
side by the choice of the customers between the offers of 
1 
various competitors. The consumer becomes the umpire. Dis­
turbances are only of short duration. Equilibrium is asstimed 
2 
always to re-establish itself automatically. 
Only the first type of competition was recognised by 
classical economy as legitimate, as the above quotations 
show. Restrictive competition, the struggle of monopolists 
against non-monopolists, is not included in the classical 
theory of competition. 
1. Bohm, "Wettbewerb und Monolkampf", p. 274. 
2. Adolf Loewe, "Economics and Sociology", pp. 66, 88. 
This competition finds its legal form in freedom of 
contract and trade, in the institution of private property 
in the instruments of production, and in the principle of 
the non-intervention of the State in the natural oouroe of 
economic processes* In a free market where competition in not 
restrictive, freedom of trade realises not only the Juridical 
but also the sociological freedom, beoause equal parties strug­
gle against one another, and each consumer bu» aotual and not 
only formal freedom of choice# Freedom of trade, like freedom 
of contract, is a necessary supplement to the institution of 
property, as both together render possible the natural selec­
tion among undertakings. 
It must, however, be stressed that this conception of 
competition was developed by classical economy only for the 
commodity and not for the labour market. It is true that for 
Adam Smith, as for his successors, the trend of development 
appeared to be necessarily advantageous for all classes of 
society. For progressive division of labour "was taken as 
permanently increasing real return .... by stimulating accu­
mulation of money capital, the same technical progress was 
constantly to raise the wage-level. In this way, the autono­
mous forces of the market were ultimately to Indemnify those 1 
classes which came off badly in the early stages". 
1. Adolf Loewe, "Economics and Sociology", p. 68. 
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7 Prom this sole legitimation of competition there fol-
1 
lows his rejection of monopolies. His repudiation of all 
monopolies and privileges is of decisive significance for the 
evaluation not only of his economic but of his social theory 
as such. It is well-known that he admits of exceptions only 
2 for colonies, and even there, only for a transitional period. 
The reason for his hostility to monopolise is the fact that 
his theory is concerned with the needs of the community as a 
whole. Monopolies were characteristic of mercantilism. The 
laws of mercantilism for the protection of monopolies were 
"like the laws of Draco; these laws may he said to "be written 3 
in blood". 
His negative attitude towards monopolies is implemented 
by certain positive postulates which relate to an economic 
condition in which privileges and monopolies exist# In his 
Lectures, as later in his Wealth of Nations, he first expressly 
asserted that monopolies and privileges such as the Corpora­
tions of the Bakers and Butchers "destroyed public opulence. 
On this account there is always required a magistrate to fix 
the prices. "For any free commodity .... there is no occasion 
1. Adam Smith, "Wealth", Vol. I, Bk. I, Chap. VII, p. 63: 
Chap. XI, Part I, p. 148; Vol. II, Bk. IV, Chap. VII, Part III, 
pp. 109, 127, 129; Chap. VIII, p. 146. 
2• Vol- IL> Bk. -V, Chap. I, Part|ITI--p. 245. 
3. Ibid., Vol. II, Bk. IV, Chap. VIII, p. 146 
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for this, but it is necessary with bakers who may agree among 
1 
themselves to make the quantity and prices what they please." 
In other words, the juridical category of freedom of contract 
is a sociological freedom only in the case of absence of 
monopolies. In the same way, the political principle of non­
intervention is desirable only if the market is a stage for 
the struggle of equal competitors. Therefore wherever monopo­
lies exist, the principle of freedom of contract and of non­
intervention ceases to be applicable* This view, that the 
difference between intervention and non-intervention entirely 
depends upon the social conditions, has been very cynically 
expressed by Talleyrand with regard to foreign policy: 
"Madame," he said, "non-intervention est un mot diplomatique 
et enigmatique, qui signifie a peu pres la meme chose qu'ln-
2 
tervention". In monopolistic situations, Adam Smith, like 
Pufendorf, clearly sees that the supplementary liberty of the 
freedom of contract must necessarily be replaced by that of 
the supplementary institution of the administrative act be­
longing to public law. The demand for a control of monopolies 
is not only reconcilable with Adam Smith's theory, it is 
rather a direct consequence of it. 
1. "Lectures", p. 177. 
2. Quoted Granville Stapleton, "Intervention and Non­
intervention or the Foreign Policy of Great Britain from 
1790 to 1865", London, 1866, p„ 15. 
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The repudiation of monopolies implies the equality of 
competitors, and, in addition, a certain type of entrepreneur. 
It is known that Adam Smith rejected the institution of the 
Joint Stock Company, and admitted it only for four economic 
activities — banking, insurance, the building and navigation 
1 
of canals, and the water-supply of great cities; and it is 
characteristic of his profound sociological insight that Joint 
Stock Companies are considered legitimate in those fields of 
economic activity in which the element of the initiative of 
the entrepreneur is unessential — in which the economic 
activity is mainly a matter of routine# The entrepreneur is, 
therefore, the capitalist who risks his capital and his labour 
power for an uncertain aim, in short,that capitalist who com­
bines all three functions of property, not only legally but 
actually. Administration and utilisation of capital make the 
entrepreneur. A divorce of the functions, a splitting of 
2 
"diffused ownership and concentrated control", a division of 
the three property functions and their allocation to various 
hands is completely foreign to him. The entrepreneur is for 
him not a functionary of society but an entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneur of classical economy had "cut out his own task 
1. Vol. II, Book V, Chap. I, Part III, Art. I. 
2. P.H. Knight, "Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit", Nr. 16 
of the Reprints of Scarce Tracts of the London School of 
Economics, p. 291. 
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to fit his own measure of himself and set himself at it", 
whereas the functionary of a corporation, the hired manager, 
has had "his task cut &&£ for him by others and been set to 
1 perform it". 
From this conception of the entrepreneur Adam Smith 
infers that he has to bear the risk of the undertaking and 
that every shifting of the risk to others, especially to the 
State, be it through direct or indirect subsidies, cannot be 
justified to the society. 
Only if these conditions exist in reality does Adam 
Smith believe in the realisation of the pre-established har­
mony of individual and common interests« Only under these 
conditions is his statement valid that "All systems, either 
of preference or restraint, therefore, being taken away, 
the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes 
2 itself at its own accord". 
& We have already mentioned that this system of a de­
mocracy of small-scale undertakings is applied only to the 
commodity market. On the labour market, in so far as there 
exists no Trade Union, typical monopolists and non-monopolists 
stand in opposition to each other. The employer as the owner 
of the means of production is typically the stronger. In the 
relation between employer and employed, freedom of contract 
does not guarantee sociological but only juridical freedom, 
1. F.H. Knight, p„ 298. 
2® Adam Smith, "Wealth", Vol. II, Book IV, Chap. IX, p. 184. 
571 
which hides the fact of social dependence. It is true that 
Adam Smith, as well as Ricardo, enjoined some measure of 
welfare for the workers, "but contrary to their theory of the 
A 
commodity market, they did not make institutional provision 
against a possible exploitation of the non-monopolist by the 
monopolist, and for a restitution of the competition in effi­
ciency# In addition we must emphasise the sociological prin­
ciple which Max Weber has called the "advantage of small 2 
numbers". The small number of the entrepreneurs gives them 
always a certain superiority as against the large number of 
the workers; and even their organisations share in this ad­
vantage, because the small number of members makes it always 
possible for their deliberations to be kept secret, and becaiise 
there is greater solidarity of interest among the employers 
than among the workers; so that even in the case of two-sided 
organisation there is always a relative superiority of the 
entrepreneur. If Adam Smith's theory of competition was ap­
plied to the labour market, it would follow that freedom of 
the worker in a sociological sense begins only with collective 
organisation. This means that the Trade Union corresponds 
to the individual employer. Even the entrepreneur who in the 
commodity market is not a monopolist, is always one in the 
labour market If trade unions are absent. 
1. Eduard Iieimann, "Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus", 
p. 19. 
2. Max Weber, "Wirthschaft und Gesellschaft", p. 610. 
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From this it follows that the postulate which is con­
stantly repeated — that Trade Unions are cartels because 
they monopolise the commodity labour power in the same way 
as cartels monopolise commodities and services; and that 
therefore wherever control of cartels is instituted, that 
control must necessarily be applied to Trade Unions also — 
is inadmissibleo The German legislation, in view of the 
structural difference between commodity and labour market, 
has clearly differentiated between them. This differentiation 
culminated in the establishment of a control of cartels and 
monopolizes on the one hand, and in the institution of a com­
plete freedom of Trade Unions on the other hand. In England, 
on the other hand, in legal theory as well as in legislative 
practice, no distinction is drawn between cartels and Trade 
1 
Unions. Cartels also come under the Trade Union Act of 1867. 
As against this, we have only to state here that Trade Unions 
certainly fulfil cartel functions by endeavouring to sell 
the labour power as dearly as possible, but they also have 
inner Trade Union functions (mutual help, training for members, 
legal assistance, cultural activities), and certain political 
2 
functions. This functional difference between labour and 
1. Trade Unions Act of 1876, cf. Slesser and Baker, 12,132. 
2. Franz Neumann, "Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung", 
1932, p. 20 ff. 
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commodity market appears also in the distinction in the legal 
forms which are used by the respective organisations# The 
cartel as the commodity monopoly fixes its prices in the legal 
form of the one-sided decision# The Trade Union, however, 
fixes wages only in the form of a mutual collective agreement 
in which the antagonistic wills have already reached a com­
promise • 
II. The Classification of State Interferences* 
In the free economic system thus constituted, State 
intervention is the exception# The function of the State is 
1 
exhausted in the "Individualistic minimum", that is to say, 
in the establishment of personal security, in the protection 
of private property, and in the provision of means to enforce 
the fulfilment of contracts# The organisations for the ful­
filment of this individualistic minimum are justice, police, 
the army, and taxes, as has been set forth in Adam Smith's 
Lectures# In attempting to classify State intervention with 
a view to recognising, on the basis of such classification, 
the aim of the general law, we shall discriminate between the 
classification of motives and that of the social functions of 
the various forms of State Intervention# We determine the 
1# H. Sidgwick, "Elements of Politics", 1891, Chaps IV 
and IX. 
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notion of the social function much as R.H. Tawney has defined 
the social function of property. We admit that State in­
tervention does not always attain the aim whose realisation 
was its motive. The economic subjects are often able to evade 
State intervention by structural and functional changes which 
immediately confront the State with new problems, (e.g. the 
influence of the Turnover Tax on the concentration of capital 
in the form of mergers of undertakings). 
1. The classification according to motives can only 
be undertaken if we keep in mind the social strata which are 
concerned by the interventionist measures* We therefore dis­
tinguish intervention in favour of the State as such, for 
example, taxes which are to provide the costs of State admin­
istration. Obviously, the motive given need not be the sole 
motive. The financing of the State's expenditure in this or 
in that way can be, and usually is, motivated also by the 
consideration of certain group interests. Intervention can 
take place in the interests of the nation as a whole, for 
example, health and food-control. It can be motivated also 
by the interests of the class of industrial, financial, or 
agrarian capitalists, as in the case of tariffs, compulsory 
cartels, prohibition to establish new undertakings, and so 
on; it can be in the interests of consumers (control of cartels 
I. "The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society", London, 1920, p. 7. 
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and monopolies, anti-trust legislation); or in the interests 
of the working class, as in the case of unemployment insurance, 
the eight-hour day, and so on. 
This classification, however, is not so important for 
us as that according to the function of intervention; that is 
to say, on the "basis of its influence on the structure of the 
economic system. For instance, intervention may have the 
object of maintaining the functioning of a competitive economic 
system, as in the case of the German law against unfair com­
petition, which prohibits the use of unfair methods by com­
petitors; or, in England, the individual prohibitions of 
1 
slander to goods; or of the deliberate spreading of inaccur-
2 ate statements fotf the purpose of damaging the business; or 
3 the prohibition of inducement to break contracts. All these 
rules will not interfere with the processes of free competi­
tion, they will not disturb its harmonious working; on the 
contrary, they are intended to protect its workihg, and to 
secure fulfilment of the rules of the game of free competition. 
These rules have, therefore, the task of moralising competi-
4 
tion, of making competition real. They.are intended to secure 
and guarantee the equality of the competitors. 
1. Sorrell v. Smith (1925) A.C. 700. 
2. Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892) 2 Q.B. 524. 
3. South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. 
Ltd. (1905) A.C. 239. 
4. Jethro Brown, "The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation", 1912, Chap. IV. 
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To these rulers there also belongs a certain type of 
social reform: those measures which are necessary for the 1 
social security of the working of the economic system. A 
certain, even if modest, number of measures for the protection 
of the working class is necessary in the interests of producti­
vity. Even the r ecognition of Trade Unions may be necessary 
for the maintenance of free competition, for the restoration 
of industrial peace, and the establishment of a certain amount 
of calculability in the relations between workers and employers. 
Interventions of the State may consciously aim at alter­
ing the economic structure, or they may functionally lead to 
such transformation. A law forbidding unfair competition will 
undoubtedly perform fundamentally different functions in a 
competitive and in a monopolistic society. In the latter, 
the fairness of the methods used in the economic struggle Is 
not determined by competition but by the monopolists themselves. 
The binding of the wholesale and retail dealer In the selling 
of trade-marked articles, and the protection of these contracts 
by injunction and even fines and damages, changes the law 
against unfair competition from an instrument for the main­
tenance of free competition into an organ of its destruction. 
If the State, as happened in Germany, defends the obligation 
imposed upon wholesalers and retailers by the monopolists by 
means of the law against unfair competition, the result is 
1. Eduard Heimann, "Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus", 
p„ 135. 
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legal protection of monopoly, whose commands become commands 
of the State Itself. To this realm of State-interventionist 
measures there belong all those provisions which recognise 
cartels and which abolish the freedom of trade; but to it 
belongs also that kind of social reform which no more servos 
the maintenance of free competition, but consciously aims at 
a change of the economic structure; as for example the recog­
nition of rights of collaboration of the working class, whether 
it be in the shop (works councils); or on the labour market 
(Trade Unions and Industrial arbitrations); or on the commodity 
market (participation in the control of monopolies and the 
establishment of estate organisation beside the political 
organisation, as for instance the Beichswirtschaftsrat). 
To summarise; only under the conditions which classical 
economy holds desirable for the structure of a liberal economic 
system is the liberal principle of non-intervention of the 
State justified« Such a State is to be what we are accustomed 
to call a negative State. If by this expression we mean only 
a factual relationship, and if no value judgment is Implied, 
no objection can be raised against the use of the term. If, 
however, we mean to express, as do fascist and Social reform­
ist critics of the non-interventionist State, that this State 
is a weak one, and that the positive State is an intervention­
ist State is in every case preferable to it; if therefore the 
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term negative implies a value judgment; we must energetically 
protest against its use, The non-interventionist State of 
liberalism was certainly negative but it was never weak; it 
was rather just as strong as its economic and. social structure 
made necessary. Whenever it was a question of conquering or 
of defending new markets, of subduing inner unrest, of pro­
tecting the bourgeois order, the liberal non~interventionist 
State proved itself strong enough in the decisive periods of 
its existence. Classical economy never thought of sacrificing 
an efficient State-machinery to the needs of free market 
economy; on the contrary, when Nassau-Senior describes the 
tyrannies of the African tribes, he says, "But they are 
trifles compared to those which are felt in the absence of 
government .... there is no tyranny which man will not eagerly 
1 embrace if anarchy is to be the alternate". 
1. Nassau-Senior, "Political Economy", p. 75. 
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1 
SECTION 2. THE POLITICAL SUBSTRUCTURE. 
A, The liberal legal system is not only functionally re­
lated to the economic structure as developed by classical 
economy, but also to a particular political structure. As 
economic theory, political theory centres around the idea of 
the harmony of society, of the identity of self- and common 
interest, of the equilibrium of all social forces, of a balance 
between the State and the society. This idea has been clearly 
2 
formulated by Bolingbroke, who as a typical eclectic accepted 
all decisive trends, the rationalism of Voltaire as well as 
the Deism of his period, and who applied the harmonistic theory 
to the political sphere. "A King of Great Britain is that 
1. In addition to either the nationalistic or the bourgeois 
liberal interpretation of German Prussian history of the 19th 
century, I should like to mention especially the following 
works: S. Cavaignac, "La formation de la Prusse Contemporaine", 
2 vols, 1991-1998. Max Lehmann, "Preiherr v. Stein, 2 vols, 
1902-1905. Franz Mehring, "Zur preussischen Geschichte von 
Tilsit bis zur Reichsgrundung"in Gesammelte Schriften und 
Aufsatze. Ferdinand Lassalle, "Gesammelte Schriften und Reden", 
edited Eduard Bernstein, Berlin. 1915, esp. vol. 2. The arti­
cles by Karl Marx, esp. in the "Rheinische Zeitung". Walter 
Koch, "Volk und Staatfuhrung vor dem Weltkriege", Stuttgart, 
1935. 
2. Leslie Stephen, "History of English Thought in the 18th 
century", London, 1917. Walter Sichel, "Bolingbroke and His 
Time", The Signet, London, 1912. Walter Ludwig, "Lord Boling­
broke und die Aufklarung", Heidelberg, 1928. 
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is that supreme magistrate who has a negative voice in the 
legislature, and several other powers and privileges, which 
we call prerogatives, are annexed to this trust0 The two 
Houses of Parliament have their rights and privileges, some 
of which are common to both, others particular to each. They 
prepare, they pass bills, or they refuse to pass such as are 
sent to them. They address, represent, advise, concentrate. 
The supreme judicature resides in the Lords« The Commons are 
the grand inquest of the nation; and to them it belongs like­
wise to judge of national expenses, and to give supplies ac­
cordingly o 
"If the legislature as well as the executive power was 
wholly in the King, he would be absolute; if in the 
Lords, our Government would be an aristocracy if in the 
Commons, a democracy. It is division of powers ... which 
constitutes a limited monarchy... If any of the three <>.. 
should at any time usurp more power than the law gives, or 
make ill use of a legal power, the other two parts may 
by exerting their strength, reduce this power into Its proper 
bounds. This is that balance which has been so much talked 
of... This proposition is therefore true; that, In a consti­
tution like ours, the safety of the whole depends on the 
1 
balance of the parts." 
1. Remarks on the History of England, "Works", XI, 
pp. 82-83. 
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This balance has been called by Walter Sichel "inde-
1 
pendent interdependence". 
I The dissimilarity of the English theory centering around 
the relationship of the two doctrines of the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and the Rule of Law, and the German theory of the 
Rechtsstaat. is only to be understood in the light of the dis­
similarity of the political structure of the two countries, 
and especially of the different role played by the German 
bourgeoisie in constitutional development. We do not, of 
course, deny that the political history is in its turn deter­
mined by economic considerations. But this economic determ­
ination is so evident that it seems superfluous to mention it 
here. We shall refrain from following the course of English 
nineteenth-century constitutional history; but it seems neces­
sary to say something about nineteenth-century German Prussian 
constitutional history in order to the understanding of German 
constitutional theory. 
J In the battles of Jena and Auerstadt the creation of 
Frederick the Great disintegrated, because free participation 
of its citizens was not only unknown to the enlightened abso­
lutism of Frederick's State, but was even consciously repudi­
ated by it. The examples of England and France, the Spanish 
wars against Napoleon, the Tyrolese risings, which proved that 
a democratic integration of the State could produce a more 
1. Walter Sichel, p. -332. 
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efficient State-machinery than had till then been "brought 
about by absolutism, had little influonce in Prussia. 
The liberal development began only after the defeat of 
the Napoleonic wars, and became visible in the Edict of October 
9, 1807, which for the first time shows clearly the break with 
the police-State tradition. The liberation of the peasants 
promulgated in this decree is -undoubtedly traceable to the 
Napoleonic liberation of the peasants, in the kingdom of 
Westphalia, and especially in the Duchy of Warsaw. The Prus­
sian liberation of the peasants was, however, only juridical 
and not economic. They became free in a dual sense„ Their 
feudal subjection was ended, but so also was their connection 
with their land. Stein himself was compelled to sacrifice 
his friendly feeling towards the peasants. In this decree, 
Prussia only decided "to abolish everything which up till now 
has hindered the individual from attaining the prosperity 
which, according to the measure of his powers, was within his 
reach". The bourgeois professions were opened to the nobility, 
the privileges of the estates were abolished, especially the 
exclusive title of the nobility to the posts of officers in 
the army. (Decree of August 6, 1808). Conscription was in­
troduced on February 9, 1813, but even then only for the dura­
tion of the war, after the great democratic reformers of the 
army — with the exception of Scharnhorst — frustrated by 
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the stupidity of Frederick William III, had been compelled 
to seek foreign service® 
Theodore von Schon, — the disciple of Kant and col­
laborator with Stein~Altenstein, and Hardenberg, all of them 
true disciples of Adam Smith, proceeded along the lines laid 
down by the Edict of October 9, 1807. On the 14th November, 
1811, the peasant acquired full property rights over his land, 
only, however, after ceding a part of it to the landed aris­
tocracy, and after waiving the protection which till then he 
had enjoyed. If economically the system was relatively pro­
gressive, socially it was the more reactionary. Stein, proba­
bly the only liberal minister who dared seriously to oppose 
the Prussian Junkers, and who was a genius in character even 
if not intellectually of the first rank, was never able, with 
his social reformist views, to assert himself successfully. 
His successor Hardenberg was socially a pure reactionary. He 
did not carry out the abolition of the exemption of the landed 
property-owners from tqxation, which had been planned by Stein. 
He introduced a feudal regulation for domestic and agricultural 
workers (Gesindeordnung of November 8, 1810), which, in spite 
of the postulate of legal equality in the later Prussian C6n~ 
3titution of 1850, remained untouched» "Rather three battles 
of Auerstadt than one October Edict", was the motto of the 
Prussian Junkers, and consequently that of Prussian policy. 
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Apart from this foundation of the State on economic 
liberty and social reaction, the State machinery was itself 
reorganised and modernised. On the 24th November, 1808, a 
ministry was created for the first time. On the 19th November, 
1808, local Government for towns was introduced; an idea, in­
deed, to which Hardenburg — a true disciple of Napoleonic 
centralism — was entirely opposed. The decisive political 
problem, namely that of the participation of the liberal bour­
geoisie in the formation of the will of the State, was however 
never attacked and never solved. 
It is true that on the 22nd May, 1815, Frederick William 
III promised to the "Prussian Nation" rights of condominium. 
It is equally true that he repeated this promise on the 17th 
January, 1820, and promised in addition to contract debts 
only with the consent of the estates. Rut he never kept these 
promises. By an order of the Cabinet of June 11, 1821, the 
settlement of the constitutional problem was postponed to an 
indefinite date. Nobility and landed property, led by the 
Crown Prince, had successfully sabotaged the constitutional 
reform. This sabotage of the promises of Frederick William 
III Is inseparably linked with the name and the system of 
Metternich, who, jointly with the Russian Czar, did his utmost 
to change Frederick's mind; a task which was made comparatively 
easy by the King's mean and suspicious character. Metternich's 
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two memoranda, in which he enumerated the reasons against 
the constitutional reform, belong to the most repulsive docu­
ments of Prussian history. What remained of the constitution­
al promises were the provincial diets (Provinziallandtage), 
which could be convoked by the Government at its discretion, 
and which deliberated behind locked doors • The Government 
appointed an official who presided over their meetings, and 
who could prevent any undesired discussion# The estates had 
tally an advisory voice, only the right to remonstrate and to 
bring forward requests* The diet consisted of 584 members, 
of whom 278 were noblemen, 182 representatives of towns, and 
124 peasants. In order to exclude the influence of the urban 
intelligentsia, only urban property owners of at least ten 
years' standing could be elected. The election of any kind 
of official could be annulled by the Government. Only in 
1840, after the death of Frederick William III, did the bour­
geoisie again begin to take courage. The bourgeoisie of the 
Rhineland, led by Beckerath, Camphausen, and Hansemann, and 
the East Prussian bourgeoisie under the leadership of Theodor 
von Schon, claimed anew the fulfilment of the constitutional 
promises. It is known that they were partly fulfilled only 
under pressure of the revolution of 1848, by the Camphausen-
Hansemann March Ministry. A National Convention was summoned, 
which was entrusted with the task of drafting a constitution 
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on the model of the Belgian. We assume that the course of 
the Revolution is known„ Its failure is attributable not so 
much to the strength of the reaction as to the cowardice of 
the bourgeoisie, which after March 18, 1848, played into the 
hands of the reaction, because of its fear of the proletariat 
which had been victorious at the barricades. The fear of 
King and Junkers in face of this revolution did not last long. 
The reaction organised itself in the conservative party, and 
began the connection with the King through the famous Camarilla 
founded by Ludwig von Gerlach. It established the reactionary 
ministry of Brandenburg, which, after the crushing of the 
Revolution in Vienna, performed the "saving deed" of adjourn­
ing, of transferring, and finally of dissolving, the National 
Convention. The King Imposed a new constitution on December 
5, 1848; abolished universal, equal, and secret, suffrage; 
and Introduced the famous three-class suffrage, in order to 
secure the consent of the new Parliament to the imposed con­
stitution, in which he was naturally successful. 
The succeeding period is on the whole one of reaction 
on the part of the landed aristocracy. The reintroduction 
of the police powers of the manorial lord; entailed landed 
property (Fideikomisse); the restriction of freedom of meeting 
by a reactionary statute; the transformation of the second 
chamber Into a House of Lords (Herrenhaus); are characteristic 
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of this period. Karl Marx rightly pointed out that Germany 
in 1848 had hardly reached the condition of Prance in 1789, 
and, as we may add, which England had already attained in 
1688. Frederick the Great had said that the condition of 
Prussia in his youth corresponded roughly to that of France 
under Francis I. 
It is obvious that this political reaction could not 
hinder the economic and social rise of the bourgeoisie; and, 
to a modest extent, the strengthening of its social position 
must have a political effect# The "new era" of liberalism 
begins in 1858, when the so-called liberal Hohenzollern-Auers-
wald ministry succeeded the reactionary Manteuffel ministry. 
The liberalism of the regent, later King and Emperor, William 
I, who appointed this ministry, was conditioned mainly by the 
fact that he needed money for the reform of the army and the 
increasing of its numerical strength, and was therefore com­
pelled to abolish the taxation privileges of the landed aris­
tocracy. For this he needed a liberal ministry. The bour­
geoisie rejoiced; it discontinued its opposition to the three-
class Parliament, and resigned itself merely in order to raise 
no difficulties for the new ministry. This reign of liberalism 
lasted only a short time0 It ended with the famous struggle 
over the army reforms, which begins in 1860 and which expands 
into a constitutional conflict. The progressive liberal party, 
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which insisted upon the bugetary right of Parliament, won 
250 seats in the election of May 5, 1862; an extraordinary 
success, of which, however, full use was not made. It is 
true that Parliament rejected the military budget. But Bis­
marck, who was called upon as a saviour, ruled without budget, 
in virtue of article 99 of the Prussian Constitution, and of 
a constitutional theory devised by him for the purpose. The 
same progressive party, which had rejected the military bud­
get, assented to the rest of the budget, negotiated with the 
Government, and contented itself with deploring the violation 
of the Constitution by the regime. In this way, political 
liberalism disgraced itself in the eyes of the petty bourgeois­
ie, which very soon, especially after the victorious wars, 
was driven into the armies of Bismarck. The right wing of 
liberalism, which had constituted itself as an independent 
national liberal party, even made formal peace with the 
regime. 
As a result of this series of defeats, the Parliament­
ary system was abandoned, and the monarchical principle, as 
advocated by Priedrich Julius Stahl, was realised in political 
practice. All decisions were made by the monarch, who was 
identical with the army, the landed property-owners, and the 
bureaucracyo The influence of the nobility in the officer 
corps was extremely strong. The internal administration of 
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Prussia was the domain of the nobility# In 1906, eleven out 
of twelve provincial presidents were noblemen; twenty-three 
out of thirty-six district presidents (Reglerungspresidenten) 
were noblemen; while for the famous post of Landrat, the title 
1 
of count was even necessary. 
The rights of the bourgeoisie were, therefore, not 
secured by participation in the formation of political deci­
sions, that is to say, not genetically, but only materially, 
by the rule of general laws as enacted by Parliament and as 
applied by independent judges. This distribution of powers 
between the various strata of the ruling classes was not 
materially altered after the formation of the empire,, This 
formation as such, and the victory of the unitarian tenden­
cies, corresponded to the economic interests of the bourgeois­
ie. The legislation of the Empire fulfilled all the demands 
of economic liberalism# Politically, however, the bour­
geoisie did not play a role in any way corresponding to its 
economic and social significance. In the decisive question 
of conflict, namely that of whether the Government was under 
obligation to secure annually the consent of Parliament to 
the budget, it was defeated. The compromise reached by 
Bismarck, that the strength of the army and the army expendi­
ture should be approved by Parliament only every seven years 
1. Cf. L.E. Schucking, "Die Reaktion in der inneren 
Verwaltung Preussens", 2 edition, Berlin, 1908. 
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(from 1893, every 5 years), was in fact a victory for him. 
This compromise lasted until 19140 Bismarck crushed liberalism, 
but he created a political Catholicism by his Kulturkampf. He 
needed the Catholic party for his economic policy, and this 
party knew how to use its key position with energy and reck­
lessness for its own interest, without attempting to establish 
a parliamentary system. At the same time, by his law against 
socialism, Bismarck practically created social democracy; 
which, however, owing to the three-class suffrage, had no 
parliamentary influence in Prussia. The semi-parliamentarism 
of Bulow in the Block Period strengthened the parliamentary 
groups, but did not substantially change the distribution of 
power. In Prussia, the three-class suffrage remained. In 
his address to Parliament on November 20, 1908, William II 
promised "an organic development of the suffrage"; but he 
remained faithful to his Hohenzollern tradition , in not 
keeping his promise, and in preferring to come to an under­
standing with the Junker reaction in the summer of 1909. The 
permanent influence of the East Prussian Junkers was made 
possible by the compromise with the Catholic centre party in 
the Reichstag in 1909, on the occasion of the estate tax* 
The conservative parliamentary group in the Reichstag was en­
tirely dominated by nobility and estate owners; for instance, 
in 1909, out of sixty conservative deputies, thirty-eight 
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were estate owners and twenty-eight noblemen; and in the Prus­
sian Parliament, out of 152 conservative deputies, ninety-eight 
were estate owners and eighty-eight noblemen. Their domination 
was secured by the three-class suffrage. In the Reich, al­
though the suffrage was general, it was only nominally so on 
1 
account of a reactionary division of the constituencies. The 
liberal socialist majority, which factually existed in the 
Reichstag of 1912 was without political importance. 
^ Cf. Statistics and Maps in Koch's book, p. 10, and 
Appendix. 
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SECTION 5. THE NATION AS THE INTEGRATING FACTOR 
1 
OP THE COMPETITIVE SOCIETY. 
I. The Concept of the Nation. 
The nation is the integrating principle of the modern 
State. It is the unifying link between the individual and 
the State in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
modern State needs a legitimation. The rational legitimation 
lies in the foundation of sovereignty on political and economic 
liberty, that is, in the reduction of the will of the State 
to those of the individuals; but these individual wills col­
lide. Each man represents the sum of various interests, and 
belongs through each of his interests to a different group. 
1. Bibliography: Otto Bauer, "Die Nationalitatenfrage 
und die Sozialdemokratie" (Marx-Studien, Vol. 2), Vienna,1924. 
Ernest Barker, "The National Character and the Factors of its 
Formation", London, 1917. Morris Ginsberg, "Sociology", 
London, 1934. R.G. Hawtry, "Economic Aspects of Sovereignty", 
London, 1930. Hermann Heller, "Staatslehre", Leiden, 1934,p. 
178^ff. Friedrich Hertz^ "Wesen und Werden der Nation", in 
Erganzungsband der Jahrbucher fur Soziologie", Karlsruhe,1927. 
Rene Johannet, "Le principe des nationalites", Paris, 1923. 
Harold J. Laski, "Nationalism and the Future of Civilization", 
London, 1932. R. Carre de Malberg, "Contribution a la theorie 
generale de l'Etat", 2 vols, Paris, 1920. Friedrich Meinecke, 
"Weltburgerturn und Nationalstaat", 6th edition, Munich and 
Berlin, 1922. F.J. Neumann, "Volk und Nation", Leipzig, 1888. 
Ernst Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation", Paris, 1882. Karl 
Renner, "Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer 
Anwendung auf Osterreich", Part I: Nation und Staat, Leipzig 
and Vienna, 1918. Heinz 0. Ziegler, "Die moderne Nation", 
Tubingen, 1931. 
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He is a member of a municipality, a member of the State; he 
belongs to economic organisations, and to social circles; to 
, 1 
religious units, and to political parties. The unification 
of these divergent desires and interests takes place in the 
nation, which thus becomes, so to speak, the irrational sub­
structure of the State. 
1. The concept of the nation must be confronted with 
that of the people; and the latter is a cultural as well as 
a natural phenomen. The naturalistic interpretation of the 
people is based upon natural properties, and especially upon 
race, in the sense in which this concept is understood by 
anthropologists, "By race, anthropologists understand a 
group of individuals who within given limits of variation, 
possess in common a combination of hereditary traits sufficient 
2 
to mark them off from other groups." Whether such natural 
differences can be objectively determinable, whether they 
arise by themselves, or are to a greater extent culturally 
and spiritually conditioned, lies outside the limits of our 
discussion,, Especially we need not investigate the problem 
of whether a way leads from the concept of the race to that 
of the State. The social and political significance of the 
race theory of National Socialism will be considered later. 
1• Renner. 
2, Ginsberg, p. 56. 
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The people as a cultural formation, however, Is con­
stituted as a sociological unit by an abundance of natviral 
and cultural factors. Common descent, common geographical 
position, language, religion, customs, science; all these 
objective factors play a role, and their individual aignifi-
1 
cance varies according to the historical-political situation„ 
But these objective elements do not suffice to constitute the 
people as a unito The Inadequacy of the objective theory is 
alleged to be met by the subjective theory, which found ex­
pression in Renan's famous formula; that the people is "un 
2 
plebiscite de tou3 les jours". Here, therefore, not exist­
ence but consciousness, tho conscious decision of the indi­
vidual to belong to a people, is considered to be decisive. 
It is obvious that this theory does not stand the test of 
3 
experience. Conscious decision in itself does not normally 
constitute a man a member of a people; nor can membership be 
lost by a reverse decision. The cultural conception of the 
nation is, therefore, an Inextricable coil of objective aid 
subjective; and within the objective, of natural and cultural 
factors. 
1. Otto Bauer, p. 114. 
2 a Renan, p, 27. 
3. The political basis of Renan's theory is the relation 
of Prance to Alsace-Lorraine (cf» Hertz, p. 56). 
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2. The concept of the nation can only he reached 
through its connection with that of the State0 A people be­
comes a nation if it has the consciousness of individual and 
common political aims, if it is capable of achieving and maln-
1 
taining a relatively united political will. As we understand 
by political everything which is directed to the acquisition 
and maintenance of power in and over the State, the concept 
of the nation is inseparably linked with that of the State0 
IIo State and Nation0 
1. The modern State is, however, not the work of the 
nation; it is rather the child of commodity production. Only 
when the product of labour has become a commodity, and has 
been converted into money, can a part of that money be used 
through taxation to finance the modern centralised State, and 
to create a machinery for Influencing the society, especially 
an army and bureaucracy. Capitalistic commodity production 
is older than the nation# Consequently it is in the Italian 
City States that we find the first modern States. These 
States were not the work of nations, but of rich capitalists 
who bought soldiers and with their help were able to establish 
1. Cf. Benjamin Disraeli in "The Spirit of Whiggism", 
1836, printed in "Whigs and Whiggism", Political Writings by 
B. Disraeli, London, 1913, p. 343: "The phrase 'the people' 
is sheer nonsense. It is not a political term0 It is a 
phrase of natural history, A people is a species; a civilised 
community is a nation. Now, a nation is a work of art and a 
work of time. A nation is gradually created by a variety of 
influences ..." 
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tyrannies. The capitalist thus used his military power, which 
was based upon money, to exploit the mass of the people by 
new taxes. These many tyrannies lacked any kind of legitima­
tion. Domination was justified by naked force. A national 
1 
ideology was completely lacking; but the modern State was there. 
2. The decisive function of the nation consists in 
rendering possible the unification of a multitude of individu­
al energies, in a period in which the bourgeoisie attains con­
sciousness of its own political value; in making universally 
binding its political and cultural decisions. The nation, 
therefore, supersedes in the first place every non-secular 
legitimation, and is thus in antagonism to the conception of 
the State as a divine Institution. Secondly, it provides a 
justification of every State, and stands therefore in opposi­
tion to the universalism of the Middle Ages. Thirdly — and 
this is decisive — it supersedes the dynastic legitimation. 
The modern State in Prance and Germany develops from the or­
ganisation of the feudal State. Kingship, whose bearer was 
the supreme feudal lord, changed the feudal State into a 
modern State by making use of the new means of commodity 
production, and, with the help of bought soldiers and offi­
cials, crushed the feudal lords. This development begins in 
Prance with Philip VI, it is effective under Louis XI, and 
comes to an end under Louis XIV. In Germany the same develop­
ment leads to the formation of territorial States, mainly 
1. Otto Bauer, pp. 165-166. 
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because the German Emperors were more interested in the higher 
profits of the Italian commodity production than in the lower 
profits of German urban production, and therefore left this 
field to the German territorial princes. 
In all these periods of feudalism, of estate absolutism, 
and of monarchical absolutism, the concept of the nation in 
1 
the modern sense is not to be found. In this period, the 
State has been created, but not the nation; the legitimation 
of the State Is either divine, or by natural law, 
3. On the continent, the nation first appears as an 
independent factor in the French Revolution, and only after 
2 
that time becomes the subject of sociological analysis. The 
objective factors which constitute the nation obviously emerged 
long before; but in this period the subjective factors, which, 
together with the objective, make a nation, first become 
3 
visible. In this period, one class constitutes Itself a 
nation. The nation becomes so to speak the property of the 
bourgeoisie. Via the nation, the bourgeois conquers cul­
ture, and by its character as nation legitimises the central­
ised rule of the State. 
1. Zlegler, p. 75. 
2. Important are: Montesquieu's "Elsprit des Lois", of 
1748, Bk. XIX; and Voltaire's "Essai sur les Moeurs et 1'Esprit 
des Nations", of 1769. 
3. Only In this sense can we agree to Professor Barker's 
statement: "It is possible for nations to exist, and even to 
exist for centuries, in unreflectlve silence", p. 116. Until 
reflection has begun, wo can only speak of a people and not 
of a nation. 
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The French Revolution resumes the development which 
had. been interrupted in 1615, and which culminated in the 
proposal of the Third Estate in the Estates General to abjure 
the monarchical principles and to establish the sovereignty 
of the crown, but which replaces the dynastic by the national 
1 
principle. The idea of the nation gains a revolutionary 
force by its systhesis with the concept of the sovereignty 
2 
of the people. Here is found the unifying principle which 
makes it possible to integrate the essentially secular com­
petitive society, and to declare universally binding its social 
and political decisions. 
All these ideas have been clearly expressed by Sieyes. 
According to him, only the Third Estate is productive; the 
hitherto privileged Estates are negative, and stand therefore 
"hors de la nation". For him, the nation is the aggregate of 
those individuals who stand under a common law and are repre— 
sented by the same legislative assembly. The nation is sov­
ereign; its being is the functional justification of its 
existence; its will is the supreme law, and finds legal ex­
pression in the pouvoir constituent. The State stands in the 
lo The discussions on the concepts of people and nation 
in the deliberations of the Third Estate of 1789 are set out 
by Neumann, p. 123, and Meinecke, p. 24. 
2. Cf. Carre de Malberg, "Contributions a la Theorie 
Generale de l'Etat", Vol. 2, 168. 
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service of the nation. Its power is justified only if legiti­
mised by the nation. This conception of the nation is revo­
lutionary, and is directed against monarchy and aristocracy. 
The French aristocracy clearly saw the implications of this 
new conception, and replied to Sleyes (de Montloslor and do 
Maistre), that the aristocracy alone, or the aristocracy and 
1 
the monarch together, represent the nation. It 13 the demo­
cratic nation of free and equal citizens, the Jacobin concept 
of the French Revolution. 
4. This new polemical-political concept has certain 
concrete social functions. In the first place, modern demo­
cratic development presses towards the recognition of the now 
2 
nation. The necessity for large thickly populated economic 
territories necessitates the creation of the State, in which 
particular local and non-secular powers are annihilated, and 
In which a common currency, a unified taxation, ami a common 
system of transport, prevail. Therefore the Constitution of 
1791 (Tit. Ill, Preambule, Art. ler), and the Constitution 
of 1793 (Declarations des Droits, Art. 25), and that of 184U 
Art. I), state that the sovereignty of the nation is "lndl-
3 
visible, imprescriptible et inalienable". The nation watchoa 
1. Cf. Neumann, p. 124; de Maistre's statement runs as 
follows: "Qu'est ce qu'une nation? c'est 10 souveraln ot 
1'aristocratic. 
2. Otto Bauer, p. 177. 
3. The distinction between the sovereignty of the people 
and the sovereignty of the nation oven has its legal conse­
quences, according to the view held by French constitutional 
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jealously over Its rights# The deputies are elected in its 
name, and not in that of Estates, of territorial powers, or 
of social groups. Wo one may interpose himself between the 
individual and the nation, as was pointed out by the deputy 
le Chapelier, when he moved his famous law of June 14, 1791, 
forbidding the association of workers; "the individual", he 
said on this occasion, "owes allegiance solely and exclusively 
to the State, and to no one else". 
Thus far capitalism is imperialistic; national feeling 
becomes nationalism and thereby the servant of economic inter­
ests. The idea of the nation mobilises the nations for war. 
The nation therefore creates for capitalism the efficient 
State. 
5. The nation has also a sociological, as distinct 
from its economic, function. If a society desires to be dis­
tinguished from others, it must be marked off from these 
other groups. The integration of a society into a unit is 
possible only if this society is confronted with others, and 
if the integrating factor is efficient enough to invest this 
society with particular characteristics by which it can be 
distinguished from others. This process of individualisation 
lawyers; the Senate is reconcilable with the sovereignty of 
the nation but not with that of the people. Cf. Carre de 
Malberg, Vol. II, p. 175. 
1. Laski, pp. 26, 27. 
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was performed, after the breakdown of Mediaeval universalis™, 
by the dynastic principle. But the divine right of kings 
became ©bsol&te. The State as such could not serve as an 
integrating factor for the liberal society, as according to 
the liberal ideology the State has purely negative functions: 
the functions of guaranteeing liberty and security, of pre­
serving the state of nature, of protecting liberty and pro­
perty. Therefore the integrating function is taken over by 
the nation. The French nation, for instance, is alleged to 
be different and distinguishable from other nations. The 
constitutive element of the civil society is found. The na­
tion has become "an effective body of adherent united by a 
1 
sense of common interest". 
6. The English development deviates from the continent-
2 
al in that the concept of the nation, though known, plays no 
decisive role. Even Richard I. used to ask, when he wished 
contemptuously to refuse some unreasonable demand, "Do you 
take me for an Englishman?" The English State very early be­
comes centralised, and overcomes the feudal powers much earlier 
than the feudal States,, In political literature, the concept 
of the nation is very often to be found in Bacon's works; for 
instance, in his Essay XXIX (Of True Greatness of Kingdoms and 
1, Haw$fey,pp. 15, 27. 
26 Hertz, p. 9 ff. 
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of States) where he contrasts people and nation. The people 
is the mass of the workers and of the middle class, "The 
middle people of England make good soldiers." The nation is 
represented by the nobility and gentry, which boar the power 
and the greatness of the State, In the Great Revolution, the 
nation plays,of course, a greater role. The Hump Parliament 
appeals to the nation. The House of Lords is abolished by 
referring to the supreme authority of the nation. Hut in 
Cromwell's Instrument of Government there appears as the justi­
fying basis of the State the people which is represented in 
Parliament and comprises the three nations. In contrast to 
the French development, the people becomes, because of the 
plurality of nations, the unifying bond. After this, the 
concept of the nation does not play a great role In England; 
in the first place, because of its insular position; then be-
cause Tudor absolutism was incomparably milder and more popu­
lar than its continental equivalent; and further because 
England did not know a bureaucracy to the same extent an did 
the continent, so that the antagonism between the State and 
society was never bo strong; and finally because of the exist­
ence of a colonial empire which naturally tended to lay more 
stress on the integrating force of the monarchy than on that 
of the English nation. 
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V. In pre-war Germany, the concept of the nation in 
the Jacobin sense does not play any role; just as the idea 
the Rechtsstaat is divorced from the political structure, 
the concept of the nation is completely separated from that 
of the sovereignty of the people; in the works of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, the sovereignty of the nation is expressly denied. 
During Bismarck's period, the whole conception of the nation 
2 
is refuted, especially by Treitschke. 
8. In this period of the rise of the bourgeoisie, it 
is socially and politically undeniably identical with the 
nation. The bourgeoisie is in this period the historically 
progressive class. In the very moment, however, that the 
bourgeoisie has fulfilled its historical mission, and when, 
therefore, a politically self-conscious labour movement ap­
pears, there necessarily begins the struggle over the question 
to whom the concept of the nation belongs. In this moment 
the nation loses its integrating force. The claim of the 
bourgeoisie to be the nation becomes a privilege which on the 
continent Is used to denounce every non-bourgeois group as 
non-national, even as inimical to the fatherland. In such a 
situation two nations in reality exist. Paul Vienot in his 
book "Incertitudes Allemandes" has formulated the problem in 
this way; "besides the Germany of Weimar and the Germany of 
1. Meinecke, p. 39. 
2o "Politik", Vol. I, p. 28. 
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Potsdam, there exists an industrial and an agrarian Germany, 
a proletarian Germany and a Germany of the propertied classes, 
a Catholic and a Lutheran Germany, a Germany of the federal 
States and a Germany of the Reich, a Germany of the youth and 
one of the old age and, above all, a democratic and an anti­
democratic Germany". 
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C. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 
Section 1. The Generality of the Law 
I• The Concept of Generality. 
1. We have, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that 
the central idea of the liberal legal system is that of the 
generality of the law. This law is in the first place the 
positive law of the State, and not any kind of natural law 
as distinguished from it. Since Kant and Rousseau, the liberal 
legal theory has been entirely based upon the view that law 
is only valid if it can be imputed to the sovereign State, 
But the tradition of scholastic and secular natural 
law is not completely lost; it is still alive in the postulate 
of the generality of the law, The general law as a new materi­
al law is thus confronted with law in a formal sense. We have, 
therefore, very briefly to state the essentials of the concept 
of the generality of the law. The general law is opposed to 
any kind of individual command. The difference is a relative 
one. It is certain that every command of a superior authority 
to an inferior organ to perform a certain act is, in relation 
to the execution of the command, always general and abstract; 
"that is to say, that it can never comprehend the whole detail 
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1 
of the act in which it is to be fulfilled". So far, it is 
undoubtedly true that the execution of any coinmand leaves to 
the commanded person a certain kind of initiative. Grom this 
point of view, the individual command can be regarded as a 
general one. 
But it is equally true that the fact cannot be over­
looked that the amount of initiative left to that person is 
carrying out an individual order is so little that it can 
sociologically be neglected. The borderline, therefore, be­
tween general laws and individual commands runs through the 
various types of commands. By a general law, we understand, 
therefore, with Carre de Malberg, an abstract rule which does 
not mention particular cases or individually nominated persons, 
but which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all 
2 
persons in the abstract. Thus only two things are relevant. 
In the first place, according to Rousseau, the law is nominally 
general (nommement generale), without regard to the content; 
but this formal structure of the law contains at the same time 
a material element, namely the prohibition of retroaction. 
1. Michael B. Poster, "The Political Philosophies of 
Plato and Hegel", Oxford, 1935, p. 115. 
2. "une prescription qui ne vise ni un caa particuller 
et actuel, ni telles personnes determinees, mala qui est 
edictee d'avance pour s'appliquer a tous les cas et a toutes 
les personnes rentrant dans les previsions abstraits du texte 
regulateur". R. Carre de Ivlalberg, "La Loi, expression de la 
volonte generale, etude sur le concopt de la lol dans la Con­
stitution de 1875", Paris, 1951, p. 4; and. similarly "Contri­
bution a la theorie generale de l'etat", Vol. I, Paris, 1920 
p. 289 . 
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The relation between this formal structure of the Law 
and the social substructure falls, as Is to be proved, Into 
three divisions. 
2. (a) The general law has a socially and politically 
protective function. It Is equalising. In this lies the 
ethical value of the generality of the law, 
(b) The general law has a disguising function. 
In a class society and In a competitive economic system, a 
general law conceals the realities. By the postulate that 
the State may rule only through general laws, the competitive 
economic systom la Invested with the dignity of a moral value. 
(c) The general law in a competitive economic 
system has finally the function of rendering the exchange 
processes calculable and predictable. This function has been 
stressed especially in the works of Max Weber, and was Indirat-
1 
ed earlier by Pufendorf and Dentham. 
The conception that the general law, as the material 
law, is distinct from law in a formal sense is decisively 
Influenced by Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers, 
which assumes that it is possible materially to distinguish 
various functions of the State. His theory presupposes, there­
fore, that legislation, jurisdiction, and administration are 
1. On the throe functions, compare Part Three, (J., 
Section 4, p. 
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not only distinguishable by the performance of these three 
functions by three different organs of the State, but that 
the three functions are themselves substantially different. 
His theory further assumes the existence of a sphere of free­
dom of the individual which is fundamentally unlimited, so 
that any intervention of the State must be based upon general 
laws and must be controlled by independent judges, who do not 
create, but only declare, the law,, The elements of the system 
are, therefore, pre-State liberty, interference with this 
liberty by material laws and execution of the laws by independ­
ent judges; with the consequence of the separation of powers <> 
II. The French Doctrine. 
The French theory was developed under the influence 
of Rousseau and Montesquieu,, Both stress the generality of 
the law. But they are distinguished by the fact that in 
Rousseau's system the generality of the law is related to a 
material valvie, whereas in Montesquieu's doctrine this ethical 
basis is absent, and is replaced by his theory of the separa­
tion of powers o The postulate of the generality of the law 
can undoubtedly be traced to the influence of Descartes and 
Malebranche <, Montesquieu himself speaks of Descartes with 
admiration and respect, and Malebranche1s influence upon him 
1 
has been clearly proved. In Montesquieu's theory, as with 
10 Of. E. Buss, "Montesquieu and Cartesius in "Philosophi-
sche Monatshefte", Vol. IV, 1869-1870, p» 5. 
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Descartes, the world is based upon the general law of mechanics, 
which even God cannot alter because any individual utterance 
is alien to him; so that God withdraws from the centre of the 
universe and becomes "immense, spirituel, et infini". The 
law of the State is equally general; general as regards its 
origin as well as its content# Two ideas are, therefore, con­
tained in this postulate; the supremacy of the law, that is, 
the exclusive governance of the rule of law; and its generality. 
Both ideas, with all their implications and consequences, 
are clearly to be seen in the French Revolution. Miraboau, as 
chairman of the Committee for the Drafting of the Rights of 
Men, proposed on August 17, 1789, a motion which was verbally 
identical with Rousseau's fallacious conclusion that "la loi 
etant 1'expression de la volonte generale doit etre generale 
dans son objet". Consequently Art. 6 of the Declaration of 
1789 contained the provision that the law is the expression 
of the general will, which is repeated in Art. 6 of the 
Declaration of 1793, and in Art. 6 of the Constitution of the 
year III. 
But beside this notion of the general law there appears 
simultaneously a second concept law in a formal sense. The 
king had still the power to carry out certain legislative 
acts; so that the National Assembly was compelled to take into 
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account this legislative activity of the monarch, and bo sanc­
tion it by the law of October 12th - November 6th, 1789. 
"Les decrets (of the National Assembly) sanctionn£s par le 
Roi porturont le nom et l'intltul& de lois"; a formulation 
whose author was Robespierre. The Constitution of September 
3, 1791, (Titre III, ch. Ill, section III, art. 6) contains 
the following passage: "Les d^crets sanctlonnes par le Roi, 
et ceux qui lul auront et$ prisentSa par troia legislatures 
consScutives ont force de lol, et portent le nom et l1Intitule 
de lols". Here the legislator was more cautious. He did not 
conceive of a formal law as a law, but only gave to the formal 
law the name and the force of law. 
The Jacobin Constitution of June 24, 1793, which, how­
ever never came into operation, divides the decisions of the 
legislative council into two groups, "lols" and "d£crets". 
The latter are mainly administrative acts, the former must 
be submitted to the people. We clearly see in this distinc­
tion the all-pervasive influence of Rousseau. 
The dedislve influence emanates from the Draft of the 
Qlronde Constitution of 1793, where In section II, art. 4, 
the following distinction is made: "les caract&res qui dls-
tlnguent les lols sont leur g£nlralit6 et leur duree indSfinie", 
Apart from this, the Draft recognises at the same time decrets 
which are either locally or materially individualised; and 
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finally, it recognises the "raesures" (art, 7) in a state of 
emergency. The Constitution of the Directorate of the 5th 
Fructidor of the year III discriminates sharply between laws 
and any other kind of legislative act, by speaking of "les 
lois et les autres actes du corps legislatif"; but in art, 92, 
it is clearly expressed that every resolution of the Council 
of Five Hundred which has been adopted by the Council of 
Elders, is designated as a law. In the consular Constitution 
of the 22nd Frimaire of the year VIII, however, this distinc­
tion is no longer maintained. Now all decisions of the legis­
lative power, the issuing of the budget, the declaration of 
war and peace, the conclusion of alliances and of trade agree­
ments, are lois (art, 45, art, 50); but at the same time, the 
law becomes no longer an act of the tribunate or of the legis­
lative body, but of the government0 In the Chartes of Louis 
XVIII and Louis Philippe, the distinction is equally lackihg, 
and in the Constitution of 1875 (Law of February 25, 1875) no 
definition of law is to be found; the law simply states that 
the legislative power is exercised jointly by the two Chambers. 
In French constitutional theory — with the exception 
of Carre de Malberg — the separation of the two kinds of law 
is still maintained. It appears clearly for the first time 
1 
in Merlin's "Repertoire universel et raisonne de jurisprudence". 
1, 5th edition, 1827, p0 384. 
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He puts the question, whether every act of the legislative 
power can be called a law; and he answers no. Duguit, Esmein, 
and Barthelmy, all still maintain the distinction between the 
general law as law in a material sense, and non-general laws 
which are law in a formal sense,, A general law is an act of 
the legislative power creating a general legal situation, 
which is impersonal and abstract and which is intended to 
1 
govern categories of individuals and series of cases . No 
proof whatsoever is given by the representatives of contempor­
ary opinion as to the justifiability of the distinction between 
the two kinds of law. Duguit invokes Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu; but he fails to prove that the positive 
constitutional law of Prance recognises this distinction. 
Neither art. 6 of the Declaration of 1789, nor the cor­
responding provisions of the Declaration of 1793 and of the 
year III, give the slightest evidence that the legislature 
can only issue general laws# These passages can only mean, 
what the Constitution of 1791 (Titre III, ch„ II, section 1 , 
art. 3) clearly expressed: "II n'y a point en Prance d'au-
torite superieure a celle de la loi". The centre of gravity 
lies, therefore, in the genesis and not in the content of the 
law. That the Constitution of 1875 does not give the slightest 
1. Joseph Barthelmy Duez, "Traite de droit constitutionel, 
Paris, 1933, pp. 224, 225; Duguit, "Manuel de droit constitu­
tionel", Paris, 1923, p. 97; and "Traite de droit constitu­
tionel", 3rd edition, vol. II, Paris, 1921, p. 160. 
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indication that a distinction is to be drawn between the two 
different kinds of laws, has been convincingly proved by Carre 
de Malberg. He has shown that the Constitution of 1875 sought 
only to make good the degradation of Parliament under Napoleon,, 
so that it laid decisive stress on the democratic legitimation 
of the law and not on its content. 
"La domaine de la loi est sans bornes, comme celui de 
1 
la volonte generale". He has equally proved that French 
constitutional practice has never factually recognised the 
2 
two types of law. As we are not concerned with a discussion 
of the merits of the various French theories, it may be suf­
ficient to refer to the works of Carre de Malberg0 The asser­
tion of representatives of contemporary French opinion, such 
as Duguit, that law is only a general rule, and that an in­
dividual command is not a law even if issued by a "pretendu 
souverain", is a mere assertion which in fact represents a 
relapse into natural law theory. French constitutional 
3 
practice knows in fact a number of individual laws. It can­
not be doubted that in a competitive society law is typically 
general; but the postulate that every law must be necessarily 
and exclusively general is nothing but an attempt to absolutise 
a certain historical situation. The great importance which 
is usually attached to the generality of the law is decisively 
1. Carre du Malberg, "La Loi", p. 54. 
2. "Contribution", Vol. I, pp. 276, 314. 
3. Examples are to be found in Duguit, "Traite", Vol. II, 
p. 168; and Carre de Malberg, "Contribution", Vol.1, pa 295. 
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conditioned by the fact that the monarchs in the middle of 
the nineteenth century imposed constitutions and thereby, by 
their own wills, limited their sovereignty^ but only in so 
far as they committed the right to make law jointly to Par­
liament and to themselveso In such a situation it became, of 
course, necessary to matek off those subjects for which a law 
— that is, a joint decision of monarch and Parliament — was 
necessary, from those for which the monarch was still the sole 
authority. The decisive characteristic for such distinction 
was the notion of the generality of the law, which seemed also 
to be a necessary inference from Montesquieu's doctrine of 
the separation of powers and from the distinction between the 
material functions of the State involved therein# 
III. The German Dftctrine. 
The German doctrine is deeply indebted to the French, 
but at the end of the nineteenth century it diverges decisively 
from it. In the Germany of the mid-nineteenth century, con­
stitutional doctrine was entirely dominated by the above--
mentioned distinction between general (material) and individual 
(formal) laws. Only the general law is law. Individual laws 
are in contravention of the postulate of equality. If a set 
of concrete facts has already been realised historically, and 
is only then regulated by law, such law is merely an arbitrary 
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act. If the realisation of the set of facts 1s not yet his­
torically accomplished, its individual regulation is in any 
1 
case objectionable. Law, according to Robert von Mohl, is, 
therefore, a promulgation of the legislative authority, intend-
2 
ed to endure and characterised by its generality. Lorenz von 
Stein accepts Hegel's formulation: the law emerges from the 
consciousness of the State and has, therefore, to attain two 
ends; to regulate similarities of the factual life, and to 
5 
establish the differences between them. Kluber, like 
Blackstone, takes as his basis the natural law theory of 
Burlamaqui, whose book appeared in a German translation in 
1848; and postulates the generality of the law and equal rights 
4 
and equal duties of all citizens in similar situations. The 
same applies to Gfaeist, Rotteck, and many others. The German 
theory, however, rejects Montesquieu's doctrine of the separa­
tion of powers. Christian Wolff and Kant accepted it, but it 
was rejected by the majority of constitutional lawyers; as 
for instance, by Bluntschli and F.J. Stahl. 
The postulate of the generality of the law is, however, 
in itself sufficient to guarantee a minimum of separation of 
powers; it is on the whole sufficient to establish the inde­
pendence of the judges. A judge who may only apply general 
1. Robert von Mohl, "Politik", Vol. I, Tubingen, 1862,p.420. 
2. "Encyklopadie" of 1859, p. 139. 
3. "Verwaltungslehre", Vol. I, p. 78. 
4. Johann Ludwig Kliiber, "Offentliches Recht des Teutschen 
Bundes und der Bundesstaaten", Frankfurt am Main, 1846,pp.^63, 
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rules Is for that very reason not subject to individual com­
mands of the government. 
A constitution such as the Prussian Constitution of 
1805 (art. 62), and the Bismarck Constitution (art. 5), can 
offer not the slightest evidence for the existence of the 
dualistic theory of law. Both constitutions are concerned only 
with the origin of law, not with its content. Both simply 
state that law is any statute enacted by the two Chamberso 
1 
Under the influence, however, of Paul Laband the asser­
tion of the general character of the law is abandoned*, Laband 
admits that the laws enacted by Parliament are typically 
general, but he denies that generality is an essential char­
acteristic of the law. He introduces, however, another dis­
tinction between formal and material law0 For him, formal 
law is simply the form in which the will of the State is de­
clared, irrespective of its content. Material law, on the 
other hand, is essentially the promulgation of a rule creating 
a right ("Rechtssatz" or "regie de droit")„ These are two 
entirely different conceptions of law„ The consequence of 
the distinction is that a law may be a formal law (as for in­
stance the budget) because it has been enacted in accordance 
1. A predecessor is von Stockmar, in "Zeitschrift fur 
deutsches Staatsrecht", 1867, p. 201. Laband's works are: 
"Deutches Reichsstaatsrecht", Vth edition, ed. Otto Mayer, 
Tubingen, 1919, p. 114; and "Das Staatsrecht des deutschen 
Reiches", 5 vols, 2nd vol, Tubingen, 1911, p. 27. 
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with art. 5 of the Bismarck Constitution; but nevertheless 
if is not a material law, because a formal law such as the 
budget does not promulgate rules creating rights of individu­
als* On the other hand, an executive order may contain rules 
creating rights — as for instance, an order by the police 
regulating the traffic — and is therefore a law in a material 
sense, but not a law in a formal sense because it is not 
enacted according to art. 5 of the Constitution. This dis­
tinction between law in a formal and law in a material sense, 
as developed by Laband, was universally accepted by German 
constitutional lawyers* It was repeated by every text-book 
1 
on constitutional law and by every University teacher. 
But what is the rule creating a right, which is the 
basis of the dualistic theory? One searches Laband's works 
vainly for a definition. He gives only an approximative 
definition by distinguishing the rule creating a right from 
2 
the contract which contains duties and claims. That is to 
1. Gerhard Anschutz, "Kritische Studien zur Lehre vom 
Eechtssatz und formellen Gesetz", 2nd edition, Halle, 1911; 
Georg Meyer Gerhard, "Anschutz, Lehrbuch des deutsches Staats-
recht", 7th edition, Munich and Leipzig, 1919, pp. 657, 638; 
Hans Kelsen, "Ilauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre", Tubingen, 
1911, p. 538; Georg Jellinek, "Gesetz und Verordnung", Frei­
burg, 1887, p. 228; their chief opponent is Albert Plane 1, 
"Studien zum deutschen Staatsrecht", II, 2, Leipzig, 1888; 
and Hermann Pleller, "Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der Reichs-
verfassung" in "Veroffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutsch­
en Staatsrechtslehrer", Heft 4, Berlin and Leipzig, 1928, p.98; 
who on the whole repeats the criticism of Carre de Malberg. 
2. "Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches", Vol. II, p. 2. 
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say, it is practically the difference between objective and 
subjective law; so that material law is only given if an action 
of the State directly concerns the individuals in their mutual 
relations and thus creates claims of one individual against 
another, with the corresponding duties* Any action of the 
State which only affects the relation between State and indi­
viduals, or which only Indirectly affects the individuals in 
their mutual relations, is therefore not law in a material 
sense • 
Anschutz, a more liberal interpreter of Laband'a theory, 
has extended the realm of the law in a material sense® At 
first, he understood by material law all those rule® whose 
immediate aim was the delimitation of the spheres of activity 
1 
of individuals. By this conclusion he altered Laband'e 
theory by bringing the relations between State and individual 
within the conception of the material law# Still, however, 
the indirect, influencing of the legal status of the Individuals 
was left outside the realm of the material law. Later, how~ 
2 
ever, he understood by the material law all those norms which 
either directly or indirectly affrct the liberty or property 
of the citizens. By this extension he practically abandoned 
the dualistic theory. For can we conceive of any activity 
of the State which does not directly concern the citizens? 
1. "Krltische Studlen", p. 3S. 
2, Meyor-Anschutz, p. 654. 
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To-day we recognise more and more the interdependence of all 
social phenomena, and we are, therefore, unable to conceive 
of any activity of the State which in the last resort does 
not affect the status of the individual; whether it be the 
organisation of administrative bodies, or of Courts of Law, 
or the creation of public enterprises. 
IV• The English Doctrine. 
In view of the English theory of the relation between 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law, which we 
have considered above, it is not surprising that the dualistic 
theory is practically unknown in present-day England, This, 
however, was not the case in earlier theories* 
Blackstone in the first place confesses his faith in 
the existence of a natural law. In this, as has been shown 
by C.K. Allen and W.A. Robson, he simply adopted the theory 
1 
of Burlamaqui, whose work had been translated into English 
in 1748. By this confession Blackstone, however, only renders 
lip-service to natural law, which has no practical significance 
for his theory. This natural law is neither concretised nor 
2 3 
institutionalised. Even Bentham pointed out the inconsistencies 
1. C.K'. Allen, "Legal Duties and Other Essays in Juris­
prudence", Oxford. 1931, p. 124; and W.A. Robson, "Civilisation 
and Growth of Law", London, 1935, p. 47. 
2. Sir Frederick Pollock, "A Plea for Historical Juris­
prudence", in "Law Quarterly Review", Vol. XXXIV, p. 145; and 
Ernest Barker's "Introduction to Otto Gierke's "Natural Law 
and the Theory of Society", Vol. I, Cambridge, 1934, XLVI. 
3. "Comment on the Commentaries", Oxford edition, p. 152. 
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of Blackstone's theory of natural law; "he sinks Into a com­
promise which involves all the absurdities of the tenets he 
discovers"# Whereas Blackstone,on the one hand, postulates 
1 
the supremacy of the lex naturalis over the lex humana, on 
the other, he postulates far more insistently the supremacy 
of Parliament which can do what it likes, and recognises no 
remedy against it. 
But this criticism of Bentham's also applies to Black-
atone 's distinction between the various types of the lex 
humana. Law is for Blackstone "a rule of action dictated by 
some superior being", and municipal law (civil law) is "a 
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the superior power in a 
2 
State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong". 
Legislation is "the greatest act of superiority that can be 
conceived that can be exercised by one being over anothero 
Sovereignty and legislature are,indeed convertible terms; one 
3 
cannot exist without the other". But this sovereignty is 
not to be unlimited« No individual laws are to be issued by 
the sovereign. Individual laws are inadmissible» An individu­
al law is not law at all* It "does not enter into the idea 
4-
of a municipal law! it is rather a sentence than a law". 
1# Vol. I, P* 41. 
2. Vol. I, p. 37. 
So Vol. I, p. 46. 
4. Vol. I, p. 4-4. 
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Therefore the State may not order by law the confiscation of 
the property of one particular or of several particular persona„ 
Laws must, therefore, be general for moral reasons In that In­
dividual laws are unjust; and for utilitarian reasons, in 
that the State cannot give injunctions to every individual# 
General laws serve, therefore, the "perpetual information and 
direction of all persons in all points whother of positive or 
negative duty". Blackstone, however, does not draw any practi­
cal conclusions from this dualistic theory. The postulate of 
the sovereignty of Parliament stands side by side with the 
postulate that the State may rule only throiigh general laws; 
and the former postulate is far stronger than this latter one. 
Blackstone!s theory is, therefore, nothing more than a recom­
mendation to the legislative power to issue only general laws„ 
Generality is not an essential of his conception of law. 
2 
The same discord can be found in Austin's Lectures. He 
distinguishes law, or rules, from "occasional or particular 
commands". "Now where it obliges generally to acts or for­
bearances of a class, a command is a law or a rule". If, how­
ever, the legislative sovereign issues a particular command, 
Austin is compelled bo admit that this command is also law. 
1. Vol. I, p. 53. 
2. 4th edition, Vol. 1", p. 94. 
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The legislative authority of Parliament is in his theory en­
tirely unrestricted., so that the dualistic theory is without 
practical significance. 
The distinction between the two conceptions of law can 
also be found in Walter Bagehot's English Constitution (V): 
"A law is a general command applicable to many cases® The 
"special acts" which crowd the statute book md weary parlia­
mentary commentators are applicable to one case only"* He, 
too, attaches no practical significance to this dualism* 
The distinction between general and individual law must 
not be confused with the public and private bills of English 
constitutional practice# Although the private bill always 
provides for one individual case, the public bill need not 
necessarily have a general content. The two notions, there­
fore, do not coincide® A private bill might be defined as 
"a measure for the interest of some person or class of persons, 
whether an individual or corporation, or the inhabitants of 
a county, town, parish, or other locality, and originates on 
the petition of the person or persons interested"; whereas a 
public bill "is introduced as a measure of public policy in 
which the whole community is interested, and originates on 
the notion of some member of the House in which the Bill is 
1 
introduced". The difference is, therefore, one of interests„ 
1. Sir Courtenay Ilbert, "Methods of Legislation", 
London, 1912, p. 28. 
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And the final statement of Sir Courtenay Ilbert, that the 
subject-matter of a private bill is a privilegium, an "excep­
tion from the general law", must not be understood as meaning 
that a public law may not deal with one particular case# 
In the decisions of the Courts, I have been able to 
find only one case in which the distinction between individual 
and general laws was thoroughly discussed; Re v. Crewe (ex 
1 
parte Sekgome). The Court had to deal with the validity of 
a Proclamation of a colonial High Commissioner for detention 
of a native made under an Order in Council of May 9, 1891, 
and based upon the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53 and 54 
Vict, c* 37), by which the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. 
Farwell, L.J», in giving his judgment, began with the follow­
ing sociological statement: "The truth is that in countries 
inhabited by native tribes who largely outnumber the white 
population such acts, although bulwarks of liberty in the 
United Kingdom, might, if applied there, well prove the death 
warrant of the whites"; which means that the general law 
guaranteeing liberty has a disintegrating force if applied 
in a society based on inequality. He, therefore, admits an 
abrogation of the Habeas Corpus Act, either generally, or 
1. (1910) 2 K.B. 576, approved by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council (1926) A.C.,p. 518. 
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"in respect of a particular individual"; and Kennedy, L.J., 
adds that the Proclamation is a privllegium, "legislation 
directed against a particular person, and generally, as I hope 
and believe, such legislation commends itself as little to 
British legislators as it did to the legislators of ancient 
Rome"; and Rowlett (for the defendant) rightly pointed out 
the relationship between such Proclamation and the Bill of 
Attainder. 
Prom this it follows that however undesirable individu­
al laws may be according to present English constitutional 
theory, they are not prohibited; and its generality Is not 
recognised as being the essential characteristic of a law. 
1 
V« The Doctrine of the Non-retroactlvlty of the Law. 
"La retroactivity est le plus grand attentat que la 
loi puisse commettre; elle est le dechirement du pacte social, 
elle est 11annullation des conditions en vertu desquelles la 
sociltl a le droit d'exiger l'obeissance de l'individu; car 
elle lui ravit les guaranties qu'elle lui assurait, en ^change 
de cette obSissance qui est un sacrificeo La retroactivity 
ote a la loi son caractere; la loi retroaclt n'est pas une 
2 
loi." In these words Benjamin Constant characterises the 
1. Ferdinand Lasalle, "Das System der erworbenen Rechte" 
in"Gesammelte Schriften und Reden", ed. Eduard Bernstein, 
vols IX, X,XI. 
2. Monlteur du lerjuln, 1828, p. 755; quoted Lasalle, 
vol. IX, p. 53. A 
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retroactivity of the law. Its general character and its non-
re troact ivity are mutually linked* If law provides for an 
indefinite number of future individual cases, a retroactive 
law cannot possibly be law; because those facts already re­
alised are computable, and therefore the law is confronted 
with a definite number of particular cases* We have already 
drawn attention to Rousseau's theory which also in this re­
spect found its way into the revolutionary French legislation. 
Art. 8 of the Declaration of 1789, and art. 14 of that of 
1793, forbade penal laws having retroactive effect; "l'effet 
retroactif donne a la loi serait un crime". Merlin, however, 
during the Thermidor reaction, asserted that this principle 
had equally to be applied to civil law. Consequently art. 14 
of the Constitution of the 5th Fructidor of the year III pro­
hibited any kind of retroaction; "aucune loi, ni criminelle, 
ni civile, ne peut avoir d'effet retroactif". Art. 2 of the 
Code civil states that the law can only provide for future 
cases, and a similar provision is to be found in art* 4 of 
the Code penal. There is, however, in spite of the high es­
teem in which the principle of non-retroactivity is held by 
liberal constitutional theory, no doubt that the prohibition 
is only addressed to judges and not to the legislative body 
1 
itself. Since the statute of April 13, 1908, however, it Is 
1* Duguit, however, in his "Trait^ de Droit constitutionel", 
3rd edition, Vol. 2, Paris, 1921, p. 230, asserts that the 
principle of non-retroactivity applies also to laws issued by 
the legislative body, because he still affirms the validity 
of the Declaration of 1789. 
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clear that the legislative body is entitled to promulgate 
1 
laws with retroactive effect. 
The development in Germany takes a similar course. 
Section VIII of the order by which the Allgemeine Landrecht 
of February 5, 1794, was published, as well as section 14 of 
the Introduction to the Allgemeine Landrecht, prohibited re­
troaction, but only to the judge; whereas the legislature was 
at liberty to issue retroactive laws, but did so only in ex­
ceptional cases. An exception, however, is to be found in 
penal law# Here the prohibition of retroaction has also an 
ethical function, which finds expression in the two principles, 
"nullum crimen sine lege", and "nulla poena sine lege". 
Section 2 of the German penal code, valid until June 28, 1935, 
has formulated these principles in the following way: "a 
crime can only be punished if the punishment was determined 
by law before the crime was committed". This prohibition 
has been rigorously applied in German practice; so rigorously 
that even an analogous application of provisions of the penal 
2 
law was considered to be in contravention of this principle. 
The Reichsgericht decided that the theft of electricity could 
not be punished as a theft under section 242 of the penal law, 
1. Cf. J. Barthelmy, "Sur 1'interpretation de lois par 
le legislateur", Paris, 1909. 
2. Cf. "Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Penal Matters", 
Vol® 29, p. 11. 
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as that section provided only for the punishment of a theft 
of things; and electricity cannot he considered as a thing. 
In order to make it possible to punish the illegal appropria­
tion of electricity, a special statute had to he enacted hy 
Parliament. The Weimar Constitution raised this principle 
1 
even to the rank of a constitutional guarantee* National 
Socialist lawyers have asserted that the principle "nulla 
poena sine lege" derives from Roman law and for that reason 
2 
is inapplicable to a Germanic system of law. This assertion 
of the non-Germanic character of the principle of non-retro­
action was intended to Justify the famous Lex van der Lubbe 
(of March 29, 1933, Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p* 151), which in­
troduced retroactively the death penalty for certain crimes. 
Every legal historian knows, however, that it is nonsense to 
allege that the principle of non-retroactivity belongs to 
Roman law* Roman law never embodied such a principle* The 
Latin formulation of the principle, which derives from Feuer-
bach, is as little proof of its Roman origin, as the Latin 
or Greek designation of a disease proves that it was discover­
ed by Roman or Greek doctors* With this principle, "nulla 
poena sine lege", there was linked a second postulate, namely 
1. For U.S.A. cf. Caldor v. Bully 3 Dall: 386 (TJ.S*1798). 
2* Esp. Dr. Nicolai in Juristische Wochenschrift, 1933, 
p* 2315, and even the memorandum of the Prussian Minister of 
Justice for the reform of the penal law, p* 127. 
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the application of the milder penal law, if between the com­
mission of the crime and the trial the punishment had been 
mitigated by statute* This postulate can already be found in 
Merlin1s report on the retroactive effect of penal laws, in 
art# 1 and 4 of the law of September 5, 1792, of the Constitu­
ent Assembly, in sectiom 18 of the introduction to the Allge-
meine Landrecht, and in art. VII of the Prussian penal code 
of 1851; as well as in the German penal code. 
The attitude of English legal theory and practice is 
similar to that of the continent* Blackstone postulates that 
2 
"all laws should be, therefore, made to commence in futuro". 
But practice applies retroactive laws if a statute expressly 
3 
and clearly demands its retroactive application* Whenever 
a judge is by the express words of a statute compelled to 
apply it to past cases, he expresses his indignation in very 
4 
strong words; thus Parke: "It seems a strong thing to hold*..11 
or Vaughan-Williams, L.J.: "It is impossible, I think, to 
5 
believe". 
1* Laaalle, Vol* XI, p* 520* 
2* Vol. I, p* 46; and he invokes Coke's formulation: "Nova 
constitutio futuris formum imponere debit, non praeteritls". 
3* Craies, "Statute Law"p* 324; and Edward Beal,"Cardinal 
Rules of Legal Interpretation", 3rd edition, 1924, p. 468. 
4. Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Es* 22, 42* 
5* Smithies v* Nat. Assoc* of Plasterers (1909) 1 K.B. 
310, 319. 
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Section 2. The Law and the Judge. 
I. The Presentation of the Theory and Practice. 
The extraordinary significance of the general law in 
the liberal legal system places the problem of the application 
of the law in the centre of the discussion* If law, and law 
alone, provides regulations for the relations between individu­
als and between individuals and the State; if enacted law is 
the sole means of social change; this naturally does not mean 
that the written words produce these changes, but that the 
application of these words by organs of the State, in the 
sphere of social relations, fulfils those tasks which are 
attributed to the law. The attitude of the judges towards 
the law, and their position in the State, Is therefore the 
crux of the liberal legal system. 
Much has been written on this problem; but, in spite 
of the esteem in which I hold the theories which have been 
developed, I cannot see that the problem has been solved. 
One of the main reasons for the inadequacy of the solutions 
is the unhistorical and unsociological treatment of this 
problem, and the complete neglect of the interdependence of 
all social phenomena. The other main reason seems to be a 
syncretism of the methods with which this problem has been 
attacked. 
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1. Let us begin with the answer which the pure science 
gives to the question of the relation between Judge 
and law# In that theory, the Judge not only performs an act 
of recognition, but also an act of will. The function of 
the Judicial decision is to create "an individual legal norm, 
an individualisation and a concretisation of the abstraot 
1 
legal norm". This individual norm, however, stands as we 
have already seen in a relation of regulation and determina­
tion* It stands under the general norm, just as the general 
norm stands under the Constitution* The general norm determ­
ines not only the procedure but the content of the decision 
too. But this determination is never complete, so that there 
always is a certain amount of discretion for the Judge, The 
distinction between the function of creating and of concretise 
ing the law is thus only a quantitative one, and therefore 
2 
irrelevant for the pure science of law. The Judge Is rela­
tively free, that is, within the framework of the general 
3 
norm. 
Similar conclusions are drawn by Hermann Heller, from 
totally different premisses. He Is unable to determine sub­
stantively different functions of the State* All activities 
1, "Relne Rechtslehre", p. 79. 
2• Ibid,, p. 90. 
3* Ibid,i p. 98, 
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of the Stat© have substantially, therefore, the same character. 
They are only distinguished by the different forms in which 
those acts are performed, and "by the superior validity of one 
1 
activity of the State in relation to others• The conclusions 
reached by Jennings are similar to those of Heller. He, too, 
is unable to make a distinction between administration and 
justice, because every decision, be it one of an administrative 
body or of a Judge "involves ..*•• the general rule, the ascer-
2 
tainment of facts, the exercise of discretion". One difference, 
however, he sees in the "rule of precedent". Wherever a higher 
Court interprets general rules, this Court always makes new 
law; an administrative body, however, whose precedents can 
subsequently be disregarded at any time, does not make such 
law; as nobody has the right that "departmental practice shall 
be followed". 
2* By these conclusions, the pure science of law seems 
to contradict the orthodox theory of Montesquieu. In that 
theory, the judge only performs an act of recognition. The 
Judgment expresses only those ideas which are already contained 
in the general norm in an abstract way. The function of the 
Judge is that of making a mere logical subsumption, in which 
1. Hermann Heller, "Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der 
Reichsverfassung", p. 98. 
2« Jennings, p0 19. 
432 
the law is the major premiss, the facts of the case the minor 
premiss, and the decision of the judge nothing but the appli­
cation of this major premiss to the minor premiss • This 
1 
"Phonograph Theory", as Morris R. Cohen called it, has been 
2 
clearly formulated by Condorcet. The classical expression is 
3 
found in Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois"; "Les juges de la 
nation ne sont •... • que la bouche qui prononce les paroles 
de la loi des etres inanimes, qui n'en peuvent moderer ni la 
force, ni la rigeur". Because of this alleged insignificance 
4 
of judicial acts they are "en quelque facon nul"; but only if, 
as in England, the judges are drawn from the body of the people 
at certain times of the year* The connection between this 
"Phonograph Theory" and the distinction of substantially dif­
ferent functions of the State has been clearly formulated by 
s 
Cagalls: "Dans toute soclete politique, il n»y a que deux 
pouvoirs, celui qui fait la loi et celui qui la fait executer* 
Le pouvoir judiciaire, quo qu*en aient dit plusieurs publl-
cistes, nfest qu'une simple fonction, puisqu'il consiste dans 
1. Morris R# Cohen, "Law and the Social Order", p. 112. 
2, Le juge a "de faire un syllogisms dont la loi est la 
majeure; un fait plus ou moins generale la mineure; et la 
conclusion 1'application de la loi". Rapport sur le projet 
girondin, Archives parlamentaires LVIII, quoted Joseph 
Barthelemy: "Le role du pouvoir executif dans les republiques 
modernes", Paris, 1906, p» 489. 
Montesquieu, "Esprit des Lois", XI, 6. 
• Archives parlementaires, lre serie, Vol. XV, p. 892. 
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lfapplication pure et simple de la loi. L'application de la 
loi est une dependance du pouvoir exScutif". The same idea 
2 
is expressed in the Federalist. There, invoking Montesquieu, 
Hamilton considers to be "the weakest of the three departments 
of power". "The courts must declare the sense of the law." 
Hobbes also accepts this theory by saying: "For every Judge 
of right or wrong, is not Judge of what is commodious or in-
3 
commodious to the Commonwealth", and even Hale, in his History 
of the Common Law, asserts "yet they do not make t he law, 
properly so called, for that only the king and Parliament 
can do". Jurisdiction is called a process of "deduction and 
illation upon those laws". In this phonograph theory, "the 
law was taken to be complete and self-sufficient, without 
antinomies and without gaps, wanting only arrangement, logical 
development; of the implications of its several rules and con-
5 
ceptions and systematic exposition of its several parts". 
Modern English legal theory accepts in practice this orthodox 
theory; "there is, in fact, no such thing as judge-made-law, 
1. Ibid. 
2* No* LXXVIII, Hamilton. 
3. "Leviathan", Chap. 26. 
4. Ed. Runnington, 1820, chap, IV, p. 90. 
5. Roscoe Pound, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Law", New Haven, 1924, p. 48; similarly Max Weber, in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", p. 395. 
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for the judgesjdo not make the law, though they frequently 
apply existing law to circumstances as to which it has not 
previously been authoritatively laid down that such law is 
1 
applicable". "It is in my opinion impossible for us to create 
2 
any new doctrine of common law*" Any Lord Shaw, a member of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, has given to that 
idea the final formulation; "the legislator is free and the 
3 
Judiciary bound". 
4 
Bentham argued the preferability of a codification 
in the following words: "A code •••• would not require schools 
for its explanation, would not require X& casuists to unravel 
its subtleties® It would speak a language familiar to every­
body; each one might consult it at his need.... Judges should 
not make new Law..** Commentaries, if written, should not be 
cited.... If a Judge or advocate thinks he sees an error or 
omission, let him certify his opinion to the Legislature". 
French doctrinairism carried Bentham's postulate to 
its logical perfection, and even transformed it into a reality* 
5 
The Constituent Assembly accepted Montesquieu's theory. 
1. Lord Esher M.R. in Willis & Co* v. Baddeley (1892) 
2, Q.B. 324/326. 
20 Farwell L.J. in Baylis v. Bishop of London (1913) 1 
CI. at 137; cf* also Mirehouse v* Rennell 1 CI. and F. 527, 
p. 46; and Dicey1s observations in Law and Opinion, pp. 336, 
367. 
3. American Law Review, 1911, p. 275. 
4* "General View of a Complete Code of Laws", Bowring 
editionp-
5. Vol. Ill, p. 210. Francois Geny, "Methode de l1Inter­
pretation et Sources du Droit Prive posltif", 2nd edition, 
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Robespierre declared: "Ce mot de jurisprudence des tribuneaux 
.... doit Stre efface de notre langue. Dans un etat qui a 
une constitution, une legislation, la jurisprudence des tribu-
neaux n'est autre chose que la loi". Consequently the decree 
of August 16th and 24th, 1790, which carried out the doctrine 
of the separation of powers, prohibited the judge from inter­
preting a law. If the judge has doubts as to how a statute 
is to be interpreted, he must apply for help to the legisla­
tive power* The law says: "Les tribunaux s'adresseront au 
corps l£gislatif toutes les fois qu'ils croient n&cessalre 
d«interpreter une loi% The functions of this r£i£re legis-
latif were later taken over by the Tribunal de Cassation 
(later, Court de Cassation), which had the task of controlling 
every judgment as to whether it contained an express contra­
vention of the wording of the law® But it must be kept in 
mind that this tribunal was not conceived to be a court, but 
a mandatory of the legislative power, as Is shown by the 
Constitution of 1791 (Titre III, ch. V« Art. 21 and Art. 19): 
"II y aura un tribunal de cassation, £tabll auprSs du corps 
lgislatifM. The r£fer£ au lSglslateur has been abolished by 
Paris, 1919, pp. 77, 84; and Carrl de Malberg. "Contribution". 
Vol. I, p. 719. ' 
1. Archives parlementaires, ler s£rie, Vol. XX, p0 516: 
similar formulations are used by Chapeller. 
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Art, 4 of the Civil Code, and the Tribunal de Cassation 
changed its functions; it had now no longer to look only for 
a formal violation of t he wording of t he law, but also for 
wrong interpretations. By this, the admissibility of inter­
pretation was implicitly admitted. Portalis who exercised a 
decisive influence on the drafting of the Civil Code by his 
Discours PrSliminaire, expressly gave to the judge the right 
to interpret law and to fill its gaps; "Nous reconnaissons 
dans les juges l'autorite de statuer sur les choses qui ne 
2 
sont p&s dSterminees par les lois"« According to Portalis, 
it is impossible for the legislator to foresee all possible 
cases* Therefore the judge has to fill the gaps "par les 
lumieres naturelles de la droiture et du bon sens" (Vol* I, 
p» 467)• This idea of Portalis, which found its way into the 
Code Civile, has, however, not prevailed in French legal 
theory and practice. On the contrary, the "ficole de 1'ExSgese 
3 
was completely victorious. 
Bonnecase mentions the characteristic fact that the 
turning point in the history of French legal thought is the 
1. Glny, Vol, I, p. 92 ff. 
2« Quoted Fenet, "Recueil Complet des Travaux preparatoires 
du Code civil", I-XIV, Paris, 1836, Vol. I, pp. 467-476. 
3. Geny, Vol. I, pp. 17-60; and Julien Bonnecase, "La 
Pensee jurldique francaise de 1804 a l'heure presents", 2 vols, 
Bordeaux, Vol. I, p. £46. 
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year 1830; from then on, for half a century, this doctrine 
prevailed practically unchallenged. 
The R$f&rl legislatif has been formally abolished by 
the laws of August 30, 1828, and April 1, 1837. 
The decisive significance of this institution is the 
attempt to carry the supremacy of Parliament to lta logical 
conclusion, and to prevent the establishment of a mile of 
judges veiled by the "Phonograph Theory"• These attempts, 
however ridiculous they may appear to us to~day, distinguish 
that period from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when 
the orthodox theory of Montesquieu prevailed without finding 
its corrective in such institutions« To-day the orthodox 
theory is a doctrine hiding the power of the judges* The 
French revolutionary period, however, by establishing the 
RlflrS legislatif, really attempted to reduce the power of 
the judges as much as possible* 
Similar developments took place in Germany. A decree 
of Frederick the Great, of April 14, 1780, also forbade to 
1 
judges the interpretation of laws; and this decree was only 
repealed by his successor, by means of another of March 8, 
1798. Section 4 of the introduction to the Allgemeine 
1» In Austria, Joseph II similarly introduced, in Art* 
XIII of Ms Code of 1786, the rlf6r£ legislatif if no clear 
decision could be found in a statute* 
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Landrecht forbade Judges to interpret laws against the wording 
of the law and the context of the words of a law# Paul Johann 
Anselm Feuerbach, the founder of the German science of penal 
law, was as much opposed to any kind of commentary as was 
Bentham# He declared it to be absurd to interpret penal laws 
by books, and it is probable that the Bavarian instruction of 
October 19, 1815, which prohibited officials and private 
scholars from writing a commentary on the Bavarian penal code 
1 
of 1815, was due to his influence# But Feuerbach's great 
2 
opponent, Savigny, took practically the same line. He sees 
in statutes and customary law the only sources of law. The 
Judge has only the function of recognising law in its truth. 
Even the filling of gaps is to be done by positive law# 
Therefore any attempt to make Savigny a forerunner of the 
School of Free Discretion must fail# 
With the victory of Juridical positivism about the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the triump/jof Montesquieu's 
theory is complete* The law is a dogma, the interpretation, 
therefore, dogmatic. The difference between the historical 
school and the dogmatic school is not great# For the his­
torical school was convinced of the prejudicial existence 
1# Gustav Radbruch, "Feuerbach", Vienna, 1954, p. 85. 
2. "System des heutigen romischen Rechts", Vol. I, 
Berlin, 1840. 
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of the law, and whereas for the dogmatic school law was only 
realised in statutes and codes, for the historical school it 
was to be found in codified and customary law* Both repudiat­
ed the right^of the Judge to entertain considerations of equity 
or morality. 
3* The absolute subjection of the judge under the law 
is supplemented by complete denial of the right of .judicial 
review. Prom the logical definition of the conception of the 
separation of powers nothing can be deduced as to whether such 
Judicial review follows from that notion or is incompatible 
with it. One can, of course, argue, with Hamilton in the 
Federalist (no. LXXVIII^ that "There is no position which de­
pends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated 
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which 
it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, 
contrary to the Constitution, can be valid". With equal logic 
one can deduce from the superiority of the legislative power 
the exact opposite of Hamilton's theory. The decision as to 
whether judicial review is compatible with the idea of the 
separation of powers has nothing to do with logic, but every­
thing to do with politics• 
The problem was practical in Germany for the first time 
in Hessen in 1849, when the judges declared void an emergency 
1. Cf. for instance the following decisions of the German 
Supreme Court in civil matters, Vol. 95, p. 35; Vol. 97. p.312j 
Vol. 98, p. 124. 
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Taxation Decree of the Government# In consequence of thio 
conflict, German constitutional theory was divided into two 
camps* The liberals advocated the right of judicial review; 
2 
the conservatives, of course, repudiated it. Although the 
fourth meeting of the German Jurists in 1863 declared itself 
in favour of judicial review, the number of the adherents of 
this principle dwindled rapidly during the Bismarck period, 
so that at the end of the nineteenth century, theory and 
practice were nearly unanimous in rejecting the controlling 
right of judges. The German Court! recognised such right only 
with regard to decrees, and allowed Judges only the right to 
examine whether such executive decree was covered by delega­
tion by a statute* The Supreme Court further admitted the 
authority of the Judges to examine laws of the federal States 
3 
as to their compatibility with the law of the Reich. The 
admissibility of judicial review of statutes of t he Reich 
and of the federal States as to their compatibility with the 
Constitutions concerned was clearly and tfHHK unmistakably 
4 
denied. 
1* Zachariae in "Archiv fur clvilistlsche Praxis", Vol.16, 
p. 170j and Schulze-Gavernitz, "Das Preusslsche Staatsrecht", 
Vol. II, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1881, p. 40. 
2. P.J. Stahl, "Rechts* und Staatslehre", Vol. II, p. 508. 
3. "Decisions of the Supreme Court in Civil Matters", 
Vol. 24, p. 3i Vol. 40, p. 69; and Vol. 48, p. 87. 
4. Ibid., Vol. 77, p. 231; and in "Juristische Wochen-
schrift", 1916, p. 596. 
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Almost the same views are held by English theory and 
1 
practice. 
4. The other radical position is taken by the American 
2 
Realists. Whereas for the pure science of law, law is the 
sum of constitution, general norms, decisions, and administra­
tive acts; and whereas for dogmatic jurisprudence, the only 
law is codified and statutory law; for realistic jurisprudence 
law is but the sum of Judicial decisions. "The law of the 
state ...• is composed of the rules which the courts, that is 
the judicial organs of that body, lay down for the determina«* 
3 
tion of legal rights and duties." The judge is not only the 
1. Cf• Chih-Mai Chen, "Parliamentary Opinion of Delegated 
Legislation", Col\ambia University Press, 1923, p. 20; John 
Willis, "The Parliamentary Powers of English Government De­
partments", Harvard University Press, 1933, p. 91; William A. 
Robson, "Justiee and Administrative Law", Chap. Ill; and the 
following decisions: Sands v. Child 3 Lev. 532 (1693); 
Raleigh v. Goschen 1 Ch. 73 (1898); Re Petition of Rights 
(1915) 3 K.B. 649; Att. Gen. v. De Keyser's Hotel (1920) A.C. 
508. 
2. John Chipman Gray, "The Nature and Sources of Law", 
N.Y., 1916; K.N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence", 
Columbia Law Review, 1930, p. 431*"Some Realism about Realism", 
(1931), 44, Harvard Law Review, 31; "Prajudizienrecht und 
Reehtsprechung in Amerika", Leipzig, 1935; Underhill Moore, 
"Rational Basis of Legal Institutions", 1923, Columbia Law 
Review, p. 609; Jerome Prank, "Law and the Modern Mind", New 
York, 1930; A.L. Goodhart, "Some American Interpretations of 
Law" in "Modern Theories of Law", London, 1933, p. 1 ff.; 
Morris R. Cohen, "Law and the Social Order", New York, 1933; 
Hermann Kantorowicz, "Some Rationalism about Realism", 1934, 
(43) Yale Law Review, p. 1240. 
3. Gray, p. 191. 
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1 
discoverer but the author of the law. The reason that the 
judges do not like to admit this simple proposition lies in 
the fact that they want to veil their power# Consequently, 
realistic jurisprudence suggests that students should turn 
2 
from the study of material law to that of judicial behaviour. 
Prank, for instance, denies any certainty of the law* He 
admits that public opinion asks for certainty, but the asser­
tion that the law is certain is for him a mere mytho Law is 
"largely vague and uncertain" even in a relatively static 
3 
society. He attempts to give a partial interpretation of 
this drive for certainty, and he finds it psycho-analytically 
in the fact that man as a child always regards his father as 
the infallible judge# Man, however, always remains the victim 
of his childish desires# In the substitute of law, he re­
discovers his father, and he ascribes to the law those quali­
ties v«hich he ascribed to his father when he was a child# 
Although Prank in many places asserts his interpretation to 
be only a partial one, the fact that he expressly rejects the 
constitutive character of religious, aesthetic, and economic 
factors, and all other psychological factors such as "a par­
tial interest in peace and quietness", "imitation", "inertia", 
1# Gray, p. 21. 
2. Llewellyn, "Realistic Jurisprudence", p. 442. 
3o Prank, "Law and Modern Mind", pp# 5-6. 
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"laziness","stupidity", shows that his partial interpretation 
becomes a complete one. His definition of law consequently 
goes even farther than that of Gray: "For any particular lay 
person the law with respect to any particular set of facts, 
is a decision of a court with respect to those facts so far 
as that decision affects that particular person. Until a 
court has passed on those facts no law on that subject is yet 
in existence. Prior to such a decision, the only law available 
is the opinion of the lawyers relating to that person and to 
those facts* Such opinion is not actual law but only a guess 
as to what the court will decide". He, therefore, distin­
guishes between actual law, consisting of already reached de­
cisions, and probable law, containing a guess as to future 
decisions# His final thesis is that the Jurist has to "catch 
the spirit of a creative scientist which yearns not for safety 
but for risk, not for certainty but for adventure which thrives 
on experimentation, invention and novelty and not on nostalgia 
for the absolute, which devotes itself to new ways of manipu-
lating protean particulars and not to the quest of undeviating 
2 
universale". The process of application of the law begins, 
therefore, with the "hunch" of the Judge, which is only subse­
quently rationalised. The traditional theory that the appli­
cation of law Is no more than an act of recognition, Is a 
1, Frank, p, 46# 
2t Ibid,, p, 98. 
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mere veil# Rules only have the task formally to Justify the 
Judge, and sometimes even hinder a good decision* "At their 
best, when properly employed, they have undeniable value* The 
conscientious Judge, having tentatively arrived at a conclusion 
can check up to see whether suoh a conclusion • ••• can be 
linked up with the generalised points of view*... If none such 
are discoverable, he is forced to consider more acutely whether 
his tentative conclusion is wise, both with respect to the 
case before him and with respect to possible Implications for 
future cases." Rules are, therefore, nothing but "formal 
clothes" for the Judge. In the second part, he applies his 
2 
theory to the doctrines of "oertain brilliant legal thinkers". 
He demands adult fudges such as Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, who have compensated for their father-complexes» "If 
the search for the father-Judge is ended. If the authorlty« 
ridden mode of regarding law Is eliminated, If men see law as 
a human adjustment and not as a gift or mandate from some ex­
ternal source, no violent transformation need or will oocur. 
The relief from fear of chance might not result In the adop­
tion of a policy of lnoessant hectic change, but will lead 
1. Prank, p. 130. 
2» The selection is very strange* It is certain that 
Dean Pound and Cardoso are "brilliant legal thinkers"; but 
it Is equally certain that this terra cannot be applied to 
Jhering, Demogue, and Wurzel. The most influential legal 
thinkers of the Continent are missing, such as Glny, Duguit, 
Haurlou, Lambert, in Prance, and Max Weber, Eugen Ehrllch, 
and Radbruch, in Germany. 
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1 
to a policy of healthy and vital growth." 
5* The Continental reaction against dogmatic juris­
prudence is expressed in the theory of the School of Free 
2 
Discretion. The School of Free Discretion is decisively 
based upon the theory of Francois Geny; according to which 
law is not only contained in statutes, as the legal system 
is not closed and complete but has gaps which must be filled. 
And they can only be filled with legal rules; therefore the 
decision of the judge must be a legal one# These rules must 
be general in order to fulfil the demands of the principle of 
equality. These rules are found by the judge, who is, there­
fore, not a mere "slot-machine™, but has creative functions. 
1. Frank, p, 250. 
2* Bibliographys, Eugen Ehrlich, "Freie Rechtsfindung", 
1903; "Grundlegung TB4&- Soziologie des Rechts", Munich and 
Leipzig, 1913; Gnaeus Flavius (Hermann Kantorowicz), "Der 
Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft", 1906; "Rechtswissenschaft 
und Soziologie", Tubingen, 1911; "Tat und Schuld", Zurich, 
1933; "Aus der Vongeschichte der Freirechtsschule", 1925; 
"Some Rationalism about Realism", 1934 (43) Yale Law Review, 
p» 1240; Franz Neumann. "Richterlichejf Ermessen und Methoden-
streit im Arbeitsrecht , in "Arbeitsrecht", 1929, p# 321 ff»; 
"Die polltische und soziale Bedeutung der arbeitsgeschichtliche 
Rechtsprechung", Berlin, 1929; Julien Bonnecase, "La Pensee 
juridique francais de 1804 a l'Heure presente", 2 vols, 
Bordeaux, 1933; Francois Geny, "Methode d1Interpretation et 
Sources du Droit prive positif", 2nd edition, Paris, 1919; 
Ignaz Kornfeld, "Soziale Machtverhaltnisse", Vienna, 1911; 
Ernst Fuchs, "Juristischer Kulturkampf", Karlsruhe, 1912; 
"Was will die Freirechtschule?", Rudolstadt, 1929. 
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To this theory of the sources of t he law there are at­
tached certain postulates of t he reform of the legal system, 
which are best expressed in the famous pamphlet of Gnaeus 
Flavius (Hermann Kantorowicz), and in the pamphlets of Ernst 
Fuchs, and which are directed to the revision of the relation 
between law and the judge. These two parts, the theoretical 
observations on the sources of t he law, and the postulated 
political theory, must be rigidly separated# In so far as 
the School of Free Discretion represents a political theory, 
it demands the supersession of formal rational law by legal 
standards of conduct* Whereas Kantorowicz, the German founder 
of the school, in his later works laid more stress on the 
theoretical aspects of the teaching of the School of Free 
Discussion, his successors have mainly underlined its poli­
tical postulates as it is, for instance, expressed by Ernst 
1 
Fuchs: "The civil code is good only in one place, namely, 
where it abandons abstract casuistries, and only puts up a 
finger-post. It bears the inscription: 'Entrance to the 
Free State of Law of the Needs of Exchange'. It is the 
section 242. This regal paragraph proved subsequently to be 
the Archimedic point, from which the old legal world could 
be shaken to its foundations". 
1. "Die Justiz", Vol. 1, p. 349 
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II. The Theoretical Evaluation of the Doctrines* 
This plethora of doctrines must not prevent us from 
recognising clearly some fundamental facts# For us, indeed, 
there stands in the centre of the discussion, not the theo­
retical problem of whether this or that theory is right or 
wrong, hut rather the politico-sociological problem of why 
in a certain historical period a certain theory became pre­
valent, and of what social function it performed. 
1• It cannot be doubted that the function of the Judge 
does not consist in a mere act of recognition. Hegel already 
drew attention to this fact. The judicial process Is, 
therefore, an indistinguishable mixture of theoretical and 
practical, recognising and creative^, reproductive and pro­
ductive, scientific and supra-scientific, objective and sub-
2 
jective elements. Since Karl Mannheim raised the sociology 
of knowledge to the rank of science, we have been in posses­
sion of a technique, even if not fully developed, enabling 
3 
us to distinguish the existential determination of thought. 
"The existential determination of thought must be supposed to 
be a proven fact, in those spheres in which we succeed in 
showing (a) that the process of recognition does not his­
torically develop itself according to 'immanent laws of 
1. "Philosophy of Right", section 211, addition. 
2# Gustav Radbruch, "Rechtsphllosophie", 3rd edition, 
Leipzig, 1932, p. 111. 
3. Karl Mannheim, "Wissenssoziologie im Handworterbuch 
der Soziologie", p. 659; and Morris Ginsberg, "Sociology", 
p. 216 ff. 
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development*j that Is in no way determined toy the 'nature of 
things' and toy 'pure logioal possibilities^ in no way by a 
'immanent spiritual dialeotlo1j but that decisively extra-
theoretical factors of a totally different kind, which we 
are aocustomed to call factors of existence, arise and deter­
mine the process of thoughtj and (b) that the emergence of 
those faotors of existence whioh determine the concrete content 
of knowledge are not only of a peripheral significance, but 
determine it in content and form, in structure and way of 
formulation." This existential determination of the Judicial 
process happens in the first place when the Judge tries to 
disoover the concrete faots of the case* The distinction be-
tween material and immaterial faots, the evaluation of state-
ments of the parties and of witnesses, in so far as rigid 
laws of evidence do not exclude the possibility of such in­
terpretation, is to a large extent the work of the will of 
the Judge and not a mere logioal process# The evaluation of 
evidence, is so to speak, dependent upon the metal climate 
of the Judge. The second sphere in which the mental climate 
of the Judge becomes operative is the interpretation of the 
legal miles, be they contained in a code, In a statute, or 
in precedents# An abundance of legal norms are open to in­
terpretation. Whether the Judge prefers this or that inter­
pretation, whether he applies a precedent or disregards it 
449 
with the help of the art of distinguishing, is entirely a 
matter of free will, 
Whoever, therefore, begins a book on the judicial pro­
cess with the proof that this process does not consist of a 
mere act of recognition, is proving the obvious. 
Given this basic assumption, the pure science of law 
is right in maintaining that the concept of law-making cannot 
be identified with that of legislation, and must not be con­
fused with the activity of certain organs of the State; and 
that, therefore, the concept of law (Recht) cannot be identi-
1 
fied with that of statutory law (Gesetz); but this conclusion 
of the pure theory of law, that there is no qualitative dif­
ference between legislation and Jurisdiction, has no great 
significance. However the theoretically unassailable position, 
that there is no theoretical distinction between legislation 
and Jurisdiction, is important for the refutation of all those 
doctrines which assert the existence of an unbridgeable gulf 
between legislation and the application of law, such as,for 
instance, the decision of the U,S, Supreme Court in the recent 
Schechter case. 
Prom this basic position, however, the contribution 
made by American realism, although significant, appears in no 
way decisive# Let us choose Prank's book# Prank asserts 
!• Kelsen, "Allgemeine Staatslehre", p. 231# 
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several times that his is only a partial interpretation* Par­
tial interpretations, however, have a merely illusory charac­
ter if one omits to state the relation of this part to the 
others# On this point, Frank remains silent* He repeatedly 
asserts that the father-as-judge theory does not represent 
the whole truth. But the passion with which he rejects any 
other Interpretation shows that this partial interpretation 
transforms itself in his hand into a complete one* His in« 
capacity to determine its relation to the various facts is 
clearly shown when he deals with the function of rules* He 
cannot ignore them, but he asserts them to he only formal 
clothes of the judge* But they are more even in his theory* 
It is true that the decision starts with the "hunch", hut in 
his view the judge has to give up the "hunch" if this intui­
tion of his is in open contradiction to the rule or to the 
case* So that practically the rule, as distinguished from 
the decision of the judge, has a reality of its own* His 
mistake, like that of all other realists, is that he does not 
see the real existence of the rules* The rule is a means for 
human adjustment, as is the decision of the judge, which in 
his view is the sole means* And the rule is as little a gift 
or mandate from some external power as is the judicial deci­
sion* It is as much the work of man as is the judgment of a 
Court* His merit, however, consists in having demonstrated 
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that the quest for certainty, for absolute security, is a 
phenomenon of bourgeois society* The bourgeois, in spite of 
the fact that in his philosophy the individual moves in the 
centre of the universe, always clings to something absolute; 
and this absolute is since Descartes the universal law. But 
Prank simply substitutes for the absolute law the absolute 
judge, who assumes the role of the absolute unrestricted 
leader. It is, therefore, true XHMX when Prof. Ooodhart says 
that the doctrines of the realist school itself are due to an 
inferiority complex. His psycho«analytical.interpretation of 
law is as much a bourgeois theory as is the orthodox theory 
of Montesquieuo 
His theory in no way explains why a Judge decides in 
in 
this or/that way, and why we have current opinions as to in­
terpretation of ruleB. 
This problem can only be solved by the method of soci­
ology, 
2. The thinking of the Judge is determined by two 
sets of factorso In the first place, by individual dominants; 
by his dislike or liking for certain lawyers or parties, or 
of males or females, or of Catholics or Protestants, or Jews. 
These individual dominants are indeterminable. They can only 
be rationalised if they have become typical habits and can, 
therefore, be observed and taken into account. 
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Par more important, however, is that the social struc-
1 
ture conditions mentality* The manner in which he regards 
a thing, what he grasps, and how he mentally transforms it, 
is basically determined toy his social position. The existen­
tial determination of thought differs in the various stages 
of the judicial process# We follow Mannheim1s distinction 
2 
between the various stages of thought. The first stage is 
that of intuition (Finden). Here the Judge waits for the in­
tuition, the "Hunch". It is the most primitive stage of 
thought, and is realised in the Cadi-justice, or in the activi­
ty of the jury. In this stage, the part played by thinking 
is relatively small, or is non-existent» The decision is 
mainly an unconscious reaction. 
But the judge does not stop short at this stage# He 
ascends to the stage of inventive thought (Erfinden). The 
process of subsumption begins# The judge is not allowed to 
be satisfied with an intuition; he is compelled to produce 
arguments, that is, to rationalise the intuition» At this 
stage of inventive thought, the share of thought is large, 
but the existence determines the thought. If the judge now 
begins to think sociologically, he ascends to the third stage, 
that of planned thought (planendes Denken). Sociologically, 
1. Karl Mannheim, "Wissensoziologie", p. 662. 
2« Karl Mannheim, "Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter 
des Umbaus", Leiden, 1955, p. 93. 
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this means — from the judge's point of view — that he makes 
himself conscious of the fact that his thinking is existen-
tially determined. This sociological self-analysis is in my 
view the first task of the Judge# This problem was presented 
in a very interesting way in Germany on the occasion of a 
controversy between the former President of the Supreme Court, 
Dr» Simons, and Radbruch, the former Reich Minister of Justice 
and Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Dr„ Simons asserted 
that no Marxist could possibly become a judge, as every 
Marxist is biassed by his conception of class struggle; as 
against which, Radbruch replied that only a Marxist can pos­
sibly be a Judge, as he is able consciously to see the de­
termination of his judicial process by his existence and by 
that of the parties to the litigation, "Planned" thought 
means materially — according to its function — the fitting 
of the Judge's decision not only into a logical system of 
rules, but into a social system which is determined by the 
constitution. 
3, Marxism fills materially this methodological con­
clusion of the sociology of knowledge, by the assertion that 
the attitude of the judge towards the law is conditioned by 
1 
the class relationship upon which it is dependent* The 
1. Ernst Traenkel, "Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz", 
Berlin, 1927, p» 27. 
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principal assertion of Marxism is that in a class society 
justice must necessarily be class justice, but it does not 
seek to indite the judge, but only to explain the function of 
the judge in modern society. Marxism, therefore, distinguishes 
the phenomenon of class justice from that of political justice; 
whereas class justice is an unconscious existential determina­
tion of the judicial process, political justice is a conscious 
misuse of the law for political purposes, mainly for the de­
struction of political opponents. The phenomenon of class 
1 
justice has been admirably described by Lord Justice ScrVtton: 
"Impartiality is rather difficult to attain in any system. I 
am not speaking of conscious impartiality; but the habits you 
are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead to your 
having a.certain class of ideas df such nature that when you 
have to deal with other ideas, you do not give as sound and 
accurate judgements as you would wish". And for labour dis­
putes, he adds, "It is very difficult sometimes to be sure 
that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial posi­
tion between the two disputants, one of your own class, and 
one not of your class". He even reaches the surprising 
statement that whereas Qommercial Courts are advisable because 
they have to deal with litigation in the same stratum of 
society, Industrial Courts are extremely precarious as the 
parties belong to antagonistic classes with antagonistic 
convictions• 
1. "The Work of the Commercial Courts in''Cambridge*^ 
Law Journal, 1921, Vol. I, p. 8. 
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The great German liberal Gneist, who was far from being 
a Marxist, regarded law as the sediment of settled class con­
flicts of society, and he added that the judge shares the 
feeling, the interests, and the ideas of the educated class 
to which he belongs. 
It is obvious that only by special investigations can 
it be proved whether or not the existential determination of 
the judicial process, in the sense that the judicial proeess 
is essentially conditioned by the class relationships, is 
valid or not. 
The sociological investigations on these two bases — 
the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of ideologies — 
have to deal with the following problems# 
4. In theory and practice a distinction is drawn be­
tween legislation and the application of law« It Is asserted 
that there exists a substantial difference between these two 
types of State activity. It is as true that jurisdiction in­
volves law-making, as it is that there are differences between 
legislation and the activity of the judge. Those differences 
are not of a categorical nature. They are historically, 
politically, and socially conditioned* As such, they are 
without interest for the pure science of law and for American 
realism; but for any sociology of law their significance is 
decisive. We are on the whole in agreement with the careful 
1. "Der Rechtsstaat", p. 259. 
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evaluation of Mr. Justice Cardozo, and Prof, Goodhart. We 
agree with him that in spite of the great importance of the 
subconscious factors in the judicial process, the importance 
3 
of the conscious factors must not be under-estimated; but 
that the logical method leads only to a certain point, after 
4 
which the sociological method has to be applied. As against 
the exaggerations of the doctrine which emphasises the creative 
activity of the judge, Mr. Justice Cardozo stresses especially 
the fact that although there are enumerable cases, yet in the 
majority the law is clear, and not open to interpretation. 
Every practical lawyer knows this# The quantitative over-
evaluation in the United States of the creative activity of 
the judge derives especially from the fact that interest is 
centred on constitutional disputes, and that the constitution 
consists not at all of abstract legal norms, but of undefined 
legal standards of conduct, which either have no content 
whatever, or whose content is indeterminable. These constitu» 
tional provisions are not legal rules; rather, they are legal 
principleso The quantitative over-evaluation is generally 
conditioned by the fact that legal theory deals exclusively 
with decisions, and not with those legal disputes which never 
1. Benjamin N0 Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial 
Process", Newhaven, 1921; and "The Growth of Law", Newhaven, 
1924. 
2. "Some American Interpretations of Law" in "Modern 
Theories of Law", p. 1 ff. 
3. "Nature", p» 31, and "Growth", p. 61; Goodhart, p« 76. 
4. "Nature", p. 43. 
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reach the stage of litigation. Finally, it is conditioned 
by the fact that legal theory concerns itself with reported 
decisions, but hardly ever takes into account the unreported 
judgments, whose number is far greater. 
Within the application of law, we have to attempt a 
distinction between jurisdiction and administration. We have 
no intention of adding a new investigation to those already 
in existence; we aim only at giving an outline of that problem 
1 
which seems to us decisive* According to the pure science 
of law, there is no formal difference between jurisdiction 
and administration; as administration, like jurisdiction, is 
nothing but the individualisation and concretisation of general 
norms« The differentiation of justice and administration is 
in this connection "in a greater or less degree, historical 
2 
arbitrariness"• 
But what is irrelevant from the point of view of the 
pure science of law, is decisive from that of sociology. 
It is generally agreed that we may speak of administra­
tion wherever "the executive arm of government interferes 
with individuals of its own motion, prior to and apart from 
1. Cf• Fritz Fleiner, "Institution des deutschen Ver-
waltungsrechtf, 8th edition, Tubingen, 1928; Hans Kelsen, 
"Allgemeine Staatslehre"; Adolf Merkl, "AllgemeineAVerwaltungs-
recht", Tubingen, 1927; John Dickinson, "Administrative Justice 
and the Supremacy of the Law in the United States", Harvard 
University Press, 1927; William A. Robson, "Justice and Ad­
ministrative Law"; Ivor Jennings, "The Law and the Constitution 
2<> Kelsen, "Allgemeine Staatslehre", p« 238. 
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the existence of any controversy between them11. It is simi­
larly agreed that the administrative activity of the State 
includes the organisation of any kind of body. In these 
cases, the State realises its aim directly, for instance by 
building hospitals, controlling the traffic, and running 
banks, postal services, and so on; whereas in all other cases, 
the State provides for the subjects certain patterns of be­
haviour, through which it only indirectly realises its aims. 
But the State deals not only with relations between 
Itself and the citizens, but also with conflicts between citi­
zens, These disputes are on the whole decided by Courts, and 
are the subject of jurisdiction. But this is not necessarily 
so; and in any case, the fact that they are decided by ordin­
ary Courts tells us nothing as to the nature of these con­
flicts* The positive law can obviously allocate any dispute 
to the sphere of the ordinary Courts. It can even appoint 
administrative tribunals for the decision of genuine civil 
conflicts. The decision as to whether the decision of a 
legal dispute is sociologically jurisdiction or administration 
does not depend upon the decision of the positive law, but on 
material criteria. One must, however, ask whether it is use­
ful to discover such material criteria, if the positive law 
has already given a decision as to whether a dispute is one 
1. Dickinson, p. 11; similarly Kelsen, "Allgemeine 
Staatslehre", p. 258. 
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of civil or of administrative jurisdiction* The answer to 
this objection is that the sociological analysis is preparatory 
to a reform of the law# If we discover "by a sociological 
analysis that a certain activity of the State is structurally 
and functionally administration and not justice, we might 
postulate in certain circumstances the allocation of this 
matter to administration or to administrative tribunals, and 
not to ordinary Courts# Prom this point of view, the analysis 
must be regarded as Justified. 
We define as administrative disputes those disputes 
between individuals which are exclusively or overwhelmingly 
decided on the basis of legal standards of conduct; that is 
to say, by free discretion. We are conscious of the fact that 
there is no categorical distinction between free discretion 
and the binding of the judge by the law; as free discretion 
is obviously granted by the legal order. In that sense, acts 
of free discretion are legal acts. We are further conscious 
j 
of the fact that even the activity of the ordinary Courts is 
| 
to a great extent discretionary activity# Notions such as 
negligence, malice, and so on, are discretionary notions. 
The distinction between discretionary notions and exact­
ly defined legal concepts is no formal one; it represents a 
1. Jennings, p# 45 ff. 
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material and sociological difference# The boundary is to "be 
found where disputes are exclusively or overwhelmingly decided 
on the basis of legal standards of conduct, such as good faith, 
good morals, public policy, or reasonableness* In such cases, 
the activity of the ordinary Courts is in fact administrative 
activity. Legal standards of conduct, and the free discretion 
which is the realisation of such standards, serve the recon­
ciliation of colliding interests, and not the determination 
of conflicting rights. Such standards make it possible ques-
tions of conveniency and not only questions of law. If for 
instance a Court dissolves a marriage because of "any facts 
by which the marital relation owing to any grave breach of 
marital duty or dishonorable or immoral conduct on the re-
dpondent's part, is disturbed to such an extent that the 
petitioner cannot fairly be expected to continue the marriage" 
(section 1568 of the German Civil Code); if the Court decides 
the legality of a strike or of a lock-out, entirely with re­
gard to its morality (section 826 of the German Civil Code); 
if an industrial cartel can be dissolved, "if any agreement 
or convention ••• shall endanger the economic life of the 
community as a whole" (section 4 of the Decree against the 
abuse of economic power of November 2, 1923); if English or 
American Courts decide the legality of a combination in re­
straint of trade entirely on the basis of whether such 
461 
restraint is reasonable or not; then the Courts, even if their 
decision has the form of an ordinary judgment, are in fact 
reconciling conflicting interests and thereby exercising ad« 
ministrative power. 
The distinction is important "because administrative 
acts and administrative decisions are essentially more politi­
cal than those of the ordinary Courts* 
462 
SECTION 3. THE DOUBT RAISED BY THE ENGLISH LAW 
1. Before, however, we approach the politico-socio­
logical problem, one central question has to be discussed, 
namely, whether the formal structure of English law, and above 
all, common law and equity, are compatible with the needs of 
1« O.K. Allen, "Law in the Making", 2nd edit*, Oxford, 
1930; "Case Law, an Unwarrantable Intervention", Law Quarterly 
Review (51) 1935, p. 33; "Legal Duties and other Essays in 
Jurisprudence", Oxford, 1931; Ashburner's "Principles of 
Equity", 2nd edit, by Denis Brown, London, 1933; Edward Beal, 
"Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation", 3rd edit., London, 
1924; C.H.S. Fifoot, English Law and its Background", London, 
1932; A.L. Goodhart, "Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common 
Law", Cambridge, 1931; "Precedent in English and Continental 
Law", Law Quarterly Review (50), 1934, p. 40; "Case Law - A 
Short Replication", Law Quarterly Review (50), 1934, p. 196; 
Sir William Holdsworth, "History of English Law", 5th edit.; 
"Sources and Literature of English Law", Oxford, 1925; "Some 
Lessons from our Legal History", New York, 1928; "Case Law", 
Law Quarterly Review (50), 1934, p. 180; Georg Jager, "Das 
englische Recht zur Zeit der Klassischen Nationalokonomie", 
Leipzig, 1919; D.M. Kerley, "An Historical Sketch of the 
Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery", Cambridge, 
1890; Henri Levy-Ullmann, "The English Legal Tradition, its 
Sources and History", London, 1935; H.S. Maine, "Ancient Law" 
(Oxford Classics); P.W. Maitland, "Equity", ed. by A.H.Chaylor 
and W.J. Whltaker, Cambridge, 1929; Herman Oliphant, "A Return 
to Stare Decisis", 1928; Theodore Plucknett, P.T., "A Concise 
History of the Common Law", Rochester, N.Y., 1929; Sir Frederick 
Pollock, "Essays in the Law", London, 1922; "A First Book of 
Jurisprudence", 6th edit., London, 1929; "Essays in Jurispru­
dence and Ethics", London, 1912; Pollock-Maitland, "The History ! 
of English Law before the Time of Edward I", 2 vols, Cambridge, 
1895; Roscoe Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law", Boston, 
1925; "An Introduction of the Philosophy of Law", New Haven, J 
1924; "Interpretations of Legal History", Cambridge, 1923; 
Sir Paul Vinogradoff, "Common Sense in Law"(Home University 
Library); Percy H. Winfield, "The Chief Sources of English 
Legal History", Cambridge (U.S.A.), 1925. 
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the liberal legal system for rationality, certainty, calcula-
bility and predictability. We have already seen that the 
generality of the law, its non-retroactivity, and the position 
of the judge, are typical.structural phenomena of the liberal 
legal system in the period of free competition. The question 
which is of sociological relevance is now whether or not these 
characteristics are constitutive elements of every legal system 
in an age of free competition and of political liberalism, or 
whether they are merely accidental* If we come to the conclu­
sion that the formal structure of English law differs funda­
mentally di-ffora from that of Continental law, then we cannot 
assert that there is any necessary connection between the com­
petitive economic system and the above-mentioned legal struc­
ture# If, however, we are able to prove that the structure 
of English law, in spite of many differences from the Conti­
nental legal system, has so much in common with it that its 
essential features are identical, then we have evidence that 
there corresponds to the competitive economic system one par­
ticular type of legal system, finding its expression in the 
generality of the law, in its rationality, and in the merely 
declaratory function of the judge. 
For this purpose, the analysis of the English legal 
system is one possible test of the validity of our thesis. 
We are conscious of the difficulties which a Continental jurist 
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has to overcome In presenting an analysis of the English legal 
system# We are fortunate, however, in that in recent Anglo-
American literature the problem has already "been dealt with, 
so that we are able to build upon the results of these investi­
gations • 
The decisive difference between Continental and English 
legal theory lies in the fact that English legal theory denies 
the law to be a closed system expressing a logical, consistent 
body of rules. It is not the lack of codification which makes 
the approach of a Continental Jurist to the problem of English 
law so difficult; it is rather the conviction of English law­
yers that the law does not present a system. This conviction 
1 
has been expressed, for instance, by Lord Halsbury; "A case Is 
only an authority for what It actually decides. X entirely 
deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to 
follow logically from it# Such a mode of reasoning assumes 
that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas as every 
lawyer must acknowledge, the law Is not always logical at all". 
This is a formulation which a Continental jurist is simply 
unable to understand# The theory of the logical consistency 
of law prevalent on the Continent is replaced in English law 
2 
by that of its historical continuity. The "law of the land" 
is a collection of principles which is in permanent develop-
( 
ment. There is no breach with tradition# It is otherwise in 
1# Quinn v# Leatham (1901) A.C# 495 at 506. 
2# Goodhart, "Precedent", p. 50. 
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Germany; the dissolution of the old Reich in 1806 interrupted 
German legal history also# The old Reiehskammergericht had 
no connection with the new Reichsgericht• The differences be­
tween the English and the Continental legal systems are con­
ditioned, as we have already noted, by the differences in 
economic and political history# The main technical reason 
lies in the existence of strong corporations of lawyers in 
England which opposed the reception of Roman law, thereby pre­
venting a synchronisation with Continental legal development. 
But these differences must not lead us to overlook the 
fundamental structural similarity of the two legal systems, a 
similarity which is so great that from a sociological point 
of view the differences lose their significance* 
2m We begin with the first thesis: that the general 
law in the Continental legal system is replaced by the ratio 
decidendi of the case in English law# The modern law as to 
the binding force of precedent is: every judge of the High 
Court is bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeal and of 
the House of Lords, but not by those of other members of the 
High Court. The Court of Appeal is bound by its own decisions 
and by those of the House of Lords# The House of Lords is 
subject to its own prior decisions. The Judicial Committee 
1# Max Weber, "Wirt&chaft u. Gesellschaft", p# 663; 
Bentham, "Rationale of Judicial Evidence", Bk VIII, Ch. Ill, 
Para. 4. 
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Committee of the Privy Council is technically not a court 
in this sense, but as its personnel is nominally identical 
with that of the House of Lords, its judgments, though not 
legally binding, are of high value. The position of the Court 
of Criminal Appeal is doubtful} it is likely that it is bound 
by its own decisions, but its relation to the Court of Appeal 
1 
is undefined# 
The following questions have, therefore, to be examined: 
a) What is tinderstood by the binding force of 
precedent? 
b) What is the distinction between the ratio 
decidendi and the obiter dicta? 
c) And to what extent is this theory used? 
d) What is the rSle of equity in the English legal 
system? 
e) What is the social function of the binding 
force of precedent and of equity? 
We begin with the statement that the principle of the 
binding force of precedent, as such, has nothing to do with 
2 
the case law system. The doctrine of the binding force of 
precedent is perfectly compatible with a codified legal system 
as well as with the common law# And it is characteristic of 
the English law that this doctrine is applied not only to 
common law but is superimposed on statutory law* 
1# R. v. Denyer (1926) 2.K.B., p. 258. 
2, Vinogradoff, p. 177; Goodhart, "Precedent", p# 43. 
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According to modern theory, a precedent contains a 
principle, a rule which has to be distinguished from the "bind­
ing force which a decision exercises between the two parties 
of the litigation. This principle, the ratio decidendi, has 
a power which transcends the binding force between the parties« 
The determination of the rule is extremely complicated* The 
1 
technique has been fully developed by Goodhart. The compli­
cations are due to the fact that the principle is embedded 
in the facts of the case, so that "every judgement must be 
read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed 
to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which 
may be found there are not intended to be expressions of the 
whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular 
2 
facts of the case in i&tich such expressions are to be found". 
Another difficulty arises from the fact that very often judges 
who concur in a decision give divergent reasons for so doing. 
The close connection between the ratio decidendi and the facts 
of the case makes it necessary, therefore, in the first place 
to determine the facts of the case, secondly to distinguish 
the material from the immaterial facts, and finally, to follow 
the conclusions of the Judge who built upon those facts• It 
is extremely difficult to state the rule of a case; but diffi­
cult as it may be, there is no doubt that the rule is identical 
1. "Essays", Chap* I, p. 4. 
2* Earl of Halsbury in Quinn v. Leatham (1901) A.C., p.506. 
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with the abstract general law of a formal rational norm® The 
ratio decidendi, therefore, is as much the object of subsump-
tion by a later judge as is the provision of a statute or of 
a code* It cannot be doubted that this inductive and prag­
matic approach presents to the finding of the general princi­
ple difficulties far greater than those involved in finding 
the appropriate provision in a code or in a statute. However, 
the dissimilarity between the two systems, although great, 
does not affect their fundamental likeness; the more so, as 
the belief that an appropriate clause in a statute or in a 
code can easily be found and as easily determined, is obviously 
2 
a myth, as everyone knows who is even slightly conversant 
with Continental law* 
The art of distinguishing, that is, "to prove a case 
cited as applicable, inapplicable", can be found in Contin­
ental as well as in English law, A comparison between the 
highly-developed technique of distinguishing in English law 
and the decisions to Section 137 of the German Gerichtsver-
fassungsgesetz (law relating to the constitution of courts), 
show this art to be very highly developed in the German legal 
system also* According to that section, a plenary decision 
of either the combined civil senates or of the combined penal 
senates of the Reichsgericht was necessary when one senate 
lo Vinogradoff, p. 182. 
2. Allen, "Case Law", p. 336. 
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intended to deviate from a known decision of another senate. 
And a plenary decision of the combined penal and civil senates 
of the Reichsgericht was necessary when a penal senate intended 
to deviate from a decision of a civil senate, and vice versa. 
But the "Horror Pleni", as the aversion to such plenary deci-
sions was called, was always so strong that the Reichsgericht 
developed to perfection the technique of distinguishing, so 
that the application of Section 137 was avoided as often as 
possible« 
In England, "it is only under a system of binding 
precedents that the necessary continuity and certainty in­
herent in the conception of law can be achieved on the basis 
1 
of judicial decisions". 
It is, therefore, of vital significance to ascertain 
when the negation of creative activity on the part of common 
law courts first occurred and when the binding force of pre­
cedent first prevailed® This question is a subject of con­
troversy, and when high authorities differ, it is impossible 
2 
for an outsider to make a decision. Before the end of the 
nineteenth century, Allen asserts, "the application of pre­
cedent was powerful and constant, but no judge would be found 
1* Vinogradoff, p. 177. 
2. Goodhart, "Essays", Chap. Ill, p. 53} Allen, "Law in 
the Making", p. 150; "Case Law", p. 337. 
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to admit that he was absolutely bound by any decision of any 
1 
tribunal". Allen quotes as general proof the decisions of 
2 
Lord Mansfield, who maintained that, "the law of England would 
be a strange science if, indeed, it were decided upon prece­
dents only* Precedents served to illustrate principles and 
to give them a fixed certainty, but the law of England, which 
is exclusive of positive law and enacted by statutes, depends 
upon principles, and those principles run through all the 
cases according as the particular circumstances of each case 
have been found to fall within the one or the other of them"0 
We are not able finally to decide the controversy# 
But we may draw attention to the following problem# 
The theory of the binding force of precedents has to 
be distinguished from the doctrine that the judge does not 
3 
make law but only applies it« The English law could — 
theoretically at least — accept the doctrine of stare decisis 
and yet repudiate the orthodox theory of Montesquieu. That 
is to say, it could maintain that in so far as judgments have 
already created objective law, judges are bound by it. But 
in so far as such law is not to be found in previous decisions, 
the judges are at liberty — and are even compelled — to 
create it. Such a state of affairs would presuppose that 
1. "Law in the Making", p. 150. 
2. Especially Jones v. Randall (1774) 1 Cowp. 37. 
3. Levy-Ullmann, p. 54. 
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Lord Halsbury's view in Quinn v. Leather is correct; that, in 
other words, the legal system is not closed and final hut in 
a permanent state of development, and full of gaps# 
We have, however, found that the English Judges adhere 
to the "phonograph theory". 
It is, therefore, not a valid objection to the theory 
of Sir William Holdsworth and Professor Goodhart that every 
decision makes law* This is the very same objection which is 
being raised against the universally binding character of 
enacted law and against the "phonograph theory" in any legal 
system. The objection does not apply only to the English law. 
In order to do Justice to English legal theory, we must reason 
on the basis of the orthodox theory* 
We want to point out that in accepting the view that 
any decision is a mere expression of what already created ob­
jective law contains and in view of the fact that the common 
law is to be found in previous decisions, the doctrine of the 
binding force of precedents must have arisen at the time when 
the orthodox theory became prevalent. If the legal system is 
closed and final and Judgments, therefore, mere declarations 
of what the law is; and if that law exists only in decisions; 
then the only possible consequence is that any later decision 
1. Cf. p.VJJ/^y 
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has to follow a previous one, as a later decision cannot 
create law "but can only apply It. There is, therefore, in 
spite of the distinction between the two doctrines, a close, 
even a necessary, relation between them. 
If we discover that the declaratory theory was fully 
developed and universally accented before the end of the 
nineteenth century, we have a probability that the doctrine 
of share decises must have emerged at about the same time* 
The declaratory theory, together with that of s£are 
1 
decises, is clearly developed by Blackstone, who asserted the 
pre-judicial existence of the common law, so that every de-
2 
cision is merely an "evidence of what is common law". That 
this theory is wrong has been proved by Bentham and Austin; 
but their criticism does not concern us here* It is true 
that the present theory of the merely declaratory character 
of the activity of the judge isjbased upon the assumption 
of the pre-judicial validity of common law, hut upon the en­
tirely different assumption that the common law has already 
been fully developed by judicial decisions, and has,therefore, 
been transformed by them into a complete body of rules, so 
that after the completion of that body, every decision of a 
common law court is a mere application of rules found in 
lft Chap* I, p. 70. "This doctrine of the law is then 
this: that precedents and rules must be followed unless 
manifestly absurd or unjust". 
2. Vol. I, p. 71. 
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previous decisions. We, therefore, argue thus: Sir W, Holds-
worth, who sees clearly the dependence of the doctrine of 
sfeare decises on the "phonograph theory" of Blackstone, infers 
that "the adoption of this point of view, gives the Courts 
power to mould as they please the condition in which they will 
accept a decided case or a series of decided cases as authori-
1 tative"® But as Blackstone's evidence theory is rejected 
and replaced by the theory that the Common Law is only to he 
found in decided cases, it follows that Professor Goodhart 
must he right, and that, therefore, the combination of the 2 
two doctrines makes for the highest possible degree of rigidity# 
This, however, also implies that In spite of the lack 
of systemization of English law, there must lie at the bottom 
of the doctrine of the binding force precedent, the conception 
of the logical closeness of the law. If all decisions are 
only to be reached on the basis of decisions already made, 
then the implication is that the legal system is complete, 
closed and logically consistent, so that any change in that 
system can be made only by way of legislation. This idea is 
stated with clarity by Georg Jager. He has proved that the 
common law is considered to be a system of objective law which 
is without gaps, closed in space and time, and which is 
1. Case Law, p» 185. 
2* Case Law, p. 197. 
3. Georg Jager, p. 38. 
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therefore unchangeable• Any change can consist only In a 
transfer of existing rights from one Individual to another. 
The land, however, is distributed. All land must have an 
owner* Somewhere the ownership must rest® Property cannot 
be in a state of abeyance — an idea which has been expressed 
by Blackstone in this way: "But when once it was agreed that 
everything capable of ownership should have an owner, natural 
reason suggested that he who could first declare his intention 
of appropriating anything to his own use, and, in consequence 
of such intention, actually took it into possession, should 
thereby gain the absolute property of it". Or, in another 
connection he maintained that "the fee-simple of all land 
must abide somewhere", and even chattels "can never be in 
abeyance or without an owner". Original acquisition does not 
play a decisive r£le» Chapters XXVI and XXVII (Title by 
Prerogative and Forfeiture) show that his whole theory of 
common law is based upon the assumption of the finality of 
that law; new customary law is no longer formed. •^Skaeptoexz 
The theory of the finality and closeness of the 
legal system is closely related to the rejection of the labour 
theory of value and the acceptance of the property theory, 
for instance, as it is developed by Kant. If the labour 
theory of value is accepted, it is difficult to atflrm the 
1. Vol. II, p. 258. 
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finality of the legal system# If property is "being grounded 
1 on labour and invention", new property must oonstsntly arioe; 
the legal system cannot, therefore, be thought of as being 
without gaps# If, however, property is being based solely 
2 on "the right of occupancy", and any other method of acquiring 
property is derived from that primary methodj if therefore 
the earth is divided, the legal system must necessarily be 
considered to be closed, sinoe In the liberal theory objective 
law follows subjective rights* Consequently, Blackstone was 
compelled to repudiate Locke's labour theory of value and to 
assert that property "grounded on labour and Invention is 
more properly reducible to the head of occupancy than any 
other! since the right of ocoupancy itself is supposed by 
Mr* Locke, and many others, to be founded on the personal 
labour of t he occupant"• It Is not our task to deal with 
the Tightness either of the labour theory of property or of 
the finality of the law* We seek only to stress the follow­
ing pointst the repudiation of Locke's property theoryj the 
constant affirmation by English Judges that they do not make, 
but only apply, law; the doctrine of the binding foroe of 
1« Blackstone, Vol. II, p* 406. 
2« Ibid,, p# 400. 
3« Ibid*, p« 406. 
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precedents; must all necessarily imply that the common law 
is a closed system, a final "body of rules, without gaps, so 
that any decision must he reached — in so far as statute law 
does not apply — on the basis of previously made decisions. 
A structural dissimilarity to the continental law has, 
therefore, to be denied, as the continental doctrine similarly 
assumes that the legal system is closed and that every decision 
is a mere application of a code, a statute, or of customary 
law* 
The doctrine of the binding force of precedents pervades, 
in consequence of these assumptions, the whole of the English 
law; its application is not restricted to those realms of the 
law where authority by precedent is necessary for the protec­
tion of subjective rights, especially of property* But is 
"founded on the broader theory that it is essential for the 
1 law to be certain". 
The conviction that the theory of the binding force 
of precedent, with that of the finality of the common law, 
must have arisen earlier than Allen believed, is further 
strengthened by the constitutional theory of the rule of law 
in the sense which we have developed; namely the rule of 
2 
enacted law. That doctrine, however, arose in the middle of 
1* Goodhart, "Essays", Chap* III, p. 55* 
2* Levy-Ullmann, p. 222 ff.j Blackstone, Vol* I, p. 87* 
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the seventeenth century, and was finally victorious at the 
end of that century. We know already that even Blackstone, 
while repeating Burlamaqui's assertion of the supremacy of 
natural law, at the same time saw no remedy if Parliament 
enacts a law "which is unreasonable"} and we have in Part II 
traced the disappearance of natural law* If, however, "rule 
of law" means "supremacy of that law enacted toy Parliament", 
then otoviously the importance of the common law must have 
toeen reduced to such an extent as to make that common law a 
body of fixed rules* 
I may, therefore, sum up: layman as I am with regard 
to English legal history, I should like to express my convic­
tion that by reason of the rejection of the labour theory of 
property; by reason of the supremacy of enacted over common 
law; by reason of the universal recognition of the orthodox 
theory of Montesquieuj the views put forward by Qoodhart are 
more convincing than those stated by Allen* "The modern 
theory as to the authority of decided cases was reached sub­
stantially by the end of the eighteenth century". 
It is nevertheless true that the culmination of the 
doctrine of authority by precedent is to be found in the fact 
that the House of Lords considers itself to be bound by Its 
2 
own decisions* This fact is, in Vlnogradoff's words, "the 
1* Holdsworth, Case Law, p* 188* 
2* p. 177. 
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keystone of the whole system" • This doctrine was formulated 
1 only in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is 
worth noting that this culmination was reached just in that 
period when in Prance the "ecole de l'exegese" and in Germany 
the "dogmatic" school became predominant; in the period of the 
full development of competitive capitalism. 
We now ask if this doctrine admits of exceptions. In 
answering such a question, two viewpoints have to be consider­
ed# In the first place, we have to ask whether courts deviate 
from clearly expressed precedents. This problem is the sub-
2 
ject of a controversy between Holdsworth and Goodhart; and 
although it is impossible for an outsider to come to a final 
decision, it seems to follow from this controversy that the 
3 attempts made by Lord Mansfield to deviate from the already 
established, consideration theory of contracts and to merge 
law and equity, have failed# It also seems that the decision 
4 
in Drummond v. Drummond which Sir William Holdsworth quotes, 
i can be explained by the fact that it was based upon a statute 
which had been overlooked; so that in this case, because of 
1. Lord Truro, L.C., Tommey v. White (1850) 3 H.L.Cas. 
48 at 69; Lord Cranworth, Ex parte White & Others v. Tommey 
(1853) 4 H.L.313 at 333, and especially Lord Campbell, At­
torney General v. Dean of Windsor (1860) 8 H.L. Cas. 369 and 
391, and Beamish v. Beamish (1859) 9 H.L. Cas0 274 at 338; Lord Halsbury L.C. London Street Tramways Co. v. London 
Covinty Council (1898) A.C. 375 at 379/380. 
2. Holdsworth, Law Quarterly Review, p. 180; Allen, 
Case Law, p. 333; Goodhart, Case Law. 
3o Who is not considered to be a typical common law judge, 
Goodhart, "Essays", Chap. Ill, p. 53. 
4, (1866) L.R.2 E. at p. 339. 
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enacted law, the court passed over a previous decision* 
Other deviations can be explained by the various degrees of 
authority which were attributed to the various reports, and 
we may conclude that no judge can deviate without abandoning 
the principle of the binding force of precedent* It seems to 
follow that the system of stare decisis is one which admits 
of no exceptions# 
The second question to be asked is how far, according 
to their own statements, Judges admit to creating new law. 
Allen's opinion is that they do admit to this, but the cases 2 
he quotes do not prove his contention. If we use Allen's 
formula, they merely show that the judges make law only "in a 
secondary sense". In all the cases he mentions, the Judges 
either apply legal standards of conduct (such as public policy), 
or they interpret contracts, or they deal with liability for 
damages without negligence. This means that they apply all 
the established principles of common law, even if the princi­
ples are not sufficiently concretised. Here, however, no 
3 divergence from Continental law can be found# 
1* "Law in the Making", p. 181. 
2. Rawlings v. General Trading Co. (1921) 1.K.B.635 (App.C.) i 
Montefiore v. Monday Motor Components C. Ltd# (1918) 2 K.B.241. Hartley v. Hymans (1920) 3 K.B. 475. Gayler & Pope Ltd. v. 
Davies & Son Ltd. (1924) 2 K.B. 75. Aktieselskabet Reidar v. 
Arcos (1927) l.K.B.352,362 (App.C.) 
3. An exception is not even to be found in Lord Abinger's 
arguments in Priestley v. Powler (1837) 3 M.and W.l, where he 
says: "It is admitted that there is no precedent for the 
present action by a servant against a master". Here, Lord 
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In order to avoid any misunderatanding, we reiterate: 
the orthodox theory is undoubtedly wrong, as has "been shown 
above. But we are primarily concerned with the juris pru­
dential problem of whether the "phonograph theory" is right 
or wrong, but with the sociological problem of why it arose, 
to what extra-legal ideology it corresponds, and what social 
function it fulfils. 
Prom this sociological view-point, we may summarise: 
There exists neither a structural difference nor a sociologic­
ally relevant distinction between English and Continental law; j 
or if they do exist, then only in the sense that the German, 
1 
for instance, is far less rigid than the English law. The 
greater freedom of the Continental law is the outcome of the 
fact that it is codified# The greater rigidity of English 
law is the consequence of its pragmatic and inductive charac­
ter. If, for instance, we compare the German law of tort® 
with the corresponding English legal provisions, we find that 
the German law distinguishes between three basic types, in ! r 
Abinger denied (probably wrongly) the existence of a precedent 
and thereby created the doctrine of common employment. It is 
worth while to note that the German Supreme Court in interpret­
ing section 278 of the Civil Code which expressly provides for 
the contractual liability of the master for any culpa of his 
servant, denied the applicability of that section to common 
employment! Even in the revolutionary judgment in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) A.C„ 562 Lord Atkin denies (on p. 582) that 
the Court creates new rule; and in Lord Macmillan's (on p.595) 
view the court simply applies "standards of a reasonable man". 
1. Goodhart, "Precedent", p. 50. 
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Section 823, Para. I, Section 823, Para II, and Section 826. 
All other provisions of the law of torts are deduced from 
these three basic types, so that in case of difficulty, a 
German judge can always have recourse to one XX of them, a 
fact which gives him a good deal of free discretion* In Eng­
lish law, the question of whether the law of torts knows such 
fundamental types is still undecided; so that if a Judge de­
nies their existence, he must necessarily attempt to bring 
any case which may arise under one of the established cases* 
Alternatively, let us compare the German law relating 
to unfair competition with the corresponding English rules* 
In Germany, the statute dealing with this problem contains in 
Section 1 a legal standard of conduct generally prohibiting 
any kind of unfair competition; so that any unfair behaviour 
on the part of a competitor, if it cannot be brought under a 
special provision of that statute, can always be made to fall 
under this legal standard of conduct* In England, on the 
contrary, we have only a series of several firmly established 
provisions, which we have already mentioned on page *T*f~whlch 
make it difficult to alter the existing law according to the 
needs of the changing competitive system of society* 
3* We have already pointed out that one of the funda­
mental doctrines of the liberal legal system is that of the 
prohibition of retroaction* Is this prohibition at all 
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reconcilable with the system of case law? Vlnogradoff, who 
alone deals with this problem, answers the question in the 
1 negative. He maintains that "Case law cannot be brought 
under the operation of a famous doctrine proclaimed for enact­
ed law, namely, that it ought not to have retroactive applica­
tion". For him, this liberal doctrine can only be applied to 
common law if we have recourse to a fiction. "For if a case 
is material for an enunciation of law, the application of 
this very law to this very case is necessarily retroactive• 
The parties could not know what the law was before the decision 
was given, and it is the exact knowledge which makes all the 
difference in a dispute: no one would willingly expose him­
self to defeat and heavy costs if he knew for certain that the 
law was against him." But this objection of Vinogradoff seems 
in no way convincing# If the creative function of the common 
law courts has really ceased, if therefore the body of common 
law rules is really closed, if the activity of judges is a 
mere application of already established principles, then the 
prohibition of retroaction is as applicable to common law as 
to statutory or to codified law* If, however, we take the 
line that every decision of a judge as an individualisation 
and concretisation of a higher norm is necessarily creative, 
then of course, the prohibition of retroaction is as little 
1. Pp. 205, 204. 
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applicable to common law as it is to statutory or doeified 
law# A difference between the Continental and the English 
legal system with regard to the doctrine of non»retroaction 
cannot therefore be maintained# 
4* With regard to equity, the question at once arises, 
whether the existence of equity as such is at all compatible 
with the need of the liberal legal system for rationality, or 
whether such equity does not render irrational any system of 
law. But even that assertion has to be denied# It is true 
that long ago equity meant the interpreting of the whole law 
in the spirit of equity* This meaning of equity has been de® 
veloped by Blackstone, who thus opposes equity to law# "Prom 
this method of interpreting laws by the reason of them, arises 
what we call equity} which is thus defined by Grotius, as the 
creation of that wherein the law (by reason of its universality) 
is deficient« For, since in law, all cases cannot be fore­
seen or expressed, it is necessary that when general decrees 
of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should 
be somewhere a person vested of defining those circumstances 
which (had they been foreseen), the legislator himself would 
1 have expressed." Equity in civil law, according to this 
definition, plays the same role as the prerogative does in 
Locke's theory of constitutional law. The role of equity thus jjj 
1. Vol. I, p. 62. 
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as thus defined Is essentially identical with that of the 
legal standards of conduct in the German law after 1919, 
Originally, it seemed that equity, in the sense in 
which Blacks tone defined it, was applied in and through the 
common law courts; without, however, the problem being finally 2 
decided. The above conception of equity may be traced directly 
to Bracton, and indirectly to Aristotle, Ulpian, Thomas Aquinas 
and Grotius# It is a conception of equity that has completely 
disappeared, but we must admit the possibility that one day, 
in changed political circumstances, it may be reborn• Black-
3 stone himself rejected that function of equity in the following 
words: "Law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is 
much more desirable for the public good than equity without 
law: which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce 
most unfortunate confusion"• This character of equity, in­
tended to pervade the whole legal system, has entirely disap­
peared. Since 1875, the only possible definition is that 
"equity is that body of rules which is administered only by 
4 
those courts which are known as courts of equity"# This 
means that for a presentation of English law even to-»day we 
1. Pollock-Maitland, Vol. I, p* 189, 
2. Winfield, p. 129; Levy-Ullmann, p. 296. 
3* Vol* X, p* 62* 
4* Maltland, p. 1* 
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can perhaps reiterate what Maitland maintained to he a 
postulate for the future and what Lord Mansfield attempted 
to carry out as Lord Chancellor; that "the day will come when 
lawyers will cease to enquire whether a given rule be a rule 
of equity or a rule of common law". 
The social function of equity is a dual one# Equity 
has created legal institutions whose formation was impera­
tively demanded by economic development, as for instance, a 
Trust (exclusive jurisdiction) or the specified performance 
and the Injunction (concurrent Jurisdiction). On the other 
hand, equity partly fulfils the function of the Continental 
legal standards of conduct. If, for instance, the statute 
of limitations is supplemented by the introduction of for­
feiture, based upon the legal standard of conduct, then 
2 "equity acts the vigilant and not the indolent"; this principle 
is identioal with the theory as developed by the German Su­
preme Court, mainly at the instance of the Jurisdiction fol­
lowing on the revaluation of the mark and the forfeiture of 
3 
wage claims of employees. Or if equity says that the con­
duct of the parties must be weighed, or that he who seeks 
equity must do equity, these provisions exactly correspond to 
1. Maitland, p* 20• 
2, Smith Vo Clay (1767) 3 Bro# C.C.640; Knight v, Simmonds 
(1896) 2 01.294. 
3o "Decisions of the Relchsgericht" in civil matters, 
Vol. 144, p. 22; "Decisions of the Reichsarbeitsgericht" in the collection of Bensheimer Publishing Co., Vol0 III, p» 58. 
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those of the German system of law which contain the prohibi­
tion of the venire contra factum proprium, deduced from the 
German legal standards of conduct. 
It is however sociologically significant that in the 
decisive period of the rise of the bourgeoisie and of the 
emergence of the competitive economic system, i.e., from the 
end of t he eighteenth century, equity was converted into a 
system almost as fixed as that of the common law itself* 
This transformation occurred in two directions. On the one 
hand, the equity rules were adjusted to those of the common 
law# On the other hand, equity became a rigid system and 
its creative function ceased. It became a closed system, 
as is common law; or rather, common law and equity together 
were transformed into final system of law. 
This development began with Wolsey's fall and reached 
its height during the period of Lord Chancellor Nottingham. 
The injunction, a weapon of monarchic absolutism against the 
ius strictum of common law courts, retarded this development 
towards rationality which is essential to the law of modern 
society. It is, therefore, not surprising that the main ad­
vocate of rational law, Sir Edward Coke, sharply opposed the 
use of equity as it was formulated by Thomas Egerton (later 
Baron Ellesmere, Viscount Brackley) and Francis Bacon. It 
cannot be doubted that Ellesmere's decision in the Earl of 
48V 
1 Oxford's case, in which Chancery reserved the right to alter 
by injunction Judgments of the common law courts which had 
"been reached by "oppression, wrong and a hard conscience", 
violated the predictability and calculability of the liberal 
legal system. The political background of this conflict, 
which has very often been described, and James I's decision, 
taken upon Bacon's advice and maintaining the fundamental 
ideas of the Earl of Oxford's case, were in flat contradiction 2 
to the required rationality of law. This irrationality has 
been explained by Selden in the following way: "Equity is a 
roguish thing. For law, we have measure, and know what to 
trust tos equity is according to the conscience of him that 
is chancellor; and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 
'Tis all done as if they should make the standard for the 
measure, a chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would 
this be! One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, 
a third an indifferent foot. It is the same thing with a 
3 
chancellor's conscience". 
This great bourgeois detected with the sure instinct 
of his class, the vulnerable spot of the legal system of his 
1. (1615) 1 C.L. Rep. 1. 
2. Holdsworth, Vol. V, p. 39; Slackstone, Vol. Ill, p.54> 
Kerley, pp. 113, 115. 
3* "Table Talk and BlackstoneP, Vol. Ill, p. 432. 
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time. Equity naturally shared the fall of the Stuarts; under 
Cromwell, the Court of Equity was abolished in 1654* With 
the Restoration, however, it rose again# But the bourgeois 
revolution, even if it retained the Court of Equity, decisively 
changed its social functions. This change brings to mind the 
three famous names of Sir Heneage Pinch, Lord Nottingham 
(1673-1682), Lord Hardwlcke (1736-1756), and especially Lord 
Eldon (1801-1806 and 1807-1827), who formulated the completion 
of this transformation in the following manner: "The doctrines 
of this court ought to be as well settled and made as uniform 
almost as those of the common law, laying down fixed princi­
ples, but taking care that they are to be applied according 
to the circumstances of each case"# And he adds, "I cannot 
agree that the doctrines of this court are to be changed by 
every succeeding Judge• Nothing would Inflict me greater 
pain in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had 
done anything to Justify the reproach that the equity of this 
court varies like the chancellor's foot". The Chancery 
Ct 
Division Is no longer a court of consolenoe. It must, how­
ever, be admitted that the doctrine of the binding character 
of Judicial precedents was received in equity later than in 
"It must not be forgotten that the rules of equity are not, 
1. Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 2 Swanst. 402, and Kerley, 
p 161 • 2. *Mr• Justice Buckley (later Lord Wrenbury) In Re 
Telescrlptor L«R« (1903) 2 C.L» at p« 195» 
3 
the common law. Even asserted that 
3„ Ashburner, p. ix • 4. In re Hallett (1879) L.R. 13 Ch.D at p« 710 
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like the rules of the Common Law, supposed to have "been es­
tablished from time immemorial* It is perfectly well-known 
that they have been established from time to time — altered, 
improved and refined from time to time,.. We can name the 
Chancellors who first invented them, and state the date when 
they were first Introduced into equity Jurisprudence, and 
therefore, in cases of this kind, the older precedents in 
equity are of very little value* The doctrines are progres­
sive, refined and improved; and if we want to know what the 
rules in equity are, we must look, of course, rather to the 
more modem than the more ancient cases"* 
This deviation is perfectly explainable by the fact 
that equity deals with legal standards of conduct, which form 
the inexhaustible resource for alteration of the law in any 
direction. On the whole, however, authority by precedent is 
established in equity as well as in the common law. 
5, The reasons for this transformation are clearly 
explained in the utterances given by the Judges concerned. 
We have already found that according to Goodhart the system 
of stare decisis pervades the whole law, but we must add 
that it does so because of the trend towards calculability, 
rationality, and stability, of property and the exchange 
processes.1 The binding force of precedent is, therefore, 
1, Pifoot, p. 252. 
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demanded in order to avoid the endangering of "property and 
1 JhgriAii , g 
titles . Receding H a property". A deviation from 
previous decision would harm promoters and landowners, and 
5 endanger the rights of property. It would undermine the 
4 confidence necessary for contractual relations, especially 
if the cases dealt with contracts "in daily use and if the 
decision had been acted upon throughout the country for a 5 
long time". Every deviation, therefore, endangers titles 
6 and embarrasses "trade and commerce". Even where there 
exists no obligation to follow precedents, deviation is avoided 
as far as possible; for Instance, by the House of Lords, with 
regard to judgments of inferior courts. The rigidity of 
equity is not only due to the puritans1 dislike of it at this 
particular period, as has been explained by Roscoe Pound, but 
results from the need of a competitive economic system for 
formal rationality of law. 
1. Lord Cranworth, Young v. Robertson (1862) 4 Macq.H.L. 
314 at 345. 
2. Lord Hardwicke, Ellis v. Smith (1751) 1 Ves. $nr. 
at p. 17. 
3. Thesiger, L.J. in Pugh v. Golden Valley Railway Co. 
(1880) 15 Ch.D.330 at 334 and 49 L.J. Ch.721 at 723. 
4. Brett, M.R. in Palmer v. Johnson (1884) 13 Q.B.D.351 
at 354. 53 L.J. Q.B.348 at 349. 
5. Lord Esher, M.R. in Phillips v. Rees (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 
17 at 21. 59 L.J. Q.B. 1 at 4. 
6. Lindley, L.J. in Andrews v. Gas Meter Co. (1897) 
1 Ch.361 at 371. 
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SECTION 4, SOCIOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THE FUNCTION OF THE LAW AND THE JUDGE. 
I. 
1* In England as well as In Germany, and naturally too 
in France, with which at the moment we are not oonoerned, tho 
expression in the belief of the rule of enaoted law, is the 
expression of the power of the bourgeoisie as well as a con­
fession of its weakness. The supremacy of enaoted law, whioh 
is stressed again and again, Implies in tho first plaoe, that 
social changes can only be brought about by legislation and 
the supremacy of legislation is emphasised beoause the bour­
geoisie had a large share in the legislative process and be­
cause laws are interferences by the State in liberty and 
property. If such interferences can only be made by law, if 
that law can only be enaoted by parliament, if the bourgeoisie 
is decisively represented in parliament, then the doctrine 
of the rule of law implies that that stratum in society which 
is the object of suoh interference, inflicts those interfer­
ences on itself. And naturally, it has a regard for its own 
interests. 
The doctrine of the rule of enacted law implies in 
the second place, a veiling of the weakness of the bourgeoisie. 
For it is clear that the conception that social changes oan 
1. Max Weber, "Wlrtachaft u. Gesellschaft", p. 174. 
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only be brought about by parliamentary law and that adminis­
trative bodies and Judges can only declare and not make the 
law, is an illusion created in order that the power of such 
administrative bodies over parliament need not be admitted. 
The law is the absolute to which the bourgeoisie looks for 
its salvation, although it regards itself self-sufficient and 
as the centre of the world. Since Descartes, the individualist 
theory asserted that man — that is the man who has property 
and education — stands at the centre of the world, and that 
the universe moves around him; but at the same time, it con­
stantly tries to discover an absolute, whether an absolute 
law, or an absolute good, or an absolute leader to whom the 
bourgeoisLennay take recourse. The confession to the rule of 
law is the expression of a weakness which accompanies the 
economic strength of the bourgeoisie. This weakness Is far 
more visible in Germany than in England. The weaker the bour­
geoisie is politically, the more the importance of the rule 
of law is stressed. 
We have, therefore, to note two functions standing in 
an antagonistic relationship; law is, so to speak., an ex­
pressive ideology £JtitX3£ (Ausdrucksldeologle) but it Is at the 
same time, a veiling (Verhullungsideologie). The latter func­
tion has two aspects* It veils the rule of the bourgeoisie, 
since the invocation of the rule of law makes it unnecessary 
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to name the real rulers in society; at the same time, the in­
vocation of the rule of law veils the unwillingness of the 
ruling classes for social reform* "The slowness of the par­
liamentary machine transforms the sole means for the altera-* 
1 
tion of the law into a means of securing its unchangeability" • 
This, however, implies that the emphasis laid upon the rule 
of enacted law depends upon the fact that parliament on the 
whole, is a representation of bourgeois interests, that is to 
say, that the proletariat has not reached the stage of being 
a political power dangerous to the interests of the bourgeoisie« 
The functioning of Parliament is normal, only so long as the 
2 
propertied classes dominate it. At the very moment in which 
the working class emancipates itself, becomes politically 
conscious, the bourgeoisie abandons the belief in the rule of 
enacted law, and either has recourse to a new "natural" law 
which cannot be changed by parliamentary legislation and 
which consists in the main, in the existing property order 
— this, however, only in a transitional period — or it 
abolishes parliament and its legislative function altogether„ 
2. The belief in the rule of enacted law is, however, 
also due to the needs of competitive capitalism for formal 
rationality of the exchange processes® "The need for calcu-
lability and reliability of the functioning of the legal order 
1» Georg Jager* p. 30. 
2. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p« 174. 
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and of administration, induced the bourgeoisie to restrict 
the power of patrimonial princes and of the feudal nobility, 
by the institution of an organization in which the bourgeoisie 
played a decisive role, and which controlled administration -1 
and finance, and collaborated in changes in the legal jqQOaOfiXX 
system," In this way, the fictitious conflict in the atti­
tude of the liberals towards parliamentary legislation, which 2 
Roscoe Pound has convincingly shown to exist in the attitude 
of American Puritans, is solved: the aversion to legislation 
on the one hand, and the firm belief in enactment on the 
others But not only the American Puritan pursued this dual 
course. It was the attitude of liberalism as such which re­
jected the principle of legal interference in liberty and 
property, but which at the same time, expressed its convic-
3LUSHK tion of the superiority of parliamentary legislation, 
either so that it might prevent such interference, or if this 
were not possible, adjust it to its own interests. 
To the needs of competitive capitalism there corres­
ponds a general law as the highest form of formal rationality 
or the binding force of precedents and the absolute subjec­
tion of the Judge under the law, consequently the separation 
of powers. Competitive capitalism is characterised, as we 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p. 174. 
2. "Spirit of Common Law", pp. 46, 470 
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have already seen, by the existence of a vast number of com­
petitors of approximately equal strength, competing on the 
free market# For details we refer to Max Weber's presentation 
1 of the various elements of the capitalist systems liberty 
of the commodity market, liberty of the labour market, freedom 
in the seleotlon of entrepreneurs, freedom of oontract, com­
plete calculability of the administration of the law# The 
outstanding characteristic of capitalism is "the pursuit of 
profit and of renewed profit by means of continuous rational 
capitalistic enterprise" .... "We will define capitalist econ­
omic activity as that which rests on the expectation of pro­
fit by the utilization of commodities for exchange, that is 
2 
on (formally) peaceful ohances of profit". The State has, 
therefore, to measure the fulfilment of contracts# The ex­
pectation that contracts will be performed must always be expectation 
calculable. The fulfilment of thls/ln a competitive society 
presupposes, however, general lawsj It also presupposes that 
the legal norms are exactly determined, that Is to say, that 
they are as formal and as rational as possible, so that the 
judge has as little discretion as possible. In such a society, 
the Judge must not have recourse to legal standards of oon-
duot such as good faith, good morals, reasonableness, or 
1, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p. "Oesammelte 
Aufsatze zu Rellgionssozlologie", Vol. I, p. 1. English translation by Parsons "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism". 
2. Max Weber, "Protestant Ethics", p. 1*7. 
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public policy* The State itself, if it interferes at all, 
must make its interference calculable, that is to say, it 
must not interfere retroactively, for otherwise it would in­
validate created expectations; further, it must not intervene 
without law, because such intervention is unpredictable* 
Finally, it must not intervene by individual commands, because 
any individual intervention violates the principle of equality 
prevailing between equal competitors. 
Consequently the judge must be independent, that is to 
say, litigation must be decided independently of any commands 
of a government. The independence of judges is, of course, 
an essential feature of competitive capitalism* It implies, 
however, a distinction between various powers in the State. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers is therefore the 
organisational element of competitive capitalism, and apart 
from its political significance, creates competences, clear 
delimitations between the various activities of the State, 
and therefore guarantees the rationality of the law and of 
1 
its administration. 
5, But the general law and the principle of distinc­
tion between the powers of the State, has, besides its task 
of veiling power and of rendering exchange processes calcula­
ble, a decisive ethical function which is expressed in 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p. 166. 
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Rousseau's theory. The generality of law and the independence 
of judges are intended to realise personal and political 
equality* The general law as the basic notion of the legal 
system of liberalism establishes the personal equality of all 
men, a postulate which seems to us to be so obvious that it 
is almost inconceivable that as a maxim it should be questioned 
to-day• We have already seen that all rights of men stand 
•under the "reservation of the law". Interferences in liberty 
must be made on the basis of the law. Therefore, the charac­
ter of the law to which any intervention must be attributed 
is of decisive significance „ Only if such intervention is 
based upon general law, is liberty guaranteed, because the 
principle of equality is preserved. In this connection, 
Voltaire's statement is true, that freedom means to be de­
pendent upon nothing else but the law; but only if the law 
is a general one; thus it was conceived by Voltaire• If 
the legislator can issue individual commands, if he can arrest 
this or that man, if he can confiscate this or that property, 
we are unable to speak of the real independence of judges. 
If the judge has to apply individual commands of the State, 
he becomes a mere bailiff, a mere policeman. True independ­
ence, therefore, presupposes the rule of the State through 
general laws which provide for an indefinite number of future 
cases. The generality of the law, the independence of judges, 
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and the doctrine of the separation of powers, have, therefore, 
functions transcending the needs of competitive capitalism, 
since they secure personal liberty and personal equality. The 
generality of the law and the independence of judges veil the 
power of one stratum of society; they render exchange processes 
calculable and create also personal freedom and security for 
the poor* All three functions are significant and not only, 
as is maintained fey the critics of liberalism, that of render­
ing economic processes calculable* We repeat, all three 
functions are realised in the period of competitive capitalism, 
but it is of importance to discriminate between them. If one 
does not draw these distinctions, and sees in the generality 
of the law, nothing but a requirement of capitalist economy, 
then of course, one must infer with Carl Schmitt that the gen-
eral law, the independence of judges, and the separation of 
powers, must be abolished when capitalism dies. 
1 II. 
Let us now consider from these view-points the social 
significance of the German doctrine. The stress which is 
1» Ernst Fraenkel, "Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz", 
Berlin, 1927; Rudolf Gneijt,"Der Reehtsstaat und die Verwalt-ungsgerichte in Deutschland", 20, ed. Berlin, 1879; Eduard 
Kern, "Der gesetzliche#vRIchter", Berlin, 1927; Johann Ludwig Klueber, "Die Selbststandigkeit des Riehteramts und die Unab« 
hangigkeit seines Urtells im Rechtsprechen", Frankfurt a/M, 
1332} Johann Jakob Moser, "Von der Landeshoheit in Justiz-
sachen", Frankfurt a/M - Leipzig, 1773; Franz Neumann, "Die 
politische und soziale Bedeutung der arbeitsgerichtlichen 
Rechtssprechung", Berlin, 1929; Carl von Pfizer, "Ueber die Grenzen zwischen Werwaltungs* und Ziviljustiz", Stuttgart, 
1818; 
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laid upon the generality of the law derives from the fact 
that In the middle of the nineteenth century the monarcha 
imposed constitutions which restricted their own legislative 
power, hut only to the extent to which they transferred that 
power to parliament# In such a situation, it became necessary 
to distinguish the subjects which were to be regulated by 
law, that is to say, those regulated by the Joint decision 
of the monarch and of parliament, from those controlled by 
the monarch alone* 
1. A real understanding of the German doctrine is only 
possible by keeping in mind the defeat of the German bourgeoisie* 
The introduction by Paul Leband, of law in a material sense, 
reduced the authority of parliament. Parliament could only 
enact laws in a material sense, but laws In a material sense 
are only such as contain a rule creating a right; that is to 
say, such as interfere directly with liberty and property© 
Laws in a formal sense are, therefore, those enactments which 
either indirectly concern the individual or which regulate 
the relationship between the individual and the State; they 
Carl Schmitt, "Verfassungslehre", Munchen u. Leipzig, 1928; 
"Unabhangigkelt der Richter, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und 
Gewahrleistung des Privateigentums nach der Welmarer Verfassung; 
ein Rechtsgutachten", Berlin, 1926; "Ueber die drei Arten des 
rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens", Hamburg, 1934; von Staff, "Commentary to articles 102-104 of the Weimar Constitution in "Die Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Deutschen , ed. by 
H»C« NiDDerdey; Adolf Stoelzel, "Die Entwicklung des gelehrten 
Richtertums in den deutaohen Terrltorien", Stuttgart, 1872; 
"Brandenburg-Preussens Rechtsverwaltung und Rechtsverfassung , 
Berlin, 1888; "Karl Gottlieb Suarez", Berlin, 1885. 
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therefore, do not come within the sphere of parliament# The 
budget, the organization of administrative bodies and tribun­
als, the fixing of salaries of Civil Servants, the operation 
of public undertakings — all these are laws in a formal sense# 
This is the first political significance of the German doc­
trine* But we must add a second. As the genetic determina­
tion of the content of the law is irrelevant, it is possibl®, 
to maintain the validity of all those laws which were issued 
before the creation of the Constitution. In Prussia this 
doctrine led to maintenance of the validity of the pre-Con-
Btitutional decrees of the monarch and of the Allgemeine 
1 
Landrecht, especially of the famous II, 17, Section 10. On 
the basis of this section the police obtained extraordinary 
discretionary powers to interfere in liberty and property 
whenever they thought fit without parliamentary consent0 
According to this section, the police had to provide the 
necessary means for maintaining public quiet, security and 
order, and for the warding off of all dangers which threatened 
the public or individuals. 
In the third place, the German school, with the excep­
tion of Gierke and Hanel, adopted a very strange theory as 
to the character of the legislative process, namely, its 
1. Fritz Fleiner, "Institutionen des Deutschen Verwaltungs- , 
rechts", 8th edit., Tubingen, 1928, p. 135. 
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separation into logical parts which were called the determina­
tion of the content of a statute, and the issuing of the sanc­
tion to the statute# The Prussian constitutional theory 
therefore arrived at the conclusion that the content of a 
statute was established by parliament (agreement of the two 
chambers), whereas the ssanction was issued by the king# "Only 
the assent of the king raises the draft of a statute to the 
1 
rank of law# The king is ... the legislator." This strange 
distribution between the powers of king and parliament has 
been deduced from Article 62 of the Prussian Constitution, 
which, however, does not say anything about it. For the 
Reich, the same conclusion was dregwn from Article 5 of Bis­
marck's Constitution# Here the determination of the content 
of a statute was left to an agreement between the Reichstag 
and the Bundesrat (Federal Chamber), whereas the sanction 
was exclusively the work of the Bundesrat# Article 5, however, 
contained nothing but that "the legislation of the Reich is 
exercised by the Bundesrat and the Reichstag". In spite of 
this clear formulation, Laband asserted: "The sanction is 
therefore legislation in the constitutional sense of the word. 
.... The question as to the object of the legislative power 
is identical with the question as to the bearer of the power 
2 
of the state". 
1. Hermann von Schulze-Gavernitz, "Das Preussische Staats-
recht", Vol. XXX II, 2nd edit., Leipzig, 1881, p. 22. 
2 m  Paul Leband, "Deutsch.es Reichstaatsrecht", 7th edit®, 
Tubingen, 1915, p. 117. 
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The political defeat of the German bourgeoisie cannot 
be more dearly demonstrated than in the aooeptanoe of that 
duallstic theory which on the one hand reduced the extent of 
the parliamentary legislative power and on the other hand, 
even within the restricted legislative power, over-atreaaed 
the role of the king or of the federal monareha assembled in 
the Bundearat. This emphasis laid upon enacted law la, aa 
we have pointed out, a veiling of the weakness of the bour~ 
geoiaie. 
2* The German bourgeoisie which never attained poli­
tical influence and therefore, a controlling lntereat in the 
genetic determination of the law, turned more to the culti­
vation of inatltutlonal and organizational security againat 
the intervention of the State, by building up a huge system 
of legal aecuritiea, particularly by concentrating ita atten­
tion to the position of the Judges. 
The development towarda the independence of Judgea la 
a very complicated proceas# German liberalism fights againat 
the interference of the monarch and against the claim of the 
monarch to be himself a Judge, and for the aole authority of 
the Judge to decide litigations. The victory of Pruaslan 
liberalism was made visible for the first time in Section 6 
of the Introduction to the Pruaslan Allgemelne Landrecht which 
says that the decree of the monarch Is no part of the code, 
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but a mere arbitrary decision, and that he is therefore un~ 
1 
fitted to settle litigation# Under Suarez1 influence, the 
view was held during the deliberations of the Allgemeine 
Landrecht that in despotic states the despot could be a judge, 
but not in a monarchy. 8M83£XX But in spite of these liberal 
2 
demands, the interference of the monarch did not cease. It 
was only in 1804 that Frederick William III renounced his 
4 
claim to declare a Judgment invalid. Finally, the king, by 
an order dated September 6, 1815, accepted the doctrine that 
5 
the judges are subject only to the law. But even in 1842, 
Savigny complained of continual interferences of the adminis-
6 
tration in matters of civil justice. The state of penal 
Justice was even worse* Frederick William III reserved 
right even in 1802 to increase a sentence of a penal court, 
and the Prussian penal code of 1805 retained this right of 
the king* The king himself could not punish, but he could 
ratify Judgments and increase their severity. This right was 8 
superseded on the 29th June, 1840, by the right of mercy. 
1. Stolzel Suarez, p. 385. 
2» Instances of such interference are to be found in 
Stolzel-Brandenburg Preussen, Vol. II, pp. 317, 324. 
3. Stolzel Suarez, p. 381. 
4. Stolzel, Brandenburg Preussen, Vol. II, p. 355. 
5. Kern, p. 97. 
6. Stolzel, Brandenburg Preussen, Vol. II, p. 741. 
7. Ibid., p. 359. 
80 Ibid., pp. 521, 522. 
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Parallel with this advance of the idea of the judge*s 
independence, is that of the generality of the law. The 
postulate of the generality of the law arose in the transi­
tional period, because it was the sole basis of the judge's 
independence in the absence of institutional means for its 
protection: that is to say, it was still possible to dis­
charge him or to transfer him to another court* The lack of 
organised security led also to the institution of special 
courts which permanently deprived the ordinary courts of their 
authority and which had to decide according to the will of 
1 
the monarch. 
A decisive change was brought about by the Revolution 
of 1848, which first secured the absolute independence of 
judges • There is little doubt that up to this time, in spite 
of the controversy as to whether the king was entitled to 2 
discharge judges at his discretion, he frequently did so. 
The law of March 29, 1844, though it represents considerable 
progress, still, however, left to the government the right 
to pension judges at any time at its discretion. The Prank-
fart Constitution, which as a matter of fact, never came into 
i Tn<*-t-ATices of such courts to be found in Kern's book, _ 1ao mhe cas0 0f the brothers Karl and Gottlieb Welcker 
L S. Sd" Processors at the University of Bonn Bight 
be mentioned. 
2. Compare the controversy centering about Section 99,11 
17 and Section 105, II, 10, of the Prussian Allgemeine Land-
re cht in Stolzel, Brandenburg Preussen, Vol. II, p. 396. 
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operation, postulated in Section 175, I, the independence of 
judges, in Section 177, the prohibition to discharge them or 
to transfer them to another court, or to pension them against 
their will; and in Section 175, II, it prohibited exceptional 
courts* At the same time, the Constitution excluded adminis­
trative tribunals and transferred solely to the ordinary 
courts the power to decide any kind of litigation (Section 182, 
I.). In spite of the failure of the Revolution, its funda­
mental ideas with regard to the position of the judge became 
a political reality. They were accepted and further enlarged 
in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. The Prussian law of May 
7, 1851 realised the fundamental ideas of Sections 175 and 
177 of the Frankfurt Constitution# Judges could then be dis­
charged or pensioned only after disciplinary proceedings* 
From 1848 until 1919 the independence of the judge was 
never problematical, in spite of many attempts by various 
governments to interfere with their independence. After the 
formation of the Reich, the law of January 27, 1877, once 
more recognised this fundamental principle. But this law in­
troduced another guarantee, that of the autonomy of judges 
the right to distribute amongst themselves the various offices 
of a court. Up to that time, the Prussian Minister of Justice 
distributed such offices himself, that is to say, he determined 
which judges should sit in the penal and other courts. In the 
already mentioned "conflict period", the Prussian Minister of 
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Justice misused his authority and so composed the penal courts 
as to obtain sentences against political enemies# The sec­
tions 63 ff. leave the selection of the Judges for the various 
courts entirely to the presidium of the court, with the excep­
tion of the examining magistrates and the presidents of the 
commercial courts* 
In this period, i.e., from 1848 to 1918, formal ration­
ality of the law was developed and realised to an extraordin­
ary degree. Laws were interpreted literally* Questions of 
equity and convenience were alien to the interpretation of 
laws. The theory of the school of free discretion and the 
sociological interpretation was expressly rejected. The right 
of judicial review was not recognised, although the liberal 
lawyers demanded it as a corrective against the lack of in­
fluence of parliament. During this period, legal standards 
of conduct play no part at all. The Supreme Court began its 
work in 1879. In the first thirty published volumes of its 
decisions in civil matters, the court only exceptionally re-
C» 
ferred to the Exceptio doli generalis. 
Even after the Civil Code came into operation on Janu­
ary 1, 1900, legal standards of conduct did not play a great 
rSle. Section 10, II, 17 of the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht 
was also hardly taken into practical account during the 
1. Gneist, p. 228. 
2* Hedemann, p. 4. 
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nineteenth century. The leading commentary on the Allgemeine 
Landrecht by Koch, (3rd edit. 1863) does not mention a single 
decision on the basis of that provision. 
This period might, therefore, be called the period of 
normativism or positivism. 
The attitude of the judges towards the law, during the 
period of William II is sociologically understandable. The 
State knew at that time perfectly how to maintain its hold 
over the independent judges. The social station of a judge 
was fixed. He began his career as an officer in the reserve. 
During his military training, he learned the significance of 
the notions of obedience and discipline. The positions of 
presidents of courts were almost exclusively occupied by former 
public prosecutors who were, and are, dependent civil servants 
of the State, and had, therefore, an exceptionally close re­
lation to the government. They well knew how to fulfil the 
wishes of the minister, even if they were not verbally ex­
pressed, and they knew how to use their power over members 
of the court. Further, the guarantees of the independence of 
Judges were only valid for those Judges who were definitely 
engaged, and not for the large number of auxiliary Judges who 
could be discharged or transferred to other courts according 
to the discretion of the minister, and who, for their careers, 
were entirely dependent upon the good will of the superior 
judges. __________ 
1, Fraenkel, p. 14. 
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Finally, the Prussian Judge, ©specially as compared 
with hla English contemporary was a badly paid civil servant, 
who had to sit. for years before he la finally engaged, so 
that only the ohildren of the middle bourgeoisie oould afford 
to enter the profession* The Judge of this period poaaeased 
all the oharacterletics of the petty bourgeois, hia resent­
ment againat the worker, especially the organieed and well-to-
do worker, love of throne and altar, desire for the mainten­
ance of property, but also his Indifference to finance-capital. 
3. The rationality of the law was realised mainly on 
the commodity market and in the relations between the ruling 
olassea. In the relationship between worker and capitalist, 
up to 1918 there were still exceptional laws, as la proved ^ 
by the law relating to the right of aaaoclation of workera» 
In Prance, we mention the law of June 14, 1791 (Lol de KMMJtiH 
Chapelier) and the penal oode (Articles 414 and 416)j in 
England, the corresponding Sooletles Acts (3D Ueo. Ill, o.7tt) 
and the combination Act. (3D "so. Ill o. 81 and 39 and 10 
Oeo. Ill o. 106)) and In Prussls the Allgemelne Landrecht 
(Section 8, II, 358) and the Prussian Factory Act of 1B4B 
(Sections 102 and 183, jrohlblted strikes and the Inducement 
to strike* The law of April 24, 1854 extended the prohibition 
to other categories of workers, and the Prussian law of May 
21, I860, extended It to miners. This period of prohibition 
1. Neumann. "Trade Unionism, Uemocrac, Wctatorshlp", 
p. 22 ff. and f»Koalitlonsfrelhelt , p. L U • 
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of trad© unions was justified ideologically by the liberal 
theory that trade unions were against the liberal rules of 
the game, and economically by the prevalence of the wage fund 
theory. 
This period of prohibition was followed by one of tolera­
tion of trade unions* In England, the period began with the 
laws of 1824 (5 Geo. IV, c. 95 and of 1825 (6 Geo. IV c. 129); 
in Prance with the law of May 25, 1864, and in Germany with 
the factory act of 29th May, 1869. At this time the State 
did rone no longer dared openly to prohibit trade unions, but 
rendered any kind of industrial action so difficult that 
strikers and the strike leaders were constantly caught in the 
meshes of exceptional provisions (cf. Section 152, II, and 
Section 153 of the Factory Act). It is specially worth men­
tioning that according to the Factory Act, a member of a trade 
union could leave the union at any time he desired, and that 
no legal relationship could be established between member 
and union# The trade unions were already so strong as to 
make their prohibition impossible, but they were not yet 
strong enough to secure recognition by the State. 
In Germany, the worker, and especially the social 
worker, was no part of the nation, William II expressed this 
very candidly when he remarked that the Socialist worker did 
not belong to the Fatherland. The nation was represented by 
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Crown, army, bureaucracy, landed aristocracy, and bourgeoisie» 
The Judges represented these strata of society. Their inter­
ests and those of these sections of the nation were identicilj 
and while the laws corresponded to their interests, why should 
they interpret them otherwise than literally? The Rechtsstaat 
was decisively a state of the ruling classes# But the gener­
ality of the law and the independence of judges contained ele­
ments which transcended the function of veiling the power of 
the ruling classes and of rendering the economic processes 
calculable. The State was reactionary, but it was not a 
despotic State. It kept wihin the bounds of its own laws. 
The separation of powers was not only a distinction between 
various functions of the Stajte, but was also a distribution 
of the power over the State between the various strata of the 
ruling classes. But this class-rule was calculable and pre­
dictable, and therefore not despotic. Those elements of the 
Rechtsstaat which we might possibly call eternal, guaranteed 
security and a certain amount of liberty to the working class. 
4. In England, where the centre of gravity lay in the 
recognition of political right., the victory of the rule of 
law was far swifter and far more thorough than in Germany. 
The obvious violation of the principle, which we consider a» 
constituting the rule of law, Is to be found In the establish­
ment of the Court of Star Chamber, which dated from the 
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statute of 1487 (3 Hen. VII c. 1), This court violated the 
principle of the separation of powers, because "the same body 
whioh Issues ordinances, which controls the execution of the 
law and the administration of the State (the King's Council) 
acts also as a court of justice with a comprehensive penal 
Jurisdiction. This body established by the statutes of 1407. 
did nothing to restrict the unlimited authority of Jurisdic­
tion of the King's Council# In addition to this committee, 
there existed still other exceptional courts of a similar 
character, but by 1641 the Star Chamber was abolished, and in 
1679, the HabeHa Corpus Aot was passed (31 Car. II 0. 2). 
The Acts of Settlement (12 and 13 Will. Ill C, 2) commissioned 
Judges quamdlu se bene gesserlnt, their salaries were fixed 
and they were removable only upon the address of both houses 
of parliament. This meant that a Judge could only be dis­
missed either in consequence of a conviction for some offence, 
or on the address of both houses® Prom a political point of 
view, the rule of law Is therefore secured. 
In the economic sphere, the rationality of English law 
reached a very high degree, but only as to relations of the 
plutocracy. We have already mentioned that among the condi­
tions which Sir William Holdsworth established as Indispensa­
ble for the functioning of the English legal system, the most 
1. Maitland,"Constitutional History", pp. 220, 221. 
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important is that the number of litigations should be relative­
ly small. This aim, however, is only attainable if the costs 
are high and if poor persons have little factual opportunity 
for litigation; that is to say if the protection of the law 
is denied to a large section of society• Owing to the de­
fectiveness of English judicial statistics, it is extremely 
difficult to obtain a correct view of the situation# We there­
fore only compare some figures for England and Wales with the 
Prussian figures for 1927. In that year, in England and 
Wales, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided 
165 cases; the House of Lords, 58; the Court of Appeal 470; 
and the High Court of Justice, 401 appellate proceedings. In 
Germany, the Reichsgericht decided 2767 appellate proceedings 
of Prussian courts in civil matters and 1197 cases in penal 
matters. We must add that the appeal decisions of the federal 
high courts (Oberlandesgerichte) in penal matters, numbered 
6410, the first appeals to the Oberlandesgerichte and the 
Landgerichte in civil matters with 117,279 cases, and the 
appeal decision in criminal matters of the Landgerichte, num­
bering 46,331. These figures reveal that the legal protec­
tion of large masses of the population is far more effective 
in Germany than in England; that the boon of the rationality 
of the law is enjoyed by far larger strata of society in 
Gerjtanany than in England. 
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The idea of extending the benefits of rational law to 
the lower middle classes and to the workers was realised only 
very slowly# In the seventeenth century, a classification of 
the various activities of the State, a distinction between 
1 Justice and administration, was hardly possible# The cen­
tralised system of the sixteenth century "pressed hardly upon 
2 the poor". The attempts to remedy these deficiencies, such 
as the Court of Requests, disappeared after the Great Rebellion# 
At the beginning of tthe nineteenth century, the English legal 
system was more centralised than any other in the world# "With 
the exception of petty criminal business entrusted to the 
justices of the Peace, practically all the judicial work of 
the country was done by the judges of the common law courts, 
the Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, or the Court of 
5 Admiralty." Blackstone demanded local courts, and the county 
courts were only by the end of 1879 (9 & 10 Vict# C. 95) in­
troduced. It cannot be denied that the problem of extending 
the rationality of the law to the poorer classes has yet to 
4 be solved# Bentham's assertion that the common law Is a 
1 W A. Robson. "Justice of Administrative Law", London, 
IQPfi' T> 16* Roscoe Pound, "The Spirit of Common Law", p. 73; i 5 "Collected Papers", Vol. I (The Shallows and 
Sllencee of Real Life), pp. 470, 478; Sir Willi™ Holdsworth, 
"History", 5th edit., Vol. I, PP-» 502, 508, 
2# Ibid., pp. 187, 188. 
I'. "Rationale'of8Judicial Evidence", Bk. VIII, Ch.III, 
Para. 4. 
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conspiracy because it is irrational, is justified only to a 
certain extent. The commom law is highly rational, hut only 
for the rich. It is still irrational to a large extent, for 
the poor and for the lower bourgeoisie* 
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SECTION 5. THE RULE OF LAW UNDER THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION. 
" (MONOPOLY CAPITALISM") 
!• The Change of the Economic and Social Structure and of 
1 
the Material Elements of the Lep:al System, 
1. From the competition of pre-war Germany there emerged 
the concentration of capital; and from the concentration of 
capital, monopoly capitalism. The post-war period has decisive­
ly affected the structure of German economy# The reasons for 
the divergent course of German and English pre-war development 
have been shown by Veblen. The beginnings of tendencies were 
fully developed by the War and during the period after the 
inflation. The scarcity of raw materials led to the creation 
of new industries. The dividion of labour reached a maximum, 
which was paralleled by a maximum rationalisation of the whole 
i Ot-t-o Bauer "Kapitalismus und Sozialismus nach dem "Rational!sierung-Fehlrationali-Weltkrleg , Bel. i Levy, "Industrial Germany, a sierung", Wien, 1931, Herman vy, ^ ^eir control by the Study of its Monopoly Organisa Rationalisation 
State", Cambridge, 1935, ^S5. Thorsten Veblen, 
Movement in Gemanfi^dl^Industrial Revolution", 1915; Franz "Imperial Germany and the , hgverfa8aung. Die Stel-Neumann, "Koalitionsfrei^it^^R^chsverfass ^ 
lung der Gewerkschaften im Dlctatorahip«> wlth a preface by 
"Trade Unionism, ?A54. Rudolf Hilferdlng, "Das Finanz-Harold J. Laski, .Lo^d^» fiDlo Wandlungen des Kapitalismus" kapital", Wien; pSul0 T Lm-,s" Heft 22/23 (1935, p. 704); in "Zeitschrift fur Sozialismus^^Heft^22/ . rty% 
A.A. Berlen^S ReAner, "Die Rechts Institute des Privat-
on", Tubingen, UM. 
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eoonomic machinery* The rationalisation of tho individual 
undertakings is supplemented by the rationalisation of tho 
whole economic system, by standardisation and uniformity« 
The needs of the single undertakings for lowering their 
oosts and securing markets press In that direction. These 
needs, however, cannot legally be fulfilled on the basis of 
free competition, they can only be realised by co-operation, 
that is to say in a higher and more conscious form of the 
co-operation of the producers# 
The potential and actual productivity of the post-war 
period grew rapidly. Technical progress surpassed anything 
that had been experienced before* But oapltal accumulation 
meets boundaries, especially in Germany, in the narrowing of 
the field of capital expansion. This challenge is met by a 
shifting of the industrialisation to new industries, but the 
weight of the stagnant Industries, especially of agriculture, 
is permanently growing. The possibility of evasion gets more 
and more difficult in the period of crisis, as the composi­
tion of capital 1. changed, and the ratio of fixed capital 
has grown. Discharging of workers does give some possibility 
of meeting the need, of the crisis by lowering costs. 
The increase of productivity on the one side and the 
ever greater difficulty of securing markets on the other 
leads to a waste of capital on a great scale. Production 
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wasted by the War, the closing down of undertakings, the im­
posing of quotas, the price struggles of monopolies, all 
increased the faux-frais of capitalist production^ The mono­
poly is the tool of organised waste of capital mainly in those 
industries which are out of date* The monopoly has, therefore, 
a dual function — a progressive one by increased rationalisa­
tion, and a reactionary one of destruction of capital. The 
monopolist is in no way hostile to technical progress, but he 
renders the full exploitation of this technical progress more 
difficult. 
The theory that monopolies are always progressive cor­
responds to the political theory of German Social Democracy 
and to the views of trade unionists, who see in monopolies 
the* first step towards Socialism. To the theory that monopo­
lies hinder the development of capitalist productivity cor-
respond, the Communist political theory of . decay of oepl-
tall em. 
Both theories ere right and wrong at the eeme time. 
For whether monopolies, es higher for** of Industrie! or­
ganised, oen be mad. beneficial to the whole of .ool.ty 
or not, depends entirely upon political forces. 
The form. In which monopoly capitalism Is organised 
.re .et out In Professor Levy', hook. The significance of 
H.eHnn can be found in Robert A. Brady's monopoly rationalisation can 
book. 
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In Germany, capitalism is organised in three different 
types of organisation: for the domination of the labour mar­
ket, in the employers' organisation, centralised in one big 
union; for the domination of the commodity market, in the 
already mentioned types of the concern and cartel; and for 
the domination of the state, in a kind of "estate" organisa­
tion, such as the "Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie"# 
The trade unions on the other hand combine all the three tasks® 
The intervention of the State has a dual character# 
It is on the hand progressive. It aids the development of 
the productive forces, either directly by its own economic 
activities (post, railways, water power), or indirectly by 
a certain amount of social insurance, especially by the taking 
over of the risk of sickness, health and unemployment insur­
ance* 
On the other side the intervention of the State hinder, 
the development of the productive forces, by subsidies which 
prevent the natural capitalistic selection, by tariffs, by 
the prevention of imports, by prohibiting the establishment 
of new undertakings, and by compulsory creation of cartels. 
The importance of the State is Increased not only functionally 
but also by the increased number of its officials. Owing to 
the Increased aMOunt of State intervention the number of those 
persons who fom the State as defined in Part One of the book 
increases rapidly# 
519 
2. This changed economic structure changes the func­
tions of the entrepreneur. The free entrepreneur disappears# 
The entrepreneur of to-day is more or less a mere functionary 
of the undertaking. The property owners as set out in Part I 
all disappear. Hilferding had already said in 1909 that the 
joint atock company is not only distinguished from the entre­
preneur by the different organisational form, but by the fact 
that it divests the capitalist of the function of the entre­
preneur# This transformation is clearly described, apart 
from Hilferding*s book, in those of Renner,/^erle^ and Means. 
The change of the economic structure also produces a 
decisive transformation of the social stratification of 
society. Technical progress creates considerable structural 
unemployment. For the capitalist stratum the ratio of those 
who live simply from rentier incomes increases. Still more 
important is the change in the composition of the working 
class* Ths number of office workers, clerks, end officials, 
increases. The Introduction of scientific methods, mass 
production, and standardization, reduces the number of skilled 
workers, while at the same time it increases the number of 
technical superintendants on the one hand and of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers, especially women, on the other. 
As markets contract and competition Intensifies, the distri­
butive apparatus grows. Consequently the number of those 
fStfO 
engaged in the distributive process In Increased. Innl.auoon 
may be found in Robert A* Brady's book# This changed composl-
tion of the \wrkiivg clanu ohanges also bh© functions of the 
trad* unions* Their aim was tho restriction of th© competl-
tion of th© labour market by collective organisation and col­
lective agreements. Insurances for health, slofcness and un­
employment acted in this oonnootlon an supplementary Insbltu* 
tions to a free labour market by relieving the pressure exer» 
olaed upon the labour market by tho groups of workers concerned. 
But by this very development, whioh wan essentially progres­
sive, the workers forged themsolves golden febbers, as Karl 
Marx has observed. Th© power of the trade unions deorearies, 
In proportion ao ratio that of the monopolist organisations 
inoreases. Unskilled workers, supervisors, administrative 
officials, shop assistants, and women, are extremely difficult 
to organise. The arbitration systems, the regulation of wages 
by the State,and the lnoreased Importance of social Insurance, 
reduced the significance of the trade unions In the life of 
the workers. But the decisive fact Is that the power of the ^ 
trade unions is greater the smaller the size of the undertaking. 
1. Karl Marx, "Capital", Vol. 1, P. edition. 
o Bl1,rtir Hllferdlng, "Das Plnanakapltal", p. 46B* Pran« K,UL!0Blonl». Democracy, Dlot.tor.K1p", p. 4b. 
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II. The Change of the Political Structure1. 
1. The constitutions of the poat-war period, whether 
written or not, are all based upon the political principles 
of pluralism, that is to say, the distribution of the power 
of the State among socially free organisations. This plural­
istic conception was specifically transformed into the idea 
2 of parity between the two olasses of society. Whereas 
liberalism ignored the existence of a class conflict, and 
felt the recognition of legal freedom and legal equality to 
be sufficient, this period of collectivlst democracy recog­
nised the existence of a class conflict, but attempted to 
1. Gerhard Leibholz, "Die Auf 1*6sung der llberalen Demokratte 
in Deutsehland und das autoritftre Staatsbild , Mttnchen & 
LeipBig, 1933; Harold J. Laski, "Demooraoy In Crisis , 
London, 1932; "The State in Theory and Practice", London, "The Pluralistic State" in "The Foundations of Sover-
London 1931, P. 232ff.; Otto Kirchheimer, Weimar - Sd wia dann?S, Berlin, 1930; Carl Scbmltt, "Me gelstes-
gdBOhichtllche Lage des Parliamentarians » ^d edition, a- 1926: "Legalltat und Legitimitttt , Munchen 
1932^ "Der HUter der Verfaasung", Tflblngen, 1931; 
"V«fS«SA«eletoe», Stoehen & Leipzig, 1988; Hermann Heller, 
Diktatur?", TtlMngen, 193°j/££* 
"Koalltlonsfreihelt und Relohsverfasaung. Dle Stellung der 
Gewerksohaften im Verfassungssystem , I*3*, Arunur 
BA«Anh«T<ff "The Birth of the German Republic , Oxford, 
Tarnheyden, "Berufsverb&nde und Wlrtschaftsdemokratie , 
Berlin, 1930. 
2. Carl Schmltt, "Httter der^erfassung", and Harold J. 
Laski, "The Pluralistic State . 
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transform the conflict Into co-operation of the classes on 
the basis of parity. The period after the war is character­
ised by the faot that the Labour movement became politically 
self-conscious, that it separated itself from the liberal 
movement of the bourgeoisie, that it constituted itself as 
in autonomous political organisation, and attempted to trans­
form the whole of sooiety according to its own philosophy 
of life* This tendency, the self-consoiousness of the Labour 
movement, has been speeded up by the War, which led to the 
transformation of the liberal state into a mass democracy. 
The idea of parity between various strata of sooiety 
Is a theory visible in the formation of the Weimar Constitu­
tion. The history of the Weimar Constitution shows that the 
conception of a social contrast is not a mere ideal or a mere 
methodological device for the Justification of the State, tut 
even sometimes a historical reality. It is strange that no­
body eve^f observed that the Weimar Constitution was in faot 
the work of various social contracts concluded between vari­
ous groups of sooiety. 
The first decisive contract is that between the late 
Reiohapreoldenfc Ebert and Oenaral UrBner on the 10th November, 
1918. OrSner, as witness in the libel action in Munich, told 
the etory of ho* this eontraot waa concluded. "We have 
1. "Der Dolchstoea-Prozeaa in MOnohen - Olrtober-November, 
1935", Munich, 1925, p. 223-
allied ourselves in order to fight Bolshevism. The roabora-
tion of the monaroJiy was unthinkable. Our aim on the 10th 
of November was the introduction of an ordered Government 
whioh Is supported by an army, and the National Assembly, «a 
•oon as possible. I have advised the Field Marshall tvon 
Hindenburg] not to figjht the revolution... 1 hairs proposed 
to him that ths Supreme Army Command might make an alliance 
with ths Social Demooratlo Par by only in order to restore 
togsthsr with the Supreme Army Command an ordered Governments* 
Ths part las of ths Klght had completely vanished." This 
alliance between Kbert on the one hand and ftrttner on the 
other was confirmed by a letter, which Hlndenberg wrote to 
Ebert. on the 8th of Deoember, Idle. 
The ssoond deolslve oontraot on which the Constitution 
was bassd was that between the oentral organisations of the 
employers and of the trade unions of the 15th November, 1918, 
ths so-called Stinnes-Leglen agreement. By this the employ-
er.< organisations recognised exclusively the Independent 
trade unions, and abandoned the "yellow" unions, which were 
till then finanoed by the employers. They promised to the 
trade unions, the right of co-operation in industrial efralrs, 
and they consented to the regulation of employment conditions 
by collective agreements. This agreement as well as the 
first one, tapl!.* not only the rejection of Bolshevism, but 
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also that of a sooialist state. 
The third decisive oontraot upon whloh the new State 
was built was that of March 4th, 1919, between the Govern­
ment and the Social Democratic Party of Berlin, as the repre­
sentative of the revolutionary Soviet movement. This covenant 
contained on the side of the Government the promise to intro­
duce Works Councils, but of a type completely distinct from 
the Russian Soviets. A result of this agreement was Article 
185 of the Weimar Constitution whloh reoognised Works Coun-
cils and promised them a share in the management of the 
eoonomio system. 
The fourth oovenant was that between the Reich and the 
Federal States on the 26th January, 1919, whloh implied the 
abandonment of the old aim of aohieving a unified Germany, 
and the recognition of the continued existenoe of Federal 
States. 
The fifth Bid final oontraot, whloh preotlo«lly In­
cluded .11 th. previous on.., was that b.tw.en th. thr.e 
coalition parti.., th. Social Democratic Party, th. O.ntre 
Party, and th. D.mocratlo Party; th. so-call.d W.laar parti... 
Th. mln oont.nt of thla oontraot «... th. malnten.no. of th. 
old bureaucracy and Judiciary, th. rejection of th. Sowlet 
system, th. maintenance of the Influence of the Church, the 
introduction of parliamentary feucracy, and consequently 
the rejection of Socialism. 
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This whole system of parity ought to bo oalled a syst«ra 
of colleotlvlst demooraoy, whloh means that the State for the 
fulfilment of Its tasks uses private organisations, and glvea 
them a share In polltioal power. The State aots between the 
two negotiating and collaborating parties as a neutral third, 
whioh should interfere only if the social opponents do not 
reaoh agreement. Similar developments oan be traoed In 
2 3 4 Austria, Pranoe, and England. This constitutional system has 
5 
been oalled a social "Reohtsstaat". 
It seems obvious that suoh a system not only did not 
reduoe the influenoe of the State, but inoreased it. Free 
agreements of the partners concerned oan only be reached If 
the economic confliots do not beoome decisive political con­
flicts. Understanding between employers and workers above 
all is only possible if the employer is able to make conces­
sions. Suoh free agreements praotloally ceased In 1931, when 
the economic orisls made further concessions lmposalbfc. From 
1. Tatarin-Tarnheyden, "BerufsverbSnde und ±t demokratle", Berlin, 1930, and Neumann, Koalltlonsfrelhelt 
und Reiohaverfassung", p. 39ff. 
2. Lederer, "Orundriss des oesterrelohlsohen Soalalrechts", 
2. Auflage, Wien, 1932. 
X Poni Pio "Tralto elementalre de legislation industrlelle", 
report by Ignace Bessll^g in -Internationales 
Hand w'drterbuoh des Oewerksohaftsweaens, I, 604 ff. 
4. w. Milne Bailey, "Trad® Unions and the State", London, 
1934, p. 298ff. 
tr n"Reohtsataat oder Dlktatur?" and Franz 
ma R6iohai"rftt83,inK"' p-63ff-
t\w 
then oil the free agreements of the social partners dlaappoared, 
and oompulaory enforcements by the State, the "neutral third", 
which ahould only intervene in exceptional oases, beearaa the 
rule. 
The politioal struoture is oharaeterlaed by mass de-
mooraey, or in Mannheim's terms, by a fundamental democratise-
tlon of the whole of sooiety. The period is then one "of the 
reintegration of large groups in which the individuals, who 
until now had been increasingly separated from one another, 
are compelled to renounoe their private interests and subor­
dinate themaelvea to the interests of larger soolal units". 
It la oharaoteriaed by the fact ttat the bulk of the popula­
tion now got politioal rights, and was no longer passively 
8 
detaohed from the ruling fcllte. But in auoh a society until 
the large mass of the working olaos has become politically 
oonaoloua, co-operation or co-ordination on the part of the 
•ooiety ia possible only if there is a balance of forces 
between the olaasesj that la to say, if neither class if 
strong enough to subdue the other, or to rule without its 
help. This balance of the forces was expressed in the con­
stitutional institutions. 
1. K»rl Mannh.Un, "R.tlon.l .nd lmr.Mon.1 In 
Oont«mpor«ry Sool.ty", London, 1934, p.SO. 
2. Mannheim, ibid., p.10. 
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The function of the suffrage changed. The universal 
suffrage with the parliamentary system is an expression of 
the fact that the idyllic period of the bourgeoisie has gone. 
The parliaments are no longer places whore the representa-
Uvea of the privileged parts of the nation deliberate. They 
have rather become the stage where compromises are reached 
1 between the various partners in the class struggle. 
2. The balance of forces between the classes is legally 
Introduced in the second part of the Weimar Constitution, 
which deals with the fundamental rights. The interpretation 
of this, the second part, was the subjeot of heated contro­
versies. Whereas the first part of the Constitution provides 
for the organisation of the State, president, parliament, 
Reicherat, and so on, the second part contains the decision 
as to the future activities of the State. The predominant 
view was that the Constitution oontalned nothing but the ex­
pression of the old liberal principles of freedom of contract, 
guarantee of property, freedom of trade, and so on. The view 
usually taken was that the fundamental decision reached in 
this second part was for constitutional democracy and the 
2 
bourgeois Re^chtsstaat. -
1. Dr. Otto Kirchhetaer, "Weimar - und »ea dann?", p.20. 
2. Carl Scbmitt, "Verfassungsletoe", p.30, and many others. 
528 
But it cannot be denied that the historical rise of 
the constitution, the various contracts which formed its 
basis, had found expression in the second part of the con­
stitution not only by the recognition of the old liberal 
principles, but by the introduction of new social principles, 
which are mainly to be found in Article 165 (promise of in­
dustrial democracy), Article 159 (recognition of the freedom 
of the trade unions), Article 156 (promise of the socialisa­
tion of certain industries). 
The system of pluralism, and the changed structure of 
the economic system, naturally strengthened the power of the 
Government as against that of Parliement. Although Parlia­
ment was formally sovereign, its power subsequently decreased 
in proportion as that of the Government, or better, that of 
the ministerial bureaucracy, increased* This process has 
been admirably set out in Harold J. Laski's "Democracy in 
Crisis". The results are equally applicable to the German 
post-war development, only with the difference that the de­
crease of parliamentary power Is even more discernible In 
Germany than In England. The German development Is charac­
terised by the fact that Parliament by empowering acts, and 
the President of the Reich by his emergency legislation, 
strengthened s bureaucracy whose position was constitutionally 
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secure in that the aoqulred rights of functionaries were 
made the subject of a constitutional guarantee* We have to 
Add that the vote of censure, which Is the final weapon of 
a Parliament against a Government, could not be successfully 
applied in post-war Germany. Every Government was a coali­
tion Government. The formation of a Government was therefore 
so difficult, so complicated, and so Intricate a task that a 
coalition partner, having finally set up a Government, dared 
not endanger it by a vote of censure. 
We have already seen that every fundamental right is 
•quipped with the so-called reserve of the legislature, so 
that the bureaucracy can intervene in those fundamental 
rights on the basis of a law. The growing economic and 
political difficulties, especially after 1931, when the 
National Socialist Party entered Parliament with 107 members, 
brought about ever-increasing intervention in these consti­
tutional rights. Freedom of meeting, freedom of the press, 
freedom of a.sembly, were more end "ore brought under the 
control of the bureaucracy. A bureaucracy ie alway. stronger 
than the Judiciary, as lte command* (euoh aa the banning of 
a paper) have to be executed at once. 
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1 III. The Change of the Legal System. 
To this changed economic and political structure there 
corresponded a rapid and decisive transformation of the legal (V 
structure. 
1. We have already shown that the conception of the general­
ity of the law was abandoned by German legal theory under the 
influence of Laband's criticism. But suddenly this notion 
experienced a strange revival, mainly through the influence 
1. Jul 1 en Bonnecase, "La pensee juridique f^^alse, <h 
1803 i l'heure presente", 2 vols, Bordea^> Dessauer "Recht, Richtertum und Mlnisterialbttrokratie , »£££ 1928; Brnst Freer*. 1, "Fur So,lologie derKl»a8«n-
Justls", Berlin, 1987; A.L. Goodhart, "Some pretations of La*" In "Modern Theories of Law > 1933* GeorgesS»urvltob, "L' Idee dn droit aoolal . Parl^ 1938, 
"Rechtsnorm und Entscheidung , » of Law", "The Institutional The°ry in od Ideal des Reichs-London, 1933; Otto Kahn-Freund, 1Das sc"Weimar -
arbeitsgerichts", Ma^e^, lSSl^Otto ^  fcteljpmgllf Berlin 
und was dann? , Berlin,iwou, nolltische und soziale 
& Leipzig, .1930;hPrSLPiCktlichen Rechtssprechung", Berlin, Bedeutung der a !bS"!?r«her NaohprVtfung der Verfassungs-
p. 617; Georges Ren^' V Munich and'Lelpzig, 1S27; 
J£5& Iriepel^ OoldbilenB.nverordnung und VorsugsaWlen , 
Berlin & Leipzig, 1934. 
»^-B£felir©graphy. 
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exercised by Carl Scbmitt upon legal and constitutional 
thought. Sohmitt alleged that the word "law" used by the 
Weimar constitution means only general laws, so that Parlia­
ment is only able to Issue general laws. Individual commands 
therefore are in his view forbidden. The legislative power 
of Parliament is checked by the impossibility of issuing 
individual regulations. For proof of this assertion, on the 
one hand he has recourse to the ideological history of the 
notion of the law which we have followed up in the second 
part of our book, and on the other he finds his assertion 
proved by Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution, which says 
"All Germans are equal before the law". That the history of 
ideas does not support his aseertion, we have already seen. 
We have attempted to prove that the postulate that the State 
may only rule through general laws Is bound up with that of 
a certain social superstructure; and that It Is Indefensible 
to divorce the postulate of the generality of the law from 
the postulated social order. The political significance of 
that renaissance of the generality of the law is obvious. 
Carl Schmitt developed hie theory for the first tine in a 
publication intended to show that the suggested confiscation 
of the property of the former Kaiser and the other princes 
1. carl Schmitt, "Verfassungslehre", p. 158, -Unabhtogigkeit 
des Richters", p» 
533 
was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of 
•quality before the law and the postulate of its generality. 
The generality of the law Is asserted to be essentially for 
the economic as well as for ths political sphere. 
2. This assertion of Carl Sohmitt's presupposes further 
that the postulate of equality ia addressed not only to the 
•xecutlve but also to the legislature. That this fundamental 
principle is intended to govern the activities of executive 
organs and of the Judloiary is not to be doubted. It means 
simply that olvll service and Judges must apply the law of 
the State equally without regard to any differences in the 
status of individuals, without hatred, without bias, so that 
the executive organs are subject only to a notion of duty. 
Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution obviously repeats 
this old notion of equality as expressed in every modem con­
stitution as it is to be found, for instance, in Article 4 
of the old Prussian Constitution. HSnel, however, the liberal 
constitutional lawyer, brought in the Blsma^kian period for 
the extension of the maxim of equality to the legislature; 
and asserted that the exceptional legislation against the 
Polish minority in Prussia, *hlcfc made It possible to derive 
Poles of their property, was in opposition to that extended 
1. Max Weber, "Wlrtsohaft und Oesellschaft", p. 188. 
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principle of equality. Hanel's theory, however, was not 
accepted. It was universally rejected in pre-war German 
constitutional theory. 
tfow, however, this old liberal idea was taken up "by 
oertain lawyers in order to protect private property. Now, 
after the Weimar Constitution had established parliamentary 
sovereignty, the constitutional lawyers began to transform 
the principle of equality Into ft maxim Intended to bind the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament. The beginning was made 
by Heinrlch Triepel, who asserted the new function of the 
of equality, which did not allow the deprivation of 
Shareholders of Joint stock companies of a part of the value 
of their shares on the oocasion of the revaluation of the 
mark, to enormous literftture was produced with the intention 
of proving that the Weimar parliament could never violate the 
principle of equality, and the Association of Oerman Consti­
tutional Lawyers even devoted a meeting to the investigations 
of this question (Volume S of their reports). We may be 
spared the particulars of these controversies. 
8. But even if ft. »«*» °f 3bOUld ^ l6gl8" 
lature, it does not necessarily follow that the principle of 
.Quality can only be realised through general Iftws. The 
1. Heinrich Triepel, "Goldbilensenverordnung und Vorsugsak-
tien", pe 26. 
8. Of. on this discussion Neumann, "Koalitlonsfreiheit , 
p.4i. 
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Assertion that equality can only be reached through such a 
itruoture of law is the fallacious conclusion of Rousseau, 
which we have already considered; that the general will, be-
eause it is general, oan only egress itself through general 
laws* As against suoh sn assertion, it must he maintained 
that material equality o«n as well be established by means 
of individual interferences. Yet whether or not this is 
possible depends entirely upon the soolal struotur. to which 
the lew Is related. In e monopolistic eoonomlo organisation 
the legislature Is Tory often confronted with only one In­
dividual oase or with a limited number of monopolist under­
takings. The legislature often can and must us. Individual 
regulations In ord.r to do Justioe to thee, speolflo olr-
oumstences. Or should It b. compelled to veil an Individual 
regulation b, having recourse to a general norm which 1. 
avowedly only Intended to serve one particular case? If there 
1. only on. Kaiser, «r « «»" ~ 
from the other strata of the population, must the Stat. If 
It wants to provide for these particular parsons use g.ner.1 
norms without mentioning th.se particular per.on.t 
Aa . matter of fact the President of tb. Reich .nact.d 
an emergency d.cree based on Article 48 of the Constitution 
T •• i 1931). Whose article VIII prohibit, th. 
(Deoree of July * 
^ vmintcv against the Darmstitdter Bank on application for benkruptcy again. 
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the occasion of the onset of the banking orisia. Should he 
have been oompelled to issue a law in abstraot terms prohibit­
ing such applications for all banks, if economically only the 
fate of this large bank was really decisive? 
In the economlo sphere, therefore, the postulate of the 
generality of the law beoomes absurd if the legislature is no 
longer concerned with equal competitions, but with monopolies 
violating that principle of equality on the market which we 
have found to be essential to the theory of classical economy. 
So long as there are equal competitors, equal regulations 
oan naturally be brought about only by general abstraot laws. 
Consequently the passionate attack of Hermann Heller 
against Carl Sohmitt and against the postulated generality 
of the law in the Constitution Of Weimar, is Justified. 
Heller, however, overlooks the fact that the generality of 
the law has not only the function of rationalising and mech­
anising economlo processes, but also an ethical function 
which beoomes apparent in the politioal sphere. 
The revival of the concept of the generality of the law 
and its Indiscriminate application to th. spheres of economic 
and political aetlvltlea aarvad therefore a. a tool against 
tha sovereignty of Parliament, which under the Weimar Consti­
tution represented not only the lntereata of landlords and the 
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bourgeois* but to a Urge extent those of the working cla»». 
The general law was intended to be applied as a weans of 
maintaining the existing property order, and it was used as 
• faotor designod to discredit the sovereignty of Parliament. 
By this the generality of the law took the place of a natural 
law. It was in faot nothing but a hidden natural law. 
4* Whereas the controversies on the formal structure of 
the law were in pre-war times theoretical discussions, be-
oause, as we have seen, the Judiolal review of statutes was 
not accepted, theao theoretloal controversies became a poli­
tical faot of the first; order, owing to the faot that the 
German Supreme flourt suddenly reversed its attitude as to 
Its authority for reviewing enacted laws. By a decision of 
April 28, 1021, the Relohsgerlcht suddenly asserted that 
they had always regarded themselves entitled to review 
statutes as to their oonformity with the Constitution. They 
2 
Maintain this attitude in later decisions. The recognition 
of the right of the Judges to review statutes constitutes a 
re-alignment of the strength of the State. The stronger the 
State the more the Judges will submit to its authority; the 
weaker a State the more the Judges will be inolined to attempt 
to ...ort their po-.r. Th. recognition of tha authority of 
1. Deoialonii of th» R.lohsgorloht In Olvll M.fctarn, Vol. 
102, p. 161. 
8 Vol 107, P.139i vol. 111. P-3»> t0lsl°" °', th* 
flLIhof, vol. 6, p. MS. «nd «—». " 
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Judicial review is In faot an attempt on the part of the 
Judiciary intended on the whole to proteot the existing pro­
perty order. That this is true may be seen by an analysis 
of the deoisions reoognlsing that right. All of them deal 
with intervention of the State in property, that is to say, 
with alleged violations of Artiole 153 of the Weimar Consti­
tution, whioh guaranteed property as oonferred by the Consti­
tution. I refer for further particulars to the excellent 
work of Klrohheimer. 
At the same time the Supreme Court aooepted the theory 
that the maxim of equality is direoted also to the legislat­
ure so that the "arbitrary" deoisions of Parliament are un~ 
constitutional. Artiole 109 and Artlol. 1153 rapidly became 
la l.gal theory and In l«gal praotloe the cover for the 
warding off of any Injury to the property order. The funda­
mental rights of the Weimar Constitution and the judlolal 
review became In constitutional theory and In the Jurisdiction 
1 v„i 10P o 161: The Court Investigates whether a statute 
1 • Vol. 10Z* p* jm Af t*ha ownors of prottilsdo Ifl vtlld^ 
whioh restricts the rights o whether the law relating 
Vol. Ill, p.32°! * Mar^ls valid( vol. 105, p.200. the 
to the Revaluation of the MarK . p.deral State 
Court denies the validity state Grants to Princes; vol. 
whioh abolishes the Jayra®JJ. ttl0 validity of revaluation 107, p.370: thecour ^..o^h. validly ^ 
2Setolr o?'aPmeral State laid upon the output of a 
mind' 1 s valid. 
2. Vol. Ill, P* 329' 
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of the Supreme Court the means of maintaining the existing 
state of political, cultural and economic life. German 
justice rapidly approached the American model. The final 
decision of the struggle between judioiary and Parliament 
was, however, prevented by the breakdown of Weimar democracy. 
5. The constitutional theory and the Judiciary, however, 
did not stop at the extension and the misinterpretation of 
fundamental rights and at recognising Judicial review; they 
even began to revive the natural law which had been dead for 
more than a century. We have already mentioned the distinc­
tion between those fundamental rights which could be altered 
by the legislature and those which were beyond any change 
and which were therefore "inherent limitations upon the 
unending power"* The body of rules which In this connection 
was unchangeable and unalterable provided mainly for the 
maintenance of private property. This conservative end re­
actionary function of the new natural la* is strikingly 
expressed by the resolution of the Association of the Judges 
of the Supreme Court, when the Government of the Heioh 
announced its intention of enacting a law dealing with the 
revaluation of the mark, end which in the opinion of the 
Association did not make enough concessions to mortgage 
1. Of., p. 
530 
holders. The resolution they adopted runs as follows: 
"This idea of good faith (Treu und Glauber*) stands outside 
the speolflo laws, outside the provisions of the positive 
law. No legal system, deserving this honourable nam®, can 
exist without this prlnolple. 
"Therefore the legislature may not frustrate by an 
arbitrary decision (Maohwort), a result which Is Imperatively 
required by good faith. 
"It would be severe violation of the honour of the 
Government end of the feeling of right If somebody, who would 
Invoke the new law, were to lose hie ease beoause the invoca­
tion of that law was against good faith." 
The Supreme Court hereby announced that It would deny 
legal protection to a mortgagee, who would Invoke the new 
law, and Jemes Ooldsohmld? supported the Supreme Court and 
even revived the ancient right of resistance, forgetting only 
that the institution of democracy and the right of resistance 
sr. incompatible institutions. Hermann Isay even went so far 
as to assert that every Judge is entitled to examine every 
statute on the basis of It. compatability with his feeling 
of right. The development steered rapidly to ths recognition 
X. "Juristisohe Woohersohrlft", 1984, p.90. 
2. Ibid., P. 245. 
n r^les Groves Haines, "The Revival of 3. P. 213, also Caries urov lnternati0nal law. 
Natural Law Concepts', 10 
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of a natural law protecting the given property order. 
6. Still more impressive is the change of front as to 
the theory of the function of the judge. The period from 
1918 to 1930 is characterised by the acceptance ©f the theory 
of the school of free discretion. It implied the destruction 
of the rationality and calculability of the law. These ideas, 
which I have set out in previous publications, are formulated 
philosophically in an important contribution of Professor Max 
1 
lorkheimer in "Eeitschrift fur Sozialforschtmg", who sums up 
the development as follows 
"If in the last centuries it was essential for the 
maintenance of exchange to keep promises at least without 
continuous interference by might, this necessity has become 
less by the progressive accumulations of capital. The ruling 
stratum no longer consists of innumerable subjects who enter 
into contracts, but of large power groups controlled by a 
few persons competing with each other on the world market. 
They have transformed vast areas of Europe into enomous 
labour camps under iron discipline. The more competition 
on the world market develops into a struggle for power, the 
more rigid their internal and external organisation. The 
economic basis of the significance of the promises becomes 
weaker day by day. Ho longer the contract, but command and 
obedience, characterise increasingly the internal relations.11 
1. Vol.IV, 1935, pp. 14-15. (Bemerkungen sur Phllosoph-
isehen Anthropologic.) 
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With regard to the formal structure of law this means 
the viotory of the legal standards of oonduot over the formal 
rational norms. These legal standards of oonduot transform 
the whole legal system. They abolish formal rational law and 
replace It by material rational norms, and Irrational deci­
sions. The legal standards of oonduot refer, as we have al­
ready seen, to extra-legal norms. Incidentally, the replace­
ment of formal rational law by legal standards of conduct 
means that the boundary between Jurisdiction and administra­
tion is shifting and that the realm of administration in­
creases, but so that administrative decisions -- which means 
polltioal deoisions — are taken in the form of Judgments of 
ordinary olvil courts. 
In order to be able to decide the question whether 
legal standards of conduct endanger the calculabllity of ex-
ohange processes and the predictability of economic reaults, 
w. have fir at to know where the legal standards are Intro­
duced and what role they are playing. 
Legal standard, of oonduot fulfil their decisive func­
tion in any la* which deals with the relations of monopolies. 
They appear wherever the legal system Is confronted with the 
problem of power. 
1. Cf. Neumai 
and Hedemann, 
"Die Politlache und Sozlale Bedeutung 
© Flucht in die Generalklauseln . 
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The problsm *h ether a strike la logal or not, was main-
1 y deoided aooording to Section 886 of the German Civil CCKU .  
The strike was illegal if It was Incompatible with the prin­
ciples of good morale. The decisive formulation of the rela­
tion between employer and employee aa class unit a was there­
fore baaed upon a moral norm, namely upon the question whether 
the dispute oonformod to the feeling of "equity and Justice" 
of the people. The question whether an employer Is to pay 
wages If he oannot make use of tha offered labour of an en­
gaged employee put off on account of a strike In another 
trade, or of a fire or teehnloal mlschunoe In his factory, 
and so on, Is clearly deoided In Sootlon 6115 of the Olvil 
Oode In favour of the employee; but the 0upreme/8ourt has 
oontlnually disregarded this provision of the Court and has 
based its decisions on Sootlon 242 of the Olvll Oode, a legal 
standard of conduot, showing that a debtor has to fulfil his 
obligations according to good faith. Whether an employee, 
who comes under the provisions of a oolleetlve agreement, 
but taoitly aocepts less wages than the collective agreement 
provides for thereby lawfully waives his claim to the wages 
thus fixed, has been continuously deoided with the help of 
Section 242; that is to say, that the decision was made de­
pendent upon the particular circumstances of the case. 
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These are only a few examples from that realm of law 
which regulates the most decisive relations in a modern 
society. They show that rationality was abandoned for the 
sake of monopolists. 
An equally dominating decision affected legal standards 
of oonduct in the law relating to •unfair competition, as we 
have already shown. They even altered the law relating to 
Joint stock companies and prevented the exercise of minority 
rights against the management of such companies. Legal 
standards of conduct pervaded the whole law relating to in­
dustrial combinations. (Decree against the Abuse of Economic 
Power of November 2, 1923.) According to that law the 
Minister of Economics was empowered to bring an action against 
any combination that "endangers the economic life of the 
community as a whole". According to Section 8, any party 
to an agreement or combination may withdraw without notice 
given for a substantial reason. And a substantial reason 
was "especially held to be established if the freedom of 
economic action in respect of such party be unfairly limited, 
particularly with regard to production, sale, and the fixing 
of prices". The legal standards of conduct altered even 
public law, administrative law and the law of civil proced­
ure* They transformed the whole legal system. 
What are the reasons for the change in the attitude of 
the Judges and the acceptance of the theory of free discretion? 
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It was In the first place the economic motive of inflation 
which caused the Supreme Court to abandon the principle mark 
equal to mark in order to attempt the revaluation of devalu­
ated claims on the basis of Section 242 of the Civil Code. 
The second reason was the political attitude of the judiciary; 
their hostility to democracy. 
From these reasons, and the instances indicated, the 
function of the legal standards of conduct can easily be 
disoerned. 
As far as the relationship of employers and workers is 
concerned the legal standards of conduct serve the compro­
mise between the two classes, the settling of antagonistic 
2 
interests; but only until about 1930. Up to that date the 
Supreme Industrial Court carefully compromised between the 
two groups. This compromise was made possible by the change­
able legal standards of conduct, which could be adjusted to 
any concrete situation. 
But after 1930, with the beginning of the economic 
crisis and the political reaction, these norms became a 
weapon against social reform legislation. So long as the 
idea of parity was a reality, so long as collectivist democ­
racy was functioning, the legal standards of conduct were a 
1. Decision of the Reichsgerlcht in Civil Matters", vol. 
104 D 122* in "Jurlstische Wochenschrift , 1925, p. 1377. 
Cft'Ernst Fraenkel, "Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz". 
2 Cf Franz Neumann, "Die Politische und Soziale Bedeutung", nd'oftfe Kahn-Freund, has soziale Ideal des Relchsarbeits-
gerichts". 
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means of compromising between the two interests. Under that 
system of parity they were Incalculable, and the result of 
an action was clearly unpredictable. The material rational­
ity of such legal standards of conduct — in this we have to 
correot Max Weber — was in fact identical with irrationality. 
Sections 826 and 242 of the Civil Code referred to extra­
legal norms in the terminology of the Supreme Court, to those 
moral standards which are universally recognised by the people; 
but in a collectivistic democracy, which is clearly built 
upon antagonistic interests, such universal recognition of 
moral standards by the classes is clearly inconceivable. An 
agreement of the two classes as to whether a strike is legal 
or not is inconceivable. To the employer practically every 
strike is illegal, to the worker practically none. The rela­
tivity of the legal standards of conduct prevented practic­
ally any kind of rationality. So long as a Judge wavers 
between the various possible interpretations of these norms, 
the material rationality becomes in fact material irration­
ality as the judge bases his decision on his individual 
evaluation. 
This aspect has Changed, however, sinee 1930. Fro* 
that time on the materia rationality of the legal standards 
of conduct is a rationality. The result of an action can con­
fidently be expected by the monopolists. In the period of 
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©rials and the beginning of political reaction the judge 
executes a series of identifications by which the objective 
structural change in the economic system leads to a psychol­
ogical transformation in the outlook of the judge. The first 
step is a distinction of the undertaking as such from the 
ownership of the undertaking. As in other countries, so in 
Germany, in legal theory the institutionalist approach be­
comes predominant. The undertaking is considered to be some­
thing different from the ownership of the undertaking. 
Further: monopolistic undertakings become identical with the 
economic system, and private economic units become identical 
with the nation. A monopoly such as the Chemical Trust 
appears in the judgments of the courts as a kind of national 
institution. The needs of monopolies even lead to an altera­
tion of the law relating to unfair competition, which makes 
it possible to punish "economic betrayal of the country". 
In the relationship between monopolies and consumers 
the law was never directed towards compromise, but only to-
2 
wards the production of monopolies. Industrial combinations 
were conceived to be mere contracts admissible on the basis 
of the prinoiple of freedom of contract, and not "a social 
organisation comparable to the State itself". The 
1 .  c f . ,  p .  r c i  
2. Franz Boehm, "Weltbewerb und Monopolkampf", Berlin, 
1933, pp. 168, 353. 
x A A RATO* article "Corporation" in Encyclopaedia of 3. A.A.Berie, arui , . Berle and G.C.Means, 
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misconception of the principle of freedom of contract is to 
be found in English judgment also. There, too, freedom of 
contract is asserted to imply the freedom to create monopo­
lies. 
The decree against the abuse of economic power dated 
November 2nd, 1923, has never been effective. The Reich 
Minister of Economics has never brought any action based upon 
Section 4 of that decree, against en industrial combination* 
And the changes which the law against unfair competition 
underwent in the monopolistic economic system have already 
been mentioned. 
In England, no better example can be found than in the 
2 
decision in Hopwood v. Roberts, where the provision of a 
statute of 1855, according to which local authorities may 
"pay such wages as they ... may think fit", was interpreted 
in such a way that they were only made to pay "reasonable" 
wages. The court, therefore, deliberately inserted a legal 
standard of conduct into a statutory provision which did not 
know of it. 
The insertion of the notion of reasonableness into 
abstract legal provisions is to be found in the English law 
n nu.<, MncMnerv Company of Canada v. Brunet (1909) 
A Ittomey Gene?Jyof "SstLlla v. Adelaide Steamship 
0onpany'(19ll) A?C. 781, Horth West Salt Company v. Electro-
lytic Aloali Company (1914), A.C. 461. 
„ a MQ9R) A C. 578. and the criticlmi 
of^ Prof^ Harold' J* Lasti m''Studie»'in Law and Politics", 
Chapter IX, London, 1932. 
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1 relating to restraint of trade. In the United States, the 
history of the interpretation of the Sherman Act of 1890, 
offers an excellent example. Article I of that Act, clearly 
stated that "Every contract ... in restraint of trade ... is 
hereby declared to be illegal". Whereas the first judgments 
based upon the statute rigidly applied that provision, the 
latter decisions only declared illegal unreasonable restraint 
of trade. It follows, therefore, that in the realm of monop­
oly law the legal standards of conduct throughout serve the 
interests of the monopolists. The irrational norms are cal­
culable for the monopolists, as they are strong enough to 
dispense, if necessary, with formal rationality. The monop­
olist cannot only do without calculable law, formal ration­
ality is even a fetter to the full development of his power. 
The rational law has, as we have tried to show, not only the 
function of rendering exchange processes calculable, it has 
an equalising function also. It protects the weak. The 
2 
3 
1 Connare A.L. Haslam, "The Law Relating to Trade Com­
binations", London, 1931, the decisions JH •. 3Hoi 
(1841) 3 Bead., 383, and the Nordenfeldt case (1893) 1 
630 1894) A C 535 especially Lord Macnaghtan's statem< 
Si RJS. "It ii sufficient Justification ... if the rest; 
2* 4 " that is in reference to the interest! 
of °the%artiesconoerned, and^easonable in reference to 1 
interests of the public . 
_ _ TUT* « astiivH "KVAlffTvh Assoc* 
C0C0 JL J 
106. 
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monopolist oan dispense with the aid of the courts; he does 
not go to the courts. His power of command is a sufficient 
substitute for the coercive power of the state. By his 
economic power he is able to impose upon customers and work­
ers, in the form of a free oontraot, all the conditions he 
thinks fit. The standard contracts of monopolists shift 
practically all conceivable risks on to the shoulders of the 
non-monopolist, whereas the latter has to fulfil all obliga­
tions of the law and the monopolist is able to compel him to 
do so without the help of the court. In such situations, the 
monopolist attempts to abolish freedom of oontraot, freedom 
of trade and the formal rationality of law. As the freedom 
of contraot also includes the freedom for the workers to 
form organisations and to bargain collectively} as the free­
dom of contraot implies the freedom of outsiders to keep 
sway from industrial combination or to leave it trtienever 
necessary; freedom of trade implies freedom to erect new 
undertakings thereby damaging established monopolistic 
possessions. The supplementary liberties of the freedom of 
oontraot and trade become fetters for the primary Institution 
of monopolistic property. The productive relationships en­
danger the productive forces of the monopolists. 
This victory of the school of free discretion, and 
thereby of irrationality, has endangered the legal protection 
550 
enjoyed by the middle and poorer classes. This function of 
the school of free discretion had already been foreseen by 
Max Weber as early as 1911: nlt is not sure whether the class­
es which are today negatively privileged, especially the 
working class, have to expect from an Informal administration 
of justice, that which the ideology of the jurists (those be­
longing ^to the school of free discretion — Author's note) 
alleges". The legal standards of conduct establish the rule 
of the Judges. A German judge of high position has expressed 
his views on the rule of judges, in the following way: "In 
the last resort therefore, the feeling of decency is decisive 
in the case of the older judges in high positions, who for 
tiie most part have never had any practical business experi-
2 
ence". Chief Justice Hughes, when he was Governor, expressed 
the sine idea in a similar way. "We are under a constitution, 
3 
but the constitution is what the judges say it is." 
This abandonment of formal rationality, is the response 
of the judges to the challenge of formal rationality extended 
to the large masses of the populace. In spite of the political 
weakness of the Weimar democracy, the legal protection of the 
1. Wirtschaft u. Gesellachaft, p. J7/ 
2. The Senatspr&siden<4TBaumbach in his Commentary to the 
Wettbewerbsgesetz, Berlin, 1929, p* 174. 
3. Quoted in Edward 3. Corwin, "The Twilight of the Supreme 
Court", New Haven, 1935, p. XXVIII. 
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poor and of the working class, reached to a very high stand­
ard. We need only look at the statistics of the industrial 
courts which were established by the law of 1927, and which 
set up special courts for the decision of litigation between 
workers and employers, between workers among themselves aris­
ing out of common work, and between trade unions and masters' 
organisations, to see that this is true. In the year 1931, 
441,243 cases came before the courts of first instance, 
20,633 before the courts of second instance, and 982 oases 
before the supreme industrial court. That is a legal pro­
tection not attained by any other country in the world. It 
shows that the boon of formal rationality was extended to the 
great masses of modern German society. It was made possible 
by the fact that the costs of litigation before industrial 
courts were extremely low, and poor persons1 cases were pre­
ponderant in many spheres of the law. 
7. This process of the disintegration of formal ration­
ality was accompanied and made possible by a complete re­
versal in legal theory. We may distinguish between four 
types of Judicial thinking: normative, institutional, de-
cisionistic and functional thought. The characteristic of 
normative thought has already been shown in previous chapters. 
Institutional thought is best made clear by some instances. 
1 The following pages contain a criticism of Carl Schmitt's 
"Sber die Drei ^ten des Rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens", 
Hamburg, 1934. 
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Whereas the normativist considers jurisdiction as the mere 
application of given law which ia asserted to have a pre~ 
Judicial existence, for the institutionalise the aotlvity 
of the judge is entirely a ore stive one, as the law is not 
closed and the legal norms are open to interpretation. The 
normativist knows no dlfferenoe between a positive and a 
negative state; the institutionalise however, reoognises 
such a distinction, and defines it in legal terms, namely, 
the positive state as a state intervening in liberty and 
property. The institutionalist sees a difference between 
case and statutory law, between autonomous law and that of 
the state, because he — rightly from his point of view — 
declares immaterial the ultimate attribution of case and 
autonomous law to that of the state. 
Institutional thought has three sources: conservative 
sooiallsm, catholic (Thomistic) natural law, and the Idea of 
plur.ll.rn (syndicalism). The characteristic example was the 
WeUsar Constitution, In which Catholic 3onda^»m^ .s,^or 
lnst.no., expressed in the Papal Encyclical, ran^-nOTarttm, 
and trade union pluralism were fused into a whole, .Ten if 
such unity proved to be unstable. Instltutionallsm is essen­
tially a static theory which, however, believes in an evolu­
tion by an orderly process. It is conservative because it 
1. opposed to any evolution, and it is progressiv. he.aus. 
It recognises the rights of ths working class up to the ltait 
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of equal collaboration. It is a legal theory and not a socio-
logloal one, aa It sees In the law a^j^iowxi value* Vkereaa the 
normativlst Jurist hates legal standards of conduct because 
they make him inseoure and destroy oalculabillty, the insti-
tutlonallst aoolaims them beoauae they leave the exercise 
discretion among the activities of the Judge. The instltu-
tionaliat aooepts the positive state because It is positive, 
and the autonomous oreation of law also beoause It Is autono­
mous. He acolaims the evolution from oontraot to relation, 
because he rejeots the theory of the will, and alleges that 
rights and duties are not attachod to will, but to objective 
faots. He aecepts the reifloation of the undertakings, he 
regards the divoroo of undertakings from ownership as 
an agreeable and progressive theory. 
Institutional thoughts leada to one of two results J 
either to tta. ideology of colleotivlst demooraoy, or to that 
•f the corporative etsts. It mystifies institution -
In thie we ecoept the orltlolem of BounKo.ee - by tewing 
them out of their eooiel interdependence .nd by making them 
absolute. This mystic character of the notion of the Insti­
tution o® he found in the definition given by one of the 
leading exponents of institutional thoory, Renard. 
1. Roscoe Pound, "Spirit of Common Law", p.31. 
17B "Tout® Institution est una structure 2. pp. 174, 178. iouce , ^ quelque Blon oommun, et 
Juridique rationellement o:Sonatltutive." And "1*Institution 
cet ordonnement est aft loi - 0,e)Bt mi gtre: une 'toutJ 
n1 est point ^ona etre, un 'tout' constitute 
aux parties ^®/ordonn6a £ un fin; un 'tout' au 
par un agenoement de p invest^© d'un certain tltre 
regard duquel chaque partle eat mve 
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Functional legal thought, which lies at the bottom of 
all our Investigations, starts from the assumption that law 
Is not a substance in itself, but a function of soolety. Law 
serves interests and ideas, but it is of no value in Itself. 
Functional legal thought accepts neither the phonograph theory 
of the law, nor that of the school of free discretion. It 
does not believe that free discretion is always progressive, 
and the strict binding of the Judge of the law always re­
actionary. Rather, it investigates the social conditions 
leading to the prevalence of the doctrine of the school of 
free discretion, and considers the reasons for the various 
theories. It does not believe that the reifioation of under­
takings is always progressive, but takes into account the 
question Whether such doctrines fulfil progressive social 
functions. 
Declslonistic legal thought has, in fact, nothing to 
do with law. In this kind of legal thinking, law Is nothing 
but a technique for transforming the political will into legal 
form. In declsionism law is nothing but an arcanum for the 
maintenance of power. It is an arcanum dominations, and it 
is characteristic that in political theory the doctrine of 
the arcana arose at the time when theology lost its dominating 
1 
InfluB nee. — 
Juridiqu© ... la r.latlon institutlonoll. est ». intSriorisa-
tion, consortium, invicem membra. 
1. Carl Schmitt, "Die Dlktatur", 2nd edit., Munich and 
Leipzig, 1928, p. 13. 
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In acoepting the funotional approach to law, wo do not 
rejeot the theories of normativism and institutionalism. W® 
have rather to distribute the task® between the various legal 
dootrlnea. 
Judge and lawyer have, In the fir at plaoe, to think in 
terms of normativiatio theory. "The Judge, as bound to the 
interpretation and the servioe of the positive legal order, 
oan^ltnow no theory of the validity of the law but the Juristic 
one." The Judge who has to apply laws, has to apply the 
provisions of those laws, and nothing else. The institution­
al and funotional approaches are for him and for his task, 
of a seoondary nature. He will think institutionally, ao 
as to make understandable to himself the meaning and the 
•ignlfioanoe of an institution* he will think functionally, 
If the interpretation of a legal provision la open to doubt, 
and he has therefore a ohoioe between various Interpretations. 
In auoh a situation, he will ohooae that interpretation which 
fits in the aooial system realised in the constitutional life. 
1. Oustav Radbruoh, "H.oht.phllo.oplii.", Srd .4. 1988, 
P«85. 
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SECTION g.—THK RPLB OF LAW UNDER NATIONAL 300IALI3M1. 
The following chaptera are not Intended to deal ex­
haustively with the problem of law under National Socialism* 
they are rather intended to demonstrate the contrast between 
the liberal legal system, the transitional period of monopoly 
capitalism and oolleotive democracy, and the legal system of 
National Soolallsm, ao that the liberal principles, by thus 
contrasting them with laber phenomena, may be made still 
olearer. 
1. Julius Binder, "Der deutsche Volksataat", TUblngen, 1934; 
Qeorg Dahm. "Natlonalaozialistisohea und fasohlsblsohas 
Strafreoht", Berlin, 1935; Ernab Forathoff, "Der totale Staat 
Hamburg, 1933; Hons Oerber, "Staatarechtlidhe Orundllnien 
des neuen Reiohea", Tttbingen, 1933; Herman flBring, "Die 
Raohtasloherheit ala Orundlage der Volksgemeinsohaft", Ham­
burg, 1936; Helnrich Henkel, "Die Unabhttngigkeit dee Rlchters 
in ihrem neuen Sinngehalt", Hamburg, 19341 Reinhard Httbn, 
"Die Wandlung im ataatarechtllohon Donken", Hamburg, 1034; 
B.R. Huber, ffVom Sinn der Verfaaaung", Hamburg, 1936; "Die 
Totalittt des vtflkischen 3taatea"in "Die Tab", 1934, p.30; 
Otto KOllreuter, "Vom Sinn und Weaen der nabionalen Revolu­
tion", Tubingen, 1933; "Orundrlss dor all«eraeinon Staatslehre 
Ttibingen, 1933; "Der deutache Fflhrerstaat", TUblngen, 1934; 
"Volk und Staat In der Weltanschauung deo Ntttionnlaozialis-
mus", Berlin, 1936; Heinrlch Lange"Llberallamua, Nation-
alaozlalisraus und bUrgerlichea Recht", TUblngen, 1933; "Vom 
Qosetzesstaat zum Reohtastaat", Tttbingen, 1934; Karl Larenz, 
"Deutsche Rechtserneuerung und Reohtsphilosophle , Tftblngen, 
1934: "Reohts- und Staatsphiloaophie der Oegenwart , 2nd ed., 
Berlin, 1935; "Rechtaperaon und subjoktlves Recht , Berlin, 
1935; Karl Lohinann, "Hitler's Staatsauf fas sting , Berlin, 1933; 
Gerhard Maunz, "Neue Qrundlagen dea Verwaltungsrechts' , 
Hamburg, 1934: Karl Michaelis, Wondlungen des doutaohen 
Rechtsdenkona , Berlin, 1935; H. Nioolal, Der Neuaufban dea 
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I* ^he Doctrine of Fascism. 
1. The Italian doctrine of the totalitarian state is 
laid down clearly in two documents; the Carta del Lavoro of 
April 30th, 1927, and the contribution of Mussolini to the 
Enciclopedia Italians (Vol. XIV). According to Article I of 
the Carta, the old and mighty Italian nation is an independ­
ent organism of higher value and with higher aims, standing 
above the individuals and the associations forming it. The 
nation is regarded in the fascist state as a spiritual, econ­
omic and political entity. The fascist state is a corporate 
state; that is to say, it is hostile to the idea of democracy, 
of majority rule, and to the idea of political equality. It 
abhors politieal and economic liberalism, but it still con­
fesses its faith in private initiative in the sphere of pro­
duction (Article VII of the Carta), because that initiative 
Reiches", Berlin, 1934; "Grundlagen der kommenden Verfassung", 
Berlin, 1933; Wolfgang Siebert, "Vom Wesen des Rechtsmiss-
brauchs", Berlin, 1935; Karl Siegert, "Grundzflge des Straf-
rechts im neuen Staats", Ttlbingen, 1934; Friedrich Schaff-
stein, "Politische Strafrechtswissenschaft", Hamburg, 1934; 
Carl Schmitt, "Funf Leitsatze fur die Reohtspraxis", Berlin, 
1933; "Staaty Bewegung, Volk", Hamburg, 1933; "Staatsgefflge 
und Zusammenbruch des zweiten reiches", Hamburg, 1934; Uber 
die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens , Ham­
burg, 1934; "Was bedeutet der Streit um den Rechtsstaat?n in 
"Zeitschrift ftlr die gesamte Staatswissenschaft , 1935, p. 189. 
1 Published in England under the title of "The Political 
and Social Doctrine of Fascism", London, The Hogarth Press. 
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is the most valuable and the most efficient instrument for 
the realisation of the interests of the nation. State inter­
vention is allowed only *here private initiative is lacking 
(Article IX). Although fascism fights the nineteenth cent­
ury, it does not seek to return to feudalism. The basis of 
^a3Clflm is the State, which is absolute in relation 
to the individual or to the social groups. It is asserted 
to be not a mere administrative machine, not a mere creation 
of politics, but a moral unity. The State is the embodied 
will to power, based upon discipline. 
It is in the main the Hegelian idea of the State, and 
it is a corporate State. The corporations are the unified 
organisation of the productive forces and sire asserted to 
represent all those interests (Carta, Article VI). They 
are, however, not organs <f self-government, but organs of 
the State (Article 43 of the Royal Decree 1130 of July, 1926 
— in execution of tiie Trade Union Law of April 3rd, 1926). 
The corporations are centralised units operating be­
tween the syndicates, but they came into being only in 
February 1934, in spite of the fact that a Ministry of Cor­
porations had been created by Royal Decree on July 2nd, 1926, 
and a National Council of Corporations by the law 206 of 
March 30th, 1930. The corporations themselves were created 
by the law of February 5th, 1934 (No. 163), as organs of 
1. Mussolini, p. 19. 
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the State. Their composition and activity is entirely sub­
ject to the decisions of the head of the government, and the 
activities of the syndicates have now almost ceased. 
1 
2. The accurate exposition of the ideology of National 
Socialism is a far more difficult task, for its doctrine is 
laid down in two documents, olaiming canonic character, both 
however, conceived before the accession to power of National 
Sooialiam: namely, the unchangeable Party Programme, and 
2 
Hitler's Autobiography — "My Struggle". Hitler's autobiog­
raphy shows a grandiose contempt for the notion of the State, 
a oontempt which still continues, as is shown in his two 
speeohes at the Party Conference in Nuremberg in 1934 and 
1935. 
For him, the State is not a moral unit in the realisa­
tion of an absolute idea, but the servant of the idea of the 
"racial people". The State is, "the organisation of a com-
munlty of physioally and mentally equal beings for rendering 
possible In a better way the malntenanoe of their apeolee, 
1. Compare the 
r^i^ ' s i :  ^ ° a i i f t i = n p S L o ^ -
^:P5Sa?9l3irSS^rfan^ (oihmar Spann). 
2. The author uses the German unabridged 16th edition In 
one volume of 1932. 
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and for the attainment of the aims ol" their existence designed 
by Providence" (p. 164). The State ia not an aim In itself, 
but a means "for the maintenance of the racial existenoe of 
man" (p.421). "For the task of the State Is not to create 
abilities, but only to oroate free room for the existing 
forces. Therefore, the State can be considered as bad If, 
in spite of high oultural standards, it dooms to death the 
bearer of this culture in its racial composition." Hitler 
does not, therefore, reoognise the absolute obedience of 
oitlaens. Aooording to his views, a citlaen Is only subject 
to the authority of the State if "it corresponds to the In­
terests of his 'Volkstum1, or at least does not damage them" 
(p. 104). The authority of the State Is not an d.m in Itself. 
The standard of measurement for the evaluation of the State 
is "the quality of this institution of the 'Volkstum' Which 
Is In question" (p.435). 
It is obvious that such a conception comes very near 
to that of liberalism. The State appears as a means, as a 
mar. maehln.s Hltl.r'. b.ll.f In Provld.no. perform. a func­
tion .imllar to that of natural law In th. liberal »y.t.m of 
aoolety, but 1. dl.tlngul.hod by th. aoologloal formulate 
of th. alma of th. Stat.; It appear, a. a mean, for th. pro­
pagation of racially pur. p.ople-
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Tills book (Hitler's Autobiography) has somewhat em­
barrassed the German theory of the State. It compelled, the 
constitutional lawyers to bring their teaohing into line with 
that canonic dooumeat. Further, the attempt has even been 
1 
made to give up the notion of the totalitarian State. 
The second difficulty lies in the social basis, in the 
oonflict of the idea of the totalitarian state with the in­
stitution of private property, an antagonism whloh, however, 
Is not speoific to German National Socialism, but is also to 
be found in Italian Fascism. For its solution, one must 
first distinguish between the various kinds of totality and 
of totalitarian states. The German constitutional theory 
discriminates between the absolute totality of the absolute 
monarch; the totality of mass democracy, whloh i» the totality 
of oompetlng massed parties; the bolshevlst totality In whioh 
the State 1* conceived to be the mere instrument of the rule 
of the proletariat; the F.aoist totality, whloh is the total­
ity of the Italian State, and the national Soolalist totality, 
whose spiritual basis Is the idsa of race. "This politioal 
14.. 1. an objective external la. of life, en unchangeable 
historical mission?" The people Is the unit of life. It 
creates the State and it is not created by it, as the theory 
of Italian Fascism teaches. The essential fact 1. therefore, 
1. Roland Preisler, "Deutsche Justlz", 1934, p.43. 
2. Huber, "Die TotalltW", p.35. 
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"this totality of the political people". 
This totality is realised by the total movement (that 
is, the Party), which in its turn, is exclusively represented 
by the total leadership. The movement acts through the leader 
who is penetrated by the idea. The Leader represents the 
people. The total movement is the dynamic force directed 
against the static force of the machinery of the State. The 
totalitarian State is therefore nothing but the form of the 
life of the people. The aims of the State are universal, 
but the racial State does not demand a total activity of the 
State as does the Bolshevist State, it is rather concerned 
with the total power of the Leader. 
The law is the will of the Leader in the form of law. 
'This is the/Sefinition of law which is, in fact, a vicious 
circle. The principles of the legality of administration, 
of the subjection of the judge under the law, receive now a 
new "meaning", namely, the unconditional subjection of courts 
and administrative bodies under the politically unified will 
of the Leader. By this theory, the Hegelian theory of the 
State is finally rejected. The totalitarian state is there­
fore a "leadership" state, which is divided into three parts: 
the Stat, which is the static part, the Movement (the Party) 
which la the dynamic element, and the People. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Carl sobaitt, "Staat, Bewegmg, Volk", p. 12 
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II. The Idea of Totality. 
1. The identification of the people with the movement* 
and of the movement with the Leader is a trlok uaed by every 
diotator who intends to justify his rule immanently, and not 
by invoking transcendental Justifications. That this is an 
unproved assertion, that actually the people are solely and 
exclusively the object of the rule and have no part In it, 
is expressly admitted by Schmitt, when he says, "that the 
people are the unpolitical side growing in the protection and 
1 
the shade of political decisions". "Unpolitical11 can only 
mean that the people, because they are not allowed to take 
part in any decision, are a mere object of leadership, that 
is to say, they must withdraw entirely into their private 
2 sphere • Obviously, the referendum which the government can 
order at any time according to the law of July 14, 1933, in 
order to learn whether the people assent to a law or not, is 
no substitute for the sovereignty of parliament. By this 
referendum the people do not become a political faotor. Com­
peting parties do not exist. The people cannot choose be­
tween two alternatives; it can say either yes or no. 
1. Carl Schmitt, "Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 12. 
anion by Carl Schmitt has provoked blt-2. This careless admission oy^ K8ureuter, in the varioui 
ing criticism by his int ^ tho bibliography. It has 
pamphlets and *°lDle Huber, to speak continually 
also caused Schmitt () ^hat however, constitutes a people of "a political peopl<• . > nQ BhQre ln the political 
a political entity if tney na 
power, remains complete mystery. 
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The sociological reason for the fact that National 
Socialism stresses the supremacy of the Movement and of the 
people, can in the first place he explained by the feeling 
of inferiority which the Party has towards the bureaucracy* 
For the German bureaucracy is numerically and functionally 
all-powerful. The constant complaints of the Party, especially 
of its old guard, against the unwillingness of the bureaucracy 
to receive orders from the Party, has brought about passionate 
declarations by Hitler at the two Party Conferences in 1934 
and 1935, that the State has not created the Movement, but 
that the Movement has created the State; that the State does 
not govern the Movement, but the Movement rules the State. 
This over-stressing of the claim of the Party for totality 
minimises ideologically at least the social importance of the 
bureaucracy and of the conservative and traditional forces. 
The sociological, historical reason for the divergence 
of Italian and German ideas of the relation between state and 
nation can easily be determined. Italy is a colonial empire 
and can therefore have no use for the racial creed of national 
Socialism, whereas Hitler's Autobiography, colonial expansion 
is expressly rejected.1 The intended Eastern expansion of 
1. That however does »ot meanttat 
the^mcuUy o? Eastern expansion, Germany has officially 
claimed the re s to rat ion of her colonial possessions. 
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German National Socialism compelled the acceptance of the racial 
idea, in order to enable M it to exclude the millions of 
eastern Jews. The stress laid upon the racial idea can further 
be explained by internal policy. According to €a.rl Sohmltt -
1 
the Crown Jurist of National Socialism — the State is the 
work of politics, and the notion of "the political" is not 
determined by the State. "The political" means, however,' ac­
cording to Carl Schmitt, the relations between friend and foe# 
Only where such antagonism exists, only where people stand in 
the relation of friend and foe, are we able to speak of politics. 
Harmony, collaboration and competition have nothing to do with 
politics* The central idea of National Socialism is the 
abolition of the class war. The National Socialist ideology 
does not recognise the existence of classes; it does not 
recognise any antagonism between the various groups in the 
State. Its central idea is that of "the community of the 
people". Consequently, in Carl Schmitt's terms, there could 
b. no politics In Germany to-day, as there e xists no constel­
lation of foe and friend. But as the State is entirely the 
work of politlcsand politics are Indispensable, an enemy mast 
be created. This enemy Is the sllsn race, which for all 
practical purposes, means the Jews. The existence of the 
Jews is the esssntlal factor for the preservation of politics! 
life in Germany. The conception of the nation 1. valueless 
1. "Der Begriff des Polltls«&en'', Hamburg, 1933. 
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as it implies as we have already pointed out — certain 
liberal and democratic consequences, and the idea of the race 
serves, therefore, as a means of Integration of the National 
Socialist society. It further serves to differentiate that 
society from others, and finally, to preserve politics, apart 
from its function in foreign policy. The new Nuremberg laws 
of September 15, 1935 are the culmination of that development 
towards integration and differentiation of the National So­
cialist society. 
On the other hand, the central position of the State 
in Italian fascism is explicable if one realises that the 
Italian State is a relatively recent creation. Bureaucracy, 
police, and an efficient army are mainly creations of Italian 
fascism, whereas in Germany, the central machinery of the 
State was highly developed and completely intact when National 
Socialism came to power. The primary task of Italian fascism 
1 
was the creation of such an apparatus. 
3. Totality, however, means the universality of the 
aims of the State, the reversal of the liberal relationship 
between the State and the individual, the transformation of 
all important social spheres to public and political spheres. 
1 Rv this we do not mean that an Italian democratic 
State could not have built up thi. central ™£ln.ry, on the 
contrary, we helleve that 
better means of ®e * be true that under democratic 
conditions; lis foSatlon would have needed more time. 
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This totality, however, is opposed toAfaith, as strongly ex­
pressed, in private initiative in the economic sphereo There 
is to-day, no more important realm than that of economics* 
The most important institution is undoubtedly that of property, 
particularly property in the means of production. If, there­
fore, one takes the idea of totality seriously, one ought to 
socialist The converse, however, is a-loe true# The economic 
1 
policy in Germany as well as in Italy may not he actually 
liberal, but it is quite surely based on the institution of 
private property. In all National Socialist pamphlets and 
books dealing with this problem, the postulate of totality 
is immediately followed by that of private enterprise# How 
are these two postulates to be reconciled? 
The key for the solution of this antinomy has been very 
ably found by Carl Schmitt. In an important lecture, deliver­
ed before the most powerful industrial organization in North-
2 
West Germany he distinguished between two kinds of totality 
a quantitative and a qualitative one. The quantitative 
totalitarian state is a phenomenon of Romanism; it interferes 
in every sphere of activity. The qualitative totalitarian 
state is a jJionrmwnnn of &ea»a&ag» interferon. »lm ovew> 
i Pnr Italv see Rosenstock-Prank, »L'Economic corpora-
tlve*fasclste en doctrine et en fait", Paris, 1934. 
2. "Mlttellungen des Langnam Verelns", 1932, p. 13. 
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specifically Germanic phenomenon. It is a strong state, but 
it does not intervene in all spheres of activity. The realm 
of economics is left free. It is satisfied with providing 
regulations for the "political" sphere. "Sound economics in 
a strong state" was the title of this lecture by Carl Schmitt, 
in which he gave legal expression to the unity between National 
Socialism and monopoly capitalism. It, in fact, nothing but 
the doctrine of Pareto, who postulated the abolition of all 
political liberties and combined this with the postulate of 
a free economic system. It remains a mystery how the notion 
of totality can be qualitative. If something is total it 
mast necessarily embrace the whole. The idea of totality can 
only be a quantitative notion. 
In so far as National Socialism or Fascism seeks to 
realise corporative or an estate order, we must apply the 
same criticism as we have used against the medieval estate 
order. In the same way as the estates of the Middle Ages 
veiled the role of landed ownership, corporations and estates 
hide the domination of monopoly capitalism. The worker is 
fettered, and his rise as a class prevented, by any kind of 
estate organisation. 
4. It is true that Fascism — Italian or Oerman — 
was in the beginning a charismatic rule • "Pure charisma la 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft", p. 140. 
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especially alien to economics. It constitutes a "calling" 
in the emphatic sense of the word: as a mission or as an 
inner task. It scorns and rejects in its pure type, the 
economic use of ex gratia gifts as a means of income — this, 
1 
however, is more often & postulate than a fact". But 
charisma has become a matter of common usage, and what remains 
is feudal domination. In the political system of medieval 
feudalism, political rights were attached to landed property. 
Beneficium and Commendatio are the two pillars, and the com-
Ct 
mendatio is the contract of faith — with unequal rights. 
Consequently, this contract of faith between leader and fol-
3 
lowers, stands at the centre of German law. Holdsworth 
describes feudalism in England at the beginning of the four­
teenth and fifteenth centuries as follows: "The new feudalism 
compassed its ends, not by direct attack, but by a perversion 
of the machinery of centralised government. It was a bastard 
immitation of BiKX the old order of society founded upon the 
weakness of the crown and of the corruption of the ruling 
classes. Those ruling classes did not represent the great 
4 
body of the nation". 
1. Max Weber, "Wirtschaft u. Oesellschaft", p. 142, 
2. Ibid., p. 142. 
3. Goring, P» 8* 
4. "History", Vol. II* P* 417• 
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The society of National Socialism has become a static 
society, as any movement inside it might very well lead to 
its extinction. The sovereignty of parliament was abolished, 
because it gave to a labour party the opportunity of coming 
to power# The totality of the State is, in fact, the total 
domination over the State, exercised by the Leader for the 
sake of a feudal class, by transforming the people into serv­
ing estates* 
III. The Law in the Totalitarian State. 
1. Is the National Socialist State a Rechtsstaat? 
1 
This question is as passionately affirmed as it is denied. 
2 
According to Carl Schmitt, Rechtsstaat is a mere liberal con­
ception. The National Socialist State is a truly just State, 
but it Is in no way a Rechtsstaat. On the other hand Rechts-
etaats character of the national Socialist State is as em­
phatically affirmed, so that under the pressure of these at­
tacks, Carl Schmitt was compelled to abandon his views, to 
accept the official view, and to admit the Rechtsstaat charac­
ter of the National Socialist State, even if the whole idea 
4 
seemed to him superfluous • 
1. The same controversy is taking place in Italy. 
8. "Nationalsozialismus^md^Rechtsstaat^in ^ristische 
Wochenschrift, 1934, p. -
STC^ 5nreuteTi:^  Stef 4. Carl Schmitt, "Was bedeutet ... 
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We have, therefore, to investigate whether the National 
Socialist State possesses the basic elements which in our 
view, constitute a Rechtsstaat. There is no doubt that 
National Socialist theory and practice reject the postulate 
of the rule of law* Law is nothing but the will of the 
Leader. Innumerable individual laws have been enacted, such 
as the law of August 2, 1934, ordering a State funeral for 
the deceased President Hindenburg; of July 3, 1934, granting 
exemption from taxes for the National Socialist Party; of 
March 7, 1934, enabling the Reich Minister of Finance to re-
duoe the taxes due on the occasion of the reorganisation of 
the Steel Trust; of July 27, 1933, and October 22, 1938, 
granting exemption from taxes for the landed property of 
President Hindenburg and his descendants, and of Field Marshal 
Mackensen; and of July 3, 1934, legalising all measures taken 
for the crushing of the Boehm revolt. There are further in­
numerable laws dealing with economic activities. It is 
characteristic that all individual commands grant privileges 
or regulate monopoly organizations. The renunciation of the 
general character of the law reveals at the same ««. the 
feudal character of legislation. — 
1 
Gerber 
r\f TCollreuter, Schmitt, Huber, 
. Compare the^ wri ;"Xelf Schaff stein and Forsthoff. 
©I® y f ' 
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The principle of non~retroactivity of law Is no 
longer recognised. in many cases, the law-giver has issued 
retroactive laws, such as the lex Van der Lubbe of March 
29, 1934, which extended the death penalty to certain crimes 
committed between January 
31 and February 28, 1953; the law of July 14, 1933, empower­
ing the Minister to repeal naturalisations and to deprive 
Germans of their citizenship; the law of July 3, 1934, 
retroactively making legal certain decrees and administra­
tive acts; and finally, the law of July 3, 1934, legalising 
all measures undertaken for the crushing of the Roebm revolt, 
a law which for the first time in history did not declare a 
past action illegal, but made legal an already committed 
crime. The characteristic of all these, and many other 
retroactive laws is either the annihilation of political 
opponents or the legalisation of illegal measures taken 
during the transitional period. The MXBXBW!, culmination 
of retroaction, however, is to be found in the new Section 2 
Of the Oerman Penal Code, valid since the law of July 28, IS 
1936. According to this section, "He will be punished, who 
commits a crime which has been declared punishable by the 1* 
1. Heinrich Henkel, p. 11« 
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or which deserves punishment according to the principles of 
a penal statute and acoordlng to the sound feeling of the 
people. If no penal statute can directly be applied to such 
crime, the crime is punished according to that statute whose 
basic idea is best fitted for it". Wherever it is necessary 
for the security of the present rulers, National Socialism 
uses individual and retroactive laws; wherever monopolistic 
situations have to be dealt with, the monopolists are exempted 
from the universally valid laws. 
By this transformation, however, the position of the 
judge has been fundamentally changed. It is true that Hitler 
has expressed himself in favour of the independence of judges 
in his speech before the Reichstag on March 23, 1933, and 
that the Reich Minister of Justice has also expressed the Idea 
that a judge is bound by the law, and that the authoritarian 
idea implies the complete subjection of the judge under the 
law/ The judge, having fulfilled during the Weimar democracy, 
his counter-revolutionary function, has now become once more, 
the absolute servant of the law, i.e., of the will of the ^ 
Leader# "Right and the will of the Leader are the same." ^ 
The independence of the Judge has now received a new "meaning" 
up to now, It served "to maUe secure the legal rtfrf of a 
1. "Deutsche Justlz", 1934, p. 370. 
the Prussian Public Prosecutors 
2. OSrlng at a meeting he Justi2», 1934, p. 831. 
after the Roehm revolt, in 
3. Henkel. 
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citizen against possible arbitrary action by a government 
1 
which was hostile to him".. To-day, independence of judges 
means their subjection to the guiding principle of the 
2 
national socialist "leadership" State. For the neutral State 
has gone. The guiding principles for the activity of the 
judge, must be the ideas of National Socialism, as laid down 
in the Party Programme and as expressed by the will of the 
5 
Leader• The judge has to serve the Leader, but at the same 
time he has to obey the written law. 
2» We are only interested here in the question as to 
how it is technically possible to fulfil at one and the same 
time, the commands of the political leader and of the enacted 
law. Conflicts are naturally possible, and are sometimes 
reported. The synchronization of the judicial machinery 
with the political leadership is not yet complete, but it 
has almost reached completion. The coordination is reached, 
in the first place, with the help of the new conception of 
law. and in the second, by means of legal standards of con­
duct) if we omit the discharging of Judges based upon the 
law of April 1, 1988 and of September 15, 1985, and also omit 
1. Cf. "Reichgericht in Penal Hatters", Vol. 66, p. 886. 
3, Henkel, p* 21. 
5. Huber, "Die Totalltat", p. 30-
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all indirect interference in the activity of judges such as 
pressure by the Party, open or hidden terror, effects which 
cannot be controlled. We limit ourselves strictly to those 
constitutional means of interfering with the freedom of the 
judge which are open to control» The subjection of the law 
under individual commands makes the independence of judges 
illusory• The individual law is a measure, because it pro« 
vides regulations for a concrete act. If the law does not 
state that any property belonging to a group hostile to the 
State has to be attached, but that property belonging to the 
Communist Party or to the Social Democratic Party has to be 
seized, and that the Reich Minister of the Interior finally 
decides whether or not property was intended to serve purposes 
1 
hostile to the State, then the judge in Germany to-day, no 
longer possesses the functions of a judge* He has become a 
2 
mere bailiff, a mere policeman. The retroactivity of law 
also partly abolishes the independence of judges, as retroac­
tive laws always deal with already accomplished facts, and 
therefore, with individual cases. 
Still greater is the significance of legal standards 
of conduct in the present legal system. Their main purpose 
1. Cf. laws of May 23, 1933 and July 14, 1933. 
2. Carl Schmitt in his earlier period expressed this con-
wfrnann +-he generality of law and the independence 
of judges in his book "Legalitat und Legitimitat", Munchen 
u. Leipzig, 1932, p. 84. 
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ia to bring into line the enacted law with the Mill* will of 
the Leader. "For the application and handling of the legal 
standards of conduct by the Judge, the lawyer, the magistrate, 
and the law teacher, the principles of National Socialism are 
directly and exclusively decisive," That is the thesis of Carl 
Schmitt's famous five leading principles for the practice of 
1 
law. The legal standards of conduct refer to moral norms 
outside the legal norms which prevail in the community« The 
declared view of the people is National Socialism# The con­
stituent elements of National Socialism's view of life are 
2 
solely determined by the Leader# Although. Carl Schmltt in 
his Thesis No. 3 asserts that the legal standards of conduct 
In no way interfere with the independence of Judges, even 
some National Socialist lawyers express dissatisfaction with 
3 
his point of view. But not only the transformation of the 
formal structure of law abolishes the Independence of Judges; 
the destruction of the principle of She principle of the sep­
aration of powers has Its share also In their subjection. 
Ae a doctrine. It Is emphatically and universally rejected 
in Germany, and In practice It is abolished. The Leader, fry 
1. "Punf Leltsatze"and"tJber die Drei Arten'', p. 59. Also 
Heflmrich Lartfe, "Liberallsmus . 
2. carl Schmltt, "Ober die Drel Arten", pp. 66, 62. 
S. Kollreuter, "Orundrlss", p. 254. 
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the empowering act of March 24, 1933, and by the law relating 
to the rebuilding of the Reich of January 30, 1934, has su­
preme legislative and executive power. Where the will of the 
political IKXiKHyif. leader meets the resistance of already 
enacted law, he can change the substance of the law at any 
time and in any direction he likes. 
But the last remnant of the independence of the judge 
disappears, if the Leader not only assumes legislative and 
executive powers, but also judicial functions; if he himself 
orders the death penalty, as happened in the famous Roehm 
revolt# According to the theory of the National Socialist 
leaders, as expressed by Hitler's Reichstag speech of July 
1 
13, 1934, by Goring and by the sensational article of Carl 
2 
Schmitt, "The Leader protects the law", the Leader is not 
only the supreme legislator, not only the supreme executive, 
he is also the supreme Judge# "The deed of the Leader was, 
in fact, a genuine act of justice; it does not stand under 
3 
the Judicial machinery, it was highest justice," The legal 
theory of Fascism is, therefore, "decis^aistic". The whole 
machinery of the law stands exclusively at the service of 
1 • p. 17. 
2. "Deutsche Juristenzeitung", 1934, p. 945. 
3. Carl Schmitt, p. 947. 
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the Leader, in order to transform, as rapidly as possible, his 
will into legal forms. We cannot, therefore, ascribe to the 
National Socialist State the basic principles of a Re^chsstaat. 
Whether the National Socialist State is a just State, is left 
entirely to the judgment of the reader* 
IV• The Economic System and the Calculablllty of the Law. 
We have already described the inroads into the formal 
rationality of the law during the transitional period of German 
collectivist democracy* We are not able to continue exhaustive­
ly with this exposition as it would entail a presentation of 
all the economic activities of National Socialism, It will 
suffice if we discuss one central problem. According to Max 
Weber's definition of capitalism, it is only possible on the 
basis of formally free labour. Exact calculation, according 
to him, depends entirely upon whether or not the worker is 
legally free to enter into contracts. Free labour, however, 
no longer exists under National Socialism. The laws of January 
20, 1935, relating to the ordering of national labour, the 
law of May 15, 1934, prohibiting free migration of workers 
1. "Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie", Vol. I, 
p. 4, English translation, p. 22. 
2« Cf. the author's article on "The State and Labour in 
Germany", in the Contemporary Review, 1935, p. 713. 
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in Germany, the regulations concerning labour camps, land 
help and the prohibition of strikes, have transformed free 
labour into a legally bound serving estate* Nevertheless, 
it cannot be doubted that the calculability of the exchange 
processes, in so far as it serves the interests of the mon­
opolists, is still given, as their power is quite sufficient 
without the help of the State and without freedom of contract, 
to attain their economic ends. We do not propose to deal 
more exhaustively with this problem; it must suffice that we 
have indicated its existence. 
V. The Ethical Function of the Law. 
Between the State and the Individual there stands no 
collective organization protecting the individual and realis­
ing his freedom. The fundamental sociological principle upon 
which National Socialism Is built, Is, In the first place, 
that of a complete atomlsatlon of society. The German 
Workers' Front, an organisation of about twenty-five million 
members, is but another name for the German people, with the 
exception of the civil servant, and peasants, who are not 
allowed to Join it. It Is a mass organisation of Individuals 
and has no similarity whatever to any kind of trade union. 
It may not enter into collective agreements, and its property 
580 
is administered by the Party# This atomization and synchron­
ization of all social groups, this abolition of every demo­
cratic principle within corporations, and this supersession 
by the principle of leadership, leads to the complete atomiza­
tion of society, and therefore enables the State to control 
the individual effectively. 
The second sociological principle of National Socialism, 
is that of totality, which is the control of private affairs 
by public power. This principle has found its most brutal 
expression in the drafting by the Academy of ^erman Law, of 
a new divorce law, which gives the State the power to divorce 
marriages against the will of both parties, if such marriages 
are no longer in agreement with the principles of the State, 
so that the divorce becomes a kind of supplementary punish-
ment for political offenders. 
The third sociological principle is that of differentia-
tlon within the society, for the purpose of creating relable 
Elites, such as a certain stratum of peasants and the bureau­
cracy of the Party• 
These three sociological principles are expressed by 
the rejection of the notion of the equality of all human 
beings. The idea of equality Is considered to be merely ab­
stract, a remnant revival of Roman law. Section X of the 
Oerman Civil Code, which states that everybody, from the 
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from the moment of birth, receives full legal rights, is 
still verbally in existence, and it is even formally suggested 
that it should be abolished and replaced by the maxim that_^ 
legal rights can be enjoyed only by being a Volksgenossen. 
According to many definitions given, right is what is 
serviceable to Germany# No exception car be taken to such 
a definition any mor4 than to defiaitioas aueh as that law 
is that which aims at the attainment of common good. The 
fundamental problem is, what has to be understood by "Germany" 
and T«ho is to decide what is serviceable and what is not. 
We therefore sum up: That law does not exist in Ger~ 
many, because law is now exclusively a technique of trans­
forming the political will #f the Leader into constitutional 
reality• Law is nothing but an arcanum dominationis. 
1. Larenz, "Rechtsperson", p. 21> Goring, p. 12• 

